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PREFACE
When I started work on this thesis some years ago the plan was to write a study on risk 
communication as a special type of protest communication in the context of technical 
controversy. This study has not been written, as I began to take a particular interest in the 
response of that societal institution that technology protest criticizes as the main risk- 
producing institution: big industry. When interest in this response grew - largely due to the 
fact that, by contrast to studying protest risk communication, studying economic actors as 
participants in technical controversy meant breaking fresh ground in research on the public 
space and public discourse - 1 started to deal with a field of research with which I was not 
familiar at that time: business political activity. The study of the existent literature in this area 
of research soon resulted in the conviction that there was urgent need of a more elaborate 
sociological approach to the topic. As a consequence, I decided to change the object of my 
thesis research. The present study integrates the ideas that I outlined for the original thesis 
project but it is a study on the response of industry as a technology utilizer to technology 
critics and opponents and not vice versa.
Here I would like to express my thanks for the co-operation of the groups and 
organizations that I asked for interviews concerning the case study on the basis of which the 
thesis theorizes about business political activity - the political activity of the chemical industry 
in the German genetic engineering controversy. In the course of my thesis studies all of my 
requests for interviews with representatives of the chemical industry, the new social 
movements, the genetic engineering research community and the politico-administrative 
system were granted. These interviews provided valuable data material without which the 
present study could not have been carried out
7
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INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF TH E RESEARCH DESIGN
This study is a contribution to political sociology. It deals with political action as a special 
form of social action. The social actor looked at in its role as a political actor is the economic 
organization. The political activity of economic organizations is discussed in relation to a 
specific situation of societal conflict, modern technical controversy, and as an activity that is 
influenced by and related to society. The theoretical-analytical perspective in which this 
discussion approaches the issue of business political activity is the organization-environment 
perspective o f »neo«-institutionalist organizational sociology. The adoption of an approach 
that views the political activity of economic organizations as reflective of and responsive to 
the organizations’ wider societal environment is connected with the following two research 
objectives. First, the study seeks to counter the continual neglect within the field of business 
political activity research of the influence of social and cultural factors on the political 
involvement of economic organizations. The bulk of existing research in the field comes from 
the political and management sciences and investigates business political activity in terms of 
a power-strategic relationship between business institutions and institutional politics. Little 
attention is devoted to the interface between the business institution and society as a whole 
system nor to the broader role played by cultural currents, motivations, and symbolic 
meanings in shaping business political activity. Second, the thesis seeks to contribute to the 
work that social scientists have carried out in the field of new social movements research on 
the way in which the protest actors under investigation challenge the boundaries of 
institutional politics. It does so by discussing business political activity in the sphere of 
noninstitutional politics as forming part of the main effect of the institutionalization of the 
new social movements. This effect is determined as the »renaissance« o f the public sphere, 
as the rise o f  public discourse (Eder 1996a: 205).
"Sociologists who do research in the area of corporations and politics", Mizruchi in his 
sociological study on "The Structure of Corporate Political Action" states, "often find
9
themselves in a quandary" (Mizruchi 1992: 1). On the one hand» there are the questions from 
those inside the discipline and outside the special field about why a special topic was 
sociologically significant. On the other» there are the objections of political scientists who 
were convinced of the importance of the topics discussed but believe they should be dealt 
with in a different way. The present study finds itself exactly in this quandary. And» like 
Mizruchi, I hope that the introduction to the study which elucidates the above outlined 
research design will point out the centrality of the issue to sociologists and generally 
demonstrate that the work can contribute to the work of political scientists as well as 
management scientists - even if the latter two disciplines would have chosen a different 
approach to the topic.
Business Political Activity as a Reflexive Answer to Social Reality
The economic enterprise does not exist and operate in a social void. Like other organizations 
it depends upon a complex network of relationships that extend beyond those o f the market 
for its existence and its survival. In times of a stable societal environment in terms of 
unchanging societal demands on business, this societal embeddedness is latent and 
unproblematic from the point of view of the economic organization. It becomes manifest and 
a critical business issue in times of changing societal demands. In these times the 
interrelations between business and society are livened up. They become an issue of societal 
reflection, discussion and negotiation. Business faces in these times a heightened need to 
explain and legitimize itself, to defend the basic institutional logic on which it is founded - 
namely, the logic of the market - and to adopt a position regarding new expectations. 
Changing societal demands make visible that business operates in a larger societal context in 
which support for economic operations and institutions cannot be taken for granted but 
depends on the responsiveness of business to this larger context »Modem« technical 
controversy denotes such a situation of change. Institutional and noninstitutional politics in 
this context unveils the complex business-society-interrelationship.
Modern technical controversy shall be broadly defined as a type of societal conflict that has 
as its focal point products and processes o f  science and technology on the material level and
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risks to man and nature on the level of content. The most important technical controversies 
that have arisen in the last two and a half decades in several countries of the Western world 
and that still constitute more or less critical political factors are the conflicts over the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy, modem chemistry, reproduction technologies and genetic engineering. 
In those countries with a strong technology-critical protest movement, technical controversy 
has become an important feature of the societies’ political culture (Peters 1991: 12). This 
holds especially true for the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and Germany. Actually, in 
these countries technology induced risk is not only a permanent political issue but constitutes 
the prime source of existential uncertainty.
The decisive actors in the process of the development of modem technology into a contested 
and controversial issue are the new social movements. Major concerns of these collective 
actors converge on the idea that life itself and the minimal standards of a »good life« are 
threatened by the blind dynamics of economic and technological rationalization, and that there 
are no sufficient and sufficiently reliable barriers within the decisive institutions of the 
scientific-technical world that could prevent them from passing the threshold to disaster (Offe 
1985: 853). According to this view, it is not only necessary, by citizen protest and the 
insertion of democratic »sensors«, to permanently urge science, economy and political 
institutions to sufficiently take into consideration safety, ethical and ecological aspects in 
institutional decision-making. According to this view, the belief that it is possible to control 
everything by calculation when one really wants to do so is a misconception and, therefore, 
self-limitation is indispensable.
Underlying this perspective is a special appreciation of the values of safety, health, a 
clean environment and participation. This "selective radicalization o f ’modern* values" (Offe 
1985: 853, emphasis in original) constitutes an answer to the question of how we want to live 
in the future, what we are willing to take and tolerate, and the basis on which new social 
movement actors in technical controversy seek to mobilize public opinion for their political 
goals. In this sense, technical controversies have a cultural relevance. To put it in Gerlach 
terms, they are events which "produce the public debates by which contemporary ways of life 
are criticized, defended, and changed" (Gerlach 1987: 103).
Notwithstanding their status as private companies, economic organizations are dragged into
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these debates in which they have to strive for their social acceptance. While business has 
historically been viewed primarily as a provider of goods and services, at all times it has been  
expected to operate within the law and within prevailing norms. In modem technical 
controversy, however, it is confronted with new demands and the need to justify business 
technology policy in view of these new demands. Business faces a lack o f  societal consent 
as a legitimation basis for business technology policy. This societal consent is no longer 
given, granted, and predictable but has to be gained, negotiated, waited for.
What was dealt with in the 1960s and early 1970s in the management sciences under 
the title of »business social responsibility« in terms of a purely moral appeal to management 
recurs today with the new societal expectations as a political challenge. As it is not 
predominantly state politics from which this challenge emanates but noninstitutional political 
actors, and the solution sought is one for which there exists no adequate formal-political 
forum, business finds itself compelled to be innovative in its political response. This at least 
holds true for big industrial enterprise, which is the priority topic and target of technology 
protest, and its trade associations. Indeed, several of these economic organizations have shown 
creativity in their response to the special political challenge of technical controversy. This 
creativity constitutes the empirical starting point of the present study.
The Em pirical Starting Point: Increased and »Publicity-Oriented« Business Political 
Activity
At the beginning of this study, the observation was made that, in the specific context of 
modem technical controversy, a significant part of big industry engages in increased and 
diversified political activity. Increase and diversification refers to extended public communica­
tion activities in terms of both media-oriented styles o f  communication and face-to-face 
communication. The bulk of face-to-face communication takes place in the context of bigger 
public events and, thus, is of a low level of »proceduralization«. In recent times, however, 
industry organizations have also instigated or participated in forums of discussion where 
information, arguments and opinions are exchanged with the aim to build agreement among 
carefully selected discussion participants comprising different industry »stakeholders«, 
including protest actors. These talks take place in a half public/half private sphere and are
12
referred to in the study as »post-corporatist« negotiations, drawing on the concept of a "post- 
corporatist order" developed by Eder (1996b: 192ff.).
Industrial public communication has not only changed in terms of structure since the 1970s, 
that is, in the period of time in which technical controversy developed into a characteristic 
of a number of highly advanced industrial societies. It has also changed in terms of 
argumentative design. »Informatory education« - banking above all on a scientific-technical 
rationality - has lost its dominance as an argumentative strategy, while »confidence-building« 
and »identity-building« - banking on cultural and/or moral reason - has gained this 
dominance. The latter two argumentative strategies basically consist of a normative 
commitment to the idea o f an environmentally and socially compatible steering o f  technical 
change. In the last two and a half decades, industrial social responsibility, public accountabili­
ty, and societal responsiveness have become the main messages of industrial public 
communication; the key concept of this communication is public dialogue.
It is fundamental to realize that the extension of business political activity to the public arena 
in the context of modem technical controversy, on the level of the firm as well as on the level 
of the business association, is not a self-evident social phenomenon. And this holds true not 
only because this extension comports with neither the classical model of capitalism formulated 
by economic theorists nor, so to speak, business political »reservedness« in the early post-war 
decades. The classical model of capitalism considers exclusively business as the business o f  
business. Business political involvement in this view generally interferes with the original 
economic functions of the company by misallocating corporate resources and detracting from 
profit making. Against all (classical economic) theory, it seems that business at all times to 
some degree is involved in political affairs. In the direct post-war period of economic 
recovery, however, it did so to a very limited degree and »behind closed doors«, that is to 
say, in camera with representatives of the politico-administrative system. Towards the general 
public, corporations and business associations at that time followed, as Epstein puts it, a 
policy o f nsilence is golden" (Epstein 1969: 47; emphasis added). Generally avoiding 
communication in the public arena (apart from product and service advertising), they either 
did not publicly acknowledge their political interests, goals, and activities or, at the very least, 
did not advertise the fact that they were concerning themselves with politics.
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Leaving most recent history and classical economic theory aside, both the mere fa c t 
of an increase in business political activity as it has occurred over the last twenty-five years 
in the context of technical debate and the fact of a growing »publicity-orientation« of business 
political activity in this context still are far from being self-evident truths for at least th ree 
reasons. On the one hand, costs do play a considerable role in business organizational 
decisions on whether to act or not to act politically, particularly as far as the individual 
company is concerned. Unlike manufacturing, product development or marketing, political 
activity generally is not viewed as a core function of the firm since it requires surplus 
resources (Jacobs, Useem & Zald 1991: 145). The costs of business political involvement a re  
especially carefully estimated and evaluated as the rewards from political activity are 
generally collective - no firm in an industry or business at large can be excluded from their 
enjoyment. Given perfect or nearly perfect information, the incentive for the individual 
company is to take a free ride, to enjoy the benefits of others* actions without incurring the 
costs. Consensus-building as regards associative political action in its turn often not only has 
to overcome internal competitive rivalries but also opposition against spending member- 
resources for an »inclusive« collective good (Weber 1987: 26), that is, a good that must be 
shared with non-members, economic actors not willing to collectively invest resources; on the 
level of the association the principle of »internal« and »external« competition might prevent 
(collective) business political activity.
Moreover, business political activity holds the risk that the »venturing out« of the 
sphere of the private business organization creates opposition or more opposition to business 
goals and interests now revealed in the public forum of political debate; entering this public 
forum, however narrowly constituted, makes opposition and a reinforced opposition more 
likely. The risk to intensify and expand political debate is run by the politically active 
association as well as by the politically involved firm; however it is higher in the case o f 
independent action as the company as an organization with clearly defined goals and interests 
is more likely to become the target of social opposition.
Evidently, the risk of generating or intensifying opposition from groups or 
organizations with opposing interests is especially high with business political activity 
organized as public communication. It is above all by going public that business organizations 
risk an extent and quality of attention which escapes their control and turns against their own 
interests. The specific risk resulting from the inherent dynamic o f public discourse and the
14
high sensitivity of the business sector as regards this risk resulting from the dominant »logic
of consequentiality« of this social sector is vividly captured by the following quotation:
Für viele Unternehmer ist die Kommunikation mit der Öffentlichkeit suspekt, weil sie 
es die längste Zeit nicht nötig hatten und ihre Legitimation ausschliesslich aus der 
Zustimmung der Eigentümer stammte. Öffentliche Kommunikation ist auch nicht 
berechenbar. Sie ist ein offener Prozess, bei dem man nie im voraus weiss, wo und 
wie sie enden wird. Dies widerspricht ihrer Gewohnheit, dass Entscheidungen so 
ausgeführt werden und verlaufen, wie sie das geplant und angeordnet haben. Offene 
Proteste sind ihnen im Grunde ein Greuel. (Dyllick 1989: 480-481)
Considering the costs and risks associated with business political activity one might intuitively 
suspect that political action in general, and political action in the public arena in particular, 
are not behaviors preferred by business organizations.
To summarize the empirical observation which in consideration of these costs and risks 
aroused analytical interest, we can note: Economic organizations in the context of technical 
controversy expand their political involvement by engaging in public communication activities 
in the noninstitutional political arena. It is no longer organized protest actors only - often 
originating and typically seeking public discourse on conflictual issues - who increasingly 
develop professionalized forms of public communication in order to reach their political aims. 
Besides traditional product marketing, economic actors also conceive communication 
strategies and campaigns targeted at a larger public and aimed at the achievement o f political 
goals. My conviction was that it deserved closer investigation; that the »Umweg über die 
Öffentlichkeit«, that is, the political strategy which in movement and associational research 
is considered as constitutive of those social actors who do not have access to the official 
political process of opinion-formation and decision-making including networks of corporatist 
negotiation or have only very limited access, is of increasing importance to economic 
organizations. Why does big industry in technical controversy, despite its strong strategic 
position in the system of political intermediation (which it occupies as it commands resources 
that are indispensable to the conduct of society), no longer rely on negotiation »in camera« 
in the classic-formal political arena but increasingly invests resources for building a strategic 
position in the arena of noninstitutional politics - a strategy traditionally pursued by groups, 
initiatives, and organizations which occupy a weak strategic position in the system of political 
intermediation?
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Guiding Question and Hypotheses
The way in which this study systematizes the empirical observations leading to this question 
is a typology that distinguishes five major types of business political activity in technical 
controversy. These are corporatist negotiation, post-corporatist negotiation, informatory 
education, confidence-building, and identity-building. The five types of business political 
activity are assigned to two different arenas in which business pursues its political goals a n d  
strategies (cp. Offe 1985): the institutional political arena (corporatist negotiations) and th e  
noninstitutional political arena (post-corporatist negotiations, informatory education, 
confidence-building, identity-building). The way in which the study attempts to explain th e  
resort to diversified and two-level business political activity is by relating this activity to w hat 
is denoted as the special business political environment o f technical controversy understood 
as including institutional and noninstitutional politics.
The study’s guiding research question reformulated according to this analytical approach 
reads as follows: How can diversified and two-level business political activity and the 
different importance attributed over time to the different types of political action and political 
action arenas be explained against the specific cultural, social, and political characteristics o f  
the societal context of technical controversy? As technical controversy is understood as a  
longlived and recurrent societal conflict, this specific societal context referred to as the 
business political environment of technical controversy is not understood as constituting an 
»instantaneous« political challenge but a challenge that has been in existence for two and a 
half decades. In relating to this stable but still developing business political environment, the 
guiding research question calls for the investigation of elements of structure as well as 
elements of process.
The question is approached in the form of two main hypotheses that will guide us through the 
study. The firs t hypothesis holds that diversified and two-level business political involvement 
as it is observable in the context of modem technical controversy is reflective of and a 
response to a process of cultural change initiated and promoted by the new social movements. 
This process of change consists of the diffusion and stabilization of the idea o f an
16
environmentally and socially compatible steering o f  technical change. In technical controversy 
this process shows effect. One major effect is a high degree o f  public exposure of economic 
organizations (Dyllick 1989) which belong to the industrial sectors which concern goods and 
services that are closely related to life, food, and health (as is the case with the chemical 
industry). The major indicators of the public exposure of industry are state intervention, 
parliamentary scrutiny, mass media attention and technology protest The public exposure of 
industry means that the affected economic organizations are plunged into a »crisis o f  
legitimation« and need to (re)produce legitimacy by responding to both institutional and 
noninstitutional politics.
The second hypothesis holds that the growing importance of confidence- and identity-building 
communication and post-corporatist negotiation along with the decreasing importance of 
informatory education as the major change in business political activity in the noninstitutional 
political arena in the context of two and a half decades of technical debate, is basically due 
to a learning process on the side of industry. According to this hypothesis, industry has 
increasingly realized that social acceptance requires more than public education, that it 
requires above all public commitment to the idea of environmentally and socially compatible 
technical change. The claim is that this commitment increasingly is experienced as 
constituting a social constraint, a basic requirement for regaining social legitimacy which in 
its turn is a basic requirement for maintaining a high degree of organizational autonomy and 
discretion.
According to this analytical model, business political activity presents a response, variable 
according to place and time, to a political environment that in its turn underlies historical and 
contextual changes. The analytical model further holds that the business political environment 
of today is more complex in terms of content and structure than that of the past.
The Concept of Social Legitimacy
The theoretical perspective that this analytical model draws on is the neo-institutionalist 
approach in organizational sociology as it has developed in the United States since the mid-
17
1980s. The most basic idea of this approach is that the organization is an open, society-related 
entity that has only limited autonomy in its goal-determination and activities.
The dependence upon the wider societal environment - culture, society, p o litica l 
system - is determined as constituting basically the dependence upon a societally conferred  
status, namely the social legitimacy o f organizational structures and behaviors. The work o f  
the »neo-institutionalists« has been pathbreaking as it points out aspects of legitimacy that a r e  
equally essential to the successful continued existence of organizations as criteria o f  
efficiency. In the bureaucracy model of Max Weber, both dimensions - efficiency a n d  
legitimacy - are taken into consideration (Weber 1972). Until very recently, however, th e  
discussion of Weber in organizational sociology has focused on aspects o f the effic ien t 
coordination and control of organizational activities. The associated neglect of aspects o f  
collective recognition has become a subject of discussion only in the context of the »revival« 
of institutionalist ideas in this field of sociological research in the mid 1980s. In this context, 
the persistently successful business organization has been described as an organization th a t 
does »well«, that means, efficiently transforms goods into products and services, and d o es  
»good«, that means, maintains or (re)produces its social legitimacy.
Social legitimacy is a central concept of the present study as business political activity 
in technical controversy is examined as a response to a lack of social legitimacy. Unlike th e  
bulk of the neo-institutionalist literature, this study does not discuss social legitimacy in  
relation to »taken-for-granted-behavior« but in relation to strategic action. It does not exam ine 
economic organizations as passive entities entrapped by coercive or cultural forces in th e ir 
environments. Instead, it investigates them as purposive, goal directed social actors  
responding to socio-cultural constraint. Business political activity is determined as an activity 
that is affected by both a logic of appropriateness and a logic of anticipated consequences. 
The basis on which both logics are applied is defined as the interpretation of the w ider 
societal environment which is, in principal, subject to ambiguities and uncertainties.
The C oncept of Political Action
The theoretical-analytical perspective of this study views economic organizations as entities 
which possess non-economic dimensions that give them specific organizational/sectoral
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political interests and goals and necessitate political involvement The principal concern of 
existing research on business political activity is to promote this view and the present study 
shares this concern. The study may be considered innovative in the following respects: It 
points out communication as the essence of business political activity (cp. Elder & Cobb 
1983), sheds light on the activity’s expressive dimension and its importance in the sphere of 
noninstitutional politics, and relates the way in which it is organized to a transformation in 
society*s ideological structure. The transformation at the cultural level is claimed to render 
technology a permanent political issue, to urge industry and other decisive institutions of the 
scientific-technical world to speak out in public and thus generate an intensification of public 
communication, and to turn commitment to the idea of an environmentally and socially 
compatible technical change into an important resource of legitimation in political and public 
discourse.
The basic analytical tool of this communication and culture-oriented approach to business 
political activity is a multidimensional and multilevel concept o f  political action. This concept 
decouples political action from the official arena of politics and determines it as a generally 
operating type of social action that has two aims, the exercise of power and the transformation 
of this power into a legitimized social order (Hitzler 1994). It is the consideration of the 
second aim that allows us to grasp and discuss political action in its cultural and communica­
tive-expressive dimension. The transformation of business power into a »Macht der 
Verhältnisse« requires the production of approval and this, in turn, necessitates "signifying 
work" (Snow & Benford 1988). The conceptualization of political action as a power and 
approval oriented activity allows one to gain insight into the way in which business actors 
assign meaning to and interpret technology issues in ways that are intended to mobilize 
political and public support and to demobilize business antagonists.
Highlighting the Socio-Cultural Embeddedness of Economic Organizations
The way in which this study seeks to contribute to the work of scholars investigating 
institutional effects on organizations and to the work of those examining the political activity 
of economic organizations, can be summed up as follows: The way is to shed light on the
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socio-cultural embeddedness o f  economic organizations. By approaching business p o lit ic a l  
activity in a neo-institutionalist perspective that draws on cultural theory, the study seeks t o  
counter, first, the societal and cultural blindness of the bulk of the literature on b u s in e ss  
political activity and, second, to support a recent development in the field of neo-institutional­
ist organizational sociology in which for-profit organizations increasingly are made the s u b je c t  
of research on the subjection and responsiveness of organizations to normative constraints. 
Even though all companies are deeply embedded in a system of laws and regulation e n a c te d  
by the political system and some of them in a sphere of high public scrutiny where p re ssu re  
is exerted by social movement actors and the mass media, neo-institutionalist research fo r  a  
long time almost exclusively dealt with nonprofit, nonmarket organizational forms, in  
particular public agencies. In short, the study seeks to promote a perspective in the tw o  
research fields that views economic organizations as a reflection of and a response to the to ta l  
societal environment and not merely to markets and state politics or exclusively to m arkets.
The Case Study
The case which is investigated in this perspective is the political activity o f  the chem ical 
industry in the German genetic engineering controversy. Genetic engineering is a technology 
the use of which concerns basic spheres of life and is characterized by considerable cognitive 
and normative uncertainty concerning what the effects o f its different applications might b e  
as well as their evaluation. Not surprisingly, in many countries of the Western world, th e  
technology’s introduction has provoked political and public debate varying in scope a n d  
intensity. In Germany, the debate about the risks and benefits of genetic engineering is  
especially extensive, intensive and long-lived. The chemical industry, the study’s unit o f  
analysis, is the key participant in this debate in the private industry sector. It is one m ain  
characteristic of the process of commercial innovation and exploitation of genetic engineering 
in Germany that the private-sector activities in this area have been dominated from the ou tset 
by the big multinational companies of this industrial sector. Partly due to its technological 
leadership and partly due to its general image problems, the chemical industry is the industrial 
sector which has faced the highest public exposure in the controversy. As a consequence, i t  
is also the industrial sector which has made the most concentrated effort to influence political
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and public debate in its interests.
The industrial sector as such, first of all, is a field of competition, an economic 
category for classifying enterprises with the same or similar range of products competing with 
each other. At the same time, however, it is an inter-organizational system that is capable of 
developing collective behavioral patterns. This does not only relate to cartel-like co-operations 
pursuing joint economic strategies but also to trade association co-ordinated collective action 
pursuing joint political strategies. As the case study demonstrates, the national chemical 
industry association, the Verband der Chemischen Industrie (VCI), has been in a relatively 
strong position to mobilize its members in a concerted response to growing regulatory 
pressures and technology protest due to a high level o f sectoral organizational development 
and a strongly developed sectoral culture.
The case study investigates the chemical industry’s political involvement in the time period 
from the mid-1970s - when the chemical industry started to take an interest in the new 
technology - to the mid-1990s - when the technology had developed into an integral tool of 
the sector. It shows in a phase-based exposition of this involvement how an increasingly 
turbulent political environment comprising institutional and noninstitutional politics has 
induced the chemical industry to expand, diversify and professionalize its political activity. 
More specifically, it expounds how an unfavorably changing political context has caused the 
industrial actor to move forward into the public arena and to engage in a communicative 
effort aimed at demonstrating commitment to the idea of a socially and environmentally 
compatible use of modem biotechnologies. This communicative effort, the case study 
demonstrates further, has increasingly taken the form of direct contacts and active discussions.
I consider the genetic engineering controversy as exemplary of the politicization and 
moralization o f economic activity in »risk society« (Beck 1986) and of the commitment to 
public communication with which economic organizations respond to the new political 
environment.
Organization of the  Study
The study is organized in three parts. In part A the theoretical-analytical framework is
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developed. Part B  applies this framework to the case study. Part C is the concluding chap ter. 
It summarizes the empirical results and sets forth the significance that the study’s theoretical 
perspective attributes to them. The content of the individual chapters of part A and B i s  
outlined in the introduction to these two parts.
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PART A: TOWARDS A THEORY OF BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN
TECHNICAL CONTROVERSY
This first part presents the study’s theoretical-analytical framework which it employs to 
provide an explanation o f the nature o f business political activity in modern technical 
controversy.
First, Part A points out the organization-environment perspective of »neo«- 
institutionalist organizational sociology as the theoretical perspective in which the object of 
research is discussed and introduces the key concepts and classifications applied for analysis 
in this perspective. The theoretical-analytical model is developed by critical revision of the 
dominant approaches to business political activity in the predominantly U.S.-American 
literature. Then, this model is applied to explain the involvement of economic organizations 
in political activity in the institutional and noninstitudonal political arena in the context of 
technical controversy. This is identified as the major change of business political activity in 
the noninstitutional political arena in the context of two and a half decades of long-lived and 
recurrent technical controversy: The growing importance of »normative« and interactive 
communication along with the decreasing importance of unidirectional educational 
communication.
The prime concern of this first part is to point out that, in contrast to previous research on 
the topic, the present study, by analyzing business political activity in the context of a specific 
type of societal conflict determining political and public debate with increasing intensity since 
the 1970s, takes a more macrostructural, or so to speak, a more sociological perspective. It 
examines business political involvement in consideration of the general relationship between 
business and society. It inter-relates this type of business behavior and society by viewing 
business political activity as basically aimed at exerting influence on the general social order 
of living together1 and in turn being basically shaped by this social order imposing 
constraints on and creating opportunities for general business activity. With the analytical 1
1 In the pursuit o f this goal business basically relies on two logics o f influence: shaping state decisions and 
shaping public opinion and the opinion of selected publics with the latter strategy understood as both an avenue 
to the goal of the former and, in the light of increasing problems of regulatory implementation, as a  strategy in 
its own right geared towards the production of general social acceptance of business policy.
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focus on the latter aspect the study takes into account cultural-institutional elements (in te rm s  
of the diffusion and stabilization of new value patterns and sense structures) and elements o n  
the level of public policy and sociopolitics (in terms of the »public exposure of business« in  
form of technology protest, public scrutiny, mass media attention, and business socia l 
regulation) as influencing factors o f techniques, rationales, and dynamics of business political 
involvement.
It is this research perspective on the wider societal embeddedness of business political 
involvement and the analytical focus on the impact of this wider societal embeddedness o n  
instigation, scope, types of action and relational structure of business political activity in  
which the study departs from the dominant approaches of existing sociological, political 
science, and management science research on the topic. The greatest part of this research 
restricts analysis to the dyadic relationship between the economic and the political system  
and/or specific firm and industry characteristics as determinants of business political activity 
(these studies generally are grouped under the rubric of »Business and Politics«). The m inor 
part that takes a broader research perspective of business political activity as a society-related 
behavior in a normative and/or practical rather than analytical orientation largely restricts 
research to the demonstration of the need for and/or ways to transform business demands and  
interests into socially legitimate demands and interests in order to be politically successful 
(this research generally is grouped under the rubric of »Business and Society«).
The following four chapters shall point out that, in order to explain business political 
involvement, the present study focuses instead on the system-bridging relationship between 
business and society (of which the relationship between the political system and the economic 
system is only a part) and investigates social legitimacy, understood as societal approval o f  
general business policy and business power, as both an inherent objective and a m ajor 
influencing factor of business political involvement.
S tructu re  and  Contents of the C hapters
More concretely, the contents of the four chapters of this part of the study are the following: 
The point of entry of my inquiry into the role of business as a political actor in technical
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controversy is to show in more detail how the research topic of business political activity has 
been dealt with so far in the social sciences. The first chapter traces the emergence of 
business political activity as a scholarly concept and a specific line of research o f such diverse 
disciplines as sociology, political science and management science. It identifies two broader 
research fields within which the topic specifically has been addressed. These are typically 
referred to as Business and Politics - first and foremost, a research field of political science, 
sociology, and management science - and Business and Society - above all a research domain 
of management science and sociology.
The presentation of this twofold anchorage of research on business political activity 
in the social sciences shall help to demonstrate the particularity and the innovative potential 
of the present study’s research perspective by pointing out how this specific perspective 
departs from both of the major approaches to business political activity in the social sciences 
and at the same time integrates particular facets of these approaches. On the one hand, this 
study rejects the restriction of business political activity to the dyadic relationship between 
the economic and the (formal) political system as is typical of the research field of »Business 
and Politics«; however, it adopts the central importance that this research field ascribes to 
power (and function) as one dimension of business political activity and the political system 
as one major influencing factor and addressee of business political activity. On the other hand, 
it rejects the normative and/or practice-orientated narrow perspective on and understanding 
of business social legitimacy in terms of the societal acceptance of business political action 
and underlying motives as a necessary prerequisite for effective business political activity - 
which, the corresponding argumentation goes, could be met by cognitive and communicative 
efforts of developing a cogent view of the public interest and, then, political positions and 
strategies that embody this notion - as is typical of the research field of »Business and 
Society«. Nevertheless, the study adopts the major role that this latter research field attributes 
to communication (and expression) as one dimension of business political activity and to the 
wider societal environment in terms of the public at large, civil protest actors2 (and prevailing 
and changing societal values and expectations) as key reference points of political strategy 
development.
The respective major shortcoming of the two ways in which business political activity
2 The concept of civil (zivilgesellschaftliche) protest actors is expounded under point HI. 1.1.
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has been dealt with so far in the social sciences may be summarized as follows: As reg ard s  
research on business political activity in »Business and Politics«, the chapter points to a n  
incapacity to recognize the increasingly political nature of business performance in the p u b lic  
and half public/half private arena and, resulting from this, to a neglect of the grow ing 
importance of mass media-oriented and »post-corporatist« styles of communication a n d  
repertoires of action. Concerning research on business political activity in »Business a n d  
Society«, it underlines the neglect of the constitutive character that social legitimacy, in te rm s 
of societal acceptance of general business behavior, has for business political activity. T h is  
study, instead, views scope and design of business political involvement as determined to a  
great extent by the degree of social legitimacy of general business policy and power.
As a general shortcoming of the bulk of previous research, I point to the relatively 
scanty attention directed to the aspect of business political activity as a (macro Structurally  
influenced activity in favor of an extensive investigation of business political activity as a  
functionally oriented activity. The benefit of drawing on both research fields, however, i s  
demonstrated to exist in the valuable insights that the two lines of research respectively 
provide in the power and communicative dimension as the functional and expressive 
dimensions of business political activity and in the specific importance of the official political 
arena and the public arena as arenas of business political activity.
It is then against the background of the specific insights and shortcomings of th e  
established approaches to business political activity that the approach of this study is defined. 
This approach is based on the »embeddedness« perspective of institutionalist organizational 
sociology. In this perspective economic and other organizations are embedded into w ider 
societal environments - culture, society, the political system - which shape organizational life  
both by imposing constraints and creating opportunities. The study adopts the »embedded­
ness« view by conceptualizing and discussing business political activity in technical 
controversy as a response to a specific business political environment.
After having positioned the present study in the available social scientific literature, the first 
chapter shall tackle the striking U.S. dominance in this literature. The research lag of W estern 
Europe in comparison with the United States concerning research on the political involvement 
of business actors is explained by differences in empirical developments, namely differences 
in the nature and time of change in business political activity in the two highly advanced
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industrialist systems in the post-war period.
The second chapter then proposes a conceptual definition of business political activity. The 
definition is developed by critical discussion of the prevalent definitions in the relevant 
American literature. It is described as being characterized by two main features: The first is 
the characterization of business political activity as business behavior that occurs in the 
institutional and noninstitutional political arena and that is not necessarily directed at the 
political system as a specific societal subsystem. Its second main feature is characterized by 
viewing business political activity as going beyond mere strategic and power behavior (that 
is, behavior directed at acquiring, developing and using options to act (even) against the 
resistance of second actors): The proposed concept defines business political activity as 
strategic, power, and dramaturgic behavior.
Underlying this definition of business political activity is a broad concept of political 
action that understands this type of action as being de-coupled from (which does not mean 
unrelated to) the specific societal subsystem of politics. This concept conceives of political 
action as a general social phenomenon that takes place on all levels and in all constellations 
of the social order. It defines political action by its inherent action goals. These are 
determined as the objective of preserving one’s interests against the resistance of second 
actors and as the objective of gaining the approval of third parties to do so in order to create 
an obligation for that which is to be put through. Political action is viewed as being ultimately 
directed at the exertion of influence on the general legitimate social order (which in modem 
society is largely, however not exclusively, determined by the formal political system; one 
only has to think of the power of traditions, rituals, and prevailing societal expectational 
structures) in a way that provides the political actor with a strong position of power. 
Proceeding from this goal determination, political action in an action-typological perspective 
is described as strategic behavior that is power- and approval-oriented implying self-staging 
activities. The approval of third parties of a social actor’s power is identified as a necessary 
precondition for the transformation of this power into a legitimized social order. In the very 
abstract, political action is conceptualized as a typically triadic situation and relationship: 
Political involvement is determined as action designed to achieve approval of third parties to 
preserving one’s will against the resistance of second actors.
On the basis of this understanding of political action, business political activity is
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described three-dimensional ly as power, strategic and dramaturgic behavior with dram aturgy 
as that dimension that is claimed to be continually neglected in the relevant literature. 
Dramaturgy is described as referring to the ultimate goal of business political activity w h ich  
is, so to speak, to transform business power into a Macht der Verhältnisse.
In sum, it will be argued that the proposed conceptualization of business political 
activity with its understanding of the formal political system as a central but not exclusive 
arena and addressee of business political involvement presents an analytical tool that provides 
especially fruitful insight into the increasing importance that the public and half public/half 
private arena has gained as an arena of this type of business activity. Moreover, it will b e  
contended that by identifying the approval of third parties as the inherent objective o f  
business political action, this thesis sheds light on the inherent cognitive, cultural a n d  
communicative-expressive dimension of business political activity.
The third chapter applies the quintessence of the proposed concept of business political 
activity to the specific case of technical controversy. It will, first, provide an outline of th e  
relational fie ld  in which business political activity in technical controversy takes p lace; 
business political activity is concretized as a specific Freund/Feind-rt\a.\ionship in this specific 
type of societal conflict. Then, a classification of business political activity as regards political 
involvement in technical controversy will be proposed. Business political activity in technical 
controversy may be classified, it is suggested, in terms of different types of business political 
action. The typology distinguishes between five activities designed to produce approval o f  
business power policy (with business power policy understood as referring to a policy that is  
to preserve business interests against the resistance of second actors) which comprise tw o  
different modes of political communication: negotiation and presentation (presentation o f  
»facts« and the »self«). Individually, they are referred to as corporatist negotiation, p o st-  
corporatist negotiation, informatory education, confidence-building, and identity-building. T h e  
five types of business political activity will be described and delimited by identifying th e  
arenas in which each of them typically is brought to bear (two major arenas of business 
political activity will be distinguished: the institutional and the noninstitutional political
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arena); their direct addressees3 (a typology of five different types of sought-after business 
allies will be proposed); the extent of interactive immediacy; the extent of dialogic drift; the 
most pronounced basic function (four basic functions of business political communication - 
and communicative action in general - will be identified: a relational, a representative, a self- 
representative, and an appellative function); the terms of content (four major contents of 
business political communication will be differentiated: a factual, a normative, a policy- 
oriented, and a moralistic content); and finally, the main logic applied for approval production 
(four major logics will be distinguished: a collective rationality, a scientific-technical 
rationality, a cultural logic and a moral logic). The five types are identified as making up the 
political action repertoire of business in modem technical controversy. While corporatist 
negotiation and informatory education, however, are determined as making up the »early« 
action repertoire, confidence-building, identity-building and post-coiporatist negotiation are 
expounded as political courses of action that have been used only in more recent times.
The fourth chapter, finally, is an attempt to relate intensive and diversified business political 
involvem ent in technical controversy and the different importance attached to the five action 
types distinguished over the last two and a half decades in this societal conflict situation to 
a number of contextual factors. The business political environment o f technical controversy, 
as these contextual factors are conceptualized, is defined as exceeding the formal political 
system. It includes social protest and public criticism which politicize business technology use 
by subjecting it to the »public interest« operationalized as a socially and environmentally 
compatible use o f technology. This, so to speak, »subpolitical« challenge constitutes at the 
same time, it is argued, a new form o f  moralization of business technology use. It is a 
challenge to justify this use beyond market, contractual, administrative, or legal obligations. 
Since the 1970s, the idea generated and promoted by social movements, of how to deal with 
technology, it is further argued, is in a process o f diffusion and stabilization. This means, the 
argumentation goes, that business actors involved in technical innovation more easily get 
exposed to local or national technology protest and that technology protest more easily finds 
argumentative and active - for example, regulatory - support in society at large. In brief, the
3 Direct addressees are the social actors whose support business seeks for preserving its interests; the social 
actors against whom business seeks to preserve these interests are referred to as the indirect addressees of 
business political activity.
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business political environment of technical controversy is determined as a context of c u ltu r a l  
change in terms of changes in the ideological structure of society. Thus the public e xp o su re  
o f business and the »crisis o f legitimation« which it faces in technical controversy a r e  
identified as long-lived political conditions.
The way in which business has responded to these conditions - the increasing r e s o r t  
to public commitment to the idea of a socially and environmentally compatible use o f  
technology in the form of confidence- and identity-building communication and p o s t -  
corporatist negotiation - is described as the result of a learning process in conditions of s o c io ­
cultural change. It is not a mechanistic reaction to a changing environment, the a rg u m en t 
goes; instead, it is the reaction to the experience that adherence to this newly developed 
societal idea constitutes a social constraint.
30
_  while ye*today's teaior manager could be concerned 
aknoct eichaively with pociboamg the company in the 
marketplace, today this manager must know how to 
position the company in society at large. Managers need 
the kind of information and training that will provide a 
better understanding of the elements in society most 
likely to affect them - government, the media, public 
interest groups, and community organizations. {Colodzin 
1987: 211)
Sociology reflextvely structures its subject matter which 
Itself has learned to think sociologically. (Giddeas 1984:
43)
I. BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVITY: DEBATES AND AGENDAS
Business political activity has been a subject of interest to scholars from such diverse 
disciplines as political science, management, and sociology. As far as sociology is concerned, 
interest in the topic has been rather scanty. The greatest part of the studies that explicitly deal 
with business political activity as a concept and empirical object of research is to be found 
in the field of management science. Since the 1970s, business political challenges have 
become a key concern both of management theorists and practitioners and their attention to 
the topic appears to be still growing. Management studies on business political activity, 
evidently practice-oriented, typically advise business political involvement and strategy 
development in the light of an increasing external politicization of large parts of the economic 
world.
The bulk of relevant sociological and political science studies deals with business 
political activity implicitly rather than explicitly in the context of general research on public 
policy agenda-building, interest group behavior, and risk communication. While in the agenda­
building and interest group literature, business political activity is dealt with mostly as part 
of the general process of interest group competition and »pressure-politics« in institutionalized 
politics, studies on risk communication shed Light on the goal-oriented and strategic dimension 
of business risk communication but do not identify and discuss the specific political nature 
of such communication. Generally speaking, up to now, research on the specific topic of 
business political activity presents practice-focused rather than theory-focused research.
The concern of this first chapter is to position the study in the realm of interdisciplinary 
research on the topic. That means, positioning will not be done by specifically addressing the
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(few) sociological contributions but, instead, by identifying two broader fields o f research t h a t  
encompass the bulk of research on business political activity and present research d o m a i n s  
of all three disciplines involved in this specific line of research. These two research fields a r e  
generally referred to as Business and Politics and Business and Society with the former b e i n g  
equally a research domain of sociology, the political sciences, and the management s c ie n c e s ,  
and the latter, first and foremost, being the research domain of the management sciences a n d  
sociology. While business political activity as a research topic developed in the 1970s f r o m  
the field of Business and Politics and soon became established as a specific line of r e s e a r c h ,  
in the late 1980s it also became incorporated in the field of Business and Society1. S t u d i e s  
in the two fields of research overlap in their principal interest of highlighting that b u s in e s s  
responds to two kinds of social forces: market and nonmarket, but differ in their o v e r a l l  
analytical focus and guiding research questions. While the field of Business and P o l i t i c s  
focuses on businesses’ relations with the formal political system and mainly does so in t e r m s  
of business power, the field of Business and Society concentrates on businesses’ relations w i t h  
society at large and primarily does so in terms of business social legitimacy.
By addressing the different approaches to business political activity of these t w o  
research fields, the chapter, on the one hand, shall trace the emergence of business p o li t ic a l  
activity as a scholarly concept and line of research and, on the other, demonstrate t h e  
innovative potential of this study’s research perspective by pointing out how this s p e c if ic  
perspective departs from both of the major approaches to business political activity in t h e  
social sciences* 2 and at the same time integrates specific facets of these approaches.
Up to now, specific research on business political activity clearly has been a U .S .-dom inated 
research domain. This fact shall not remain untackled in the following expositions on t h e  
present study’s integration in social scientific research. After the study has been related to a n d  
delimitated from the two major approaches to business political activity, the chapter w i l l  
attempt to explain the research lag, as far as Western European social scientific research i s  
concerned, against the background of different empirical developments of business p o litica l
’ The research field of Business and Society itself emerged as an interdisciplinary field of study in the 1970s.
2 In this study, the management sciences, presenting, so to speak, a hybrid of economics and the - narrow ly 
defined - social sciences in view of the study's concentration on their sociological rather than economic in sig h ts  
shall be classed with the - broadly defined - social sciences.
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involvement in the two highly industrialized systems.
1. Business and Politics
Business and Politics is an interdisciplinary field of study the central research object of which 
is the relationship between the economic and the political system as the relationship between 
two distinct societal subsystems. It has its analytical focus on the chances, activities and 
strategies of business to influence the formal political process according to its interests3. 
Political in this field of study is typically either restricted to structures of and activities in the 
formal political system or to these plus structures and activities directed to the formal political 
system. Structures and behavior, the nature of which could be described as political but are 
outside the formal political system, either are excluded from analysis or are treated 
peripherally. Political action usually is reduced to the dimensions of strategy and power.
The topic of business political activity emerged in this research context during the 
1970s and brought in its wake a significant reorientation of the broader field of study.
Up to the 1980s, that is, in the immediate post-war decades, the social sciences - which was 
at that time primarily political science and political sociology - dealt with the topic of 
business and politics at a relatively high level of abstraction and with broadly conceived 
grouping concepts. The key issue underlying this early research on business and politics is 
well grasped by the title of an . early and influential book: Business as a System o f Power 
(Brady 1943). It focuses on the general power of business to shape public policy in its favor. 
Operating on the assumption that business power is, above all, a function of business* 
potential for mobilizing as a politically united force, much of the literature is concerned with 
the question of to what extent business as a whole is politically unified. This work is largely 
structured by the controversy known at that time as the pluralist model versus the classlelite
3 As business political objectives are discussed, for instance changing the size or structure of the market, 
reducing the costs in an industry, shaping business and/or industry regulation and deregulation etc..
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mode?. The elite model (in its extreme version) advances the idea of business as a u n i f i e d  
capitalist class with concentrated political power of a type that makes it possible to  u s e  
government for its particularistic interests4 5. The pluralist model (in its extreme v e r s io n ) ,  
reasoning that business’ political cohesion was unlikely given the divisive nature of e c o n o m ic  
competition, just as business collective political action was unlikely given the collective g o o d s  
problem, advances the idea of atomistic companies competing for political influence6. In  t l i i s  
view, the conditions for business political unity and, with that, the conditions for a tra n s la t io n  
of economic concentration and strength into political privilege are not given7.
In the course of the 1970s, the debate about whether business was primarily u n i f i e d  
or divided increasingly developed ideological traits (Mizruchi 1992: 21) and e v e n tu a lly  
declined in importance. Attention shifted from the question of whether business is unified t o  
the question of when it is unified. The conditions under which passive and active unity a m o n g  
business organizations occurs moved into the centre of analysis. A great deal of the s tu d ie s  
which take this newer approach to business unity and power proceed from the O ls o n ia n  
collective goods problem and point to the conditions under which free rider problems c o u l d  
be overcome8.
This reorientation in the study of business power is not the only development that c h a n g e d
4 For a general overview on the different positions on the issue of business and power, see Berg & Z a l d  
(1978). For a more detailed review and critical discussion of the »elitists versus pluralists« debate, see M izruch i 
(1992: 3-8, 14-32).
5 As advocates of this view, see, among many others. Mills (1956), Hunter (1953), Heilbroner (1964). A  
useful summqfy of several of the multiple facets of this position may be found in the collected essays by Z e itl in  
(1977).
6 As empirical confirmation of the existence of business political pluralism, the latter model, in the f i r s t  
place, used the »managerial revolution« (Berle & Means 1932). Professional managers were portrayed a s  
bureaucrats rather than capitalists beholden only to themselves and thus pursuing their particularistic in te rests  
regardless of the political consequences for the class as a whole (Mizruchi 1992: 4).
7 For such arguments, see, among many others, Dahl (1958), Epstein (1969: esp. 187-253), Chamberlain 
(1973), Nadel (1976).
8 During the last ten to fifteen years, it is, above all, social network factors which have been investigated 
as such conditions: social networks of enterprises are analyzed as important arenas of business power. A m ong 
these, interlocking directorships - that means, particular individuals sit on two or more corporate boards - a r e  
given the most attention. For a review of recent developments in the analysis of business power focusing o n  
those approaches rooted in the techniques o f social network analysis see Scott (1991). For pertinent contributions 
to this approach see: Useem (1984) and Mintz & Schwartz (1985), and, more recently, Mizruchi (1992).
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the face of the research field of Business and Politics in the 1970s. The field as a whole 
experienced an expansion, differentiation, and empirical orientation reflecting empirical 
changes in business political behavior in terms of increased and diversified political 
involvement. This transformation has three main features. First, the previous dominant 
position of the political sciences and political sociology in the research field is relativized by 
blossoming work on business and politics in the management sciences.
Second, the aspects of power and the general relationships between state and capital 
loose their prior major importance. Focus shifts to more concrete interactions between state 
and business. Power frequently is an explicit or implicit concern of this literature; however, 
it is less tackled in rather abstract studies on existence, extent, and structural conditions of 
business political power than in studies on attempts of business to exert and build power in 
concrete state-business relationships. This work takes an interest in describing business- 
specific political resources - which are identified basically as extensive material resources and 
an associated strong ability to organize and lead a conflict - and their strategic use to build 
business power in the form of public policy that is favorable to business interests.
And, third, there is the development of a more differentiated view of »business« as 
a political actor. Since that time, the object of analysis has been less business as a whole or 
the corporate elite but rather more narrowly conceived groupings such as the single firm and 
coalitions of firms such as specific industries. More attention is paid to differences in the 
political resources of specific firms and industries and the political contingencies faced by 
specific firms and individual industries which both are assumed to result in specific political 
strategies. Research on the level of the firm has proliferated since then. This research is 
predominantly carried out by management scientists and its basic argument is that, in pursuing 
corporate interests, collective action (e.g. through trade associations) is but one choice open 
to firms9.
The empirical point of departure of the bulk of this work on the political activity of 
firms, firm-groups, industries, and business as a whole is the observation that, during the
9 These studies usually draw on Epstein’s book The Corporation in American Politics. The book which was 
published as early as in 1969 is widely recognized as the landmark on scholarship on corporate political activity. 
Even today, it is one of few books dealing exclusively with the topic of political activity on the firm-level. One, 
or even the key issue of the book is corporate political power. It is the central concern of the author to expound 
the political, social, and economic limitations of this power. Being "patently normative in character" (Epstein 
1969: VIII; emphasis in original), the book formulâtes a political theory of the firm in a pluralist theoretical 
perspective that recognizes corporations as legitimate participants in the American political process.
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1970s and 1980s» changes in business environments at the local, national, and in te rn a tio n a l 
level did lead to increases in the scope (number of issues) and magnitude (depth o f  
involvement) of business political activity, and to a diversification of political strategies10 1.
In sum, central to the reorientation in research on business and politics in the 1970s is t h e  
shift in emphasis from business as a system of power to business organizations as p o w e r -  
oriented political actors; emphasis shifts from the aspect of business structure to the a s p e c t  
of business action. The rubric which is established to class studies in this new perspective i s  
correspondingly labelled business political activity, with business political activity as t h e  
concept that generally refers to the political action of economic organizations; when a s in g le  
organization is the object of analysis, the study typically is classed under the sub-rubric o f  
corporate political activity11.
The central assumption underlying this more empirically oriented research perspective 
is that business organizations generally respond to two kinds of social forces: market a n d  
nonmarket. In the case of market forces, a firm or industry responds by varying its product* 
service, promotion and price mix to meet changing consumer needs and expectations. In t h e  
case of nonmarket forces economic organizations may respond with political and/or so c ia l 
activities, with the former distinguished from the latter, first and foremost, by its po w er- 
orientation. The view that studies specifically investigating business political activity seek t o
10 For the United States, the hypothesis of a general increase in business political activity during the 1970s 
and 1980s has been defended by numerous scholars in this field (see among many others, Epstein 1969:3, V ogel 
1981, Keim & Zeiihaml 1986: 828, Kcim & Baysingcr 1993: 127-129). As empirical proof o f this hypothesis, 
scholars pointed to the following phenomena: the increase in the number of corporations with public affairs 
offices in Washington D.C.; the greater status of government relations within the corporate organization; and th e  
greater personal involvement of chief executive officers in external relations (see esp. Vogel 1981: 176-178). 
The hypothesis of a diversification of business political activity has been advanced, e.g, by Keim & Zeithaml 
(1986: 829). The authors contend that traditional political strategies of lobbying and direct campaign 
contributions have been supplemented with alternative strategies such as constituency building, coalition budding 
and advocacy advertising.
For Western Europe and Germany there are - to my knowledge - no empirical studies advancing these 
hypotheses. However, there is, on the one hand, the management sciences’ growing concern with business* 
sociopolitical and sociocultural environment which can be taken as an indicator of a growing need of business 
to react to political and social challenges. On the other hand, as far as the highly publicly exposed industries a re  
concerned, increase in and diversification of coiporate/industry political activities since the mid 1980s arc highly 
visible. This visibility refers, above all, to corporations and trade associations increasingly »going public« an d  
speaking out on political issues.
11 For a brief overview of issues tackled in the literature on corporate political activity, see Mitnick (1993b: 
24).
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foster is that economic organizations are entities which possess non-economic dimensions that 
give them specific organizational/sectoral political interests and goals and necessitate political 
involvement.
While political scientists and sociologists usually examine business political activity as the 
political activities and strategies of organized interest groups (such as trade or peak 
associations), management scientists concentrate on the critical role of the individual firm as 
a political actor. At both levels of analysis, political involvement is typically conceptualized 
as business power behavior on the basis of economic resources as business-specific political 
resources. The bulk of the literature further approaches business political activity by 
attempting to categorize business behavior by looking at those activities and strategies that 
are pursued in the formal political arena or are directed at the political institutions and 
designed to influence regulatory and legislative decisions in the interests of a firm, an industry 
or a general business. As a rough classification, the literature typically distinguishes between 
business political activity concerned with economic regulation and legislation and primarily 
following a market rationality, on the one hand, and business political activity concerned with 
social regulation and legislation and primarily following a political and social rationality, on 
the other1 2. The former category includes activities designed to avert economically 
unfavorable regulation and public policy and activities directed to the strategic use of 
regulation and public policy as tools for achieving economic objectives (for instance, 
regulation may provide a single firm or a national industry with a competitive advantage in 
a specific national or international market)13. The latter category refers to activities aimed 
at the prevention, moderation or repeal of restrictive social regulation and legislation and the 
strategic use of social regulation and legislation as tools for achieving political objectives (for 
instance, in a situation of societal conflict, legislation may have the effect of lessening
11 While social regulation refers to controlling activities with direct effects on people - such as safety, 
affirmative action and environmental regulation - economic regulation refers to the control of instrumental market
activities such as price, entry, and trade practices.
13 This view that economic organizations use politics as a means to achieve economic objectives that they 
cannot otherwise achieve through market channels contradicts the premise of neoclassical economics that the 
viability of the firm depends on its ability to produce at low cost and meet market demand. Sdgler (1971), 
however, has shown that firms often seek relief from the pressures of a competitive market. They attempt to 
obtain from the state subsidies, entry restrictions, protection from new products and technologies, and prices that 
guarantee profits.
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challenges from citizens and public attacks and, consequently, their negative effects o n  
business).
Finer classifications, mainly suggested by the literature on business political activity  
at firm level, typically distinguish some (usually four or five) specific influence activities su ch  
as lobbying, political action committee contributions14, coalition-building, constituency 
building, and advocacy advertising15. These classifications usually lack a specific organizing 
dimension; they merely demonstrate the existence of different objectives or options o f  
influencing public policy16.
Empirical research typically focuses on direct interactions between business 
organizations and formal political institutions, particularly business-government interactions 
and the formal political system as the major arena of business political activity.
Attempts to explain business political activity are rather rare, and are neither very systematic 
or contextual. Management studies largely restrict explanatory efforts to considerations in th e  
framework of resource-based strategic management theory. In sociology and political science, 
analysis of the determinants of business political activity concentrates on business 
organizational and interorganizational structures, such as firm characteristics, industry 
organization, and business network properties17. Expositions on the wider environmental 
structures of business typically take the form of introductory statements pointing to, first, 
increased levels of business social regulation - that is, controlling activities with direct effects 
on people, such as safety, affirmative action, and environmental regulation - and an increase
14 Much of the attention on political activities on the single firm level is focused on political action 
committees (PACs) and their donations to political candidates. See Kaufman, Karson & Sohl (1987) and Eismeir 
& Pollock III (1987).
,s This is a  classification proposal by Keim & ZeithamI (1986).
16 Among the notable exceptions are, for instance, Yoffie (1987) who classifies corporate political activity 
according to the dimension of collective action decisions which firms make to achieve competitive advantage 
(The author’s typology distinguishes between the five strategies of free rider, follower, leader, private goods, and 
entrepreneur), and Mahon (1993) who distinguishes between corporate political activities that are issue, arena, 
and stakeholder based.
17 For outstanding examples of such research see Jacobs, Useem & Zald (1991) and Mizruchi (1992). The 
former provides a differentiated view on specific characteristics of companies, industries, and the relations among 
these actors as determinants of level (or intensity) and direction (or thrust) of business political involvement. The 
latter draws on the techniques and ideas of network analysis and investigates the way in which inter-firm 
relations shape the political activity of corporate actors.
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in the number of civil protest actors demanding such regulation; second, increased levels of 
government influence on critical uncertainties in business environments, such as interest rates, 
inflation, and energy costs; and, third, the globalization of the economy making business view 
government as a potential ally against foreign competition (see e.g. Yoffie 1987: 45)18. 
Usually this contextualization of business political activity is not elaborated further. To my 
knowledge, there is no study which systematically contextualizes business political activity 
in business' wider societal environments or in specific situational contexts such as issue-based 
societal conflicts.
To conclude these expositions on the approach to business political activity in the research 
field of Business and Politics: Corresponding with the analytical focus of the broader field 
of study business political activity is approached by describing and analyzing the variety of 
business activities and strategies employed to bias public policy according to business 
interests with a special focus on business activities and strategies undertaken in the arena of 
institutionalized politics, and the specific relationship between business and government. 
(Business political activity in this field of study is frequently simply associated with business- 
government relations)19. Corresponding with the research field’s dominant understanding of 
political action, business political activity is described in its instrumental dimension in terms 
of strategy and power with a specific emphasis placed on material resources as business- 
specific political resources. Explanatory efforts are largely restricted to resource-theoretical 
and meso-structural considerations on the level of the economic system. Efforts to 
systematically explain the logics of business political activity by historical, general societal, 
or societal conflict-specific contextualization - that means, contextualization that exceeds the 
immediate opportunities and constraints of the formal political system - are practically non­
existent.
18 A more extensive account of changes in governmental involvement in the economy, the reasons of these 
changes, and their impact on business political activity is provided by the »classic« of corporate political activity, 
Epstein’s The Corporation in American Politics (1969). However, this book appeared at a time when a new era 
of social regulation and protest was just beginning. In short, the macro-structural business context still was 
significantly different from that of today.
19 One notable exception to this state-centered approach to business political activity is Mahon’s article on 
Corporate Political Sculpting (1993) the basic premise of which is that business engages in political activities 
in multiple arenas of which the formal, generally recognized, institutional framework of politics represents only 
one forum.
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An extended contextual perspective on business political activity is introduced w ith  
the incorporation of the research topic into the research field of Business and Society. This 
research field’s specific view on business political activity as society-related behavior 
relativizes the importance of the formal political system as arena and addressee of business 
political activity and, moreover, provides fruitful insight into the communicative and  
expressive dimension of business political activity.
2. Business and Society
Business and Society was established as an interdisciplinary field of study in its own right in 
the 1970s. Its research object is the interface between business and society. It is oriented 
towards understanding how, why, to what ends and with which effects business organizations 
interact with the societies of which they are a part. Sociologists and management scientists 
contribute most to this kind of research20. Contributions to the debate on and analysis o f  
political activity of economic organizations in this society-related perspective, however, so 
far exclusively come from the management sciences. According to my knowledge, there is 
no sociological study in the Business and Society field of research which explicitly and 
systematically deals with the topic21. Sociologists so far have not taken a particular interest 
in the action-strategic aspect of society-related business political power22.
20 For an overview on the debates and agendas of Business and Society as a sociological field of study sec 
Berg & Zald (1978). For collections of essays on issues in Business and Society as a management field of study 
see especially Scthy & Falbe (1987) and Steiner & Steiner (19772).
21 Sociological research in the field of Business and Society traditionally has dealt with, firstly, effects o f  
corporate policies and practices upon community life, work groups, their supervisors and local unions. This line 
of research was mainly inspired by labor-management conflicts in the 1920s and 1930s and focused on human 
relations in the workplace. Secondly, in a more macroscopic perspective, traditional research has been concerned 
with the wider powers of business to affect the structure and functioning of industrial societies taken as whole 
systems. This line o f research has its intellectual roots in studies of the genesis of and socialist challenges to  
capitalism. More recent research mainly consists of studies of the effects of business on the public interest in  
society generally and studies on "managerialism" and its effects on the structure of labor markets, industry 
structure, and economic and political developments generally and the bases on which the legitimacy of business 
can rest (Berg & Zald 1978).
22 The 1978 article by Berg & Zald tackles this aspect but does so not very extensively. However, in dealing 
with business political behavior it identifies a tendency that until today has continually grown stronger and relates 
to the key topic o f studies on society-related business political activity in the management sciences. This is the 
tendency of a growing importance of shaping and mobilizing public opinion as a business political strategy and
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There are only a few studies in the management literature on business-society 
relationships (which are investigated basically in the terms of business social responsibility 
and business social responsiveness23) which specifically deal with business political 
involvement in terms of a society-related activity. However, these studies which emerged in 
the late 1980s deserve special attention as they introduced a different, sociologically very 
interesting perspective on research on business political activity. This perspective provides 
fruitful insights, first, into the normative and communicative-expressive dimension of business 
political activity, second, by pointing to citizen activism as a major political challenge to 
business organizations into the importance of business relations to non-governmental, non­
profit oriented groups and organizations, and third, into the wider societal context as an 
influencing factor of business political involvement mainly in terms of such citizen activism, 
prevailing societal norms, values and expectations constituting the public interest, and the
an associated and increasingly visible character of business political involvement.
23 In the management sciences, the research field of Business and Society, in the light of an increasingly 
hostile business societal environment, originally started out as an attempt to ask business organizations to do 
more to ameliorate the second-order effects of their activities and to bring business behavior up to a level where 
it would be in congruence with currently prevailing societal norms, values and performance expectations. These 
endeavors initiated a whole debate on the question of the role of business in society, on how economic 
institutions should act in society, on what constitutes legitimate business behavior, on what is business ethics and 
how it should or can be employed by organizations, on the economic and noneconomic arguments for 
corporations to behave in a socially responsible manner, etc.. Studies participating in and contributing to this 
debate were grouped under the rubric of Business Social Responsibility. They, in turn, brought in their wake a 
series of studies that set the abstract-philosophical, normative reflections on business relations with society 
against an action and/or strategic orientation. This more recent type of research seeks either to point out the 
structurally determined need of business to respond to its wider societal environments or to expound strategics 
to manage changing societal conditions in the sense of optimally warding off new societal pressures on business. 
While, in the first case, the research perspective is that of business as a social institution, one that depends on 
society's acceptance of its role and activities, in the second case it is that of an external constraining environment 
the adverse impacts of which must be limited so that the organization can obtain necessary resources, pursue its 
own goals, and manage its affairs relatively free from outside intervention. Management activities which are 
discussed as general processes of responding to society's needs and demands or as general strategies of managing 
the wider societal environment are environmental assessment, issues communication, and stakeholder relation- 
building. This literature was grouped under the rubric of Business Social Responsiveness. The work on Business 
Political Activity combines facets of both of these lines of research. It identifies business social legitimacy as 
constitutive of business existence, survival, and growth and - in an evidently normative orientation - demands 
on these grounds business societal responsiveness in terms of political involvement that is based on and 
contributes to the public interest. That is, business social responsibility is defined, in the first place, as a 
structurally determined necessity for business, and then secondarily as a desirable business characteristic. 
Generally, I shall note, the management aspect of business societal relations in the research field of Business 
and Society has increased in the last fifteen years. (For a review and critical discussion of these dehates and an 
integrative perspective on them see Wood 1991a, 1991b.)
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public at large acting together through citizen groups as »guardians« of that public interest24-
The basic assumption underlying this innovative view of business political activity holds th a t  
economic organizations for their existence, continuity and growth depend on both econom ic 
efficiency and  social legitimacy in terms of society’s acceptance of their roles and activities. 
It further holds that the ethics of the marketplace and the legality of an act provide only tw o  
kinds of social legitimacy which are necessary but not sufficient conditions of business social 
legitimacy; business social legitimacy in terms of a prerequisite for business well-being i s  
understood as being composed of these two types of social legitimacy and a third ty p e  
defined as the adaptation to prevailing societal norms, values, performance expectations th a t 
are not (yet) legally codified. According to this supposition, widely advanced in management 
studies on Business and Society, business has to do welly that means, efficiently transform 
goods into products and services, and do goody that means, maintain or (re)produce its social 
legitimacy (Marcus, Kaufman & Beam 1987b: 8). Business’ quest for social legitimacy a n d  
doubts by its critics about the legitimacy of some of its policies and actions are at the co re  
of the entire debate pertaining to management research on Business and Society.
Proceeding on this assumption, studies on business political activity declare legitimacy o r  
societal acceptance o f business political actions and its underlying motives as the paramount 
issue of business political involvement (Sethi 1987: 529). Effective political participation o f  
business in the societal political process, the argumentation goes, presupposes this social 
legitimacy which in turn is determined by political positions and strategies that embody a  
positive notion of the public interest. The development of a clear and cogent view of th e  
public interest and, then, the political positions and strategies that embody this view is  
considered by this approach to business political activity as being the essence of business 
political activity (Sethi 1987: 531). It contends that what business often lacks and, therefore, 
causes ineffective political action is not only a political position but the habits of thinking and 
talking about the ways in which corporations and their products and services contribute to  
society’s well-being and help citizens realize their personal objectives.
M The most notable contributions to the analysis of business political activity in a societal perspective are  
probably provided by the 1987 reader compiled by Sethi & Falbe in the form of essays by Sethi, Holcomb, and 
Markowitz.
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Business people cannot participate effectively in the political process until they can 
articulate who and what they are socially» what role their products and services play 
culturally» and what difference it really all makes. This demands positive political 
strategies, not ad hoc responses to immediate crises. (Sethi 1987: 531)
This more recent approach to business political activity sheds light on the normative and 
communicative-expressive dimension of business political activity. The normative dimension 
of business political activity (with which I shall refer to the influence of societal norms on 
instigation, design, and structure of business political activity) is pointed to by arguing that 
successful business political action presupposes a positive relation to, that is, respect for, and 
ideally, genuine pursuit of the public interest constituted by prevailing societal norms, values, 
and societal expectations. Neglect or non-consideration of the public interest is considered as 
leading in the long-term to a loss of public credibility and support and, finally, to a loss of 
options to exert influence on the social order. As the public interest is not a stable structural 
element, it is further argued, consideration of and adaptation to the public interest presupposes 
an environmental scanning process designed to detect what is in the public interest or in 
which way this public interest might be in a process of change.
The communicative-expressive dimension of business political activity is referred to by 
contending that this positive relation to the public interest to prove politically effective has 
to be transformed into a political identity, ideology, and positions that can be demonstrated 
and credibly communicated to different business publics and the public at large. A successful 
political action program is understood as requiring, so to speak, the staging of business 
positions in terms of the public interest and as a bona fide to address public needs. This 
staging is viewed to lead to a public awareness and understanding of a corporation’s position 
and rationale on political issues which in turn would result in business public credibility and 
support as major preconditions for effective political participation.
In a primarily practice- and/or normative orientation, the development and communication of 
a political identity, ideology, and activity positively related to the public interest, first and 
foremost, is formulated as advice to or call on business actors. Studies taking this society- 
related approach to business political activity cite a need for such cognitive, communicative, 
and action-related efforts. However, some of them also engage in explanatory efforts and
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point to contextual - external and internal - business conditions which are identified a s  
conducive to the development and use of such efforts. Among these the following two s e e m  
to be the most relevant F irst scholars identify a high degree of public exposure25 o f  
business organizations in terms of a high degree of mass media attention and a large n u m b e r  
of business-critical public-interest and citizen groups mobilizing public opinion to further t h e i r  
political goals as constituting a major stimulating influence of public interest-based b u s in e s s  
political activity and communication. As a second basic conducive condition they point t o  
management which is highly sensitive to social issues and civil protest groups as it has b e e n  
the target of such groups or of public concern about the gap between corporate and p u b l ic  
interests (and then found that adversarial confrontation is not necessarily the most e ffe c tiv e  
and successful way of responding to social needs and political challenges) (Sethi 1987: 5 3 4 — 
537).
The growing political challenge to business constituted by citizen groups at the national» s ta te ,  
and local levels promoting collective benefits for society in general and viewing them selves 
as adversaries of the corporate world has received special attention as a contextual co n d itio n  
in the society-related perspective on business political activity. The political challenge th e s e  
groups pose to corporations may be seen in their direct effects on corporations - in the s e n s e  
of initiating lawsuits against companies, organizing boycotts, and sponsoring shareholder 
resolutions on specific issues etc. - and especially in their indirect effects on corporations 
through their influence on public policy-making; citizen groups are held largely responsible 
for numerous social regulations affecting industry (e.g., on equal employment, em ployee  
health, product safety, and environmental protection). Research focusing on business-citizen 
group relations typically distinguishes between different modes of business responses t o  
citizen activism and, in terms of social legitimacy, advises or calls upon a more co-operative 
response to these political challengers. A departure from the hardline, confrontationist 
approach, however, is not merely presented as a normative request or an action advice on t h e  
grounds of strategic and structural considerations, but as well as an empirical tendency.
Holcomb, in this sense, points to a change in business response to citizen activ ism  
over time the main feature of which was a decline in importance of confrontationist strategies
25 The concept of public exposure ("öffentliche Exponiertheit") is borrowed from Dyllick (1989: esp. 6-7 a n d  
15ff.). It will be developed under point IV.1.2.
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along with an upgrading of co-operative, participative, and negotiatory strategies (Holcomb 
1987: 369-371).
The society-related approach to business political activity departs from the dominant approach 
to business political activity in the literature on Business and Politics in the following 
respects: The prime object of analysis is not business’ relations with the formal political 
system but instead its relations with the public at large, on the one hand, and business-critical 
civil protest actors, on the other. The analytical framework in which business political activity 
is investigated is based on a broader understanding of the terms political and political action. 
Political in this definition, on the one hand, refers to structures of and actions in the formal 
political system and structures and actions directed at the formal political system. The society- 
related approach focuses on the latter; it understands the relations and communications of 
business as a political actor to the public at large as a key determinant of business’ influence 
on the public policy process. On the other hand, political refers to structures and actions that 
are part of the overall societal political process but may be not directed at the formal political 
system. In this broad understanding political includes, for instance, business interactions with 
citizen groups in the form of inter-organizational negotiation.
The decoupling of the concept of political from the formal political system together 
with the emphasis placed on business-public relations in the process of influencing public 
policy according to business’ interests causes the importance of the formal political system 
as an arena of business political action to be relativized. Besides this arena, the public arena 
referred to as a forum in which business may stage itself as a socially responsible participant 
in the political process and the half public/half private arena referred to as a sphere in which 
business might attempt to come to terms with its organized critics are presented as alternative 
arenas of business political activity. A second effect is the relativization of the importance of 
the formal political institutions as addressees of business political activity. The public at large 
and business-critical civil protest actors are highlighted as important addressees and potential 
or actual political challengers of business political action.
More specifically, with the importance ascribed to general societal acceptance and 
public staging of business political activity, the instrumental dimension of business political 
activity, to which the bulk of the literature on Business and Politics reduces this type of 
business behavior, is complemented by an expressive-communicative dimension. Political
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action in this view is understood and examined as approval and audience-oriented b eh av io r 
relying, above all, on ideative and symbolic resources rather than as power behavior re ly in g , 
first and foremost, on material resources. This view on business political activity sheds l i g h t  
on the dramaturgic aspect of business political action.
Furthermore, with the importance ascribed to public exposure, credibility, and support, 
and the institutional and cultural framework as determinants of design and success of business 
political participation, business political activity is contextualized in a way that exceeds i t s  
embeddedness into the political and economic system: At the macrostructural level t h e  
society-related approach to business political activity points to prevailing societal n o rm s, 
values, and performance expectations, at the mesostructural level it points to the p u b lic  
exposure of business in terms of the extent of public criticism, mass media attention, a n d  
protest challenge as critical contextual factors of business political activity.
The dayt when (be public welcomed industrial and o t h e r  
economic activities simply because they created jo b s o r  
provided products or service« are gone, once and for a l t  
People have become more critical of technological 
progress and more «wire as regards consumption a n d
consumerism. (Leuenberger 1995: 9 8 )^
While the same general set o f forces [legal and so c ia l  
pressures] is impending on an institutions, the impact i n  
the world of business is especially dramatic because t h e  
historic criteria for evaluating the performance o f  
business have seemed so relatively simple and clear c u t .  
(Ackerman A Bauer 1976: 3)
3. Business Political Activity in the »Embeddedness-Perspective«
Why and how are courses of business political activity constructed, according to w hich  
external influences and internal logics? It is difficult to give an answer to this question w hich 
grasps »external« and »internal« influences in all of their complexity. As has been argued in  
the preceding sections, the bulk of the relevant literature has concentrated on instrumental 
rationality in terms of resource-strategic thinking as the central logic underlying business 26
26 Andreas F. Leuenberger is Vice-Chairman of the Board o f Directors of F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. L td , 
Basel and President of the Board of the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry.
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political activity and on the formal political system as the main political environment of 
business organizations. The present study goes on from the more recently developed research 
perspective of the Business and Society literature and investigates business political activity 
as a multidimensional activity - including a dimension of power, strategy and dramaturgy - 
related to and influenced by society as a whole system. Its principal interest is to highlight 
the role that »cultural reason« in terms of integration-conscious thinking (which, actually, is 
translated into an instrumental rationality - a culturally based/shaped instrumental rationality, 
however) and the cultural-institutional environment play in business political involvement. It 
does so by discussing business political activity in technical controversy as a response to a 
process of cultural change initiated and promoted by the new social movements and 
interpreting this response as a kind of »cultural politics«, a politics aimed at conciliating 
»business culture« with »societal culture«.
What is referred to as a process of cultural change and a major political challenge to 
business is the societal diffusion and stabilization o f  the idea o f a socially and 
environmentally compatible steering o f  technical change. This process, I shall argue, means 
for the economic organization to be confronted with new societal expectations as regards its 
role as a technology utilizer. These expectations go well beyond the classic task of the 
provision of goods and services. They include the fact that companies take into account the 
social, ecological, and moral implications of their technological activities and by that 
acknowledge newly developed sense structures and value patterns. My argument is that these 
new expectations and their detrimental effects on business - losses in credibility and 
trustworthiness, production delays due to citizen and new social movement protest, 
demotivation of employees - have forced economic organizations to engage in a new form 
of business political activity aimed at (re)producing societal consent as a basis of 
legitimization for business technology policy: Activities of public commitment to the new 
social movement generated and promoted ideas on how to deal with modem technology. To 
put it in more general terms, these detrimental effects have forced economic organizations to 
pursue a policy opposite to the policy of »silence is golden« as was characteristic of the first 
two decades of the postwar period. The new policy, which for the sake of metaphorical 
analogy shall be referred to as the politics of »communication is golden«, consists o f engaging 
in public responsibility discourse. The new policy has not replaced the traditional policy of 
insulation against the public in business at large but has complemented i t  It is pursued by
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business organizations that have a special feature or that represent business organizations w ith 
this special feature: This special feature is an especially high degree of public exposure.
The basic assumption underlying this culture-oriented approach to business political activity 
is the same that underlies the general perspective of the Business and Society management 
literature. This is the assumption that business survival and growth presuppose both economic 
efficiency and social legitimacy and that economic organizations operate in a larger societal 
context in which support for business operations and institutions cannot be taken for granted. 
However» as distinguished from the management sciences, social legitimacy in analyzing 
business political activity in the present study is not conceptualized as societal approval o f  
business political activity itself and a necessary precondition for successful political 
participation. Instead, it is understood as societal approval of general business policy and 
business power and, as such, conceptualized as both an inherent objective and a m ajor 
influencing factor of business political involvement.
The theoretical-analytical perspective from which this view of the connection between 
business political activity and business social legitimacy is derived is the »embeddedness- 
perspective« o f institutionalist organizational sociology. It is the basic theoretical suppositions 
of this perspective (similar to those of the Business and Society management literature) that 
the present study draws on in discussing business political activity in technical controversy 
as behavior that is reflective of and responsive to a political environment in which cultural- 
institutional elements play a central role.
It seems fair to state that, at this point in time, institutional theory in organizational sociology 
represents a theoretical orientation - that is to say, a family of concepts and arguments - rather 
than a tightly integrated, elaborate theory. Constitutive of this theoretical orientation and 
common to the various conceptual frameworks and arguments employed is the attention to 
context^ that is, to the relation between organizations and their environments, the concern with 
the role of culture in shaping organizational reality, and the characterization o f  
institutionalization as a process which by restricting the options among which organizations 
can choose also restricts organizational instrumental rationality. While this study’s analysis 
operates on the basic assumptions underlying the general analytical perspective of the 
institutionalist school, it specifically builds on that supposition which is central to the most
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contemporary line of institutional research on organizations in sociology, the so-called »neo­
institutionalist« approach. This supposition holds, first, that the wider societal environment - 
culture, social norms, conventions, society, the political system, organizational fields - 
strongly influences the definition of interest and the structures and courses of action an 
organization might develop. This influence provides the organization with social legitimacy. 
The supposition holds further that social legitimacy of organizational structures and behavior 
constitutes a major determinant of the continued and successful existence of organizations, 
alongside efficient coordination and control of productive activities.
Organizational legitimacy has been a core concept of the neo-institutionalist debate 
since the mid 1980s in (american) sociology and political science. This concept operates on 
the assumption that socially legitimate organizational structures and actions do not merely 
constitute a means for the achievement of specific organizational goals but above all things 
the attempt to demonstrate the appropriateness of a goal or the appropriateness of a way to 
reach goals. A major means of demonstrating the appropriateness of goals and purposive 
action, according to the neo-institutionalist approach, is institutional behavior. That means, 
as distinguished from the neo-institutionalist approaches as they have developed in economics 
and economically oriented political sciences (and distinguished from the traditional theories 
of symbolic politics) that institutions are not merely viewed as mechanisms in the enlargement 
of options for rational action, but also as instances that decide on the appropriateness and 
social legitimacy of organizational reality. Much institutional behavior, according to this view, 
is behavior that is - consciously or unconsciously - aimed at the creation or confirmation of 
an implicit societal agreement. This means, this institutionalist view is not only concerned 
with »rules« (routines, organizational forms, technologies) that make possible purposeful and 
decisive organizational action, but also with meanings and beliefs that determine the 
appropriateness of that action. The perspectives in which institutional behavior is investigated 
are cultural and cognitive. They are cultural since they view institutional behavior as based 
on cultural reason; they are cognitive since they, first, refer to that which social actors 
designate as reasons for their action, that is, argumentation and justification, and, second, to 
the preconscious reasons for this reasoning, that is, classifications, representations, scripts, and 
schemata (Eder 1995c: 4).
The influence of the wider societal environment on organizational life is of major interest to
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the present study. In this respect it corresponds with the neo-institutionalist approach i n  
organizational sociology. It departs from the mainstream of the work approach ing  
organizations in this perspective in that it positions the organizations under inquiry in a w id e r  
societal context than the »narrow« institutional environment This wider societal co n tex t, 
conceptualized as the business political environment of technical controversy, com prises 
institutional-cultural as well as sociopolitical and public policy elements. Then, in analyzing  
the organizational response to the institutional elements of this broader societal environm ent, 
to be more precise, to those cultural elements of this broader societal environment that a r e  
in the process of institutionalization, it places more emphasis on the political-strategic e lem en t 
of this response. The political-strategic element is conceptualized as the conscious, purposefu l 
use of institutional-cultural logics for the goal of (reproducing social legitimacy. With t h e  
importance ascribed to intentional behavior in institutional environments - behavior how ever 
that is institutionally induced - the study forms part of the general »turn« of the n e o ­
institutionalist sociological literature towards integrating strategic and political elements in to  
the analysis. This turn has been introduced by statements such as the following by one of th e  
most prominent advocates of the neo-institutionalist approach to the study of organizations:
And if organizations are rewarded for compliance with external demands, how can w e  
argue that conformity is not based on the calculating behavior of those who a re  
seeking legitimacy? (Powell 1991: 190)
Business Organizations as »Open« Systems
The most basic assumption that this study’s approach to business political activity shares w ith  
the neo-institutionalist approach is that organizations are open systems affected by th e  
environments in which they exist (see Scott 1992 in Scott & Christensen 1995). On the basis 
of this assumption, the validity of the conceptualization of business organizations as self- 
directed, self-sufficient actors pursuing their own ends is denied. This conceptualization is  
countered with the notion of business organizations as other-directed, depending for survival 
on the types of relations they establish with the larger systems of which they are a part.
The supposition of the centrality of environmental forces in shaping the structures and 
behavior of organizations is not specific to institutionalist organizational sociology but is  
shared by the majority of theoretical perspectives of this branch of sociology, including
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contingency theory, resource dependency, and population ecology. The notion by which the 
importance of the environment as the ground in which organizations are rooted is expressed 
is organizational embeddedness. While the embeddedness argument generally points to the 
importance of context, its exposition varies according to the definition of the boundaries of 
this context. Sociologists have investigated organizations as embedded in technical, 
institutional, cultural and social environments and in environments of interorganizational 
relations defined varyingly as industries, organizational fields and societal sectors27.
Up to the 1980s, the environment of for-profit organizations was viewed primarily in 
technical terms. From this perspective, business organizations are seen as embedded in 
environments within which a product or service is exchanged in a market such that 
organizations are rewarded for effective and efficient control of the work process. In other 
words, business organizations are viewed as organizations that can be expected to survive and 
flourish when their structures and actions best match the requirements of the market of which 
they form part. In the »technical« perspective, the emphasis is on materialist forces - 
technology, resources, production systems - as determinants o f the organization-environment 
relationship.
This narrow perspective on the embeddedness of for-profit organizations slowly but 
continually has been broadened in the course of the »revival« of institutionalist organizational 
sociology in the 1980s inaugurated by the article of Meyer & Rowan (1977) entitled 
institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. This article initiated 
a series of studies that directed attention away from narrow concerns with the location of 
resources or the number of competitors and called attention to the way in which organizations 
participate in wider arenas of relations and forces. This line of research that has been called 
»neo-institutionalism«28 highlights the broader role played by the state, the legal system, 
public interest groups, and the public in shaping organizational structure and action and by 
doing so demonstrates that organizations are more than just products of their immediate local
27 For arguments based upon the notion of embeddedness see especially the contributions of Granovetter 
(1985), Fligstein (1990), Galaskiewicz (1991), and the collection of essays edited by Powell & DiMaggio (1991). 
The latter also provides a sophisticated presentation and discussion of the neo-institutionalist approach in 
organizational analysis.
28 It differs from the earlier approaches in being more »structural«, that is, in paying greater attention to the 
way action is situated within larger structures of social relations and social meanings (Strang 1994: 15).
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environments, whether defined as organization »sets«, supplying critical resources or direct 
competition; as organization populations, made up of similarly constituted organizations 
competing for the same resources; or as organizational communities, composed o f  
interdependent systems of co-operating and competing units sharing the same locale29.
The increased attention to form and function of institutions has both contributed to and 
borrowed from the renewed interest in the sociology of culture. Placing particular emphasis 
on normative and cognitive systems, institutional analysis provides a more cultural account 
of the wider societal context than is found in other analyses of the modem organization (or 
in most other versions of structural sociology). In contrast to the studies embedding 
organizations in technical environments, highlighting the importance of materialist forces, the 
neo-institutionalist approach stresses the role of ideational forces and cognitive processes. 
Cognitive processes are understood as the basis on which organizational actors respond to 
ideational forces by taking action. They concern - conscious or unconscious - assumptions and 
decisions regarding the appropriateness of organizational structure and action. Ideational 
forces and cognitive processes are defined as major determinants of organizational legitimacy 
which in turn is identified as a necessary prerequisite for organizational success and survival. 
In short, the cultural and cognitive approach to the analysis of organizations as it has 
developed in the course of the 1980s has shifted attention from the efficiency o f  
organizational structure and action to the legitimacy of organizational structure and action and 
to the ideational forces and cognitive processes that determine i t
The array of environmental influences to which the organization must conform in 
order to receive legitimacy and support usually is subsumed under the notion of institutional 
environment30. Dependent on how narrowly or broadly defined, this environment is 
characterized by the elaboration of routine/reproduced programs or rule systems (Jepperson 
1991) and/or the elaboration of weaker forms of reproduction such as conventions, rituals, 
ideology, accounts, or myths - social control structures that can be more or less
29 For a collection of essays based upon the notion of institutional embeddedness which underlines the 
important role of culture, society, organizational identity, and industrial sectors in the definition of interest and 
courses of action that organizations might develop, see Powell & DiMaggio (1991).
30 For an elaborated definition of institutional and technical environments see Meyer & Rowan (1977) and 
Meyer, Scott & Deal (1983).
52
institutionalized31.
Even though the economic system is deeply embedded in a system of laws and regulations 
implemented by the politico-administrative system and parts of it in a sphere of intense public 
scrutiny and pressure exerted by social movement actors and the mass media» empirical neo­
institutionalist research for a long time focussed on nonprofit» nonmarket organizational forms» 
in particular public agencies such as schools, organizations of the mental health and health 
care sector, cultural institutions, etc. (Meyer & Scott 1983, Zucker 1988). Public agencies 
were considered the most interesting subject of research as institutional environments were 
conceived of as the determining context of this organizational form before any other. It 
always, more or less, was recognized that both of the most important organizational 
environments identified - institutional and technical - to a certain but differing extent place 
pressures on organizations to which these must respond in order to survive. However, it took 
some time until forprofit organizations were considered an appropriate and relevant subject 
of research in institutional analysis. It is only since very recently that scholars have developed 
a growing interest and increased activity in investigating social and cultural linkages between 
business organizations and business environments32.
Like these scholars, the author of this study aims at highlighting that business is not a 
separate sphere of society that has become disconnected from its socio-cultural environment. 
Modern business is characterized by the existence of a recognizable and distinct type of 
behavior (market behavior) and a specific dominant type of rationality underlying this 
behavior (economic rationality). However, it does not exist detached from its sustaining 
institutional and normative nexus. The free market system - which is based on the intention 
to maximize the affluence of all by providing each individual with the full scope for freely 
developing his endeavors directed at material success - is embedded in the moral, cultural,
31 Jepperson (1991) makes the point that the identification of »institution« with »culture« confuses the 
discussion and development of institutional arguments - a confusion that would be caused by many »institutional« 
analysts - as cultural elements might be more or less institutionalized.
32 For contemporary research that seeks to broaden the empirical scope of institutional analysis to embrace 
the private sector see Galaskiewicz (1991), Fligstein (1990), Dobbin et al. (1993), and Strang & Bradbum (1993). 
These studies emphasize that companies and markets are also social institutions. While Galaskiewicz’s study 
examines patterns of corporate philanthropy, the other studies investigate how markets are constructed through 
interaction between private organizations and the state.
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and legal constitution of the society of which it forms part and is itself a major institution 
within this society. While in times of cultural and institutional stability this socio-cultural 
embeddedness largely remains latent, it becomes manifest in times of cultural and  
institutional change that calls into question the institutional logic upon which the free market 
system is based (accumulation and commodification of human activity). In these times - e.g, 
in times of newly emerging institutional ideologies basically or at times contradicting the 
logic of the market - there is a heightened need for economic organizations to explain and 
legitimize themselves, to defend the basic institutional logic they are founded upon and to 
take a look at the newly evolving socio-cultural patterns. Cultural and institutional change 
affecting the institutional logic of the modem economy demonstrates that economic 
organizations operate in a larger societal context in which support for economic operations 
and institutions cannot be taken for granted but depends on the responsiveness of the 
economic sector to this larger context.
Technical controversy, 1 shall argue, is an expression of cultural change which affects 
business by confronting it with new societal expectations. It becomes manifest in organized 
technology protest, an alerted, technology-critical mass media and public at large, and more 
restrictive technology-related state regulation which is responded to by a range of business 
organizations with increased and diversified political activity. This study conceives of 
technical controversy as a societal situation that unveils the influence of the wider societal 
context on the behavior of for-profit organizations. Unlike the bulk of the neo-institutionalist 
literature, it analyzes organizational action - political action - not structure as an expression 
of the organization-environment-linkage. The context in which the organizations at issue are 
investigated is not defined as a specific societal or interorganizational structure but as a 
collection of factors - social structures and actions - characterizing a specific situation o f  
societal conflict. These factors are assumed to have a significant impact on business political 
activity. They are referred to as the business political environment o f technical controversy.
Before I engage, after this exposition of the study’s specific approach to the topic of business 
political activity, in a further clarification of terminology and concepts - beginning with the 
concept of political action - 1 shall briefly reflect on the striking U.S. dominance in research 
on the topic.
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4. The Research Lag of Western European Sodai Sdences
Today, business political activity as a specific line of research is clearly dominated by U.S. 
social scientists. This is a fact that shall not remain untackled in the context of literature 
stock-taking. How is it, that Western European social sciences do not take a particular interest 
in economic organizations as political actors? Neither in the political sciences and political 
sociology nor in the management sciences can one find something like a European »research 
tradition« regarding business political activity. Research contributions laboriously have to be 
extracted from the (burgeoning) literature on issues management, risk communication, and 
business ethics in which the topic is only implicitly dealt with.
There seem to be at least two ways of accounting for this difference in the extent of scholarly 
attention to the topic at issue. The first concerns the juncture of significant changes in 
business political activity. In the United States, the critical phase of an increase in and 
diversification of business political activity was reached in the 1970s, in Western Europe - 
or, to be more precise, in some of the Western European countries - this critical phase seems 
to have been reached at the end of the 1980s. Vogel has pointed out in his discussion on the 
first big wave of social regulation in the period of the late 1960s to the end of the 1970s that 
increase in business political activity in this time has been much more profound in the United 
States than in comparable capitalist democracies such as Western Europe and Japan (Vogel 
1981: 180-185). In Western Europe it is only since the late 1980s that there can be observed 
a growing and multifarious political involvement of large parts of business. Scientific 
research, as we all know, often lags substantially behind the factual developments - tendencies 
need some time to be recognized as such. Against this background, it seems reasonable to 
assume, that research on business as a political actor in Western Europe is still in a 
developmental stage.
The second explanatory proposal regards the prevailing understanding of the social sciences 
of what is political. As the literature review has shown, the bulk of the literature on business 
political activity understands this type of business behavior as actions directly addressing 
formal political institutions. The concept of political underlying this understanding restricts 
the realm of political behavior to behaviors undertaken by individuals and groups in the
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formal, generally recognized institutional framework of politics. Political is understood, a s  
Mahon puts it, in its "structurally oriented meaning" (Mahon 1993: 19533). The increase in  
and diversification of business political activity in some of the Western European countries, 
however, first and foremost, concerns business political activity in the noninstitutional arena 
of politics. In the United States, in contrast, due to a different historical business-government 
relationship, it concerns this »de-centralization« of business political activity34 and  a  
significant increase of business political activity in governmental arenas35. It is quite possible 
that the dominance of the structurally oriented concept of political obstructs W estern 
European scientists the view on changes in business political activity which, above all, take 
the form of newly emerging business activities that are political in nature but occur outside 
the specific realm of the traditional political institutions, and by doing so prevents empirical 
developments from framing business political activity as a new social scientific issue. This 
alternative explanatory attempt identifies the research lag of Western European social sciences 
as a, so to speak, conceptually determined construct
33 Mahon distinguishes the structurally oriented meaning of political from a functionally oriented meaning 
of political (Mahon 1993: 193-196). While in the former political refers to government and legal systems and 
the organizations that comprise those systems, in the latter political is understood as a process in which outcomes 
may be explained by the exercise of power. Mahon advancing the latter process-oriented concept contends that 
the exercise of business political strategy and behavior can occur in a variety of circumstances and situations. 
While this study supports this decentralized view of business political activity, it departs from Mahon’s 
conceptualization of political in that it rejects the reduction of business political activity to mere power behavior; 
it understands business political activity equally as dramaturgic behavior. For this argumentation see the points 
II. 2, 3.
34 Still, this decentralization process in the United Stales is less pronounced than, for instance, in Germany. 
This is due to the fact that German business responds to the pressure o f civil protest actors primarily via the 
shaping of public opinion and negotiation outside the traditional political institutions, while in the United States, 
business largely settles political conflict with these groups in administrative and judicial arenas.
33 According to Vogel, the overall volume and severity of environmental, consumer and occupational health 
and safety standards cannot account for the »uniqueness« of the (government-related) political response o f 
American business as it was not sufficiently different from that o f Western Europe and Japan. Among the 
arguments which Vogel puts forward to explain the varying response to the new regulatory arrangements, the 
following seems the most important to me: The closer ties that have historically existed between business and 
government in Western Europe and Japan - the historically relatively high regulation of business and the co­
operative working relationship between business and government - would have prevented a more radical response 
to expanding social regulation. In Western Europe and Japan, as Vogel puts it, the new regulations "took their 
place beside an already extensive list of constraints over management decisions" (1989: 183) and, thus, 
"represented only a marginal reduction in autonomy for executives" (Ibid.). In contrast, in the United States the 
new regulations meant a far greater proportional increase in the degree o f public controls over business and, 
hence, it tended to meet with proportionally greater resistance.
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It seems reasonable to assume that U.S. dominance in the research field in some way is 
related to both givens to which I have pointed. This study, in any case, seeks to contribute 
to reducing this dominance. A first step in this direction shall be the development of a 
concept of political action that is broad enough to encompass the hypothesized variety of 
business political activity.
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Wer "die richtigen Worte* findet. « «  weiß, wann er 
Kompromisse wehen muß ood wie er sie finden kenn, 
wem es gelingt, vom Besonderen suf das Allgemeine tu 
verweisen und das Allgemeine im Besonderen 
aufzuzeigen der hat - m welchem sozialen Kontext 
auch immer • zumindest guu Chancen, politisch 
erfolgreich zu handeln. (Hitzler 1995; 293; emphasis in 
original)
II. CONCEPTUALIZING BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVITY
It is clear that, before substantial progress can be made toward a theory of business political 
activity in technical controversy, there must be a clarification of terminology and concepts. 
As mentioned earlier, I do not know of any study analyzing business political activity in this 
specific or a similar societal conflict situation. This study needs to be innovative in building 
its overall analytical framework. The same applies to the conceptualization and classification 
of business political activity in general. The available literature does not offer a generally 
accepted framework of business political activity in which I could place my research. What 
it does provide is a range of different conceptual definitions and classifications due to 
differing definitions of political action and varying categorizations of activity or strategy 
types. Frequently the specific understanding of political action is more implicit than explicit 
and as a result there is no identifiable dimension according to which categorizations are 
organized. Faced with this variety and the general conceptual vagueness of analytical tools, 
every new study begins with an individual definition and classification of business political 
activity adjusted to the specific scope of analysis - and I am no exception here.
To begin with, I shall provide a definition of political action which then will serve as 
the conceptual basis of the definition of business political activity. The definition of political 
action is adopted from Hitzler (1995, 1994, 1991) and formulated in an action-typological 
perspective. According to this definition political action is a special form of social action that 
is designed to achieve the approval of third parties of having one’s will against the resistance 
of second actors.
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As pointed out in the literature review, the concept of political action (mostly im plicitly) 
underlying the bulk of American literature on business political activity restricts the realm o f  
political behavior, and therefore political strategies, to behaviors undertaken in the form al, 
generally recognized institutional framework of politics. The minority of studies that se ts  
against this »structural« understanding a »functional« understanding of political action 
typically reduces the function of political action to the exercise of power1. The fe w  
management studies in the field of Business and Society, by defining societal acceptance o f  
business political activity and underlying motives as a major condition of successful political 
performance, point to the production of social legitimacy as another function of business 
political activity. However, these studies do not determine the production of social legitim acy 
as a genuine function  of this specific type of business action; it is defined, instead, as a  
potential (and desirable) function.
This study, in contrast to the majority of studies on business political activity, defines political 
action broadly as a functionally oriented behavior, which means being uncoupled from (b u t 
not unrelated to) the political system as a specific societal subsystem. Political action is  
conceived of as a general social phenomenon that takes place on all levels and in a ll 
constellations of the social order. As a result, business political activity is not restricted to th e  
behaviors undertaken within the formal political arena but incorporates interactions between 
business and society, civil protest actors, and other groups and organizations that a re  
identified as political in nature but occur outside the specific realm of political institutions. 
This implies that action that is not directed at the political system as a specific societal 
subsystem can be construed as political action. This broad understanding of political action 
is bound to the fundamental premise of this study that business engages in political action in  
both institutional and noninstitutional political arenas.
Thus, the concept of political action as it is advanced in this study differs from th a t 
of the existing studies that understand business political activity in its functional sense in so
1. Structurally and Functionally Oriented Concepts of Political Action
1 Mahon, for instance, defines corporate political strategy as "those activities taken by organizations to 
acquire, develop, and use power to obtain an advantage (a particular allocation of resources) in a situation o f  
conflict" (Mahon 1993: 196, emphasis in original).
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far as it conceives of this type of action as having two functions instead of one: The first 
(well-studied) function is the exercise o f  power, the second is the transformation o f this power 
into a legitimized social order. Translated into action goals, this means that political action 
aims, first, at protecting one's interests against the resistance of second actors and, second, 
at gaining the approval of third actors of doing so. On the basis of this bi-functional 
understanding of political action, it will be possible to support and illustrate the study's basic 
assumption that business organizations are not merely settings of instrumental activity but are 
action contexts also for expressive behavior.
This definition of political action is adopted from Hitzler2 3. In what follows, I shall 
expound the conceptual and action-typological considerations upon which the definition is 
based.
2. Political Action as Instrumental and Expressive Behavior
The concept of political action that forms the conceptual basis of this study's definition of 
business political activity has been developed by Hitzler in the context of reflections on the 
development of a systematic sociology o f political action (Hitzler 1991)\ An important step 
towards such a systematization of sociological analysis was to answer the question of whether 
and in what respect political action could be determined as a special form of social action. 
The attempt was made to reconstruct political action as a specific, generally operating type 
of action in its basic structural form. In what follows, I shall outline this reconstructive 
process as it has been undertaken by Hitzler. The structural description o f political action 
shall present a first step towards understanding the phenomenon of business political activity.
2 Hitzler’s action-typological definition has been adopted on the assumption that »political action« (like the 
»Political«) docs not present a clearly outlined, objective and as such exactly definable object of the social world. 
Concepts of »political action« in general and the one advanced in the present study are assumed to build on a 
cognitive process directed to social reality, in which certain single aspects of this reality have been qualified as 
genuinely »political behavior« and as such as constitutive of the conception of political action to be constructed.
3 For a derivation of this concept from Plessner’s anthropological perspective see Hitzler (1995).
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2.1 Political Action as a Generally Operating Type of Action
Hitzler premises the reconstructive process with a delimitation of political action as a sp ec ia l 
form of social action from two other (specifically operating) types of action that refer to th e  
Political but do not constitute generally operating types of action* These two types of a c tio n  
are conceived of as phenomena of which political action forms a part. Together with th e  
action type of political action they are characterized as the three dimensions to which a  
"sociology of political action" principally (which was to mean not always and even le s s  
necessarily with an empirical object, but, so to speak, as a horizon of possibilities) w o u ld  
have to relate. The three dimensions are identified as, first, action of social actors which a r e  
defined or definable as "politicians", in short: the action o f  politicians; second, action in  
contexts, areas, and arenas which are defined or definable as "political", in brief: action in  
political contexts; and third, action that on the basis of special structural characteristics c a n  
be delimited from other types of social action as "political", in short: political action, or, a s  
Hitzler puts it, protopolitical action, as it is relevant also in so-called pre- or extrapolitical 
spheres and among non-politicians4.
These three dimensions Hitzler does not consider of equal rank. The author determines action  
of politicians as action including political action, political contexts as action contexts 
including political action. The structural particularity of both phenomena as against o th e r 
similar phenomena, Hitzler argues, is that protopolitical action takes effect especially 
strikingly in them, be it by reason of historical processes of institutionalization or be it b y  
virtue o f social processes of assignment. Protopolitical action, however, the argumentation 
goes, is to the politician and to the political context as theoretical action is to the scientist, 
the university or science; that means, protopolitical action is not merely domain- an d  
profession-unspecific, it is a "universalhistorisches Phänomen, ein lebensweltliches D atum " 
(Hitzler 1991: 13) which has basic structural characteristics that can be described. (For the  
sake of brevity I shall take "political action" to denote "protopolitical action" in the m eaning 
Hitzler assigns to i t )
4 Hitzler chooses the more defensive term "protopolitical" for the sake of terminological clearness (Hitzler 
1994: 68).
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2.2 The Structures of Political Action
What are the objectives, the characteristics on the basis of which we can refer to social 
behavior as »political« behavior?
Hitzler identifies two different objectives of political action (of which the available 
literature on business political activity identifies and treats only the first): The first objective 
is to protect one’s interests against the resistance of second actors. The second is to gain the 
approval of third actors in doing so. The proposed action-typological definition of political 
correspondingly reads as follows:
Protopolitisches Handeln soll heißen ein Handeln, das seinem Entwurf nach darauf 
abzielt, Zustimmung von einem Zweiten zu erlangen dazu, seinen Willen auch gegen 
das Widerstreben eines Dritten durchzusetzen. (Hitzler 1994: 68)
An interesting aspect of this definition is that it does not relate the political actor to one social 
actor (as it is typical of the literature on business political activity according to which political 
action refers to a diadic power-relationship) but to (at least) two social actors. Drawing on 
Carl Schmitt’s 1927 concept of the Political (Schmitt 1963), social action is identified as 
political action if it includes a Freund!Feitid-relation and action operating on the principle of 
Freund-and-Feind. Political behavior is determined as behavior aimed at asserting one’s own 
interests against other interests with reference to interests of third parties claimed to match 
or overlap with one’s own interests. In the very abstract, political action is determined as a 
triadic relationship5 between the political actor, at least one social actor the political actor 
identifies as an »antagonist« and at least one social actor that the political actor identifies as 
a potential »ally«6.
5 As Hitzler (1995: 291) points out, there exists one exceptional case which, however, could be understood 
as deduced from this triadic situation: The first actor, on the one hand, pursues the objective o f having his way 
against the opposition of a second actor, and, on the other, the objective to gain for this, nevertheless, the 
approval of this second actor. Although only two actors participate in this special case, Hitzler argues, it is more 
complicated to be handled by the first actor than the simple triad: Stable backstages or common secret 
knowledge, for instance, cannot be built and employed
6 Antagonist in this context shall broadly refer to a social actor who holds interests and pursues objectives 
alternative that conflict with those of the political actor and thus presents a potential opposing power that the 
political actor aims to discourage and restrain from exercising and gaining power. That means, antagonism 
relating to the power aspect of political action does not necessarily refer to a  manifest and open conflictual 
situation; it also includes latent, »invisible« clashes of interests. Ally shall refer broadly to a social actor who the 
political actor identifies as a potential supporter of his particular interests, positions, and objectives and aims to
63
The triadic relationship and the two action goals correspond with a bi-functional
determination of political action as the exercise o f power and the transformation o f  this p o w e r
behavior into a legitimized social order, into a Macht der Verhältnisse (force o f
circumstances). Political action is not only to have one’s will, it is also to provide the ob jec t
of one’s will with a generally binding character. For those actors against whom som ething
has been put through with the approval of others that which has been put through is to have
a temporary, long-range, or fundamentally binding character (Hitzler 1995: 291). Political
action thus in a broad interpretation of positions such as Machiavelli’s (1972) and W eber’s
(1980) is defined as action that is herrschaftsbezogen:
Das - implizite oder explizite - Ziel jeglichen politischen Handelns ist, von D ritten 
akzeptierte - wie auch immer geartete - Möglichkeiten zu erwerben, zu erhalten o d e r 
zu erweitern, auf spezielle und/oder anonyme andere dem eigenen Willen entsprechend 
einzuwirken. (Hitzler 1995: 292; emphasis in original)
Every measure that is taken with the intention to be appropriate for achieving this objective 
is then a political measure. Everybody who attempts to exert influence on the order of living 
together is then a political actor. Political action, in this sense, secures rules of living together, 
establishes (relatively) stable practices, and ensures the (relative) reliability of the action o f  
significant others. That is, it reduces the complexity of options and produces a legitim ized  
social order (Hitzler 1994: 69), in the sense of a social order that is deemed binding and 
exemplary. Political action, in this meaning, and this is the first important point of H itzler’s 
conceptualization of political action as regards the guiding research question of this study, 
principally has a macrostructural reference: Political action is understood as being ultimately 
aimed at shaping the institutional order in the political actor’s interests; changes in the 
institutional order affecting these interests accordingly I shall conceive of as having an impact 
on the political behavior of social actors.
On the basis of the determination of political action as having two functions, two action goals
convince or persuade of and/or mobilize for these interests, positions, and objectives. That means, alliance- 
building relating to the dramaturgic aspect of political action does not necessarily refer to coalition-building in 
terms of organizing for collective action or action mobilization in terms of getting other social actors to act in 
one's interests; alliance-building also includes preventing other social actors from acting against one's interests, 
for example by public opinion formation - comprising both the shaping of »published public opinion« and 
»latent« public opinion as the opinion of the population which in turn might become manifest in opinion polls - 
around these interests.
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and referring to a triadic relationship and situation, political action as a special form of social 
behavior is further described as having a power aspect, a strategic aspect, and a dramaturgic 
aspect, and as a type of action that cannot be reduced to one of these aspects (Hitzler 1995: 
292). Political action in this sense is delimited, first, from pure power behavior as, adopting 
the definition of Weber according to which power behavior is aimed at preserving one’s will 
against resistance (Weber 1972: 28), pure power behavior is not (necessarily) oriented towards 
approval. Then, political action also differs from pure strategic action in so far as pure 
strategic action, following for example Goffman’s (1981) analysis of strategic interactions, 
is »solely« directed at putting other social actors in zugzwang - as inevitably as possible (for 
instance, by use of tactics to delude these actors concerning one’s own intentions). Purely 
strategic action thus is also not (necessarily) geared to approval. And third, political action, 
in this meaning, is also not identical to pure dramatizing self-staging. Dramatizing self­
staging, as it has been demonstrated by Goffman’s early theatrical-imagery (Goffman 1969), 
is »solely« aimed at gaining approval for that identity that the respective actor claims for 
himself by the chosen way of self-presentation. That is, pure self-staging is not (necessarily) 
power-oriented (Ibid.).
However, and this is the second essential point of Hitzler’s action-typological definition as 
regards the research perspective of the present study, political action starts from the problem 
of success-oriented self-presentation, self-presentation with regard to the realization of one’s 
own interests. A central means of self-presentation is communication and the definition of a 
specific situation. It is a specific feature of the definition of political action here presented 
that it determines communication, generally, and approval-oriented communication (which is 
mainly communication about more general ideas and interests), in particular, as a central 
component of political action. In a structural perspective, Hitzler points out, political action 
as a specific type of social action concerns the achievement and safeguarding of chances of 
definition (Hitzler 1995: 293):
Wer die richtigen Worte findet, wer zu formulieren versteht, was er will, wer weiß, 
wann er Kompromisse suchen muß und wie er sie finden kann, wer sein Wollen, sei 
es nun rational, traditional oder auch charismatisch, zu legitimieren vermag (...), wem 
es gelingt, vom Besonderen auf das Allgemeine zu verweisen und das Allgemeine im 
Besonderen aufzuzeigen (...), und wer schließlich über die Möglichkeiten - und das 
heißt auch: die Mittel - verfügt, um sein Wollen (auch gegen Widerstreben) zu 
realisieren (...) der hat - in welchem sozialen Kontext auch immer - gute Chancen, im
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proto-politischen Sinne erfolgreich zu handeln. (Hitzier 1994: 68; emphasis i n  
original)7
An essential aspect of political action thus is identified as the negotiation of matters of f a c t  
and matters of issue between divergent positions with respect to consent to and p u ttin g  
through of binding decisions.
The central role assigned to self-legitimizing presentation and communication i s  
closely tied to that facet of Hitzler’s definition which I shall identify as the third im portan t 
point of this conception as regards the analytical focus of the present study: By determ ining 
the communication of policy preferences as the immediate goal of political action and th e  
Herstellung von Öffentlichkeit in the sense of the ensemble-public relationship as an essen tia l 
part of this objective (Hitzler 1995: 295) the conception points to public arenas (how ever 
narrowly or broadly constituted) as potentially essential reference points of political action . 
More specifically, by placing the emphasis on the audience- and approval-oriented nature o f  
political action Hitzler’s definition draws attention to the mass media as the communication 
channels with the greatest range and thus a potentially important point of reference in th e  
design o f political action. ,. .,..
2.3 Political Action as Means- and Ends-Related Behavior
By ascribing equal importance to power and dramaturgy, the action-typological definition o f
7 Hitzler’s determination of the dramaturgic aspect of political action differs from that of the Business an d  
Society literature in so far as it determines approval-oriented self-presentation action-typologically as a  structural 
feature of political action, and not, as it is typical of the society-related management literature, in an advisory 
and/or normative attitude (merely) as a structurally determined (desirable) prerequisite for successful political 
action. For example, issue construction by protest movements as it has been so comprehensively described in  
sociological studies working with the frame-analysis approach can be construed as genuinely »political action« 
within the definition offered herein. Issue construction by protest movements according to this definition presents 
action aimed at the production of public approval o f protecting »alternative« interests against the resistance o f  
»established« interests. The emphasis that Hitzler’s concept places on the approval-oriented presentation of one’s 
interests and goals (and on the communicative technique of normatively charging one’s action motives and goals 
by linking them to more general interests and ideas and dramatizing their collective goods character) b y  
identifying it as a structural feature of political action imparts the same cognitive and cultural bias to this concept 
as it is characteristic of the concepts of frame analysis in new social movements research. For the 
cognitive/cultuial strand of new social movement research see among many others Eder (1996a, 1995b), Gerhards 
(1992), McAdam (1994), Snow et. a. (1986), Snow & Benford (1988).
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political as I shall use it to investigate the political behavior of economic actors has features 
of two of the »classic« conceptions of political in the social sciences that are basically 
opposed to each other: the Machiavellian/Weberian »realistic« conception of political focusing 
on the means-character of political, on the one hand, and the Aristotelian »normative« 
conception of political focusing on the ends-character of political, on the other3. However, 
it does not fully correspond with either of these conceptions. As described above, it differs 
from the Machiavellian/Weberian definition is so far as it uses political in an instrumental 
sense but does not reduce it to dyadic power-relationships. Instead, it relates political also to 
the construction of a legitimized social order in terms of generally accepted power 
relationships. As social acceptance of such power relationships basically builds on the 
successful assignment of collective, general or even universal ends to these relationships, 
besides means it is also ends (Zwecke) to which major importance is ascribed as one aspect 
of political reality.
While the legitimacy-oriented dramaturgic aspect constitutes the ends-related character of this 
study’s concept of political action, the concept is still significantly different from the notion 
of political of classical practical philosophy and most of the ends-related conceptions of 
political in the social sciences. The latter conceptions are inherently normative approaches to 
political reality. They proceed from the Aristotelian assumption that the characteristics of 
political associations and political action can be determined on the basis of goals and ends 
which are given and assigned to them and cannot be chosen at will. In this normative 
conceptualization, politics is not a value-free notion, but more or less synonymous with good, 
public interest-oriented politics, which can be further characterized by ends such as justice, 
peace, liberty or democracy. The normative element of this conception of political shows 
itself in a notion of political order which is understood as a norm and not as an empirical fact.
The conception of political action as it is proposed in this study also links political to 
normative contents; however this linkage follows from an empirical-analytical approach to and 8
8 For a description and critical discussion of the »realistic« and »normative« conception of political (the latter 
conception is alternatively termed normative-ontological or essentialistic) see Berg-Schlosser, Maier & Stammen 
(1981: 23-26). For an overview of conceptions of political and their different ideological traditions that 
distinguishes between problem-, means-, and ends-related conceptions see Mickel (1983: 349-354).
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structural interest in the research object* It is not the concern of this study to define what is 
a good political order and measure real political behavior against this order. The normative, 
ends-related dimension of this study’s action-typological conception of political results from  
the importance that is attributed to interpretive efforts and dramaturgic performance as one 
aspect of political action meaning the attachment of the political actor’s particular ideas, 
interests, and goals to more general ideas, interests, and goals and underlying norms and 
values currently prevailing in the society of which the political actor is part
For a definition of business political activity on the basis of these conceptual considerations, 
two more points have to be clarified. The first point is the role of the political system and the 
political arena in terms of the generally recognized institutional framework of politics, that 
is, the entirety of legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, in the concept of political action 
presented. The second point is the specific understanding of »arena of political action« and 
»institutional« and »noninstitutional political arena« in the conceptual framework of this 
study. The following three sections shall tackle these points. The first relates the 
differentiation of modern society into functionally specialized subsystems of which one is 
termed »political« to the proposed action-typological definition of »political«. The other two 
sections concretize the study’s arena terminology.
2.4 The Relationship between Political Action and Political System
As has been mentioned above, it is a basic feature of the present study’s definition of political 
action that it describes this type of action as a special form of social behavior and, as such, 
as structurally uncoupled from the political system. This implies that the political system is 
understood, first, as one (collective) political actor among others and, second, as one arena 
and addressee of political action among others. It does not imply, however, that the political 
system is considered as equal in position with other political actors and arenas and addressees 
of political action. Rather, I shall advance a conceptual framework which attributes central 
importance to the political system in the political topography of modem society and as a point 
of reference of the political action of social actors (In this respect the present study differs 
from those studies of business political activity describing political action functionally as pure,
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short-term, power behavior; in the latter studies priority treatment of the political system and 
public affairs theoretically is rather accidental). This central importance results from the 
ultimate aim which is ascribed to political action: the aim to create temporary, long-range, or 
fundamentally binding obligations, that is, to influence in some way the construction and 
nature of the legitimate social order. There arc two main reasons which, in connection with 
this goal of political action, account for the special role that the political system has for 
political action as a special form of social behavior.
First, in modem society the political system holds the specialized function of 
producing collectively binding decisions. It has the special right to control other societal 
systems, a right that these other systems do not have. By monopolization of this type of 
authority in the hands of the state, the political system basically defines the framework of 
these other societal systems, primarily by decisions which in the case of conflict can be 
bindingly enforced. In short, in modem societies the legitimate social order is largely based 
on a political-judicial codification and authoritative implementation by virtue of a 
monopolistic state authority; it largely presents a legal order. In view of this fact, it appears 
only consequent, if social actors (equipped with a certain resource-base9) for the most part 
include the political system as one actor and arena of reference in their political reflections 
and activities. In order to lastingly change society it often may be the most effective strategy 
to induce political decision-makers to decide in one’s interests. This can be done by means 
of direct negotiation and then typically takes place in the official political arena. And it can 
be done indirectly by means of pressure of »public opinion« favoring one’s political goals, 
and then takes place in the noninstitutional political arena. The reception of public opinion 
by political decision-makers at least to some extent is guaranteed since one of their main 
action goals is the maximization of votes for the achievement of decision-making power. For 
this aim public opinion serves political decision-makers as an indicator of the preferential 
needs of the population according to which they orientate their own actions.
The second reason, I shall state, is the legitimatory power of the political system in modem
9 One has to bear in mind, that political action directed at the political decision-maker (directly or indirectly) 
is a type of political action that depends on certain preconditions. To be heard by the political system it needs 
specific resources such as a certain degree of organization, power, knowledge, popularity, and riches which 
actually only few social actors possess.
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representative democracies. This specific power originates in the democratic control o f  t h e  
political system itself, in the binding of political decision-makers to the opinions and in te re s ts  
of the population. The democratic political system is to notice, operationalize, and hold t h e  
public interest. In view of this political principle and the corresponding institu tional 
arrangements in those cases that political action goals of social actors, in the first place, d o  
not refer to the shaping of the formal institutional structure but to the shaping of in form al 
institutional structures such as, for example, the closer organizational environment th e  
reference to ideative and material state support of one’s own objectives may further politically  
effective involvement. Political actors, thus, either may communicate this support them selves 
or (by reason of a lack of social credibility) ask state actors to inform the respective 
addressees of political action about it.
It is, above all, the monopolistic state authority which has directed the attention of scholars 
dealing with business political activity first and foremost on state-business interactions. O n e  
major concern of this study is it, however, to suggest that despite the central importance o f  
the political system as a reference point of political action, social action neither m ust 
necessarily occur in the arena of the political system nor must necessarily be directed at the  
state or rely on the approval of the state to be recognized as political action. In a society in  
which »subpolitics« play an increasingly important role and policy implementation gets m ore 
and more difficult, political action might be also directed, in the first and final analysis, a t 
social actors in their role as »private politicians«, that is, at social actors whose attitude 
towards the political actor is directly decisive for the well-being of this political actor. In the 
context of such relationships it might be the most effective strategy to attempt to create v ia  
(more or less) »private« negotiations (more or less) informal enduring structures and practices 
safeguarding and promoting one’s particular ideas, interests, and objectives.
2.5 The Institutional and Noninstitutional Arena of Political Action
I have already repeatedly pointed out that it is a basic premise o f this study that social actors 
do engage in political activities also outside the official political arena, that is, outside 
executive, legislative, and judicial settings. On the basis of this premise the study
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distinguishes between an institutional arena of political action and a noninstitutional arena of 
political action. What precisely shall be meant by »arena of political action«, and 
»institutional« and »noninstitutional arena of political action«?
Political action arena in the conceptual framework of this study shall be conceived of as a 
delimitable sphere of social action in which different social actors may engage in political 
activities. In a political action arena political actors communicate with other political and/or 
social actors in order to bring forward their political position and/or problem definition in the 
respective political discourse, to articulate their political objectives and to initiate and/or shape 
decisions of a certain binding character that safeguard and/or promote their interests. Political 
action arena further is understood as composed of arena fora  which in turn comprise fora 
actors (the political actors) and fora audiences (the addressees of political action and the 
audience reached without plan).
Two different spheres of action are distinguished in which social actors pursue their political 
goals and strategies: The institutional and the noninstitutional political arena. Actions in the 
two arenas may be primarily directed at exerting influence on the political »outputs« of the 
respective arena of action itself or may be primarily aimed at exerting influence on the 
political »outputs« of the other arena. By institutional political arena I meant the generally 
recognized institutional framework of politics. That means, the boundaries of this arena are 
defined as those of the formal political system. The institutional political arena presents the 
action sphere of the system of professionalized politics and its multitude of formal and 
informal fora. The major characteristic of this political arena is that it is part of that societal 
system that has a functional and normative authority unique in society and is of central 
importance as arena and addressee of political action by virtue of this exceptional authority.
From this political arena the noninstitutional political arena is distinguished. This second 
arena refers to fora of political action that are external to the generally recognized institutional 
framework of politics. Political activities in these fora are political activities that are not 
constrained by the channels of coiporatist and representative bureaucratic political institutions. 
They constitute practices "that belong to an intermediate sphere between ’private* pursuits and 
concerns, on the one side, and institutional, state-sanctioned modes of politics, on the other"
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(Offe 1985: 82010). They are different from private modes of action (in their usual s e n s e  
denoting person-related familiar, intimate social activity and »skirmish« inside the family a n d  
the circle of friends), as they are connected with some explicit claim that the means of a c t io n  
can be recognized as legitimate and that the ends of action can become binding for s o c ie ty  
(Ibid.: 826/27). They are struggles for the general putting through of specific social p ractices.
The study with regard to these two arenas of political action distinguishes further b e tw ee n  
different fora of political action. It does so by resorting to the publicfprivate dichotomy. A s  
political action is aimed at the rules of living together, it is in a sense in p rin c ip le  
offentlichkeitsorientiert, however not necessarily »public«. Political action, I shall argue, c a n  
take place in public, private and in half public/half private fora and is dependent on w h e th er 
the kind of forum is oriented to publicity, privacy or a »controlled« publicity.
Political action taking place in public fora is principally open, that is to say, v is ib le  
and audible for everybody. To put it in Habermas’ terms, crucial for political action in p u b lic  
fora is the "prinzipielle Unabgeschlossenheit des Publikums" (Habermas 1962: 52ff.). 
Whatever is said and done in public fora diffuses into an immeasurable environment. T h e  
»boundless« audience of the political behavior of a social actor may comprise other political 
actors as well as non-political actors, that is, social actors that simultaneously engage or d o  
not engage in political action. Political action in these fora actually takes place on the horizon 
of all citizens. In short, political action in public fora is distinguished by a high degree o f  
»publicity« and a great »breadth of communication transmission«. In the institutional political 
arena, parliamentary sittings and public hearings are examples of fora of political action »in 
public«. In the noninstitutional political arena political activity in the context of public events 
and in the form of symbolic action are examples of political action »in public«. Political 
activities taking place in public typically are mass media oriented as mass m edia 
representation allows for the greatest publicity and broadest transmission of political 
messages.
When political action takes place in private fora, it means that the number of addressees and 
the size of the audience of political action are principally limited and controlled. Linked to
10 With this definition Offe refers to the »new politics« of the new social movements.
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exclusiveness as a characteristic of private fora of politicai action is the characteristic of 
confidentiality. What is said and done in private fora does not diffuse in the external 
environment as a matter-of-course. Instead, what becomes public typically is based on a joint 
decision of the respective forum-participants. Confidentiality is a key criterium for handling 
publicity in private fora. In short, publicity and breadth of communication transmission is 
relatively low in private fora of political action. In the institutional political arena »corporatist 
negotiation« is an example of political action »in private«, in the noninstitutional political 
arena »post-corporatist negotiation«, that means, state-independent negotiations between 
representatives of different social interests affected by a special problem, sporadically also 
occurs »in camera«.
Political action also takes place in half public/half private fora. In these fora there exist 
rules or agreements about at least a certain extent of publicity, for example on making action 
procedures or results open to the public. In the institutional political arena Enquète- 
Kommissionen are an example of fora of »half public« political action. In the noninstitutional 
political arena »round table« talks with a clear membership and a continual public 
representation via press reporting provides an example of such fora.
2.6 Political Action and Publicity
The degree of publicity of political action varying according to the respective forum of action 
affects the action’s communicative design in three respects. Firsts publicity has a 
strengthening effect on the genuine argumentative thrust of political communication: Publicity 
is directly proportional to self-legitimizing political communication in terms of the public 
interest. The greater the forum audience, the more political actors are likely to explicitly and 
extensively attach their political arguments to ideas, goals, norms and values perceived as 
constituting this public interest Second, publicity has a strengthening effect on the reference 
to generally held values. The greater the forum audience and with that the group of lay people 
as regards the political issue in question, the simpler the mechanisms of opinion-formation 
have to be in order to be effective. As empirical results of the Nachrichtenwerttheorie have 
shown, the attachment of topics and opinions to generally held values and the personalization 
and emotionalization of the topic and opinions providing them with a »human interest«
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character are key techniques to form opinion in a general, dispersed, predominantly lay p u b l i c .  
And third, publicity typically goes along with an increased use of dramatizing c o m m u n ic a tio n  
which is a result o f the political actor’s interest in attracting mass media attention. M a s s  
media attention is not given per se but in conditions of competition is limited and must o f t e n  
be purposively produced11.
3. Business Political Activity as a Multidimensional and Two-Level Activity
The present section, first, recapitulates the preceding conceptual considerations and fo rm u la te s  
on this basis a summary definition of business political activity. Then, it advances the c l a im  
that over the last two and a half decades business political activity has undergone a s ig n ific a n t 
change consisting of a heightened importance attached to the noninstitutional political a r e n a  
as an arena of political action. It is this change which the analysis of business p o litic a l 
involvement in the specific context of technical controversy is to exemplify.
The definitory expositions so far can be summarized as follows: The conceptual basis o f t h e  
concept of business political activity as it shall be employed in this study is an ac tio n - 
typological definition of »political«. This definition conceives of political action as a sp ec ia l 
form of social action that is pursued in the institutional and noninstitutional political a ren a . 
Constitutive of this special form of social action is a threefold action orientation: a p ow er, 
strategic, and dramaturgic orientation. This threefold action orientation results from th e  
specific objectives of political action. These are, first, to have one’s way against the resistance 
of second actors, and second, to achieve the approval of third parties in doing so in order to  
create obligation for that which is to be put through. While the power orientation relates to  
the preservation of interests against alternatives, the strategic orientation to technically correct, 
that is, promising, designs and performance, the dramaturgic orientation refers to th e  
audience- and approval oriented nature of political action. Political action according to th is  
definition constitutes a relationship of coalition and a relationship of power.
11 For reflections on the specific communicative rationality of the public sphere and the way in which this 
rationality is shaped by the constitutive characteristics of this social sphere see Gerhards & Neidhardt (1990:17- 
19).
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By consideration of political action as dramaturgic action, the proposed concept opens 
up a perspective on the cognitive, cultural, and communicative dimension of this type of 
action. It opens up this perspective by determining the approval-oriented consideration and 
communication of a much broader social reality than just one’s own interests as an essential 
aspect of political action. It stresses that, despite every centering on self-interest, political 
action always also has an explicit reference to (more) general concerns and ends, that is, to 
a collective and/or public interest and its underlying norms and values. In brief, it identifies 
the inclusion and communication of some assessment of social worth of one’s interests and 
goals and with that of some reference to current expressions of society’s culture as a basic 
constituent of political action.
The action-typological definition of political as a general social phenomenon avoids 
the exclusive or focal view of actions pursued in the official political arena and opens up the 
view of political action outside this arena. Nevertheless, it concedes central importance to the 
formal political system as a reference point and arena of political action. The concept 
considers this importance a result of the key role that the monopolistic authority and 
legitimatory power of the political system is able to play in the creation of obligation which 
is the ultimate aim of political action.
On the basis of this conceptualization of political action, business political activity generally 
shall be defined as
business activities, pursued in the institutional and/or noninstitutional political arena, 
which are designed to achieve approval for exercising influence on specific and/or 
anonymous social actors according to business interests.
Business political activity is described as an activity that may be pursued inside and outside 
the official political arena. At a very general level it shall be further described as comprising 
two basic modes of communicative action: negotiation, on the one hand, and presentation of 
»facts« and the self, on the other. Presentation also forms part of negotiation. However, the 
analytical distinction between the two modes of communicative action may serve to 
distinguish between business political activity that is largely monological (in the official 
political arena typically referred to as lobbying, in the noninstitutional arena as education or 
image campaigns) and dialogical communication, that means a direct exchange of information 
and arguments (provided that it has a certain level of »proceduralization« and result- and
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policy-orientation, dialogical communication in this study is referred to as »corporatist 
negotiation«, when it takes place in the official political arena and among the state and the 
big established interest groups, and as »post-corporatist negotiation«, when it takes place 
independent of states and among representatives of different social interests affected by a 
specific problem in the non-official political arena).
Looking at the most recent history, I shall formulate the following claim as regards 
business’ resort to the two arenas and basic modes of political action distinguished: In the 
first two postwar decades business political activity was largely restricted to negotiation and 
presentation in the official political arena. Since about the 1970s, however, it has significantly 
expanded by political activities pursued in the noninstitutional political arena. At first, these 
activities almost exclusively consisted in unidirectional communication designed to convey 
»facts« and a favorable business image. Since about the end 1980s, however, an increasing 
part of these activities is dialogical communication pursued in public and half public/half 
private fora taking the form of loosely structured noncommittal face-to-face communication 
(also designed as image-building) as well as communication with a higher level of 
»proceduralization« oriented towards concrete results (designed to build tolerance on the side 
of a new political challenger). This expansion of business political activity, I shall argue, 
constitutes a response to a new political challenge - the new social movements, their »quality- 
of-life« issues, and their politics of public mobilization.
In the 1950s and 1960s the central societal concerns were overall economic growth, advances 
in collective and individual distributional positions, and legal protection of social status. The 
dominant collective actors were political parties and specialized, comprehensive, and highly 
institutionalized interest organizations (Offe 1985: 824). For business this meant that the 
business political environment was restricted to the institutional political arena and that 
political challenges could be met by relying on business’ strong strategic position in the 
system of intermediation; business political activity could be limited to power- and approval- 
oriented activities as regards the state, the unions, and occasionally the scientific community 
and pursued »in camera«. With the emergence of the new social movements the business 
political environment, so to speak, »expanded« as a result of a new collective actor on the 
political scene seeking to politicize the »established« institutions "in ways that are not 
constrained by the channels of representative-bureaucratic political institutions" (Offe 1985:
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820), and of new societal concerns related to environmental, health, and safety issues and 
questions of identity developing with the increasing »institutionalization« of the new 
collective actor. Business has found its activities more and more questioned on the basis of 
these new societal concerns which imply new demands on the societal responsibility of 
economic organizations. In short, economic organizations since the 1970s have undergone a 
profound process of politicization and moralization. This process, I shall argue, has induced 
these organizations to move onto the noninstitutional political arena and engage in the active 
creation o f public support for their activities. It has induced business to involve in educational 
activities (referred to in this study as »informatory education«) and image-building activities 
(here the study distinguishes between confidence-building and identity-building 
communication).
The immediate major targets of these types of political activity are the 
interested!concerned public, opinion makers (journalists, politicians, top executives of science 
and the economy) and »credibility groups«, that means, groups with the societal reputation 
of being especially trustworthy (teachers, students, professors, church representatives, and 
practitioners). The immediate action goal is to induce these population groups to approve of 
business activities that are objects of new social movement criticism or protest, to create a 
public opinion climate favorable to business views and positions and unfavorable to 
movement views and positions. For the achievement of this goal the approval of opinion 
makers is attributed special importance. Opinion makers are to be provoked into sympathetic 
responses to business opinions and convictions calculated to take effect as a multiplier of 
these opinions and convictions in the mass media and the population.
The ultimate target of business political activity in the public arena is the state: The 
pressure of a business-friendly public opinion climate is to prompt the state to take decisions 
that favor private enterprise. The ultimate goal of business public communication is to gain 
state approval of business technology policy; business public communication is to win state 
approval indirectly. State approval in its turn is to help improve public opinion on business 
technology policy.
Business political activity in the noninstitutional arena has not only targeted the 
interested/concemed public and opinion makers. It has also targeted its major challenger in 
this arena: the new social movements. In about the late 1980s business has started to
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increasingly engage in »post-corporatist negotiations« with these actors. The principal g o a l 
that business pursues with these state-independent negotiations is the creation of tolerance o f  
business activities on the side of the protest actors. The mobilization of public support - in  
the form of a favorable »published« public opinion and/or a favorable population opinion 
(which reaches its highest visibility in form of results of public opinion polls) also serves to  
provide a special »trump« that can be used in these interorganizational negotiations.
Technical controversy is a situation of societal conflict typically provoked by new social 
movement actors and centered on »quality-of-life« issues. In this societal context, I shall 
claim, a large part of business political activity has been pursued in the noninstitudonal 
political arena aimed at education and the building of image and tolerance. The following 
chapter proposes a classification of business political activity in technical controversy which 
represents this claim.
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in .  APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVITY TO 
TECHNICAL CONTROVERSY
Before the quintessence of the developed model of business political activity is applied to the 
issue-specific context of technical controversy, a further specification of this model is 
necessary. This specification refers to the exclusion of the microstructural level, in terms of 
the political behavior of individual managers, from the analysis. The model conceives of 
business political activity as an organizational - independent and collective - activity that is 
intended to accomplish the political objectives of a firm and/or a collectivity of firms. 
Business organizational behavior that refers to the political behavior of an individual firm the 
model denotes as Corporate Political Activity, business organizational behavior that refers to 
the co-ordinated political behavior of a collectivity of firms the model denotes as Collective 
Business Political Activity, In the special case that the economic organizations acting 
collectively belong to the same industry, the term is Industrial Political Activity (this type of 
business political activity typically takes the form of associational activity).
On the basis of this additional specification and the hypothesis advanced in the 
preceding section we can note, that the business political activity concept as it is used in the 
context of this study refers to
business independent and collective organizational activity in the context o f technical 
controversy, pursued in the institutional and noninstitutional political arena, that is 
designed to achieve the approval o f  third parties o f preserving organizational interests 
against the resistance o f other social actors1.
In the following two sections this concept of business political activity is used to, first, sketch 
the relational field  in which business political activity in modem technical controversy takes 
place, that means, to concretize business political activity in this situation of societal conflict 
as a specific FreundlFeind-islatiomhip. Then, it is employed to classify this political activity. 
I shall distinguish between five major types of communicative action in which business 
organizations in this specific relational field engage in order to lastingly succeed with their 1
1 It shall be made explicit at this point that the term social actors is used to point out that the addressees 
of business polidcal activity in technical controversy - including antagonists and sought-after allies - as a rule 
are social systems such as groups, organizations, associations, and institutions which concrete persons as role- 
holders merely represent
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technology policy.
1. The Relational Field or Business Political Activity in Technical Controversy
The concern of the present section is, so to speak, to »give names« to the (direct and indirect) 
addressees of business political activity - who so far have been presented as mere abstract 
structural phenomena - with respect to the specific situation of technical controversy. O n a  
general assessment of business political activity in recent controversies over m odem  
technology (such as the controversy about nuclear energy, conflicts over the use of specific 
products of chemistry, and debates on the handling of waste) and under special consideration 
of business political activity in the societal conflict over genetic engineering, I shall describe 
business political activity in technical controversy as a business behavior that is directed 
against the interests of a specific social actor and at gaining the approval of specific th ird  
parties of protecting business interests against the interests of this other social actor. T hat 
means, the underlying claim of the following exposition is that modem technical controversy 
is characterized by a specific business antagonist and specific sought-after business allies. 
With business antagonist I shall refer to the social actor who participates as a political actor 
in the controversy and among all political participants represents those interests which differ 
most from the interests of business. Therefore, the »antagonist« presents the biggest threat to  
business interests and that social actor upon whom business, in particular, seeks to impose its 
will. With sought-after business allies I shall refer to the social actors that business, in 
particular, seeks to make accept the imposition of its will upon the political antagonist. The 
»sought-after allies« do not need to be political participants in the controversy. They may be 
politically active, but also passively interested or (so far) entirely indifferent social actors.
1.1 The Business Antagonist
As Mazur (1981) convincingly has pointed out, in modem technical controversy there are 
typical roles which are occupied by specific social actors. The typical roles refer to the two 
opposing positions in this specific type of societal conflict These are termed the »proponent
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position« presenting the position which supports the technology and the »opponent position« 
constituting the position that opposes the technology, either wholly or in specific fields of 
application, and consequently also the technology proponents (Mazur 1981: 43). The 
»proponent side« Mazur describes as being made up of some combination of corporate 
business, government bodies, and professional associations and organizations. The »opponent 
side« is identified as a combination of environmental, consumer, citizens* groups and ad-hoc 
groups formed specifically to protest against the specific technology.
1 shall draw on and support this structural description of technical controversy on the 
interactive level in so far as I identify some combination of new social movement groups and 
organizations (including »Green Parties« as the institutional anchorage of the new social 
movements at the level of official politics) and citizens* and ad-hoc groups as that collectivity 
of social actors that in technical controversy has the role of the major technology opponent 
and consequently also of the major business opponent In order to denote their political role 
as active technology opponents and business challengers and their social position as non- 
established, system-unspecific social actors, I shall term these organizations and groups »civil 
protest actors«. OV/7 protest actors in this study are determined as the key antagonist of 
business in technical controversy, to be more precise, of those business actors that have a 
special interest in the development, promotion, and implementation of the technology at issue. 
Civil protest actors strive for a mobilization of the public against the technology at issue and 
its proponents and the exertion of influence on political decision-making. Their aims are to 
call attention to risks associated with the technology, to spread arguments on the technology’s 
riskiness and dangerousness, and to try by political or legal steps to restrict or prevent the use 
o f the technology2.
2 Civil society, following Habermas, is understood as a system of voluntary associations, non-statal and non­
economic, which root the communicative structures of public opinion in the realm of life. These associations 
constitute the organizational substrate of that public of citizenry which emerges from private life and which seeks 
public interpretations for its interests and social experiences and the exertion of influence on the institutionalized 
formation of opinion and will. A major part of these associations belong to what has been called the »new social 
movement sector«. In the present study the terms civil protest actors and new social movement actors are used 
as synonyms. Adopting a definition by Gerlach, I shall broadly define these social actors as "groupts] of people 
who are organized for, ideologically impelled by and committed to purpose which implements some form of 
personal or social-cultural change; and who are actively engaged in the recruitment of others, and whose 
influence is spreading in opposition to the established order within which it originated" (Gerlach 1987: 112). 
More specifically I shall understand them as a new type of collective actor which on the one hand expresses 
doubts about unlimited technical and industrial progress, the desire for more quality of life, and the wish for 
more political participation, and on the other hand increasingly succeeds in exerting influence on the field of 
public communication. It is important to note that the social actors referred to by these definitions include citizen
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1.2 The Sought-After Business Allies: A Typology
I also agree with Mazur that there is typically some collectivity of »established« social a c t o r s  
that, together with those business actors that have a stake in the respective technology, f o r m  
the proponent side in technical controversy. As opposed to Mazur, however, I shall ta k e  a  
different view on the »establishment side«. In an action-theoretical and p ro cess-o rien ted  
perspective I propose to distinguish between that part of the »establishment« the interests o f  
which are similar to or overlap with business* interests as regards the technology at issue a n d  
which out of these original interests sides with business and that part of the »establishm ent«  
which business in the process of technical controversy has convinced (or has sought t o  
convince) to passively and/or actively support the technology at issue, for instance, b y  
directing attention towards similar or overlapping interests or by declaring business in te re s ts  
as being in the general public interest The latter »established« actors form part of the so u g h t-  
after allies of business in technical controversy. This differentiated view serves simply t o  
emphasize that support of business technology policy also from the »establishment« is n o t  
necessarily the »self-evident« result of a correspondence or overlap of interests but may b e  
the effect of business strategic action.
But it is not »established« actors in terms of state actors and the big social in te re s t 
groups only whose support business organizations have sought in this type of societal conflict. 
Spatially defined parts of the population, the public at large and protest actors, too, have b e en  
the target of business political activity. In essence five types of sought-after business a llie s  
in technical controversy can be distinguished of which the fifth concerns a special case o f  
business political action in this context:
(1) decision-makers in politics and administration in the field of technology policy  
and representatives of that part of science and economy (including the trade 
unions) taking a particular (institutional) interest in the technology at issue;
(2) representatives of opinion-making professions/social groups and/or credibility 
groups such as journalists, politicians, top executives of science and economy,
action committees; though these citizen groups are special in their concerns and organization in those cases in  
which this difference is of no or minor importance they are - for the sake o f brevity - subsumed under the 
concepts o f civil protest actors and new social movement actors.
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teachers, students, professors, church representatives, practitioners;
(3) the local public within the sphere of business locations;
(4) the interested and/or concerned public, and finally,
(5) civil protest actors, that is, the antagonist itself.
The theoretical construction of a social group of actors as political antagonist and sought-after 
ally of a political actor (type 5) appears paradoxical only at first sight It concerns the special 
case of this study’s conceptualization of business political action, which, however, is to be 
understood as, so to speak, deduced from the typical triadic situation (see Chapter II., f t  5): 
The political actor, on the one hand, aims at preserving his will against the resistance of his 
political antagonist, and, on the other, at gaining, nevertheless, approval of this of the political 
antagonist What could an action, pursuing simultaneously these two goals, look like? Such 
action may consist in the making of concessions to the political antagonist not as far as one’s 
basic interests at issue are concerned but concessions as regards minor related interests. In 
technical controversy, business usually does not make concessions to its political antagonist 
which mean a clear self-restriction in using the technology in question. Typically, concessions 
concern the safety and/or informational policy pursued with regard to specific technology 
applications. These concessions are usually not aimed at building consent as regards the 
protested technology or technology application - the political antagonist may stay in 
opposition to these. Rather, the aim is, by demonstrating readiness to negotiate about selected 
matters of the technology’s implementation, to make the political antagonist reduce its active 
resistance to some extent. The aim is to defuse and control this resistance by directing the 
political activity of the antagonist to matters of secondary importance.
To act successfully in the dyadic situation is more difficult than in the triadic situation. 
It presupposes a political antagonist who regards it a futile attempt to protect his fundamental 
interests against the political actor’s interests, on the one hand, and who does not shrink from 
entering into negotiations, that is, into an interaction that might jeopardize his own political 
identity, on the other. Furthermore, successful political action presupposes more political skill 
as, contrary to the triadic situation, it is not possible to build stable backstages and to produce 
and use common secret knowledge (Hitzler 1995: 291).
Among the sought-after business allies in technical controversy decision-makers in politics
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and administration take up a special position. This special position results from the a b o v e  
expounded role of the political system as the central agent of control and guidance in m o d e r n  
society. Political and administrative decision-makers together with the representatives o f  t h a t  
part of science and economy taking a particular interest in the technology at issue c a n  b e  
described as the, so to speak, »traditional« addressees o f business political activity. T h e  
opinion-making professions/social groups and credibility groups, local communities w ith in  t h e  
sphere o f business locations, the public at large, and civil protest actors, however, have b e e n  
addressed by business only in recent times in the specific context of technical con tro v ersy . 
In technical controversy, business obviously perceives activities aimed at coming to t e r m s  
with the state and the big organized social interests alone not as sufficient to protect i t s  
interests.
How do business organizations attempt concretely to gain the approval of the five d iffe re n t 
types of social actors just listed in order to be able to lastingly succeed with their techno logy  
policy? I shall argue that business organizations in the specific context of tech n ica l 
controversy engage in five major types of approval production.
2. A Typology of Business Political Activity in Technical Controversy: 
Distinguishing Five Types of Approval-Oriented Communicative Action
On the basis of the proposed concept of business political activity I suggest to distinguish f iv e  
types of business political activity in modem technical controversy. These five types are  
corporatist negotiation, post-corporatist negotiation informatory education, confidence- 
building*, and identity-building (see table l)3 4. That is, I suggest to classify business political
3 The characterization of informatory education and confidence-building as specific types of business political 
activity in technical controversy in some basic aspects follows Wiedemann’s characterization of information 
provision respectively credibility-building as two of four strategies of risk communication (the other tw o 
strategies which Wiedemann distinguishes are co-operation strategy and conflict management strategy) 
(Wiedemann 1990).
4 The proposed typology consists of five ideal types of business political activity. The five types distinguished 
are abstractions based on a  concentration on and one-sided exaggeration of specific elements of business political 
activity that are attributed special importance. In reality, the boundaries between the types are fluid; one often 
finds mixings.
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activity in terms of different modes o f  approval-oriented communicative action which 
comprise the two basic modes of negotiation and presentation o f »facts« and the self 
Communicative action is understood as action which has the following four basic functions: 
to represent certain circumstances (representative function); to influence the addressee(s) of 
communication in a cognitive and/or emotional respect and/or with respect to their behavior 
(appellative function); to represent the communicator itself (self-representative function); and 
finally, to define and change relations between social actors (relational function)5 (Schulz von 
Thun 1988).
In accordance with the definitoiy thrust of the proposed concept of business political 
activity the organizing dimension of this classification is not business’ interactive relationship 
with its antagonists but business’ interactive relationship with its potential and sought-after 
allies. It does not chiefly regard the power aspect but the dramaturgic aspect of business 
political involvement.
The following expositions are organized as follows: Individual sections are devoted to the five 
types of business political activity just listed. In each section, I shall describe the respective 
type of communicative action by determining its addressees, the extent of interactive 
immediacy, the extent of dialogic drift, that function of the four basic functions of 
communicative action just listed which is the most pronounced, the terms of content, the main 
logic it applies for approval production, and finally, the fora in which it is typically brought 
to bear.
5 In real communication these four functions are connected with each other. However, one of the functions 
may be the central one, dependent on the problem perceived and the goals strived for (Wiedemann 1990: 346).
85
Corporatist-
Negotiation
Post-Corpora- 
tist Negotia­
tion
lnformatory
Education
Confidence-
Building
Identity-
Building
Arena institutional
political
noninstitutio- 
nal political
noninstitutio- 
nal political
noninstitutio- 
nal political
noninstitutio- 
nal political
Breadth of 
Transmission
low low high high high
Fora esp. legislative 
and executive 
settings
e.g. communi­
ty advisory 
panels, con­
fidential cor­
porate dia­
logue, partici­
pative techno­
logy assess­
ment projects
e.g. seminars, 
lectures, exhi­
bitions, print 
media articles, 
brochures
e.g. issue and
institutional
advertising,
brochures,
Open Days,
plant tours,
discussion
events, post-
corporatist
negotiation
e.g. issue 
advertising
Priority
Targets
state, unions,
research
community
community 
groups, protest 
and other 
social actors
opinion
makers,
concerned/
interested
public
opinion
makers,
concerned/
interested
public
opinion
makers,
concerned/
interested
public
Ultimate
Goal
influence on 
state politics 
by collective 
agreements
influence on 
protest politics 
by collective 
agreements
influence on 
state politics 
via public 
opinion- 
formation
influence on 
state politics 
via public 
opinion- 
formation
influence on 
state politics 
via public 
opinion- 
formation
Immediacy direct
communication
direct
communication
direct and
mediated
communication
direct and
mediated
communication
mediated
communica­
tion
Dialogic Drift two-way- 
communication
two-way- 
communication
one-way- 
communication
one-way- and
two-way-
communication
one-way-
communica­
tion
Main
Content
policy-oriented policy-oriented factual normative moralistic)
Central Co­
mmunicative 
Function
relational relational representative self-
representative
appellative
Main Logic 
Applied
collective
rationality
collective
rationality
scientific-
technical
rationality
cultural reason moral reason
>le 1: Types of Business Political Activity in Technical Controversy
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2.1 Corporatist Negotiation
The first type of business political activity that I shall present is corporatist negotiation6.
Corporatist negotiation shall be defined as
business political activity that is designed to gain approval for business technology 
policy from  a limited number o f social actors, including representatives o f the politico- 
administrative system and, dependent on the issue, organized labor artdfor the 
scientific community, with this approval taking the form  o f collective agreements 
worked out in a process o f policy-oriented, direct, two-way-communication which 
takes place in the institutional political arena.
Negotiation defined in general terms refers to direct two-way-communication with a certain 
extent of »proceduralization« and result-orientation. It includes a limited number of persons 
and typically (however not necessarily) takes place »behind closed doors«. The output to be 
collectively produced typically is not an agreement on a single action but agreement on a set 
of related actions, that is, a specific policy; in terms of content negotiation can be 
characterized as policy-oriented. Negotiation can further be described as action that exerts 
influence on the relations between a limited number of social actors. It is the relational 
function which is particularly pronounced with this type of action.
The political actor who engages in negotiation may bank on concessions, threats, and 
persuasive appeals to promote an agreement which optimally protects his interests. However, 
the basis on which negotiation is to create lasting support of these interests is the willingness 
and ability to compromise. In negotiation the political actor ascribes to the collective output 
a value of its own and hence puts up with a certain restriction of his specific interests. 
Basically negotiation is to achieve approval of one's interests by demonstration of the 
willingness and ability to »rationally« co-operate with others: The banking on a collective 
rationality7 (relating to the whole of the negotiation parties) is a major characteristic of
6 For a study on corporatist intermediation that has developed, to different degrees, in European democracies 
in the twentieth century see, among many others, Schmitter & Lehmbruch (1979).
7 »Collective rationality« shall be defined as a logic according to which cooperative action leads to a  general 
situation that improves the individual situation o f all co-operating parties.
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negotiation8.
The present section deals with negotiation as a type of business political activity w hich i s  
pursued in the official political arena and typically »in camera« and involves the pa rtic ipa tion  
of the politico-administrative system and, dependent on the issue, organized labor and/or t h e  
research community, those interests affected by the technology at issue which are so c ia lly  
dominant. It is mainly business associations but also big corporations which engage in  
corporatist negotiation in modem technical controversy. Key matters of negotiation are th e  
public funding of technology research and development and regulation of risks, that is, s ta te  
promotional and control policies.
There are various fora in the political arena (which in technical controversy ac tually  
comprises the national political arena and the political arena of the European Union w h e re  
more and more basic decisions on national technology policy are taken) in which business 
organizations engage in negotiation ranging from informal meetings to commissions a n d  
advisory bodies and committees.
Especially in negotiation procedures which are rather informal, economic 
argumentation is of central importance. Business in this context typically seeks to win support 
by pointing to disadvantages for the national (and/or European) economy such as loss o f  
national (and/or European) competitiveness that would result from restrictions of the 
technology’s development and/or implementation. Usually, this argumentation is advanced in 
direct communication and submitted as texts in form of collective statements and memoranda; 
collective statements and memoranda form the »material« basis of negotiation. A typical 
means of negotiation that business organizations employ above all in informal contexts is the 
threat o f  relocating research and production facilities abroad. This threat is, so to speak, a 
»standard« business statement in technical controversy, above all directed at the political 
decision-maker. A typical means of negotiation applied in the context of regulatory debates 
is concessions in terms of »voluntary« s e l f  obligations which may take the form of industry­
wide safety measures or guidelines concerning the more general handling of the technology 8
8 While political activity by definition has a reference to a rationality that goes beyond the consideration of 
the particularistic values and interests of the political actor, negotiation as a specific type of political activity is 
further characterized by the reference to a specific collective rationality considering the different values and 
interests of the collectivity of the negotiating parties.
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at issue. Self-regulatory measures typically are to produce agreement on the abandonment of 
(more restrictive) state regulation.
In negotiation procedures which are more formal, for instance in advisory commissions, the 
importance of economic argumentation is relativized due to the specific »forum rules« 
basically resulting from the formal commission tasks. In committees advising on safety 
classifications of technical risks, for instance, business needs to widely restrict argumentation 
to scientific-technical data and argumentation. In technology-focused Enquête-Kommissionen, 
on the other hand, it has to take a more general, multidimensional view on the technology at 
issue. These parliamentary commissions axe designed to grasp and describe, in co-operation 
with political experts and experts of »societal practice«, technologies or specific technology 
applications in all of their complexity including their complex effects on society and on this 
basis work out future-oriented policy proposals. They differ from the typical corporatist 
negotiation in so far as they operate in a half public/half private forum (the higher degree of 
»publicity« in the form of joint press statements and publication of the negotiation results also 
induces business to take a more holistic view on the issue) and often include participants who 
are not plainly representatives of the major interest groups (for example, experts in law or the 
social sciences).9
9 The Enquête-Kommission, one o f the most intensive forms of parliamentary policy advising in Germany, 
in the last decades has significantly gained in importance as a forum of business political negotiation in technical 
controversy. The parliamentary commission of inquiry, with the help of which more complex and significant 
subject-matters are assessed, has advanced in the course of the 1980s to the special form of parliamentary 
treatment of specific technologies (nuclear energy and genetic engineering as two highly conflictual technologies 
have been the subject-matter of Enquête-Kommissionen) and technically induced problems (more recent Enquête- 
Kommissionen have dealt with such problems under the overarching subject-matters of climate change and 
sustainable industrial development). Enquête-Kommissionen are »mixed« commissions composed of members 
o f the Bundestag of the different political parties and »experts« (appointed by the parties) who include 
»independent« scientific experts (comprising natural and social scientists) and experts of »societal practice« with 
the latter usually being representatives of industry, the trade unions, and the research community, and, recently, 
sometimes also representatives of the environmental movement. Enquête-Kommissionen are distinguished from 
more traditional forms of parliamentary policy advising in so far as they assign (at least theoretically) equal 
status to parliamentary and non-parliamentary commission members with decisions that have to be voted on. As 
von Thienen (1989:93) puts it, with Enquête-Kommissionen the demarcation line of the classic model o f policy 
advising, between the "(entscheidungsohnmâchtigen) Beraterals Informationslieferanten und dem (wertorientien 
handelnden) politischen Entscheider als Informationsbearbeiter" (von Thienen 1987:93) according to tendency 
is abolished.
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2.2 Post-Corporalist Negotiation
Business organizations do not only involve in negotiations in the official political arena in  th e  
context of technical controversy. Since about the second half of the 1980s individual 
corporations and trade associations do also increasingly engage in negotiations in the 
noninstitutional political arena. Drawing on the model of a "post-corporatist order" in  
advanced modem society developed by Eder (1996b; 192ff.10) this type of business political 
activity shall be referred to as post-corporatist negotiation. Post-corporatist negotiation shall 
be defined as
business political activity that is designed to gain approval for business technology  
policy from  a limited number o f social actors, including new social movement actorsf 
with this approval taking the form  o f collective agreements worked out in a process 
o f policy-oriented, direct, two-way-communication which takes place in the 
noninstitutional political arena.
The social actors whose approval business seeks to achieve in these state-independent 
negotiations are. in the first place, selected groups/organizations of the new social movement 
sector including local citizen groups. The involvement of economic organizations in 
negotiation in the noninstitutional political arena, in the first instance, is meant to produce 
tolerance on the side of local and supra-regional protest actors of business technology policy. 
This tolerance individual corporations or trade associations attempt to gain by giving 
empirical proof of the willingness to plan and perform technology policy in a continual »feed 
back« with the critical direct and wider societal environment.
The fora in which economic organizations engage in post-corporatist negotiation range from 
informal and sporadic meetings to »round table« negotiations, that is to say, negotiations that 
have been institutionalized for a certain or indefinite period of time. These round tables may 
be locally focused and organized as negotiation between corporate actors and representatives
10 Eder identifies the characteristic element of this order as an increasing decoupling of the self-organization 
of the emerging institutional order in advanced modem society from the state, the emergence of a  negotiated f
order beyond the market and the state, and a new legitimating ideology supporting these arrangements (Eder (
1996b: 194). The model attributes to social movements and collective mobilization a constitutive role for the [
generation of this order. According to Eder, the phenomenon of systems of negotiation outside the classic-formal j
political arena is the key to the institutional transformation that accompanies the rise of nature as a collective f
concern for a common good (Eder 1996b: 192). f
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of local citizen groups and other major local groups as is the case, for instance, with the 
"Gesprachskreis Hoechster NachbanT, a local discussion forum which the chemical enterprise 
Hoechst has set up in order to »institutionalize« the company-neighborhood dialogue and 
which deals, among other things, with technical matters. Or they may take place on a more 
general level and be organized as negotiations between corporate or industry actors and 
representatives of social movement organizations and possibly other social actors as is the 
case, for example, with the Unilever ’’Genetic Engineering Dialogue" initiated in different 
countries by the Dutch food company Unilever. This dialogue has the objective to work out 
lines of consent in the field of novel food. In Germany the participants in these negotiations 
included the environmental organization "Bund fur Uniwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland" 
(BUND) and the consumer organization "Verbraucher Initiative" (VI). While in the case of 
the local round table the negotiations are held »in public« - journalists and the interested 
public are invited to act as an audience of the negotiations - in the case of the supraregional 
round table they have been held »in private«; even the existence of the German Unilever 
dialogue (which has finished recently) was made public only after about one year of debate 
(Die Zeit 7.7.1995, p.25; see for these examples of post-corporatist negotiation Part B, point
III.2.4.2).
Key matters of post-corporatist negotiation instigated by or entered into voluntarily by 
business are technical safety and ecological compatibility of industrial/corporate research and 
production facilities and technology products, and industrial/corporate informatory 
responsibilities. The major line of reasoning of the economic organizations is scientific- 
technical argumentation on technological safety for man and environment. Typical means of 
negotiation are concessions as regards extensions and improvements of corporate/industrial 
safety and informatory measures.
2.3 Inform atory Education
Business does not only engage in negotiations in the noninstitutional political arena. It also 
engages in the presentation of »facts« and self-presentation activities targeted at a larger 
public. In this section I shall present the conveyance of »factual« knowledge as a specific type
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of business political activity in technical controversy. I shall refer to this activity a s
informatory education. Informatory education shall be defined as
business political activity that is designed to achieve the approval o f  b u s in e s s  
technology policy directly from  opinion makers and the interested!concerned p u b l ic  
and ultimately from the state by opinion-formation via the imparting o f  »fa c tu a l«  
knowledge with a special focus on scientific-technical information. In fo rm a to ry  
education is practiced above all in the public arena as direct and mediated one-w a y  -  
communication.
Economic organizations engaging in informatory education attempt to create a public o p in io n  
climate favorable to business views and interests by the supply of information on this p o lic y  
and the technology at issue. The goal is to educate the selected targets on the basis of th is  
information about the technology and the way it is developed and used by business. 
Informatory education is pursued by business associations as well as big corporations in  
various fora in the public arena. There are on the one hand seminars, lectures, and exhibitions, 
fora in which informatory education is practiced as direct communication. On the other hand, 
there are the mass media (radio, television, print media); business performs inform atory 
education also as mediated communication, for example, in the form of issue-related 
newspaper articles. Moreover, business organizations spread information by their own m edia 
such as brochures and newspapers. A special characteristic of business political 
communication in the educative mode is that the flow of communication is unidirectional 
from the political actor to his targets. Informatory education is one-way communication.
The assumption underlying this type of business communicative action is that while support 
of the selected targets grows with the extent of factual knowledge of business technology 
policy and the technology at issue, the reasons for non-acceptance are on the one hand 
ignorance or superficial knowledge and on the other misinformation caused by non-balanced 
media reports and protest communication placing the emphasis on potential detrimental effects 
of industrial and other applications of the technology and misperceptions and fears arising 
from that ignorance/superficial knowledge and misinformation. From this assumption it is 
concluded that approval of the targeted groups is best achieved and the concern of these 
groups best allayed or prevented by providing them with sufficient and »sound« information 
by knowledgeable experts, information which brings the groups* perception and evaluation 
into line with those of the »experts«. Informatory education thus places the emphasis on the
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representative aspect of communicative action. It seeks to influence the cognitive factors of 
opinion-formation.
»Sound« information is characterized as factual, »objective« information. In terms of 
content, informatoiy education basically is factual communication. Its special focus is on 
scientific-technical factual knowledge. The logic which in infoimatory education in particular 
comes to use is scientific-technical rationality11, the rationality which business traditionally 
utilizes as proof of argumentative superiority in public and political discourse1 2 13. It is the 
knowledge, skills, and authority of scientific-technical experts that this type of business 
political activity banks on for approval production. Scientific-technical reason is meant to de- 
emotionalize and de-dramatize public discourse and to create an »objective« public view of 
the technology at issue and its different applications.
The information provided by business educative policy in technical controversy is 
multifarious. It comprises on the one hand information on the general role of science and 
technology in modem society and the specific role of the respective technology in question 
and business’ use of this technology in current and future society(ies). For example, 
information is provided that shows how medical technology in the last centuries has increased 
life expectancy or that the application of modem biotechnologies in agriculture is necessary 
to secure in the long term a sufficient world food supply. Information on this level focuses 
on the communication of the societal benefits of technological development, on the relations 
between scientific-technical progress and societal welfare and business’ contributions to the 
societal welfare by promoting scientific-technical progress. It often combines factual 
information and scientific-technical data that provide the basis of normative conclusions in 
terms of a societal and industrial obligation to develop and use the respective technology with 
technology images of familiarity and naturalness. Factual information is embedded in 
portrayals of the technology and its products as rooted in familiar, thus graspable, and natural
11 »Scientific-technical rationality« may be determined with Plough & Krimsky (1987) as a form of thinking 
that "rests on explicitly defined sets of principles and scientific norms" (1987: 8) which include "hypothetico-
dcductive methods, a common language for measurement, and quantification and comparison across risk events" 
(Ibid.).
13 However, the importance of this kind of rationality as a means o f producing approval of modem 
technology and business technology policy in the recent past more and more has declined in importance; to 
demonstrate this is one aim of the present study.
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processes. »Normalization« and »naturalization« of technical developments serve to support 
factual information in de-emotionalizing public discourse.
The focus of informatory education, however, is on technical risk. Information is supplied on 
the nature and dimension of the risks of the technology at issue and measures taken for risk  
reduction and safety maximization. Technology risks are communicated as a fundamentally 
technical issue, that is, as a problem that can be accurately assessed and solved by technical 
means (social, political, and cultural risk categories largely remain unconsidered in  
informatory communication). Communication about technical risk often is accompanied by 
information on the general safety philosophy advocated by business, that means, on business’ 
view of how uncertainty and indistinctness should be treated in principle. This information 
seeks to provide answers to questions such as: Are technical risks principally avoidable? Have 
they attained a new quality? Is life today more risky than yesterday? How can risks be 
assessed and what are the possibilities for a responsible handling of risks? The tenor of the 
answers is that uncertainty and risk are existential constituents of industrial society as they 
are an integral part of technology and technology society’s material basis of existence. 
Consequently, it is argued, the objective o f risk policy could not be the removal of risk by 
prohibition but would have to be risk management in the sense of a best possible risk 
assessment, calculation, minimization, and control. Informatory education on this level 
basically takes the form of technical risk communication that is meant to convey the message 
of the highest possible standard of technical safety. Technical safety and the correspondence 
o f technical progress with societal progress present the main messages of this type o f 
business political activity.
2.4 Confidence-Building
Another type o f political activity that economic organizations in the context of technical 
controversy pursue in the public arena is confidence-building. Confidence-building shall be 
defined as
business political activity that is designed to gain the approval o f business technology 
policy directly from opinion makers and the interested! concerned public and ultimately 
from  the state by opinion-formation via the enhancement o f business social credibility
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and trustworthiness. Confidence-building is basically normative communication in 
terms o f communication that declares business technology policy in fu ll conformity 
with society's norms and values and is practiced above all in the public arena as 
mediated and direct, monologic and dialogic communication.
As distinguished from informatory education confidence-building proceeds on the assumption 
that it is business social credibility and trustworthiness rather than factual knowledge which 
forms the basis of the targets’ approval of business technology policy and the technology 
itself. Approval and disapproval are understood as depending to a great extent on how much 
confidence the targeted groups have in business generally as a societal institution and 
specifically as a technology promotor and user. The assumption further holds that due to the 
emergence and diffusion of a modernization-critical perspective, this societal confidence has 
decreased in the last decades and that there exists, consequently, fertile ground for widespread 
disapproval of both the technology at issue and its proponents. From this assumption it is 
concluded that confidence of the targeted groups in business has to be (re)produced in order 
to achieve acceptance and reduce the effectiveness of communications of the business 
antagonist to the targets. Such trust is considered of central importance for approval 
production and so the targets are characterized by high social credibility and trustworthiness - 
especially, teachers, professors, church representatives, and practitioners; sympathetic 
responses from these groups to business technology policy are considered to have a generally 
strengthening effect on business social credibility and trustworthiness.
Confidence is built by . conveying the message of business as an 
organizational/interorganizational system that is not secluded from its societal environment 
but open to it; that in developing and implementing a technology policy, is open to society’s 
concerns, needs, and expectations and willing and capable to orientate its actions according 
to the norms and values underlying these concerns, needs, and expectations. In short, the 
message to be transmitted characterizes business as a public-interest-institution willing and 
capable of societal co-operation and the subordination of self-interests to the public good. 
Confidence-building in this respect differs from communication in the educative mode which 
also stresses the contributions of business technology policy to the societal welfare in that it 
expressly communicates these contributions as the result of a well-conceived business socio­
political responsibility. It is meant to give evidence of the functional role of business in
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society and of business social and moral responsibility as the basis of this role’s performance; 
it is meant to give evidence of business as a morally behaving agent In comparison w ith 
educative communication communication in the confidence-building mode has a much more 
pronounced self-representing function.
In terms of content this type of business political activity, pursued by individual corporations 
as well as business associations, basically presents normative communication. It is 
communication about business acting in full conformity with society’s norms and values. The 
logic underlying business communication in the confidence-building mode is based on the 
perception of what constitutes societally appropriate business policy on technology 
development and use. It holds that the documentation of the societal appropriateness o f 
business technology policy is necessary for the creation of business credibility and 
trustworthiness in the context of technical controversy. It is cultural reason13 which is the 
main logic applied for approval production.
Societally appropriate technology policy is basically defined as a policy that safeguards 
and/or promotes human safety, health and environmental soundness and that is in continual 
exchange with its societal environment It is the societal values of safety, health, a clean 
environment, and participation operationalized as public dialogue upon which business 
communication in the confidence-building mode focuses. A method increasingly applied to 
demonstrate the normative, obligatory character that these values have for business is the 
establishment and public announcement of business self-regulation in terms of codes o f  
conduct committed to these values.
Public dialogue is communicated as a highly appreciated societal value as well as practiced 
as a specific form of public communication. As distinguished from the one-way- 
communication model of informatory education, confidence-building complements monologic 
communication activities with dialogic communication activities. The message of openness 
towards society’s interests and concerns is to be transferred not only by the content of 
communication but also by its form . Especially, face-to-face dialogic communication, the 13
13 »Cultural reason« shall be broadly defined as a  form of logic according to which social reality is shaped 
by the cultural fabric o f society. The term "cultural rationality" has been used by Plough & Krimsky (1987) to 
account for risk communication and set against "scientific-technical rationality".
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immediacy and realness of this kind of communicative encounter is to convey the message 
of a co-operative and consent-oriented stance of business towards society. It is to signal the 
step from positional to discursive communication, that is, reciprocity and openness for the 
revision of one’s own opinion.
The main fora of confidence-building in the form of direct dialogic communication 
are Open Day events, national and regional discussion events, the individual corporation in 
the context of tours of research or production facilities, and the above mentioned »round 
table« talks with participation of local and/or social movement groups.
Business political activity in the confidence-building mode also takes place as 
monologic, mediated communication. In the mass media it is organized, above all, as issue 
and institutional advertising, in business* own media it basically takes the form of self- 
representation and issue-related brochures.
2.5 Identity-Building
There is a second self-presentation activity in which economic organizations engage in the 
public arena. This activity I shall refer to as identity-building. Identity-building shall be 
defined as
business political activity that is designed to gain the approval o f business technology 
policy directly from opinion makers and the interested! concerned public and ultimately 
from the state by opinion-formation via the production o f  moral resonance. Identity­
building basically is m oralistic) communication in terms o f  communication drawing 
the boundary between the Good and the Bad in technical controversy and is practiced 
above all in the public arena as mediated monologic communication.
The basis on which identity-building seeks to gain the targets’ approval is not factual 
knowledge or trust but moral identification. Constructed as a source from which moral self- 
worth can be derived business political communication in the identity-building mode is to 
create moral resonance. It portrays business technology use as a valuable contribution to the 
public good in order to offer the targets the opportunity to be »on the right side« and to fulfill 
the moral responsibilities they have to the society in which they live by committing 
themselves to this policy. By means of dramatization, identity-building communication 
emphatically calls on the targets to seize this opportunity - it constitutes a positive appeal to
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individual and societal moral responsibility. In short, this fourth type of business 
communicative action has a pronounced appellative function and the main logic it applies for 
approval production is moral reason14; it is designed to influence the affective factors o f  
opinion-formation.
Like confidence-building communication, business communication in the identity-building 
mode highlights business* socio-political responsibility. However, while the former focuses 
on business dealing responsibly with technology risks for man and the environment, the latter 
places the emphasis on business acting responsibly by developing and using the disputed 
technology, on business technology policy as being dedicated to the good of society. 
Communication, in the first place, is not defensive but se lf  confident and offensive. It is self- 
confident and offensive as the language used is euphemistic as regards the contributions o f  
the respective technology and business technology policy to the public good - typically 
defined as human health, a sound environment and a sound economy, however, with varying 
foci - and cacophonous as regards the effects of a non-use of the technology on that public 
good. Identity-building does not necessarily imply direct discrediting of those social actors 
advocating issue positions that challenge business technology policy. However, euphemism 
and cacophonism create a polarized structure of terms which means that the moral upgrading 
of one’s own position coincides with the moral downgrading of the opposing position and its 
advocates. Business communication in the identity-building mode basically is moralistic 
communication implying the moralization of the business antagonist The message to be 
conveyed is that of the moral correctness of business technology policy and the moral 
incorrectness of the opponents of this policy. Identity-building banks on the principle of 
(social) inclusion and exclusion.
Identity-building communication basically is organized as mediated, one-way-communication 
in the form of issue-advertising. A means of strengthening the moral credibility of advertising 
communication is the use of »testimonials« in the form of business-friendly statements of 
persons generally acknowledged as moral authorities such as church representatives, ethicists 
or practitioners. It is business associations rather than individual corporations that engage in
reason« shall be broadly defined as a form of thinking that rests on categories of »good« and
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this type of business political activity. Corporations are rather cautious with this more or less 
directly conffontationist communication as there is a high probability that goal achievement - 
creating approval of the targeted groups - goes hand in hand with an intensification of protest 
discourse. The potential damage associated with becoming the focus of this discourse is 
deemed too high for the single corporation. Business associations are a valuable means to 
render antagonists of corporate technology policy »moral outlaws« without these corporations 
having to be visible and risk image-damage.
Summarizing the preceding sections, I have argued that economic organizations in the context 
of technical controversy engage in policy-oriented, »fact«-based, normative and moral 
argumentation for creating approval of business technology policy. The major means of 
approval production are compromise, education, confidence-building and identity-building, the 
major logics applied are collective rationality, scientific-technical rationality, cultural reason, 
and moral reason. Business political activity is pursued »in public«, »in private« and in a 
»half public/half private« sphere.
The basic argument that the proposed classification of business political activity makes is that 
business in the context of technical controversy engages in political activity in institutional 
and noninstitutional political arenas. Looking back on two and a half decades of recurrent 
technical debate, I shall advance the following claim: Since the 1970s business has 
significantly expanded its political involvement as it has ceased to rely exclusively on its 
strategic position in the system of intermediation and more and more has engaged in political 
activities in the noninstitutional political arena to safeguard its technology-related interests. 
Political involvement in the latter arena in this period of time has undergone a significant 
change. Economic organizations decreasingly have solely relied on unidirectional informatory 
education for safeguarding their interests. Instead, in the pursuance of their political 
objectives, they have increasingly complemented educational communication with 
»normative« (confidence-building, identity-building) and interactive communication.
The next chapter attempts to relate these developments to a number of contextual factors. 
These contextual factors comprise forces on the level of culture, sociopolitics (that is, politics 
pursued by »public« actors outside the formal political system), public policy (that is, policy 
formulated through elected representatives), and morals.
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oder moralischer Autoritlt bemessen. (Dyllick 1989: 
XIX. eophasis m original)
IV . EXPLAINING BUSINESS POLITICAL A C TIV ITY  IN  TECHNICAL 
CONTROVERSY
The present chapter expounds the study’s explanans and explanandum. The first sub-chapter 
introduces the explanans which adopts the embeddedness-perspective of neo-institutionalist 
organizational sociology and characterizes technical controversy as a specific type of business 
political environment for which a process of socio-cultural change is constitutive. The second 
sub-chapter presents the explanandum. It describes the scope, design, and dynamics of 
business political activity as influenced by this political environment This second sub-chapter 
advances the argument that business political activity in technical controversy basically is 
cultural politics, a politics aimed at conciliating »business culture« with »societal culture«.
1. Technical Controversy as a Specific Type of Business Political Environment
As has been expounded under point 1.3, organizational analysis in the neo-institutionalist 
»embeddedness-perspective« relates organizational structure and behavior to the cultural- 
institutional environment in which these organizations find themselves embedded. The 
embeddedness-perspective suggests searching for the reasons for diversified and two-level 
business political activity in an environment that exceeds the formal political system which 
traditionally is identified as making up the business political environment It suggests taking 
the sociocultural embeddedness o f  economic organizations into consideration.
In applying the neo-institutionalist perspective, the present study deals with the issue 
o f business political activity in technical controversy by investigating the social phenomenon 
of extensive and continuing public and political debate on modem technology as a process
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o f cultural change initiated and promoted by the new social movements. This process o f  
cultural change refers to the diffusion and stabilization of the idea o f an environmentally a n d  
socially compatible steering o f  technical change. The argument is that in technical controversy 
this process shows effect and that one major effect is a high degree o f public exposure o f  
economic organizations which belong to the industrial sectors which concern goods and  
services that are closely related to life, food, and health (as it is the case with the chemical 
industry). The major indicators of the public exposure of industry organizations are 
characterized as state intervention, parliamentary scrutiny, technology protest, and mass media 
attention. In short, it is argued that the diffusion and stabilization of the newly developed idea 
of how to deal with technology subjects a significant part of business to a process o f  
politicization and moralization in which both institutional and  noninstitutional politics p lay  
a role. For the affected organizations this process means to be plunged into a »crisis o f  
legitimation« which means in its turn a major threat to the organizations* autonomy and 
discretion.
The environment in which the study situates business political activity for analysis thus 
comprises a cultural, moral, sociopolitical, and public policy factor1. By determining »cultural 
change« as part of the political environment, business political involvement is set against the 
background of broader transformations in society’s ideological structure. The following 
sections expound the forces identified as making up the business political environment o f  
technical controversy, that is those environmental forces which are claimed to have a major 
influence on business decisions to act politically and how to act politically.
1 To investigate business political activity as a  reflection of and a  response to an external environment 
conceptualized like that means to choose a level of analysis that is societal. Except from very general 
observations, the following aspects are excluded from analysis: company characteristics (influential factors at 
the organizational level such as scale, resources, and market position), characteristics of industry and business 
structure (influential factors on the supra-organizational and inter-organizational level such as concentration and 
networks of competitive, strategic, and co-operative relations), and managerial features (influential factors at the 
individual level such as uncertainty, experience, values, external networks).
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1.1 The C ultural Factor: Technical Controversy as Value Conflict and Expression
and M otor of Ideological Change
The analytical framework to the study of business political activity that I shall propose 
highlights the role of »culture« in the construction of this type of business activity. »Culture« 
in this context is not restricted to the subjective, inner thought or values of individuals or to 
some indistinct notion of a collective consciousness, but is understood as constituting its own 
objective reality, albeit a socially constructed reality. Culture is recognized as an object of 
orientation existing outside the individual/social actor.
The cultural factor of the business political environment of technical controversy as 
a lasting situation of societal conflict in modem society is determined as a process o f  cultural 
change. This process consists in the dissolution o f the traditional societal consent on how to 
deal with technology and the associated transformation o f the societal ideology on technical 
change. The process set in, I shall argue, with the emergence of the new social movements 
bringing up the fundamental question about the future of industrial society and the role of 
technology in this future. The driving force behind this process, the argumentation goes, is 
the new social movement politics of mobilization. This public- and protest-orientated politics 
has produced a »manifest« politicization o f  technical risk and technical change in general in 
modem society. The basis on which this politicization takes place is a conflict o f values. 
Politicization takes place in the form of a confrontation of the values of individual and 
collective material affluence, private property, efficiency, and hard work - the values to which 
the traditional, fundamentally positive perspective on technical change is primarily orientated - 
and the values of safety, health, a sound environment and a sound relationship between man 
and environment - the values to which the technology-critical perspective of the new social 
movements is above all orientated. The publicly enacted and resonant confrontation of these 
two sets of values has caused traditional societal consent regarding the developmental 
dynamics of technical change to crumble. It has produced new public expectations on how 
these dynamics should be socially steered.
In terms of ideology, this process of dissolution comprises the following two 
developments: On the one hand, the idea on which the traditional societal consent is built, the 
idea of »technical progress equals social progress« attaching special value to material 
affluence, is losing in importance as a mechanism to legitimize technical change and
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technology policy and to build consent regarding these. At the same time the idea generated 
by social movements of a »socially and environmentally compatible technical change« 
orientated to so-called »post-materialist« values is gaining importance as a legitimizing and 
consensus-building mechanism. It is gaining an »ideological« character. As will be expounded 
under point 2., it is fundamental to see this development in order to understand the 
argumentative design of business political communication in the context of technical 
controversy.
1.1.1 The »Materialist« Perspective on Technical Change
Up to the 1970s, throughout the Western world the developmental dynamics of technical 
change was based on a broad societal consent This consent was built on a specific idea: The 
idea that technical progress equals social progress as it increases individual and collective 
material wealth. This idea was especially prominent in the 1950s and early 1960s; these years 
constitute a period of unquestioning faith in technical innovation grounded on its welfare 
effects. The idea of the correllation of technical and social progress forms part of the 
"industrielle Hntwicklungsparadigma" (paradigm of industrial development), as Brand (1982) 
puts it, or of the Fortschrittsideologie (ideology of progress), as this paradigm more generally 
is referred to by German scholars, which is a major institutional logic of advanced modem 
society. In this ideological framework social progress is a function of both technical 
innovation and industrial progress constituting basic requirements for increases in collective 
and individual wealth.
The idea of the congruence of technical and social progress is based on three major beliefs: 
The first belief is that the beneficial side of technical innovation - modernization of the 
economy, improved working conditions, securing or creation of industrial competitiveness, 
and finally, a reduction of working hours and increased spending power - compensates its 
negative side effects such as dequalification, loss of jobs and professions, health risks, 
environmental pollution etc. (Braczyk 1986: 1742). The second belief is that the potential
2 Braczyk (1986) exemplifies the »erosion« of the ideology of progress on the basis of the conflict over 
nuclear reprocessing.
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risks associated with technical change and technical solutions to societal problems in principle 
are technically controllable and, therefore, a matter of »expert« and not of societal concern. 
The third belief, finally, holds that there is no need in expressly legitimizing developmental 
direction and outcome of technical change as these result from technical-economic inherent 
necessities that are inevitable.
The belief in the inner logic and laws of technical change puts the societal constitution 
of technology genesis, use and implementation under a taboo. In the ideological framework 
of which this belief forms a part, a debate about concepts of technical use and implementation 
is an irrelevant and layman’s undertaking. What is problematized and legitimized are purely 
the social effects of technical innovation; the issue of technical change is confined to the 
problem of (re)distribution.
1.1.2 The »Postmaterialist« Perspective on Technical Change
The societal consent as regards the fundamentally positive value attached to economic and 
technical innovation begins to crumble with the emergence of the new social movements in 
the course of the 1970s. Groups and organizations more or less closely affiliated with the anti­
nuclear energy, the environmental movement and the women's movement swerve from this 
consent in that they declare the question of how to deal with technology in modem society 
an open question, a problem that remains to be settled. The explanation provided for this 
position challenges the ideological basis of the traditional societal consent on three grounds: 
First, technical development is determined as a societal construction; second, the social 
control of technical development is declared a real possibility following from the societal 
constitution of this development; and third, the social shaping of technical development is 
defined as being indispensable because of the various negative side effects and risks 
associated with technical innovation in general, and the development and use of the so-called 
»new technologies« - nuclear energy, modem biotechnologies, modem chemistry - in 
particular.
In this view technical innovation is not a beneficial societal matter of course but a risky 
societal project the realization of which demands the highest caution and comprehensive
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1reflection and deliberation. The need for caution, reflection and deliberation is deduced from 
the uncertainty, side effects and risks associated with technical development and 
implementation as regards human health and safety, environmental soundness, as well as the 
moral and social order of living together and the responsibility not only for the present but 
also for future generations. Special emphasis is placed on the destructive potential of 
technology as regards the ecological equilibrium. The decision for technology development 
and use, according to this view, requires that the »dark side« of this development and use has 
been thoroughly investigated, publicly discussed, and evaluated by as many social groups as 
possible.
This view that constitutes the common ground on which the various social movement 
groups and organizations meet in their technology discourse I shall refer to as the idea that 
technical progress is social progress when it is a societally controlled progress. It is the idea 
that the socially and ecologically detrimental potential of technology needs to be prevented 
from being realized through the social control of technical change organized as a discursive, 
participative, public-orientated process. To put it differently: it is the conviction that there is 
a need to control technical change in a societally reflexive way: by including in principle all 
social groups affected; by considering all effects of technical innovation in all of their 
dimensions; by generating public discourse within which a public opinion on the technical 
innovation or project at issue can develop.
In its value basis this idea differs from the traditional idea of »technical progress equals social 
progress« in that it puts more weight on the values of safety, health, a clean environment, and 
a sound relationship between man and environment and less weight on individual and 
collective material affluence and the associated values of private property, efficiency, and hard 
work; »postmaterialist« values rank higher than materialist values. Essentially more weight 
is given to the value of a sound environment. The relationship between man and his natural 
environment is at the core of this idea. Moreover, special emphasis is placed on participation 
and public dialogue. Public deliberation and social participation in the process of policy 
formulation are identified as the adequate means for building societal consensus as regards 
technology development
The main conceptual difference lies in the focus on the concept of risk instead of the 
concept of progress. Risk is the concept upon which the idea of the need for societal
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reflection, deliberation, and decision-making on technology development, in short, of the need 
for social control of technology development, is grounded.
1.13 The »Enactment« of Antagonistic Ideas of Technical Change
The societal context in which the contrariness of the traditional and the newly developed ideas 
regarding technical change is publicly »enacted« is technical controversy. Societal conflict 
over the use of a specific technology or technology application is typically initiated or at least 
extended by protest action organized by some collectivity of new social movement actors3. 
Protest action is the attempt to initiate a societal counter-discourse to the dominant »discourse 
on progress«, a »discourse on risk« that is based on the idea of a socially and environmentally 
compatible technical change and to integrate this discourse as widely as possible in society.
This attempt has been rather successful. Technology protest has generated an intensive and 
enduring public and political debate in the form of a confrontation between the traditional and 
newly developed ideas regarding technical change. This confrontation takes place in the 
political arena in the context of technology-focussed commissions, inquiries, and technology- 
assessment bureaus and agencies. The political system increasingly establishes fora of 
reflection and deliberation with the task not only to deal with the technical and economic but 
also with the ecological, social, and moral aspects of technical development on the basis of 
which a »societally responsible« technology policy is to be formulated. In the public arena 
it is »round table« talks and, above all, the mass media which give way to this confrontation; 
the objects, strategies, and ideas of technology protest and their discussion against the 
background of such issues as »Standortsicherung«, international competitiveness, and 
decreasing willingness to take risks are an integral part of this type of public discourse.
3 The recurrence of technical controversy in a number of countries of the Western world must be understood 
as an effect of the process of stabilization of the new social movements. They have transformed from relatively 
free-floating social phenomena into a social movement sector, that is, into an economically grounded stable 
system of a political public. The issue of technology and technical change is deeply anchored in this system and 
in case of technical innovations collective protest is regularly organized in order to transform it into a general 
public and political issue.
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In short, in the last two and a half decades technology protest has transformed technical 
change from an unquestioned social phenomenon into a salient public and political issue. 
What is more, it has generated widely shared new expectations on how technical change 
should be socially controlled and on what public and private technology policy should be, 
expectations that are for the most part antagonistic to the traditional ones. Referring to 
society’s ideological structure, this means, that technology protest has transformed the 
»ideology of progress« from an institutional logic with a monopoly character in the field of 
society and technology into an institutional logic that is part of a complex and partly 
contradictory ideational system.
1.1.4 The Unsettled Cultural Environment of Business
What does this development mean for business as a societal system heavily involved in and 
relying on technology development and use? It means to be embedded, since the period of 
unquestioning faith in technical progress following World War II., into an unsettled cultural 
environment. This unsettled cultural environment consists of a change in societal perceptions 
of what constitutes societal progress and the way in which technology can contribute to this 
progress. It consists of a process of dissolution of the traditional consent that technical- 
scientific and associated economic progress constitute the common denominator of a modem 
conception of the good life; this cultural environment above all represents a threat to business 
social legitimacy.
Social legitimacy shall be understood with Epstein as collective recognition based on 
the "belief in and acceptance of the ’rightness, propriety, moral goodness* or 
’appropriate(ness)’ of particular persons, institutions, or modes of behavior” (Epstein 1969: 
51). Social legitimacy, according to this definition, is bound up with social norms and values 
and a conferred status and is, therefore, always controlled by those outside the respective 
person, organization or institution. It is granted on a contingent basis and is subject to 
alteration as social demands are modified. The threat to which since the 1970s business social 
legitimacy is subject consists of a gap developing between public expectations and business 
performance as regards technology use: Business employs technology in the most efficient 
and effective way; the public increasingly expects business to use technology in consideration
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of economic as well as ecological, social, and moral aspects. It results from a process of 
dissolution of the traditional basis of legitimation of technical change - the »ideology of 
progress« attributing highest value to an efficient and effective use of technology - a basis on 
which also a significant part of business social legitimacy rests.
In a similar, albeit much more direct way, business social legitimacy in the nineteenth 
century was deeply threatened (and its basis finally significantly altered) by a process of 
transformation of that societal ideology that functions as the basis of legitimation of the 
market system. While in the nineteenth century the underlying dynamics of this process is a 
socio-political debate focussing on the social question and the distribution of wealth, in the 
twentieth century it is a socio-political debate focussing on technology induced risk and the 
question of what, in the final analysis, constitutes a »good life«. The issue of the latter debate 
is not business intervention into the social sphere by capitalist activities. (Despite conflicts 
over details this type of business intervention is firmly grounded in a society-wide consent 
on values; it is a settled issue nowadays.) Instead, the (business- and otherwise-related) issue 
is technical intervention into the social and ecological sphere, the »artificialization« of human, 
animal and plant life and their exposure to technically induced risks.
Social legitimacy is becoming an especially unstable status for business organizations that rely 
on modem technology and provide products and services that directly affect life, nutrition, 
health, and environment and with that are closely related to the issues of the newly developed 
technology debate. It is especially these organizations that arc confronted with the problem 
that their social legitimacy may no longer be assured by providing society with goods and 
services and by appearing to effectively and efficiently employ and develop technology for 
the production of these goods and services, that is, by adhering to the idea of »material 
affluence«. It might also increasingly depend on appearing to consider the social, ecological, 
and cultural effects of technology development and use, that is, by committing to the idea of 
»socially and environmentally compatible technical change«.
Technical controversies as situations of societal conflict over a specific technology or 
technology application are situations in which the unsettled business cultural environment as 
it has existed since the 1970s as regards business as an agent of technical change becomes 
turbulent It becomes especially turbulent for those organizations that in the context of
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technical controversy get »publicly exposed«. These organizations become directly subjected 
to technology protest, public scrutiny, and regulatory action, that is, to direct challenges of 
their social legitimacy.
1.2 The Public Policy and Socio-Political Factor: The Public Exposure of Business in 
Technical Controversy
On the cultural level, the business political environment of technical controversy has been 
determined as the process of dissolution of the traditional societal consent on how to deal 
with technology and the ideology on which this consent was built Drawing on Dyllick 
(1989), the basic environmental factor at the level of politics and society shall be defined as 
the public exposure o f  business. My argument suggests that business in the context of 
technical controversy is not only subjected to some »structural« changes and challenges: 
Those business organizations that have a direct economic interest in the technology or 
technology application at issue are directly confronted with more or less concrete expectations 
and demands advanced by »public« actors (and deduced from the generally changing societal 
perspective on technology and technical change) who aim either themselves or via third 
parties to exert influence on the organizations' goals or the way of reaching these goals. 
These economic actors get themselves a public issue. Their social legitimacy is not solely a 
tentative status but a status under direct public and political attack. For these business 
organizations, I shall claim, technical controversy means a situation of legitimation crisis.
The concept of a public exposure of business is adopted from the business economist Thomas 
Dyllick (19894). Broadly defined, it refers to the fact that business in general, and the big 
industrial enterprise in particular, by their operations increasingly affect public interests and.
4 Dyllick identifies and investigates public conflict as such, including technical controversy, as a new 
business environmental challenge and the public exposure of business as a  new management dimension (1989: 
esp. 15-35). The author's concern is to highlight the previously neglected non-economic external control systems 
of the corporation and elucidate their effects on management Dyllick very convincingly argues on the basis of 
three case studies (Nestlé and the issue o f baby milk products, Etemit and the issue of asbestos, and von Roll 
and the issue of dust- and noise-immissions) that corporations in principle in their decision-making are subjected 
to all three areas of practical philosophy: economy, politics, and ethics, and that, accordingly, the yardstick of 
the success o f corporate action is not restricted to economic efficiency but includes political legitimacy and moral 
authority.
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vice versa, are also affected by activities that are pursued in the name of the larger public 
good and directed against private-autonomous freedom of choice and operation. To the extent 
that this happens, business organizations take on the character of quasi-public institutions5 
which, notwithstanding their private-law foundation, get involved in public conflict in which 
they have to strive for their social acceptance. To get involved in public conflict is a question 
of being able to justify in view of a sharpened risk sensitivity the societal consequences and 
risks of industrial activity not only to the political decision-maker but also to those individuals 
concerned and to a larger public. It means becoming subjected to constraints of justification 
and legitimation, indeed similar to those of political institutions (Dyllick 1989: 460). 
According to Dyllick, the major indicators of the public exposure of business are state 
intervention, political alertness by parliament and political parties, interest of science, media 
attention, and protest action.
Technical controversy, I shall claim, is a situation in which the transformation of 
business organizations into quasi-public institutions prototypically finds expression.
The major forces that drag economic organizations out of the »restricted area« of the 
»private« enterprise and make them »organizations of the public interest« in technical conflict 
are the same as in other public conflicts in which business is involved in contemporary 
society. These major forces are protest actors and the mass media. To focus on protest action 
and media attention as both expressions and determinants of the public exposure of business 
is to highlight that technical controversy is a public, not a specialized, discourse6. The 
argument behind this focus holds the following: The fact that the public, that is to say, the 
public sphere is the stage on which technical controversy takes place is a key to 
understanding and analyzing business political activity in this specific societal context The 
fundamentally different political challenge to business as compared to traditional problems 
of competition or conflicts of distribution results from this fac t
5 For the conceptualization of big enterprises as "quasi-public-institutions" see Ulrich (1977).
6 Drawing on Hennen’s exposition on the public discourse character o f technical controversy, I shall 
understand public, not specialized discourses as discourses that occur when subsystem-specific programs of 
problem-solution fail and an unqueried consensus on legitimate problem-solution has dissolved. To conceptualize 
technical controversy as public discourse thus means to understand it as an attempt to create, in view of a lack 
of societally shared interpretative patterns and action preferences, a new consensus about that what is and that 
what should be (Hennen 1994: 461).
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The public exposure of business in technical controversy results to a major extent from the 
activity of new social movement groups and organizations aimed at preventing technology 
development and/or use. This is due to the specific political strategy of this social actor which 
is the mobilization o f public pressure. New social movements are a new collective actor on 
the public stage, albeit with specific, limited, political resources. They only have a restricted 
»Konfliktfahigkeit« (capability to engage in conflict), that is, they do not command resources 
- energy, money, food - that are indispensable to the functioning of a society, and, therefore, 
they usually lack direct access to the official political process of opinion-formation and 
decision-making. Exertion of political influence depends on mobilizing as wide as possible 
a public support for their own ideas, positions, and goals; public opinion-formation is the 
political strategy that is constitutive of this social actor. The type of action upon which this 
strategy is based is collective protest. Collective protest as a form of public action draws the 
technology or technology project at issue as widely as possible to the attention of the public 
and sensitizes the public to the collective actor’s ideas and concerns. Usually, its ultimate aim 
is to place the technology issue on the docket for authoritative decision-making and to play 
a role in the public policy process.
A favorite topic and target of collective protest is the big industrial enterprise and big 
industry in general. Their technology policy and the risks and broader societal consequences 
emanating from the implementation of this policy often form the core of protest discourse and 
activities. Industrial technology policy characteristically is a major topic both in written 
documents such as books, articles, brochures, folders, leaflets and such action contexts as 
demonstrations and elaborate campaigns. Moreover, it is often the direct target of protest 
action in the form of symbolic single-actions and legal action. Symbolic single-actions and 
legal action are those protest actions to which big industrial enterprise finds itself most 
exposed. Both forms of protest typically are organized in co-operation with citizen action 
committees - which have been either specifically formed to protest against the technology 
policy of the adjacent enterprise or which have already existed for a longer time being 
concerned with the general policy of this enterprise or with various local problems - and some 
collectivity of regionally- or nationally-orientated new social movement groups and 
organizations. Often one can find a kind of division o f labor in that the local group takes over 
the protest action on the spot and the more widely orientated groups provide this action with 
financial aid and/or argumentative support in the form of scientific expertise or legal advice.
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The characteristics that make big industry a favorite object of protest discourse and action are, 
on the one hand, its very »bigness« and, on the other, its profit-orientation. While bigness 
means that it generally attracts some public attention, profit orientation means an inherent 
(systemic) reference to the problem of safeguarding collective and public goods in a free (or 
relatively free) market system. To organize technology protest as protest against big industry 
is an effective means to popularize and, particularly, to moralize the technology matter by 
accusing a prominent economic actor of trading public safety, a clean environment, and 
morals in return for private profits (this point is elaborated under point 1.3). In short, big 
industry is the right peg on which to hang the protest story; at least in most cases it is more 
suitable than other technology-promoting organizations such as small and medium size 
enterprises or government and science institutions.
What does technology protest precisely do when it makes industry the peg upon which the 
protest story is hung? It instrumentalizes the »problematic nature« of for-profit organizations 
for the recruitment of activists and media work, the two constitutive parts of the strategy of 
mobilization of public pressure. The successful pursuit of this strategy requires, on the one 
hand, the recruitment of as many active and committed supporters as possible who can carry 
out protest action when necessary. Technology protesters usually search widely for allies; 
there is the tendency to unite with like-minded groups in branched coalitions and alliances, 
out of which, depending on the concern, may develop complex, dynamic, or even 
internationally working networks that are regularly activized in form of protest action.
Moreover, the strategy's successful pursuit presupposes effective media work. The 
media are the carrier of public debate. They are the channel by which issues arc drawn to the 
attention of the public, the most important amplifier and disseminator of protest arguments 
and demands. Therefore, technology protesters usually try hard to enter mass media discourse 
(the intensity of this endeavor to a great extent depends on the financial resource base). A 
typical means to this end is dramatic and symbolic action, for example, the occupation of 
industrial testing ground. So,
So, for industry to be made the peg upon which the protest story is hung means to be dragged 
into the limelight, to be made a public issue. To be more precise, it means two things: In the 
first place, it means to become exposed to the inquisitive looks of a critical, sometimes hostile
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public. Technology-related decisions and technology practice which beforehand were 
concealed from the public eye are now made transparent Then, as a second step, this 
information now known to the public is subjected to public opinion, that means, it is 
considered in the light of the publicly prevailing assessment criteria and evaluated with 
respect to the public interest In a society considerably sensitized to the »dark side« of 
technical change, subjection to public opinion as a rule leads to the development of public 
demands directed at industry itself or at the political system to take measures to protect 
company neighborhoods and the public at large from the dangers and risks associated with 
industrial technology development and use. These demands are threats to industry’s discretion.
New social movement organizations and citizen action committees are important but not the 
only social actors that in technical controversy challenge industry in the name of superior 
societal interests. Sometimes, the scientific community and the trade unions, too act as 
advocates of the public good (they did so extensively in the nuclear energy conflict) and so 
contribute to making industry a public issue. Moreover, there are the »professional« advocates 
of the public good, parliament, the political parties, and government. In technical controversy 
they are forced to engage in political discourse on the socio-political responsibility of industry 
as a technology developing and using system. As the German genetic engineering controversy 
shows, the political system may act as a »public« challenge to industry even before significant 
protest and public attention to the technology at issue has developed (for example, in the form 
of parliamentary commissions of inquiry). The probability that this is the case increases with 
the institutionalization of technology criticism at the level of the political system in the form 
of »Green Parties« and the experience-based general increase in sensitivity of the political 
parties regarding both the negative effects of technology development and technology protest So,
So, the public exposure of business in technical controversy basically means that industrial 
organizations no longer pursue their technology activities in the »safe« private sphere but in 
the very different public sphere. That is to say, they are dragged into a sphere of action in 
which it is necessary to mobilize good reasons for the social acceptability of one’s behavior. 
Above all they have to justify the potential detrimental consequences and risks associated with 
industrial technology development and use towards wide sections of the population. While in 
former times it was sufficient to reach an agreement with the responsible authorities, in
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contemporary society it is a larger public which has to be convinced or persuaded.
The higher industrial public exposure in the form of public scrutiny and appeals to alter or 
control industrial technology policy (and the less extensive or effective the attempts of 
business to reach consent), the higher the risk for industry to be subjected to the, so to speak, 
most extreme form of public exposure of business: government intervention in some form of 
burdensome administrative, regulatory or legal arrangements. Regulation can be understood 
as the most extreme form of public exposure of business as it subjects business to the public 
interest in a legally binding form. Technology regulation defines the very rules by which 
technology-based actions in the economy are to be carried o u t Indeed, some form of 
technology regulation imposed to effect public ends, such as product safety or environmental 
protection typically affecting both industry and science at some point in technical controversy, 
is the rule rather than the exception. The genetic engineering controversy, for example, in 
most countries of the Western world has produced some regulatory arrangements (and a 
European Union-wide regulation in form of a number of directives concerning modem 
biotechnologies), and in some countries even special laws.
Regulation is not the only typical effect of industrial public exposure in the form of 
protest and public pressure. Indeed, detrimental effects are manifold. They range from internal 
encumbrances such as internal quarrels and moral stress for the staff members and employees 
over indirect costs in terms of a loss of credibility and trustworthiness, delays in the approval 
of production facilities and new products, absorption of time and man power, the impairment 
of negotiation leverage over the state to offset costs in terms of reduction of sales, reduction 
of stock prices, and an increase in direct expenditures (for example, for consultants) (Dyllick 
1989: 463-464).
These direct and indirect costs, internal encumbrances and the loss of discretion by regulation 
are expressions of a business situation which this section has expounded as a crisis o f  
legitimation. The legitimacy at stake is not business legitimacy in view of the market, or 
business legitimacy in view of the share holders; instead, it is business legitimacy in view of 
society as a whole, of society as a co-operative project The major causal force of this crisis 
of legitimation I have determined as being the power o f the public, the maintenance or 
reproduction of business social legitimacy as bonded to actively entering public discourse. The
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concern of the next section is to argue that moral argumentation is a constitutive element of 
the power of the public. Moral reasoning in technical controversy, the argument goes, plays 
a major role and causes especially high restraints on justification and legitimation. It means 
that industry is put into the »moral offside«.
1.3 The Moral Factor: Technical Controversy as a Moral Challenge
To fully understand business political activity in technical conflict it is not sufficient to 
recognize that industrial organizations in this context are publicly exposed and that this 
exposure forms part of a process of change in the societal value and ideological structure. It 
is also fundamental to see the moral nature of the public exposure of business. In technical 
controversy business is not challenged primarily on the ground of economic, scientific, or 
political insufficiencies but on the ground of morally misguided behavior. The reproach of 
exposing industry’s immediate environment and society at large to technically induced hazards 
and that of »artificializing« man and nature by technology development and use arc 
reproaches of trading the public good - operationalized as public health and safety, a clean 
environment, and a harmonious relationship between man and nature - in return for private 
profits. It is moral accusation from which the »crisis« character that technical controversy has 
for economic actors originates. The especially strong need for justification and legitimation 
results from the fact that the public exposure of business in technical conflict basically 
constitutes a moral challenge.
Moral discourse in technical controversy for the most part is protest discourse. A significant 
part of protest discourse is the elaboration, mobilization and dramatization of a specific moral 
conception of the world, of a specific idea of the nature of moral obligation of society in this 
world. This idea basically is the notion of what should be man’s relationship with nature and 
of what should be done to safeguard public health and safety.
Moral discourse on man’s relationship with nature plays a major role in controversies 
over technologies that have a special power in deconstructing or newly constructing »nature«, 
such as nuclear technology, modem chemistry, and modem biotechnologies. However, it is 
also relevant in all those technical conflicts in which the environmental issue is of central
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importance. This type of moral discourse argues against the de-moralization of nature, a 
subjectivist conception of morality, and a scientifically based conception of truth, prevailing 
societal value orientations which are favorable to technical modernization in highly 
industrialized Western society. It argues against a world view that has neutralized natural 
morally and reduced it to the level of a resource for man. h  counters the idea of an 
instrumental relationship with nature with one of a moral, non-utilitarian relationship based 
on the acknowledgement of an inherent value of nature. In short it advances an ethicized 
concept of nature; its central concepts are »respect for naturalness«, »sanctity of life«, »life 
in harmony with nature«, and »preserving nature’s mystery«. This type of moral discourse 
usually provides the basis for a fundamentalist opposition of technology.
Society’s moral obligation in protest discourse is not typically limited to recognizing the 
inherent value of its natural environment Moral protest discourse also attributes highest 
importance to the joint fight against the drawbacks of modem technology which take the form 
of risks and dangers for public health and environmental integrity as well as for the social and 
moral order now and in the future. In this line of moral argumentation the protection of the 
environment is synonymous with the protection of human health from ecological disturbances 
and the preservation of natural resources for future generations. The political effectiveness of 
moral protest discourse in technical controversy basically results from the reference to moral 
obligations regarding danger precaution, risk avoidance, health protection and resource 
preservation since these are societal concerns generally recognized as legitimate. This 
reference transforms moral discourse from a »soft« political weapon into a »hard« and 
powerful one.
By being based on an ethicized concept of nature and the principle of conceding priority to 
the worst prognosis, the moral conception that protest actors advance in technical conflict is 
related in an antagonistic way to the moral force that technical modernization and the 
marketplace obtain from the idea of scientific-technical and economic progress (attributing 
special respect to experiment and risk) and the domination of nature. The form in which it 
is publicly advanced is not limited to a moral appeal to the technology-promoting and - 
controlling institutions. It is communicated as a direct accusation of immoral behavior, as 
moral stigmatization as well. Moral stigmatization means to engage the public’s sense of
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morality and indignation against the technology’s proponents. The major target of moral 
stigmatization is industry. As I have mentioned above» this forms part of the strategy of public 
mobilization. The idea behind this is that the representation of private profit as the guiding 
motive for technology use and associated public exposure to new uncertainties» dangers, and 
risks is especially suited to mobilizing public pressure against the protested technology. To 
not fulfill the moral duties one has towards the society of which one forms a part appears 
especially morally reprehensible when the reason for this misguided behavior is not, for 
example, political commitment, scientific conviction, or a different idea of the public good 
but private utility. The public is to be mobilized by pointing out not only the winners 
(industry) and losers (the rest of society) of technology use but by declaring this use a zero- 
sum-game; the means of mobilization is the »moralization« of industry based on the argument 
that industry gains at the expense of the rest of society.
Moral argumentation translates abstract technical-scientific matters into issues communicable 
and attractive to the public at large. It makes them issues of a general public interest and 
provides them with an element of drama. Therefore, it usually attracts a certain extent of 
media interest and coverage.
For industry, the public representation of its moral doubtfulness means that it is put 
under severe pressure to take up a position; to think of its industrial technology activities in 
moral terms and to defend them in these terms. As the next chapter will argue, technical 
controversy may turn into a battle on the stage of morality.
Man mag fiber die Offeotlfcbkeit denken, wie man will, 
tie ist COT das Untemehmcn eine getellschafiliche 
Real!tit, die tie beifickskhtigen muB. (RAglm & von 
Orcbtner 1988:40)
2. Business Political Activity as a Reaction to Sodo-Cultural Change
To summarize the argument of the foregoing sections: The business political environment of 
technical controversy is bigger than the formal political system. It includes social protest and 
public criticism which politicize industrial technology activity by subjecting it to the »public
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interest* operationalized as a socially and environmentally compatible use of technology. 
This, so to speak, »subpolitical« challenge constitutes at the same time a new form  o f  
moralization of this activity. It is a challenge to justify industrial technology activity beyond 
market, contractual, administrative or legal obligations.
Since the 1970s, the business political environment of technical controversy has not 
been an exceptional but a recurrent political context This holds true at least for a significant 
part of the highly advanced industrial societies of the Western world. This is due to the fact 
that the newly developed notion of the public interest as regards technical change since that 
time is in a process of stabilization as an element of society’s ideological structure. The 
driving force behind this development are the new social movements. It is their policy of 
mobilization and the institutionalization of this policy in the form of a new social movement 
sector which has given rise to a different and much more critical attitude towards technology 
in society at large.
Business organizations that, due to these developments on the occasion of the 
introduction of new technologies or realization of specific technology projects, get involved 
in public conflict and are subjected to wide public exposure are plunged into a »crisis of 
legitimation«. That is to say, technical controversy is a societal situation in which the fact, 
that legality and ethics of the marketplace - the traditional legitimation basis of economic 
activity in general and industrial technology activity in particular - no longer exhaust business 
social legitimacy, becomes manifest.
The following sections discuss the five types of business political activity distinguished - 
corporatist and post-corporatist negotiation, informatory education, confidence-building, 
identity-building (see point III.2) - as industry’s action repertoire for managing this situation 
of crisis. In doing so they take a historical perspective and explain the increased importance 
of the public arena as an arena of industrial political activity, the different importance 
attributed over time to informatory education and confidence-building as the two major types 
o f industrial political activity in this arena, and the political use made of post-corporatist 
negotiations and a value loaded but »self-confident« and »offensive« type of public 
communication, identity-building, as more recent developments in industrial political behavior, 
against the specific business political environment of technical controversy and more general 
contextual conditions, on the one hand, and learning processes on the side of industry, on the
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other. This learning process concerns above all the realization of the »constraint-character« 
of public commitment to the idea, generated by new social movements, of how to deal with 
technology.
The exposition seeks to show that the problem of legitimacy is an especially difficult 
one for industry because of its intangible, cultural qualities. A basic assumption underlying 
the exposition is that, in undertaking political action, business organizations act in accordance 
with their perceptions and interpretations of their environment. Business actors are assumed 
to construct rationales for their political behavior on the basis of how they view the »world«.
2.1 Constructing New Forms of Business Political Action: Business Goes Public
What is at stake in technical controversy for the publicly exposed industrial enterprise or 
industry is financial and time resources, and cultural resources in terms of 
»corporate/industrial identity«, in the short term; in the long-term, it is the power to impose 
industrial technology policy built on the principle of the highest possible economic efficiency 
(economic principle) on those protesting against the priority attributed to this principle in 
technology development and use. One option to limit expenses and maintain or build power 
is to enter into negotiations with the challengers themselves in order to control and defuse 
opposition, for example, by compromising on matters of secondary importance. In the 1970s 
and the first half of the 1980s, that is, at a time when technical controversy was still a 
relatively new experience for industry and technology protest was pure confrontation, this type 
of »interorganizational« negotiation was not seriously discussed as an option for industrial 
political action. In the light of deepseated polarization, any communication with the 
challengers not only appeared to be doomed to failure; on the assumption that the negative 
public opinion was a mass media construction rather than a true picture of public opinion, and 
that public acceptance was a matter of cognition or emotion rather than a change in values, 
it also appeared as the less efficient method.
The more efficient strategy is seen in warding off the political and moral challenge 
by engaging in public opinion formation. Public opinion-formation is deemed an efficient way 
to assure industry power, above all, as it is supposed to increase industry’s bargaining power 
against the state. In public conflict generated and promoted by a social actor that has public
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mobilization as its major strategy, that is, in a situation manifestly lacking consent as regards 
the nature of a legitimate solution to the problem matter, this power is significantly restricted. 
That is to say, industry finds itself in a situation in which state support can no longer be 
optimally assured by justifying industrial technology policy, against third party opposition, 
to the established players of the political game. It requires justification to the very carriers of 
these interests as the basis of industry-friendly and socially acceptable political decision­
making. While, for example, in wage disputes or debates on protective duties, state support 
for long-term interest assertion can be reached by bargaining with the state and the big 
interest groups alone and social acceptance of interest assertion may be secured by 
institutionalized negotiation procedures only, in technical controversy this state support and 
social acceptance presupposes innovative forms of political action.
The two basic new forms of political action that industry developed in the course of 
the 1970s and 1980s were carefully directed public education, on the one hand, and a 
(re)production of public confidence, on the other.
2.1.1 From Cognitive and Emotional Mobilization to the Building of Confidence
The logical basis on which informatory education and confidence-building as new types of 
industrial political activity are built is not, in the first place, an abstract rationality, that is, 
clearly defined calculations of how efficiently different forms of action are able to create a 
climate of public opinion favorable to industry interests7. Instead, it is a rather unclear 
perception of the nature of industry’s wider socio-cultural environment, of the way in which 
people form attitudes on technology and industrial use of technology and the role that protest 
actors, the mass media, and politics play in this formative process and, more generally, in the 
construction of the public opinion.
7 Abstract rationality refers to the concept of rationality employed in classic economic theory. According 
to this concept, the choice of an action alternative is rational when it can be dciamincd as die most favorable 
means for the achievement of the end at which the action is aimed. The basic assumption as regards rational and 
efficient behavior is that actors always precisely know the results of different action alternatives. In a sociological 
perspective, however, I shall emphasize the loose coupling of action decision and action result and the fact that 
a result can be achieved by different action alternatives.
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In the heyday o f controversy regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy - so to speak* the
birth of a new societal perspective on technical modernization - and up to the mid 1980s th e
prevailing industrial view was that technology/industry-crideal public opinion was basically
made up of the reproduction of protest discourse in the mass media and diffuse, »irrational«
fears of a minor part of the population resulting from either ignorance and insufficient
information or misinformation due to a negatively biased mass media reporting. The political
strategy built on this perception consisted of feeding »factual-objective« information in to
public discourse. The provision of sound and sufficient information was meant to counter
protest mobilization by providing a cognitive basis on which »rational« - that is to say ,
positive - attitudes on technical matters could be built.
As public discourse focusses on the topic of risk, the imparting of »knowledge«
basically takes the form of information about the »real« nature of technical risks; of th e ir
technical nature, their controllability, and their existential necessity. Industrial actors in
seminars, lectures, exhibitions, brochures, newspapers, and issue-related articles supply
opinion makers and the interested/concemed public with information on risks associated w ith
nuclear energy, modem biotechnologies or industrial chemistry.
In this period of time, public approval in the first place was to be produced by
recourse to scientific-technical rationality, messages of technical safety and the sym biotic
relationship between technical modernization and societal progress. In short, it was to be
produced by mobilizing the ideology o f  progress. The basic assumption underlying
informatory education was that, except for the new social movements, societal consent bu ilt
on this ideology was still existent The not untypical representation of technology protest as
incompetent incoherent emotional, irrational, politically motivated and ideologically impelled
has to be viewed against the background of this assumption.
The following statement by one of the managing directors of the German Bayer A G
on the occasion of a press forum of the multinational on "Gentechnik bei Bayer" captures well
the strategy of informatory education and the »situation analysis« upon which it is based:
Trotz der vielversprechenden Zukunftschancen, welche die Gentechnik für 
W issenschaft und Wirtschaft bietet, ist die Akzeptanz dieser Technik in der deutschen 
Öffentlichkeit beängstigend schlecht Die Gründe hierfür sind Unkenntnis, falsche 
Vorstellungen und daraus resultierende Ängste. Das liegt vor allem auch daran, daß 
die industrielle Gentechnik, die wir nutzen, begrifflich mit möglichen Anwendungen 
in der Reproduktionsbiologie am Menschen und anderen humanmedizinischen 
Aspekten vermengt wird. Ideologische Randgruppen, die den technischen Fortschritt
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aus Prinzip bekämpfen, tragen zur weiteren Verzerrung des MeinungsbUdes bei. Zur 
Verbesserung der notwendigen öffentlichen Akzeptanz der Gentechnik halten wir es 
für dringend erforderlich, dieses schwierige und mit Emotionen beladene Thema im 
offenen Dialog - vor allem bezüglich seiner Sicherheitsaspekte - transparent zu 
machen. Dabei wollen wir sachlich erläutern, welche Maßnahmen wir zur 
Gewährleistung der Sicherheit treffen. Dies ist ein wesentliches Anliegen unseres 
heutigen Gentechnik-Presse-Forums. (Büchel 1989: 28)
The assumption that, when all is said and done, the »Fortschrittskonsens« is still unbroken 
also formed the basis of the »early« confidence-building strategy as employed by the German 
chemical industry at the end of the 1970s as a supplement to informatory education. At this 
time, the chemical industry began to develop into the other major target of new social 
movement industry- and technology criticism, besides the nuclear energy industry. Its 
response was, so to speak, double-tracked; it consisted of information and confidence-building 
measures. The idea behind this double-tracked strategy was that there was not only a 
cognitive factor but as well an affective factor involved in the public resonance of the new 
social movements* modernization-critical perspective. This affective factor was characterized 
as an emotional estrangement, above all, of the part of the public least well educated about 
industry. This estrangement, it was assumed, produced a loss of confidence which in its turn 
provided fertile ground for the development of »irrational« fears and prejudices in response 
to technology protest. These emotional reactions were considered to be most effectively 
answered on the same level, that is, in the form of a positive emotional address by industry.
This address was organized as an institutional advertising campaign with a design 
similar to the one of classic product and capital goods advertising*. The campaign presented 
a written and pictorial emotional address in the form of »intact world« emotionalism aimed 
at turning industry into a likeable subject. The placard-style ads depicted the chemical 
industry’s contributions to individual well-being, contributions that, the assumption was, were 
largely taken for granted and not necessarily associated with industrial chemistry. The
* The campaign launched in June 1979 comprised ads with the slogan "Chemie. Auf Ihrer Seite" and ads 
with the slogan "Chemie ist, wenn...". With this campaign the German chemical industry employed for the first 
time large-sized ads as an instrument of public relations (see the folder Chemie auf Ihrer Seite. 13 Fragen und 
Antworten zur Initiative "Geschützter Leben" produced by the Initiative uGeschützter Leben" - 
Aktionsgemeinschaft der Chemischen Industrie, 1GL, the organization of the German chemical industry 
responsible for image promotion). For more information on the context in which this campaign was launched 
and its design see my essay on the development of the communication policy of the German chemical industry 
since the late 1970s (Dreyer 1997).
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demonstration o f the »omnipresence of chemistry« was meant to convey the image of industry 
as the people’s partner in the more or less difficult situations of daily life. The personification 
of the economic actor served to create an emotional and personal relationship with this actor 
which in its turn was to provide fertile ground for the (re)production of confidence.
This »early« mode of confidence-building relied on the same social-psychological 
insights as traditional product and capital goods advertising. In contrast to the one developed 
later, it does not consider protest issues as confidence impairing mechanisms in their own 
right; the root of all evil is determined to be the impersonal and anonymous image of 
industry.
Industrial communication organized as an implicit or explicit dissociation from technology 
protest and designed to create public approval by cognitive or emotional mobilization did not 
prove very successful, however. This, at least, suggests intensifying and expanding technical 
debate; apparently, the targets neither gave credit to risk information nor developed sympathy 
towards industry. Indeed, cognitive and emotional mobilization even seems to have proven 
counter-productive, to have had the unintended effect of creating an even greater deficit of 
public acceptance.
In view of this situation, the conviction grew that what was lacking was not so much 
factual information or emotional relations but confidence in industry’s willingness to make 
those decisions and follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of societal 
objectives and values. This lack of confidence was imputed to a protest discourse that 
resonated not only on the cognitive or affective level but also on the level of political 
convictions. That is to say, scientific, political and moral protest argumentation was assumed 
to have mobilized not only a more critical societal attitude towards technology but, more 
importantly, skepticism about the social desirability and acceptability of industrial technology 
use grounded on the assumption of a lack of orientation of industry created by this changed 
attitude. In doing so, the assumption went, it had turned public acceptance into a matter of 
giving a socially meaningful and compelling rationale to industrial technology activity, a 
rationale that is able to transform skepticism into a positive attitude. In view of an ever 
increasing diffusion of the idea, generated by social movements, of a socially and 
environmentally compatible steering of technical change, it was further assumed that giving 
such a rationale implies special commitment to the values upon which this idea is based. The
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new perspective on industry’s political environment thus determined protest issues as 
confidence-harming mechanisms in their own right and suggested that the »ideology of 
progress« was no longer an adequate instrument for mobilizing public approval.
As a consequence, industrial public communication was reorganized. Public communication 
was increasingly designed as confidence-building communication; as communication which 
by presenting industrial technology policy as committed to the values of a clean environment, 
safety, health, and participation operationalized as public dialogue was meant to (re)produce 
public confidence in industry’s orientation by the objectives and values of society. 
Commitment to these so-called »post-materialist« values is communicated face-to-face in the 
context of Open Day and national and regional discussion events, tours of research or 
production facilities, and round table talks; and in mediated form, for example, in self- 
representing and issue-related brochures, issue and institutional advertising9, and codes of 
conduct. The »institutionalization« of commitment in terms of codes o f conduct is meant to 
build trust by documenting the normative, obligatory character that the values have for 
industry.
Confidence-building10 communication did not replace informatory education. 
However, the latter lost its dominance as a strategy of approval production. Its instrumentality 
was viewed as dependent on the successful use of the former method understood as the 
creation of that confidential relationship in which industry’s information is given new credit.
Industry’s new »situation analysis« and communicative strategy is captured by the following 
two statements of top managers of the German chemical industry:
9 Examples of mass media confidence-building communication presenting the way in which industry deals 
in a socially responsible way with technology and industry’s willingness to make public its technology policy, 
are a range of ads run by the Verband der Chemischen Industrie (e.g. on core technologies, genetic engineering, 
chlorine technology) forming part of the ad scries that have been run by the association since 1990 under the 
slogan of "Chemie im Dialog" (see appendix n. pp.277-279); ads by the three big chemical enterprises Bayer, 
Hoechst and BASF, e.g. on agricultural technology and genetic engineering (see appendix II. p.280); and the ad 
series run by the German power-producing industry in 1996 entitled "Initiative Energievemunft" (see appendix 
II. p.281). A further example of industrial confidence-building communication are the yearly VCI-mn ad 
invitations for the chemical industry's Open Day; these ads were not expressly technology-related, but conveyed 
the message of the sector’s general openness, transparency and public accountability (see appendix n . p.282).
10 From this point onward, communication in the confidence-building mode will refer to this value-based 
communicative strategy as opposed to the earlier emotion-based strategy.
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Viele Anzeichen sprechen dafür, daß auch unsere Mitbürger im Zeichen des 
sogenannten Werte wandeis einen neuen Dialog über die Chancen und Risiken der 
Industrieproduktion führen möchten. Wesentliche Voraussetzungen dafür sind 
Transparenz und Dialogfähigkeit, aber auch Kompromißbereitschaft bei allen 
Beteiligten. (Weise 1988: 66; emphasis in original11)
Von der Chemie werden entscheidende Beiträge erwartet, wenn es um die Lösung der 
großen Aufgaben unserer Zeit geh t Das gilt sowohl für die Ernährung einer rasch 
wachsenden Menschheit, die Bekämpfung von Krankheit und Leiden sowie die 
Sicherung unseres Wohlstandes. Nicht zuletzt ist die Chemie für die Erhaltung einer 
intakten, lebenswerten Umwelt gefordert ... Wir haben ... die unbestrittene 
wissenschaftliche und technische Kompetenz, für alle diese Bereiche wesentliche 
Leistungen zu erbringen. ... Es genügt aber n icht ... technisch und wirtschaftlich 
erfolgreich zu sein. Die Menschen wollen davon überzeugt sein, daß wir bereit sind, 
aus Fehlem zu lernen, daß wir verantwortlich denken und handeln. Dies zu zeigen, 
darin besteht das zentrale Anliegen unserer Politik des Dialogs. (Strenger 19911 2, 
quoted in Ueberhorst & de Man 1992: 45)
2.1.2 Public Dialog and Post-Corporatist Negotiation
Risk communication in the educative mode with its focus on safety for man and environment 
also makes reference to safety, health, and a clean environment. However, it seeks to prove 
commitment to these values by scientific reasoning and determines the limits of commitment 
basically as the limits of what is scientifically and technically possible. Confidence-building 
communication, instead, seeks to prove commitment by socio-political reasoning and declares 
the limits of commitment open to learning processes and processes of consensus-building in 
dialogue with the public. Its key message is that industry is committed to these values not as 
a technical expert but as an institution with socio-political responsibility.
To use technology in a socio-politically responsible way is not merely defined as both 
protection and promotion of a sound environment, health and safety. It is also defined as 
subjecting technology use to public control and public dialogue. Industrial socio-political 
responsibility is basically defined as the recognition of public accountability. The key 
concepts used to communicate the acceptance of such a responsibility are openness,
11 Weise stated this as president of the co-ordinating committee Toxicology/Ecology of the VCI, the trade 
association o f the Chemical Industry.
12 Strenger made this statement as president o f the VCI.
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transparency, public dialogue, and readiness to build consent.
The acknowledgement of industrial public accountability is documented, for example, by the 
organization of Open Day events and discussion events for specific targets” , tours of 
industrial facilities, the ready provision of informational material, or ad-integrated appeals to 
enter into dialogue with the industrial actor by letter or electronic media. Since about the late 
1980s, documentation of public accountability has gone beyond this relatively diffuse and 
noncommittal public representation. The publicly exposed individual corporation as well as 
its trade associations have also entered into direct negotiations with the main »antagonist«, 
that is, into more structured, result-oriented communication with local or national protest 
actors. These »post-corporatist« negotiations range from rather informal and irregular meetings 
- organized, for example, with the resident citizen action committee on the occasion of 
technical innovation in order to negotiate about safety measures or the choice of testing 
grounds - to »round table« negotiations, that is to say, negotiations that have a higher degree 
of »proceduralization« and are institutionalized for a certain or indefinite period of time13 4.
13 In Germany it is above all the VCt which has discussions on technology matters with selected targets - 
journalists, teachers, environmental organizations - as an integral part of its communication politics. However, 
such discussions arc not only organized on the level of the industrial association. In Denmark the company Novo 
Nor disk, an ancillary industry in the food sector and an important producer of industrial enzymes, organized five 
two-days-meetings with different public interest and established interest groups hetween 1991 and 1995 in order 
to discuss general corporate and technology policy; the production of genetically engineered enzymes, for 
example, formed a central discussion topic (Behrens, Mcycr-Stumborg & Simonis 1996). On the occasion of an 
invitation to a workshop on genetically engineered foodstuffs and questions of labeling organized by CEAT 
(Clearing House of Biotechnology) and the German environmental organization BUND in October 1994 in 
Brussels, Novo Nordisk expressly pointed to the dialogic stance that it takes towards the public: "Im wcscnUichcn 
ist das, was gebraucht wird, ein Dialog mit dem Ziel, einen Konscns zu erreichcn. Das wichtigstc Prinzip dabci 
ist Offenheit, das ist ein Schritt hin zur Tran spare nz" (Mahler 1995:31). In Switzerland the chemical enterprise 
Ciba-Geigy has for some time been leading a "Risiko-Dialog" with different corporate publics and potential or 
manifest opponents of corporate policy either in general or related to technology; here a central subject has been 
the construction of a bioengineering school (Thielemann 1994b: 136-137).
14 The Unilever "Genetic Engineering Dialogue" and the "Gesprftchskreis Hocchsta Nachham" which have 
been already mentioned above are examples of such »round tabic« negotiations (these two round table procedures 
are described in more detail in the case study, see Part B, point DI.2.4.2). Another example arc the negotiations 
between the German cultivation company Klein-Wanzlebcncr-Saatzucht and critics and opponents of the use o f 
genetic engineering in agricultural production. Note, that there is a research project funded by the German 
Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) on company initiated dialogues. The project, 
entitled "Untemehmensdialoge als besondere Verfahren im Rahmen der Gcstaltung d a  UmwcUbczkhungen", 
understands "corporate dialogue" as a "third kind" of relation formation between enterprises and the public 
(besides information and persuasion) (Niederges&S & Rettbcrg 1995: 32).
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The aim of such negotiations in the noninstitutional political arena is to create support on the 
side of the larger public and »tolerance« on the side of the local and national protest actors 
by, so to speak, giving empirical proof of the company’s/industry’s willingness to plan and 
perform its technology policy by using continual »feedback« with its direct and wider societal 
environment The decision of corporations to engage in this more binding »societal dialogue« 
has to be seen against the following facts: First, confrontation does not prove very successful 
as a strategy of warding off technology protest Second, the increasing diffusion of protest 
ideas and arguments into the political institutions transforms these actors from a political 
fringe group into a significant political factor; to control this factor by public opinion- 
formation only appears increasingly difficult Third, a part of technology protest signals 
(limited) willingness to co-operate (also due to the experience that the strategy of 
confrontation is only of limited efficiency). Fourth, efforts to settle conflict by 
interorganizational negotiation - »round table talks« is the key word - currently enjoy highest 
societal legitimacy. Due to these facts and the fact that a confrontationist stance as regards 
technology protest is hardly compatible with the overarching idea of »public dialogue«, post- 
corporatist negotiation has presented itself as a form of political action worth testing.
2.1.3 Identity-Building: Engaging in Moral Discourse
For the individual corporation that has dialogue-orientation as its overall public 
communication strategy and that enters into negotiations with some of its challengers, it is 
hardly possible to simultaneously publicly confront technology protesters without risking 
undue loss of credibility and efficiency of its overall political strategy. To do so via the more 
»intangible« and less directly exposed trade association, however, may appear as a promising 
action option, at least, when the contextual conditions are especially favorable. This is 
demonstrated by the Swiss and German15 genetic engineering controversy and shall be
15 Though not as moralistic and openly confrontative as the VCI’s communication campaign, the campaign 
that was run in late 1991 by the Inter pharma, the trade association of the three big Swiss chemical enterprises 
Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz, and Hoffman-LaRoche, via the "Gen Suisse - Die Schweizer Stiftung fiir eine 
verantwortungsvolle Gentechnik" also can be classified as identity-building communication. Brochures, placards, 
and ads not only expound in euphemistic terms the opportunities that genetic engineering provides to combat 
disease - cancer, Aids - and environmental pollution - e.g. by the use of genetically engineered pesticides (Müller 
1992; see appendix III. p.284) - but present the technology as more or less the only chance that society has to
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exemplified here by the German case.
In late 1992, at the outset of the downswing phase of the Gennan rDNA controversy 
and at a time of growing economic recession (that is, at a time when the public and 
politicians blamed industry and at the same time placed great hopes in it and, in doing so. 
provided it with a relatively strong political position), the trade association of the Gennan 
chemical industry launched the "Meinungs-Offensivc Gentechnik", an advertising campaign 
made up of positional, moralistic, confrontationist statements (see appendix III. p.283),fc. 
With these statements industry countered moral protest discourse on the same argumentative 
level, it engaged in a moral counter-discourse.
This moral counter-discourse was based on both »materialist« and »postmaterialist« 
values, that is, it »moralized« technology opponents on the very values upon which this 
opposition was based. Opposition was accused of immoral behavior by impeding the use of 
technology for the creation of a better quality of life: of a cleaner environment, healthier 
people, and increased job security. Industry’s moral counter-discourse is to mobilize support 
by offering the opportunity of moral identification on the basis of »old« atid »new« societal 
ideas of what constitutes »societal progress«.
Moral accusation was not formulated as a direct address. Indirect confrontation of the nature 
of the following two statements was given preference:
Wer heute noch die Chancen der Gentechnik verhindem will, handclt
unverantwortlich.
Gerade die UmweltbewuBten müssen sich vehement für die Gentechnik cinsetzcn.
It is the polarized structure of terms - euphemism as regards the contributions of genetic 
engineering and industrial use of this technology for the public good and cacophonism as 
regards the effects of a non-use of the technology on that public good - which morally 
downgrades the protest actor and morally upgrades the economic actor. Industrial 
communication in the identity-building mode constitutes, so to speak, a dramatic enactment 
of industry’s socio-political responsibility and, at the same time, a dramatic enactment of the 16
cope with these problems. Expressly for its communication campaign the Interpharma arranged for the 
foundation of the association "Gen-Suisse" consisting representatives of the major societal sectors (Ibid.).
16 This campaign is described in more detail in the case study. See Part B. point III.2.4.3.
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antagonist's socio-political irresponsibility.
2.2 Business Political Activity as Strategic Action Under Socio-Cultura! Constraint
The concern of the preceding sections was to show that in countries such as Switzerland, 
Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, industrial organizations are faced with a 
special political challenge. This challenge originates from civil protest actors who are 
organized to promote collective benefits for society in general and publicly attack industrial 
technology use as individual utility against which these collective benefits have to be 
protected. The political challenge these protest actors present to industrial organizations 
consists, on the one hand, of direct economic effects such as a decrease in stock prices or 
increased expenditures for consultants. It consists, in the first place, however, of indirect 
economic effects such as absorption of time and man power, delays in the approval of 
production facilities and new products, demoralization of staff members and employees, loss 
of public trust and credibility, impairment of industry’s negotiation power against the state 
and the constant threat of restrictive regulatory action which implies unfavorable conditions 
for investment activities.
To effectively meet this challenge, it is not sufficient to rely on power and money as the 
traditional means of industrial environmental control. Instead, what is needed is an additional 
means of control that is positioned somewhere between rational discourse and moral suasion 
(Willke 1983: 64). What is needed is a special communicative effort, a special endeavor to 
convince - not merely the established players of the political game but the public at large. 
What must be made use of in this regard is the public sphere's function as a legitimatory 
realm o f resonance17. Persuasiveness in its turn cannot be gained by relying on scientific- 
technical information about technical safety alone. With the dissolution of the societal consent 
as regards the role that technology can and should play in societal development the exposition 
of technical safety without exposition of the social objectives and values upon which the 
definition of safety as well as the very development and use of technology is based is no
17 The theoretical perspective of the public sphere as a "legitimatorischer ResonanzraunT of institutions is 
adopted from Rehberg (1995: 184).
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longer a sufficient means of convincing. Actually, persuasive power not only requires general 
exposition of these social objectives and values; what is more, it requires a special 
commitment to the objectives and value orientations of technology protest, that is, to the 
grounds on which a generally more critical public attitude towards technology and technical 
change has developed; it requires special commitment to the idea of an environmentally and 
socially compatible technical change.
Such commitment in technical controversy, 1 have argued, is not a mechanistic reaction of 
industry. It is a learning process under conditions of cultural change. The learning process 
consists of the experience that a purely confrontationist strategy towards protest actors and 
a purely educative attitude towards different industry publics clinging to the traditional 
convictions concerning technical modernization do not prove efficient. To put it into positive 
terms: Publicly exposed industrial organizations experience adherence to newly developed 
convictions as a social constraint. Public communication designed to convey the message that 
industrial technology policy values environmental protection and health/safety as much as, or 
even higher than economic profitability is the result of the experience of a new socio-cultural 
constraint. That does not mean, that confidence- and identity-building communication docs 
not also bank on »materialist« value orientations and scientific-technical rationality. Rather, 
this new type of public communication is the representation of a new political identity, 
ideology, and positions that incorporate different and sometimes conflicting societal objectives 
and values. Industrial public dialogue is the cognitive and communicative effort of developing 
a positive relation to a heterogeneous rather than a homogeneous public interest. When the 
state as the traditional embodiment of the public interest turns into a welfare and steering state 
and develops the individual "Interesse an sich selbst" (Willke 1983: 129), industrial 
organizations, as the traditional embodiment of the individual interest, due to the 
institutionalization of the idea of an environmentally and socially compatible technical and 
industrial development had to develop an interest in overall social development
While this process of institutionalization has plunged industrial organizations into a 
crisis of legitimacy, it at the same time provides for the possibility of a way out: legitimizing 
industrial technology activity and (recreating a consensus with society on this activity by 
means of framing it in terms of this idea; in frames that arc related to dialogue, environment, 
safety, and health. The possibility of a way out is the possibility to use the idea as a
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legitimizing ideology.
Is this to say, that newly developed societal expectations can easily be managed on the level 
of »rhetorics«, of »symbolic politics« (Edelman 1971,1988)? To study organizational reaction 
to such demands in terms of political activity implies highlighting organizational agency. It 
implies stressing that economic organizations do not readily conform to this type of external 
dictate but act »strategically« in terms of hiding from it or negotiating about i t  Publicly 
exposed industries in technical controversy recognize the framing of industry practice and 
structure in terms of the idea of a socially and environmentally compatible technical change 
and negotiation in the framework of this idea as a political necessity. This political necessity, 
however, is deduced from the objective of keeping the influence of this idea on industrial 
practice and structure as minimal as possible. At the same time, however, communicative 
action based on this perception and aimed at achieving this objective produces some extent 
of self-restriction in the pursuit of original organizational interests. In the final analysis, self­
set normative bounds make some extent of restraint necessary. They (re)produce normative 
expectations behind which industry behavior cannot fall without risking an even greater deficit 
of credibility. Publicly advanced self-commitments can be prosecuted by opponents at any 
time and with high public attention and moral pressure. The drawback of industrial political 
activity in the confidence- and identity-building mode consists of a further loss in credibility 
and legitimacy, namely then, when industrial practice does not fulfill what industrial 
communication promises, when it does not proceed on the basis of what it publicly propagates 
as the moral basis of entrepreneurial action. Sham-dialogue and sham-co-operation, even if 
it is designed as such, is only possible to a limited extent18. To summarize the argument: 
Industrial »strategic« communication produces a normative pressure for reflection as an action 
principle and with that an operatively restricted room for manoeuvre. This fact reveals the 
extent to which the dissolution of the »Fortschrittskonsens« constitutes a constraint on 
industry behavior - also beyond regulatory action. It means obligations on the level of both 
industrial communication and industrial practice.
18 Following Thielemann (1994b: 123), sham-co-operation is understood as a situation in which one or more 
but not all of the participants of an event declared as »co-operation« or »dialogue« merely pretend to be willing 
to take into consideration the claims of others according to their legitimacy.
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The theoretical-analytical framework that has been presented in this first part of the study 
shall now be applied to a specific case and the propositions just formulated in this framework 
shall be tested on the basis of this case: This case is the political activity of the chemical 
industry in the German genetic engineering controversy.
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PART B: APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE  
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN  THE GERMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING
CONTROVERSY
This second part of the study expounds the chemical industry’s political involvement in the 
German genetic engineering controversy in the time period between the mid 1970s and the 
mid 1990s. Its central concern is to explain the sector’s political activities and the changes 
in political involvement that occurred over the specified period of time - as regards extent, 
choice of arena, argumentative strategies, and communication media - against the background 
of a political environment that in the course of debate became an increasingly critical factor 
for the chemical industry. The analysis shows, first, that the chemical industry as a technology 
utilizer has attracted public scrutiny from various angles and actors and from an early stage 
of the technology’s uptake. Second, it demonstrates that this special political challenge has 
provoked a special political response from industry. Industrial political activity in the course 
of debate has not only expanded and diversified but also entered an advanced stage o f 
organization and professionalization.
Structure and Contents of the Chapters
Part B is composed of three main chapters. The point of entry of my inquiry into the German 
rDNA debate and the chemical industry’s role as a key participant in this debate is to provide 
a short portrayal of the chemical industry as a »technology utilizer«. Before the firs t chapter 
points out the economic value of genetic engineering for the sector and the role that the sector 
has played in the technology’s commercialization, it clarifies what is understood in this study 
by the »chemical industry«. This clarification is necessary as there exists no generally agreed 
upon definition of this sectoral designation. Then, the chapter looks at the current trends in 
rDNA technology as used in the chemical industry. Finally, it exposes the leading position  
that the industry holds in the exploitation of genetic engineering at the national and 
international level and the sector’s overall strategies in the technology field.
The second chapter provides an exposition of the key factors of the political environment in
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which the chemical industry's efforts to develop and commercialize the new technology have 
been embedded. The exposition covers the time period from the mid 1970s - when the 
chemical industry began to take an interest in the new technology - until the mid 1990s - 
when the technology had developed into an integral tool of the sector. The environmental 
factors looked at are regulatory policies, parliamentary scrutiny, social protest a t the local 
and supraregional level, and a critical m ass media discourse. The exposition shall point out, 
first, that the societal controversy about rDNA technology in Germany shows the effects of 
a process that is taking place to some extent in all highly industrialized countries of the 
Western world and that has accelerated since the turn of the 1980s: The diffusion of the 
concern about technological risk into the political and legal system. It is due to this process 
that the established political and legal institutions (and not merely civil protest actors) in the 
German rDNA debate present a real political challenge to the chemical industry. In Germany, 
it will be shown, this process is above all reflected and driven by the entry of the Green Party 
into parliament.
The chapter will expound, second, the special challenge that new social movement 
actors including the Green Party have presented to the chemical industry by organizing in 
collective protest and bringing direct and indirect pressure to bear on the technology utilizer. 
In order to expound this special challenge the chapter provides a portrayal of collective 
protest in terms of development, structure, and practice.
The third chapter, finally, provides a phase-based exposition of the chemical industry’s policy 
on the rDNA issue. It discusses changes in industrial political activity as regards extent, arena 
choice, argumentative thrust, and interactive nature by relating them to the contextual factors 
outlined in the preceding chapter. Four phases of industrial political activity are distinguished. 
They are denoted as follows: 1) corporatist negotiations (1975-1983), 2) deliberations a t the 
parliamentary level (1984-1987), 3) public education and reassurance (1988-mid/1990), and 
4) public dialogue (mid/1990-1994). The empirical focus is on the latter two phases, the 
phases of continued public appearances of the chemical industry on the rDNA issue. The 
major concern of the chapter is to show how an increasingly turbulent political environment 
comprising the political and public spheres has induced the chemical industry to expand, 
diversify and professionalize its political activity. More specifically, I will show how an 
unfavorably changing context caused the industrial actor to »move forward« into the public
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arena and to engage in a communicative effort that is aimed at demonstrating commitment 
to a socially and environmentally compatible use o f the technology at issue. This 
communicative effort, it will further be shown, has increasingly taken the form of direct 
contacts and active discussions.
The phase-based exposition is preceded by a short portrayal of the major 
characteristics of the chemical industry as a »policy community«. This portrayal expounds and 
attempts to explain the special role that collective action through the industry association, the 
Verband der Chemischen Industrie (VCI), has played in the rDNA debate.
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I. THE CHEM ICAL INDUSTRY AS TECHNOLOGY UTILIZER
The chemical industry is not only the key private sector protagonist in the German genetic 
engineering controversy, a fact expounded and analyzed in the subsequent chapters. It is 
moreover the industrial sector which holds a leading position in the development and 
application of genetic engineering: The private-sector activities in this technology field in 
Germany have been dominated from the outset by the big, established, internationally active 
combines of the chemical industry - a fact which obviously has to be seen in relation to the 
sector’s »external« and »internal« politicization. It is this chapter’s concern to provide a brief 
portrayal of the chemical industry as a »technology utilizer«. Before the impact of genetic 
engineering on the sector in terms of innovation and exploitation is pointed out, it must be 
made clear what precisely is understood by this industrial sector. Any classification of 
industries has its arbitrary elements. It has to be made explicit, therefore, what is understood 
by a specific industrial sector. A clarification of what constitutes the »chemical industry« is 
the necessary basis of an illustration of the value of genetic engineering for the sector. This 
basis is provided by the first section of the present chapter. The second section, then, looks 
at current trends in genetic engineering as applied in the chemical industry. The third section 
points out the leading position that the sector occupies in the development and 
commercialization of genetic engineering (at the national and international level). Moreover, 
it reconstructs the introduction of genetic engineering in the sector in terms of a "nachholende 
Modemisierung" (catch-up modernization); this is the term which Dolata (1991: 33) has 
coined denoting the relatively late venturing of the German chemical industry into the field 
of modem biotechnologies. Finally, it outlines the sector’s overall, internationally oriented, 
strategy in this field. 1
1. What is the »Chemical Industry«?
In very general terms this question can be answered as follows: The chemical industry is one
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of the most internationalized industries* with a multifariousness of substances and products1 2 
which is both capital- and research-intensive3. In nation-specific terms it can be replied that 
the chemical industry is one of the industries which led post-war economic recovery in 
Germany and today constitutes a leading edge of the economy with around half of all 
production being exported. According to in-house information, the German chemical industry 
is the fourth biggest employer among the German branches of industry (the first three ranks 
are occupied by the machine-building, electrical and automobile industries)4; it ranks fifth 
in sales (the first four ranks are taken up by the automobile, electrical, machine-building and 
food industries)5; it ranks second in investments (the automobile industry ranks first); and it 
ranks first as far as self-financed investments for research and development are concerned 
(VCI 1996: 1; see ft3 ). Since its inception, the sector has been dominated by its major firms: 
the giants BASF, Bayer, and Hoechst which form part of the leading chemical firms in the 
world (Allen 1989: 160).
This short portrayal, however, does not clarify the process- and product-related nature 
of the industrial sector. The »chemical industry« is a common term in economic and 
production statistics. As to its definition, however, there is a lack of clarity and significant 
differences in international comparison. This study, adopting a useful classifying device by 
Kleine (1984, see also von Osten 1988), defines the »chemical industry« as an industrial
1 Today, particularly in basic industrial chemicals but also in fields such as pharmaceuticals, soaps and 
detergents, manufacture is undertaken in a range of countries by transnational enteiprises which think in terms 
of international rather than domestic markets.
2 Moreover it is an industry with many levels of production: it produces basic materials as well as semi­
finished products and end products.
3 This holds especially true for the German chemical industry. One of its salient characteristics is a high 
degree of technical innovation and research and development (R&D) activities, with the latter being self-financed 
at about 95 per cent (Grießhammer 1993: 35). In 1995, the sector spent about DM 10,4 billion on research into 
new products (VCI 1996: 2). A breakdown of R&D spending with regard to the three leading companies (for 
1992) results in the following figures: BASF spent DM 2.084 million, or 4,5 per cent of sales; Bayer spent DM 
3.096 million, or 7,5 per cent of sales; and Hoechst spent DM 2.904 million, or 6 3  per cent of sales (Kümmerte 
1993: 5). Together with the electrical and automobile industries the chemical industry belongs to the most 
research intensive branches of industry in Germany. Since it costs over DM 180 million to research, develop, 
test, and innovate a new drug, it is the pharmaceutical sector which swallows up the biggest part o f the R&D 
expenditures.
4 According to information by the chemical industry’s trade association, VCI, in 1995 538.000 people were 
employed in about 1.800 chemical enterprises (VCI 1996: 1).
5 According to information by the VCI, in 1995 the chemical industry had a  turnover o f approximately DM 
179,8 billions (VCI 1996: 1).
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sector which is made up of four main divisions. These are the following6: The first group 
covers the manufacture of basic chemicals in bulk including inorganic chemicals such as 
sulphuric acid» slaked lime and ammonia and organic chemicals derived from petroleum 
feedstocks» such as ethylene, benzene or propylene as well as petrol itself. Basic chemicals 
are the basis from which a range of subsequent treatments in the chemical industry proceed. 
The second division is the production of industrial chemicals in bulk including for example 
the production of chemical fibers, fertilizers, synthetic rubber, solvents, and plastic materials. 
According to the field of application, these economy-priced products, which in most cases are 
not homogeneous substances but mixtures, are processed and optimized. The third division 
is the manufacture of fine  chemicals. These products present basic material or »building 
blocks« for specialty products and comprise amongst others amino acids, essential oils, and 
vitamins. Unlike basic and industrial chemicals, fine chemicals are produced in small 
quantities. The fourth group, finally, covers knowledge-intensive specialty chemicals. Among 
these high-price low-volume products are pharmaceuticals, pesticides, detergents, soap- and 
cleaning preparations, paints, and catalysts - to note only some of the most important product 
groups.
Specialty chemicals make up the division in which currently the greatest expansion in the 
chemical industry takes place. In the 1970s, the German companies faced intensified 
competition from the big European transnational companies in a period of slow growth. At 
the end of the decade the big European firms including the German giants made strategic 
decisions to reduce their dependency on basic chemical production; they decided to switch 
their emphasis towards global niche markets for specialty chemicals and to working with 
customers to develop higher-value applications of underexploited existing products (Green & 
Yoxen 1990a: 4797, see also Green & Yoxen 1990b: 88). Specialty chemicals promise high 
W ertschôpfung as they are usually produced from relatively cheap source material and are
6 This rough categorization, as von Osten stresses, is not always unequivocal. The boundaries between the 
different product groups are fluid, so that assignment o f products to one of the groups is often difficult (von 
Osten 1988: 13).
7 Green and Yoxen regard this switch to value-added chemicals as one example of the more general trend 
of the post-Fordist form of production organization which has been dubbed flexible specialization. This 
production organization is based on smaller production units and a more flexible use of labor, with a core of 
highly-paid skilled permanent workers and a periphery of more disposable temporary, part-time or sub-contracted 
less skilled workers (Green & Yoxen 1990a: 479).
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subjected only to minor fluctuations in demand (von Osten 1988: 19). Especially producers 
in the highly developed countries decided to increasingly concentrate on these research­
intensive products the development of which is strictly application-orientated. As production 
did shift to new product areas, so did research and development Since about the late 1970s, 
one can find in the chemical industry a special emphasis on strategic research into new core 
technologies such as materials and modem biotechnologies, the results of which are especially 
useful in pharmaceuticals. With the strategic orientation towards specialty products, modem 
biotechnologies by the larger chemical companies by that time became to be increasingly 
recognized as an important tool in the attempt to meet intensifying international competition 
in the chemical-pharmaceutical sector. Especially high importance came to be assigned to 
genetic engineering constituting an integral part of modem biotechnologies.
2. The Value of Genetic Engineering
The chemical industry’s overriding interest as regards the methods and procedures of genetic 
engineering clearly is in specialty products with an especially high Wertschopfung. In the case 
of bulk chemical production and fine chemicals, the new technology is forced to compete with 
the great potential that conventional methods still offer, and for this reason interest is limited 
and the degree of innovation likely to be modest (Green & Yoxen 1990a: 479).
In the area of specialty products, growing interest is placed in prospects for plant 
breeding. Large profit is expected from the production of herbicide-tolerant plants and the 
substitution of a single, broad-spectrum herbicide for the present »cocktail« of selective 
herbicides which distinguish between a particular crop and weeds. The manufacture of new 
additives in consumer products is another area in which genetic engineering is assigned 
innovative strength; here, genetically engineered enzymes in detergents are among the most 
important products8.
The keenest interest of the chemical industry, however, has been placed from the
8 In processes, enzymes have considerable potential as biological catalysts, although they are restricted to 
low-temperature fermentation processes. Biotechnologicaliy produced enzymes are already used for multifarious 
ends of which detergents is only one example. With the help of genetic engineering it will be possible to 
substitute chemical synthesis increasingly by biochemical, that is enzymic synthesis with the advantage that the 
reactions take place in normal temperatures and at atmospheric pressure.
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outset, and is still placed, in the application of genetic engineering in the pharmaceutical 
sector. In some cases, early hopes and expectations based on the techniques in this sector 
have met with temporary disappointments or deferrals - for example anticipations that rDNA 
produced interferon might provide a general cure for cancer (Bundesministerium fiir 
Gesundheit 1993: 11). Nonetheless pharmaceuticals (drugs and human health care) is by far 
the biggest field of application of modem biotechnologies (this holds true for the German 
chemical industry as well as for the chemical industry of the whole Western world). The main 
activities of genetic engineering research and production in the pharmaceutical sector are in 
the areas of therapy, prophylaxis and medicinal diagnostics. While in the plant breeding 
sector, into which genetic engineering was introduced relatively recently, the technology’s 
commercial exploitation is still being awaited - no product so far has been introduced to the 
market - a number of pharmaceutical products made with the help of the new technology have 
already entered the market.
In the pharmaceutical sector, genetic engineering in the course of the 1990s has clearly 
surpassed the status of a »niche technology« (Dolata 1997: 14). Despite these remarkable 
economic dynamics, the use of genetic engineering techniques in pharmaceutical research and 
production is characterized by astonishing ambivalences. The predominant portion of the 
marketed recombinant therapeutics and diagnostica still have a substitutive rather than 
innovative character. That means, genetically engineered products such as insulin, blood 
clotting Factor VIII preparations, growth hormones or hepatitis-B-vaccines substitute and 
improve preparations already on the market and produced with traditional techniques. On the 
other hand, the development of really new products up to now has remained limited to a few 
exceptions such as recombinant erythropoietin (EPO), a haematogen hormone. This does not 
mean, however, that the use of genetic engineering in the pharmaceutical sector still is not 
a profitable business. The first recombinant products of some of the German chemical 
enterprises today prove lucrative. The products' sale yields a significant part of the turnover 
of these companies and has already retrieved the high expenses for research and development 
(Ibid). At the international level, in fact, some of the marketed products meanwhile are 
counted among the so-called »blockbusters«.
In other fields of application, the first commercial breakthroughs still are missing: On 
the basis of the present state of research in the agricultural sector, economically utilizable
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results on a larger scale should be expected only in the medium or long-term9; in the area 
of bulk chemical production» decisive economic breakthroughs are not in the offing at all 
(Dolata 1995: 20).
Indeed, the general rate of introduction of genetic engineering products (world-wide and with 
regard to all industries involved) has been much slower and the general rate of 
commercialization much lower than predicted in the early 1980s. At that time, particularly 
promoters of biotechnology-based companies competitively and inevitably over-emphasized 
the »dramatic significance« and supposedly imminent commercial opportunities which would 
result from the revolutionary widespread diffusion of the new technology. In view of the 
developments since then, the initial euphoria has given way to more sober (and realistic) 
assessments (Green & Yoxen 1990b: 4)10 1. A view has emerged that fewer branches of 
industry than originally anticipated can expect to gain significant commercial advantages from 
the introduction of genetic engineering and that only very few companies will in fact enjoy 
a comfortable return on their genetic engineering investments11.
Despite the fact that genetic engineering has failed to some extent to live up to its early 
promise and still is not far advanced in its technological and economic life circle, the German 
chemical industry does not believe that this has taken the edge off the potential of the 
technology. On the contrary, particularly the giant companies regard genetic engineering as 
indispensable to future corporate success on the national and international markets; they have 
accorded it a privileged position in their research and development priorities.
9 Research and development activities in the research laboratories of the chemical industry, however, are of 
considerable scope and the number of field trials with transgenic plants is steadily growing.
10 The noisy »hype« of the early 1980s is not untypical of the initial stage of scientific-technological 
innovations; at this stage potentialities and expectations associated with the innovation are often projected to 
completely exaggerated forecasts, in which retarding aspects, such as imponderabilities and alternatives of the 
research process, difficulties concerning the introduction of new products and processes or stoppages due to 
societal opposition and acceptance problems, are underrated or totally overlooked.
11 Indeed, still today, as Spangenberg (1994: 31) points out, it is a difficult task to make sound economic 
stocktaking and forecast turnovers. On the one hand, in the case of many genetic engineering activities in basic 
research it is hardly possible to anticipate which technical and economic relevance these will have in the future. 
On the other hand, the relevant statistics do not report traditional biotechnology and genetic engineering in clear 
differentiation, neither for research and development nor for production (Ibid).
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3. Technological Leadership at the National Level - »Catch-up Modernization« at 
the International Level
The multinational chemical enterprises of the Western world hold a leading position world­
wide in the development and application of genetic engineering, particularly in the 
pharmaceutical sector but also in plant breeding (Spangenberg 1994: 32). Likewise the giant 
German chemical companies play the decisive role in the development and commercialization 
of genetic engineering at the national level12. It is a salient characteristic of the German 
development that from the outset the private-sector activities in the field of modem 
biotechnologies have been driven and dominated by the big, established, internationally 
operating combines of the chemical industry13 14. Newly founded biotechnology firms, in the 
United States initially the driving force of the bio- and gene technology development” , one 
could hardly find in Germany in the beginning. After a small wave of foundations in the mid 
1980s, these firms have remained of minor economic importance15.
The core group of companies involved in research and/or production in the field of
12 To correctly conceive o f the German chemical industry's role in the commercial exploitation of genetic 
engineering, it is important to recall that the production of pharmaceutical products is in substance as well as 
economically part o f the chemical industry. In Germany it amounts to about fourteen to fifteen percent of the 
total production value of the industrial sector. The pharmaceutical production is highly concentrated and usually 
an integral part of the (substantially broader) product line of the big chemical companies such as Bayer, BASF, 
and Hocchst. It is also important to note that the major German chemical companies are among the twelve agro­
chemicals producers with the biggest sales rate in the world and produce between five and thirteen per cent of 
their total sales in the agricultural sector. As such, they also conduct big parts of biotechnology and genetic 
engineering oriented research and development in the field of agrochemicals (DoLita 1991: 25).
13 There has been another decisive driving force: the national government By acting as a co-ordinating 
Klammer of emerging research networks and via the drawing up of multi-year research and development 
programmes, it has exercised a certain amount of influence on the pace of technological development and 
industrial involvement.
14 In the United States, early commercialization in the late 197& was accompanied by a mushrooming of 
these small venture capital companies, most of which were dealing almost exclusively with research rather than 
with development, production, marketing, etc., and the main function of which was to accelerate the transition 
from basic research to industrial production. In the US these firms decisively stimulated scientific and 
technological development in the field of modem biotechnologies. Today, however, also here the technological 
development has come to be dominated by large transnational corporations. The innovative, small biotechnology 
firms have formed an alliance with large pharmaceutical and chemical corporations that have entered the 
biotechnology field to establish the Biotechnology Industries Association (see Baaxi & Jamison 1990: 41).
15 Besides specialty products these firms concentrate on research under contract and Seniccteistungen 
(examples arc the firms Diagcn, Orphegen or Progen). With the exception of Sweden and Great Britain, newly 
founded biotechnology firms in other western European countries have played and continue to play only a minor 
role.
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modern biotechnologies in Germany includes - besides the three chemical giants BASF (via 
its pharmaceuticals-subsidiary Knoll), Bayer, and Hoechst (with the French subsidiary 
Roussel-Uclaf)16 - on the one hand the big chemical companies Schering, Boehringer 
Ingelheim and Boehringer Mannheim17; like the three giants these companies in the course 
of the 1980s set up or extended their own biotechnical working teams and departments. On 
the other, it comprises a number of established medium-size enterprises concentrating their 
activities on the pharmaceutical sector where they usually serve market niches (c.g., Biotcst 
and Dr. Rentschler), complemented by the Kleinwanzlebener Saatzucht (KWS) which is the 
only larger enterprise of the German plant breeding and seeds industry that occupies a special 
position in the field of modem biotechnologies (Dolata 1995: 101).
Thus, in Germany, it can be noted, the big companies exploring and applying the new 
technology's potential belong to the chemical industry. With their decision - partly taken in 
the early 1980s, partly in the second half of the 1980s - to start to extensively qualify their 
know-how in the area of modem biotechnologies and to firmly establish their starting position 
in the struggle for future markets, a marked priority-setting occurred in Germany in favor of 
modern biotechnologies. With regard to the overall strategies o f these big firms, the studies 
of Dolata (1996, 1995, 1994, 1991) have pointed out three main particularities: First, (with 
the exception of Boehringer Mannheim) the companies do not belong to the early pioneers. 
Especially in comparison to their US competitors, they have entered relatively late into the 
genetic engineering field18. The companies' policies of reorientation and concentration in the 
course of the 1980s on a technology field that for a long time had been widely neglected, 
Dolata denotes as "catch-up modernization" (nachholende Modernisierung, Dolata 1991: 33). 
According to the author these policies indicate a (late) correction of course, which was based 
on the fear of »missing the boat« in the sense of a trend-setting technological innovation 
rather than the expectation of imminent gains in a new field of expansion (Dolata 1991:
16 The German big three are the three largest chemical companies (followed by the UK’s IQ ) o f the nine 
EU based firms which belong to the world’s fifteen largest chemical companies (Green & Yoxen 1990a: 478).
17 With the exception of Knoll all of these companies belong to the fifty pharmaceutical companies with the 
biggest sales rate in the world.
18 Already in 1982, only eight years after the first publication of a successful genetic modification, the US 
multinational Eli Lilly started with the industrial production of the first genetic engineering product, human 
insulin (on the basis of a license of the biotechnology company Genentech).
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3 Iff.)- Since then the big firms have undertaken a great endeavor to catch up with 
international technological development and to improve their starting position with regard to 
the decisive future markets - especially with regard to the US m arket This points to the other 
two particularities in terms of strategy. These are, on the one hand, the resort to research 
resources and know-how o f the United States which results in a range of US-commitments 
and a strong dependence on US-patents. Closely linked to this is, on the other hand, the focus 
o f all entrepreneurial strategic approaches on an international extension and differentiation 
o f  research and development activities. These take the form o f innumerable co-operations 
particularly with US biotechnology firms and research facilities, specific buying-ups and new 
company-owned research centers in the United States and increasingly also in Japan. Possibly 
no innovation before genetic engineering has been driven so intensively on the basis of 
worldwide strategies19 (for an overview of the international activities of the big German 
chemical companies see table 2 by Dolata 1994).
This international strategy, Dolata points out, is primarily aimed at gaining a foothold 
in the locality of the leading research centers of the new technology, worldwide tracing and 
acquisition of know-how as well as being positioned in the main markets of the competitors 
if  possible with the whole chain of research, development, production, and marketing (Dolata 
1995: 23-24). It forms part of a more general process of internationalization of big industry, 
a process which in the mid 1990s is discussed under the heading of »globalization«20. 
According to Dolata, the frequently advanced assertion that the numerous co-operations, 
participations, buying-ups and investments particularly in the United States would be linked 
to a significant drain of genetic engineering research and production from Germany up to the 
present cannot be born out National capacities would not be reduced to the advantage of
19 Dolata uses the term "regional duality" (regionale Dualität, Dolata 1991: 19-20) to describe this strategic 
orientation which is distinctive of big industry's involvement in most western European countries. "Regional 
duality" refers to the fact that, on the one hand, the companies are involved in multifarious ways in technology 
related development in their home countries: They participate in the drafting of national research and 
development programmes and avail of the supportive measures of their governments; they are integrated in the 
setting up of national research complexes and expand their gene technological research and production basis at 
these traditional business locations - and, on the other hand, they are engaged in the setting up a  research and 
production infrastructure abroad.
30 It is Dolata's main thesis that the biggest part of the chemical-pharmaceutical industry's genetic 
engineering commitment abroad is a consequence of internationally orient»! corporate strategies and not the 
result of an unacceptable research and production environment at home. The author argues against the popular 
argument that this global commitment would be a well-considered flight from tedious German approval 
procedures, overdrawn bureaucracy and public participation (Dolata 1995: 24).
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capacities abroad but the extensions abroad would be added to the national capacities. The 
research priorities and competences, however, would be redistributed at the global level, 
which would inevitably relativize the importance of the domestic centers (Dolata 1995: 22).
To recapitulate, in Germany the innovation dynamics in the area of modem biotechnologies 
from the outset have been determined by the big companies of the chemical industry. Genetic 
engineering offers this industrial sector considerable innovative scope - particularly in the 
pharmaceutical and plant breeding sector - and since the early 1980s the industry has been 
seizing this opportunity. It does not only invest in corresponding research, development and 
production at the national level but expands research and production capacities world-wide.
In what follows the international level is left aside. The next chapter looks at the national 
political and socio-political context in which the chemical industry has been seeking to 
capitalize on the new technology. How supportive or how critical has this context been?
148
ta b le j i  The German Chemical Industry’s International Genetic Engineering Activities
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II. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
It goes without saying that the chemical industry’s interest in the commercialization of genetic 
engineering is linked to its desire for a favorable political and public climate in which this 
objective can be successfully pursued. As the present chapter will show, this wish, particularly 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was fulfilled only in part - at least from the perspective of 
the industrial actor. Covering the period from the mid 1970s - when the chemical industry 
entered into »first contacts« with the new technology - until the mid 1990s ■ when rDNA 
technology had become firmly established in the sector * the chapter points out the key factors 
of the sector’s political environment concerning the development, application, and exploitation 
of genetic engineering. These key factors are, first, regulatory policies comprising the 
proposal bill of 1979, the subjection of genetic engineering research and production under the 
control of the Federal Emissions Act in 1988, and the Genetic Engineering Act of 1990; 
second, parliamentary scrutiny due to a technology-critical newcomer to the parliamentary 
arena - the Green Party - and the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry (Enquête- 
Kommission) dealing with the prospects and risks of the new technology; third, social protest 
at the local and supraregional level; and fourth, a critical mass media discourse.
Among these factors, the chapter shall show, the party Die Grilnen and civil protest 
at the local level have played a special role in challenging the chemical industry at the 
political, social and moral levels: While the transformation of the rDNA issue from a 
technical issue into a political and (highly moral) protest issue was carried out to a great 
extent by the technology-critical policy of the movement-related parliamentary newcomer 
(pursued at the parliamentary and social levels), legislation was significantly driven by local 
protest against the construction of genetic engineering facilities in the chemical industry. The 
exposition generally focuses on civil protest actors; these actors are recognized as the 
principal technology opponent and major challenger of chemical enterprises engaged in the 
new technology. The subsequent chapter will identify this political factor and the others stated 
above - which influencing each other make up the »external politicization« of the chemical 
industry - as the major determinants of the sector's political activities - that is, of the sector's 
»internal politicization« - in the German rDNA debate.
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1. Parliamentary Scrutiny and Regulatory Policies
Looking back on the process of politicization of the genetic engineering issue in Germany, 
this chapter shall demonstrate, first, that the chief initiative for a lasting transformation of a 
technical issue into a political issue did not come from the extra-parliamentary but from the 
parliamentary sector - largely due to the Green’s entry into that sector. As distinguished from 
the nuclear energy issue for which the anti-nuclear energy movement had the »monopoly of 
sensitization« before it was put on the systemic political agenda and had become a 
mainstream issue, there was no such exclusivity for protest actors in the case of the rDNA 
issue. This is what Gill refers to when he states that it would be "eigenartig ..., daß der 
Meinungsbildungsprozeß genau anders herum ablief als üblich" (Gill 1991a: 430). Whereas 
usually, as the author points out, an issue comes into existence somewhere in society, is 
placed by activists onto the media and public agenda, and then as a reaction to the challenge 
of public opinion is taken up by a political party and thus reaches parliament only late, in the 
case of the rDNA issue it was parliament which translated the issue into a political and public 
agenda item (Ibid.). The role o f the (extra-parliamentary) activists is restricted to keeping the 
issue on these agendas; to play this role, however, implies a real endeavor.
In the process of lawmaking, on the other hand, parliament played only a minor role. 
The chapter, secondly, argues that legislation on genetic engineering was set off in the final 
analysis by extra-parliamentary actors, namely local protest groups, the Bundesrat and the 
highest administrative court in one o f the Lander, the Administrative Court o f Hesse.
The principal concern of the present chapter is to point out that the societal 
controversy about rDNA technology in Germany shows the effects of a process that to some 
extent is taking place in all highly industrialized countries of the Western world and has 
accelerated since the turn of the 1980s: The diffusion of the concern about technological risk 
into the political and legal system. It is due to this process that the established political and 
legal institutions (and not merely civil protest actors) in the German rDNA debate present a 
real political challenge to the chemical industry.
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1.1 BMFT-Led Corporatist Negotiations: A First Approach to Legislation Peters Out
In Germany a first approach to a broader politicization of the rDNA issue occurred in the late 
1970s (at a time of the very first public and private commitment to the new genetic 
engineering techniques) in the arena of institutionalized politics. This approach consisted of 
the subjection of genetic engineering research and development to safety guidelines and 
subsequent corporatist negotiations about a legislative regulation of rDNA technology.
The national regulatory and safety debate was closely linked with the events which 
took place in the United States at that time. In July 1974, eleven leading American scientists, 
involved in recombinant DNA research, called for a worldwide moratorium on specific forms 
of recombinant experiments thought by the group to be potentially hazardous, and requested 
an international conference on the potential biohazards of such research. (It is worth noting 
that such a moratorium on a particular form of scientific research is probably unique in the 
history of science.) Seven months later in February 1975, an international conference was held 
at Asilomar, California. The conference concluded that most work involving recombinant 
DNA research could continue with appropriate safeguards which took the form of physical 
and biological containment. The following year, the American National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) turned the rough plans laid out at Asilomar into specific detailed guidelines for 
recombinant DNA research. The American scientists’ call for a temporary halt to experiments 
initiated a debate about technical safety matters and the appropriate regulation of genetic 
modification experiments not only in the United States but in several western European 
countries. Most countries which support recombinant DNA research, such as Germany, 
adopted some form of guideline more or less closely related to those of the NIH1.
Seen from an international perspective it was thus the scientific community itself 
which gave birth to the rDNA issue and put it onto the political agenda; seen from the 
national perspective the driving forces in the transformation of a previously technical issue 
into a regulatory issue at this time was the executive in the form of the Federal Ministry for 
Research and Technology (Bundesministerium fiir Forschung und Technologic, BMFT1 2) on
1 The German genetic engineering guidelines were revised four times (the last time in May 1986; Der 
Bundesminister fiir Forschung und Technologie 1986).
2 The Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT) has been recently extended into the Federal 
Ministry for Education, Science, Research and Technology (BMBF).
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the one hand, and the labor unions on the other.
In 1978, the German Federal government issued the Guidelines on Protection From Dangers 
From Nucleic Acids Recombined in Vitro (Richtlinien zum Schutz vor Gefahren durch in- 
vitro neukombinierte Nukleinsäuren). These rDNA safety guidelines - closely patterned on 
those developed by the NIH - introduced a risk evaluation system for planned genetic 
engineering experiments. The evaluation procedure was institutionalized with a Central 
Commission for Biological Safety (Zentrale Kommission für die Biologische Sicherheit, 
ZKBS) located at the Federal Health Office (Bundesgesundheitsamt, BGA) in Berlin3. The 
guidelines’ range of validity, however, was restricted. It merely covered projects carried out 
with federal funds; hence the guidelines were not binding for privately supported research in 
or outside industry or for university research funded by Länder governments. Relevant for this 
type of research and development were laws and Verordnungen applied only analogously to 
genetic engineering procedures.
The guidelines’ limited range of validity, however, did not remain uncriticized. The 
labor unions in particular strongly argued for more stringent and generally binding regulation 
of rDNA research and development. According to them, a law was needed, on the one hand, 
to place the government’s regulatory efforts on an adequate legal basis and, on the other, to 
ensure that workers could be protected against the risks emanating from genetic engineering 
research regardless of their place of employment Responding to these demands from its 
powerful labor constituency, BMFT drew up a bill in 1979 authorizing the Federal 
government to regulate genetic research in all sectors, both public and private (Jasanoff 1985: 
32). In September 1979, BMFT convened a non-public hearing of German and foreign experts 
to discuss the proposal to give the rDNA guidelines statutory force (as well as more 
theoretical questions about scientific autonomy and the likely impacts of full-scale commercial 
utilization of genetic engineering). The German participants in this fust political debate on
3 The commission which represents a plurality of social interests as well as different areas of technical 
expertise was assigned the task of advise the Federal government and the Lânder as well as the registration office 
for gene technological experiments at the Federal Health Office with regard to the assessment o f safety issues 
in the held of genetic engineering.
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the "Chancen und Gefahrcn der Genforschung”4 were representatives from large organizations 
with an institutional interest in genetic engineering research policy. In this respect, as Jasanoff 
points out, the German contingent constituted a "typical negotiating forum for corporatist 
decision-making, providing opportunities for major interest groups to bargain with each other, 
but excluding marginal or extreme viewpoints" (Jasanoff 1985: 32/33). The meeting aroused 
a great deal of negative comment on the BMFT proposal; indeed, it met with massive 
opposition from representatives of science and industry. Their main argument against 
legislation was an (alleged) international shift in risk evaluation towards the view that the 
riskiness of the new techniques had originally been greatly overestimated; a phenomenon 
which they saw expressed by the recently relaxed NIH-guidelines5. Having generated a 
substantial record against the proposed statute, the Research and Technology Ministry was 
able to drop the bill, to the satisfaction of both the chemical-pharmaceutical industry and the 
research community.6
However, this action could have elicited significantly more opposition, particularly 
from  the labor unions, if two major sectors of the research community - private industry and 
the universities - had not agreed voluntarily to abide by the government guidelines. The lead 
in mobilizing industry support for the guidelines was taken by the Federation of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry (Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie, BPI). The trade 
association employed the threat of legislation in order to persuade its members that voluntary
4 "Chanccn und Gefahrcn der Genforschung" (Opportunities and Hazards of Genetic Research) was the title 
of the hearing; for proceedings and documents concerning the hearing, sec Der Bundesministcr fiir Forschung 
und Tcchnologie 1980.
5 The first revision of the NIH*guidelines took place in January 1979. Foremost in relaxing regulation, it 
politically institutionalized the scientific community’s "paradigm change" (Sibatani 1986:39) which had shifted 
the burden of proof from those assuming rDNA technology as being safe to those who viewed it as being 
imminently hazardous. An American statement on proposed German legislation at the government hearing 
demonstrates the profoundness of this paradigm change: "One colleague told me: Is this a joke? Legislation? 
Don’t they know in Bonn that all the legislative efforts were abandoned in the United States for almost two 
years? Tell them that the issue is dead and the concerns are out of date." (SzybaLski 1980. 299)
6 Still, the international hearing did not lack contributions expressing substantial concern about the use of 
the new technology. The participant who most strongly advocated stringent regulation was the American 
biochemist Erwin Chargaff. Chargaff, one of the founding fathers of molecular biology, is the firmest opponent 
of genetic engineering in the United States* scientific community. Since the mid 1970s, with forceful rhetorics 
and apocalyptical scenarios, the scientist has been denouncing the new technology as an outrage to nature 
unparalleled in previous history: "The two greatest deeds - and probably misdeeds - in my time have been the 
splitting of the atom and the discovery of a  way to manipulate the genetic apparatus. When Dr. Otto Hahn made 
his tragic discovery, he is reported to have exclaimed: ’God cannot have wanted that’’ Well, maybe it was the 
devil." (Chargaff 1977: 32, quoted in Radkau 1988: 336)
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compliance with the more flexible guidelines would be to choose the lesser of two evils 
(Jasanoff 1985: 33). The Länder governments, at the same time, agreed to extend the 
guidelines to the state-controlled university system; that way arbitrary differences in the 
standard of care expected of academic researchers employing genetic engineering techniques 
was to be precluded.
Among the federal and state parliamentarians, it can be noted, the hearing and its 
subjects generally met with a low profile. The German public hardly took any notice of the 
event. In short, the regulatory debate was neither placed on the main political agenda nor did 
it enter the public arena, and in the political »side arena« in which it took place it soon fell 
into oblivion.
1.2 The Ethical Discourse of the Greens: Setting off an Extensive and Lasting 
Politicization of the rDNA Issue
It seems fair to state that, up to the mid 1980s, the German parliamentarians and the general 
public displayed remarkably little interest in the novel biological techniques (Radkau 1988: 
340). The American events (if noticed) presumably had a reassuring rather than alarming 
effect. With the international scientific consent of Asilomar the rDNA issue - restricted by 
the participating scientists to safety risks associated with the techniques* use in research and 
development and designated as a technical problem to be resolved on technical grounds7 - 
seemed thrashed out and its resolution with the Federal rDNA guidelines and the Central 
Commission for Biological Safety at the national level adequately institutionalized. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the genetic engineering issue in Germany presents itself as a, so to 
speak, »imported« safety problem with a pre-produced technical solution.
It was only in 1984 (after more than a decade of federal support for modern biotechnologies), 
when Parliament at the request of the Green and the Social Democratic Parties resolved to 
set up the Bundestag Commission of Inquiry on the Opportunities and Risks of Genetic
7 Wright (1978) has determined technicalization as the major means o f issue definition of the Anglo-Saxon 
molecular biology community in the mid 1970s; the aim pursued by technicalization was to secure self-regulation 
and preclude outside-regulation.
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Engineering (Enquête-Kommission "Chancen und Risiken der Gentechnologie", see point 1.3), 
that the technology became institutionalized on the systemic political agenda8 (at about the 
same time the rDNA issue was taken up by extra-parliamentary protest actors, see point 2).
The structural basis for a persistent politicization of rDNA technology had been laid 
with the entrance of the Greens into Parliament in 19839. In the parliamentary committee of 
research and technology, the new political party had from the start declared genetic 
engineering one of its main issues of interest. Considering that until that time modem 
biotechnologies had not been the issue of an ongoing political or scientific discussion, this 
represented a politically vital decision. It was based on the assumption that rDNA research 
and application would have two adverse effects against which the Federal guidelines could 
not give protection: First, ecological and human health problems of unpredictable proportions; 
and second, an irresponsible disregard for alternative, non-technical, that is social and political 
solutions to those problems in the envisaged fields of application that were social and political 
rather than technical problems (Schramm 1988: 39).
Yet, the first Green position concerning genetic engineering which was formulated in 1984 
in the context of a parliamentary interpellation (große Anfrage; Bundestagsdrucksache 
10/1153) and consisted of a fundamental rejection o f the advancement o f rDNA technology 
was less based on these foremost political rationales than on ethical grounds. Ethical 
perspectives had been provided by a hearing on ethical and legal questions concerning the 
application of cell biological and gene technological methods to humans organized by the 
Federal Research and Technology Ministry in the autumn of 1983. The line of reasoning of 
participating critical ethics, such as the conservative philosopher Reinhard Low10, had 
exerted strong influence on the opinion-formation of Green parliamentarians - as it seemed 
at least a stronger influence than the expert knowledge of critical biologists affiliated with the 
party (Schramm 1988: 40). As Schramm observed,
8 The concept of "systemic agenda" is borrowed from Cobb and Elder who define this political agenda as 
consisting o f "all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public 
attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority1' (Cobb 
& Elder 1983: 85; emphasis in original).
9 The thesis that the Green Party has played a special role in the politicization of the genetic engineering 
issue has been defended by Schramm (1988).
10 For Lbw’s moral philosophical assessment of genetic engineering see LCw (1985).
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Die Ethik blendete so, daß von den Einschätzungen der wissenschaftlichen 
Gewährsleute nur die Skepsis an den zu einfachen Modellen der Gentechnologie und 
damit auch an deren Machbarkeitsansprüchen aufgegriffen wurden. (Schramm 1988: 
40)
It was the conservative non-interference ethics, as advocated by the American biochemist 
Chargaff11, and feminist and science-critical argumentation - the wording of which, as 
Schramm puts it, suited the formulation of a rigorous ethical opposition to the "seduction by 
the feasible" (Verführung durch das Machbare", Ibid.) - which provided the main grounds 
upon which the 1984 Green position was built: The new techniques were interpreted as 
entailing a qualitative change in the nature of scientific inquiry which would render possible 
»man’s« total manipulation and subjugation of nature. The novelty in scientific inquiry was 
determined as a highly interactive approach to nature, inherent in which was the potential to 
genetically reconstruct living beings. It was deemed implausible that a technology which 
interfered in such »nature adverse« (natur-widrig) and, therefore, »hard« way in genetic 
material could be employed in a beneficial way1 2 13. Genetic engineering as well as 
reproduction technologies were rejected primarily on deontological, non-utilitarian grounds 
attributing all life-forms not only a right to exist but a dignity all of their own which in its 
turn was understood as the prime criterium for man’s intercourse with nature. Rather than 
safety, political, ecological and social reasons it was the integrity and goodness of the 
»natural« defined as a moral norm for human behavior which formed the basis of the 
declaration of technology opposition.
The political and social importance ascribed to the new technologies was demonstrated 
by the establishment of a Federal Working Group on Genetic Engineering and Reproduction 
Technologies (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Gentechnologie und Fortpflanzungstechnologie, 
BAG) in May 1984. The working group’s principal task was defined as making evident the 
lack of legitimacy of government and industrial research policy in these technology fields; the 
main strategy to fulfill this task consisted of the representation of the ethical reprehensibleness
11 According to Chargaff genetic manipulation represents more of an ethical problem than one of public
health, and the "principal question to be answered” was "whether we have the right to put an additional fearful 
load on generations that are not yet bom" (Chargaff 1976: 938).
13 For an assessment o f genetic engineering as »hard science and technology« see von Gleich (1986,1987). 
Von Gleich has been a scientific collaborator with the first Green parliamentary group.
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of the new technologies.
The Greens* technology policy proved successful insofar as it had a triggering effect for 
placing the rDNA issue on the systemic agenda (moreover, it gave rise to intensifying 
discussions in the social movement sector, see point 2.). The party’s decision, first, to declare 
genetic engineering one of the main points of emphasis of its parliamentary work and, second, 
to take up a position of unequivocal opposition on mostly ethical grounds to the technology 
is likely to have put significant pressure on the established parties to deal more intensely with 
the subject matter. It is the subsequent increased activity of these parties in the field which 
indicates this pressure: The Parliamentary Social Democratic Party organized a number of 
expert discussions; in 1984, the Federal Research and Law ministry established the Working 
Group In-Vitro Fertilization, Genome Analysis and Gene Therapy, the so-called Bcnda- 
Commission13 (Bundesminister fur Forschung und Technologic & Bundesministcr dcr Justiz 
1985), which was to deal with the ethical and legal questions of reproduction technologies and 
the application of genetic engineering techniques to humans; in the same year, finally, the 
Parliament decided to set up a Bundestag Commission of Inquiry on the Opportunities and 
Risks of Genetic Engineering.
With regard to the political system as a whole, there is, besides the moral challenge 
o f the ethically-grounded position, a heightened sensitivity regarding the ambiguity and the 
social conflict potential of technological progress which is likely to have constituted the basis 
on which the pressure of the Greens could develop; the modem biotechnologies, so to speak, 
provided the opportunity to avoid the mistakes which had been made in the debate about 
nuclear energy. In the special case of the Social Democrats, it seems reasonable to assume 
that it was, in particular, the challenge of a new rival on the left which generated the 
motivation to act on the issue. The rise of the Greens confronted the Social Democrats with 
the societal attractiveness of »new politics values« including the quality of life value of clean 
and sustainable technologies. The decision of the SPD to make a request for a Bundestag 
commission is likely in part to have been a response to this new intra-parliamentary challenge. 
It was to forestall an exclusive »occupation« of the rDNA issue by the Greens. 13
13 Ernst Benda, former president of the Federal Constitutional Court, took over the chairmanship o f the 
working group.
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1.3 The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry: Transforming a Political Issue into 
a Public Issue
With the appointment of a parliamentary commission of inquiry on the prospects and risks 
of genetic engineering in the summer of 1984, the rDNA issue was definitively placed on the 
systemic political agenda. The Commission’s appointment was jointly supported by the 
opposition and the government coalition parties.
As alluded to above, the support of the Commission’s establishment across party lines 
has to be seen against the background, first, of the technology-political challenge that the 
Greens’ entry into the parliamentary arena meant to the established parties, and second, of the 
negative experiences of the nuclear energy debate of the 1970. In retrospect, the polarization 
of society into pro- and anti-nuclear energy camps for large parts of the political community 
presented itself essentially as the result of a political failure to anticipate and forestall social 
conflict resulting from both new dimensions of and increased sensitivity as regards 
technology-induced risk and uncertainty. According to this view, prevention of a similar 
development in the case of modem biotechnologies required a technology assessment in these 
terms at an early stage of technology implementation. Risk analysis and decision-making 
based on these grounds at a point in time at which genetic engineering was not yet fully 
institutionalized14 and before extensive public debate had arisen15 was considered the 
appropriate political strategy to avoid another technical controversy; and the Enquète-
14 However, in 1984 there existed already considerable public and private commitment to the technology in 
the form of significant investments in genetic engineering research and research organization. At this point in 
time, both the state and the private sector had assigned the new technology the importance of a »key technology« 
for the future industrial prosperity o f the Federal Republic and for its international competitiveness. The 
triggering event for a larger public and private commitment had been the first major investment in genetic 
engineering techniques by the chemical enterprise Hoechst. The decision of the company in 1981 to share in the 
establishment of a new department of microbiology at the Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston with a 
financial contribution of S 70 million had rapidly led to massive support from state and industry for technology 
development in Germany. Since then, the focus of support has been on projects and undertakings likely to bring 
about a closer link and co-operation between fundamental research and industrial application, that is a 
strengthening of application-oriented basic research. The most important example to state here is the creation 
of four national genetic centers (in Heidelberg, Cologne, Berlin, and Munich), with the participation of the major 
chemical companies (respectively BASF, Bayer, Schering, and Hoechst) constituting a new form of 
institutionalization of science. For a comprehensive analysis of this preliminary stage of commercialization, see 
Hack & Hack (1985).
15 In 1984 there was no unfavorable public opinion to put pressure on the parliament to act on the novel 
techniques. Social advocacy groups had not yet taken up the subject, and public discussions were limited to small 
academic and Green-associated circles.
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Kommission was deemed a vital instrument of such »proactive« technology policy 
(Catenhusen 1988: 361)16.
In the light of the nuclear energy controversy the Commission was assigned yet 
another function, particularly by the opposition parties: to re-establish the shattered confidence 
in the willingness and cognitive and practical competence of the modem parliamentary system 
to exert influence on the pace and direction of scientific and technological development and 
to initiate decisions regarding the extent to which risks associated with this development are 
tolerable for society. In this sense, the Enquête-Kommission was not only considered a 
particularly appropriate source of information for both parliament and the public; furthermore, 
it was understood as a suitable institutional instrument to keep informed on and control over 
government policy on the novel technology.
The Commission of Inquiry on the Opportunities and Risks of Genetic Engineering (in the 
following referred to as the Commission) - in which also a representative of the chemical 
industry participated17 - actually constituted the first parliamentary committee in the world to 
attempt to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the novel genetic engineering techniques. 
Based on the consent of the Commission majority of Social and Christian Democrats, the 
Commission’s brief was to define and evaluate the prospects and risks of the technology as 
used in the principle applications then emerging - health care, food, raw materials, energy, 
and environmental protection - with particular emphasis on economic, ecological, legal, social, 
ethical, and safety aspects, and to make recommendations for concrete political actions to be
16 However, as Gill (1991a: 413-417) exposes in his account of the commission’s appointment debates, this 
strategy was defined very differently by the political panics. While the Social Democrats defined it primarily 
as a strategy of building consensus on the technology, the Christian Democrats understood it foremost as a 
strategy of promoting political and public acceptance of the technology. The Green Party, in contrast, defining 
societal controversy as an integral part of a democratic shaping of technology development, employed the 
commission as an instrument to mobilize political and public opposition to the technology.
17 Industry was represented by the then chairman of the board of the Knoll AG, a subsidiary of the chemical 
company BASF. Enquete-Kommissionen are »mixed« commissions. That means, they are composed of members 
of parliament of the different political parties and »experts« who include independent (theoretically at least) 
scientific experts and experts of »societal practice«. The latter usually are representatives of industry, trade 
unions and the law and, since quite recently, sometimes also representatives of the environmental movement 
They are distinguished from more traditional forms of parliamentary policy advising (such as the fact-finding 
committee, Untersuchungsausschuß) in so far as they assign equal status to parliamentary and non-parliamentary 
commission members when it comes to voting on derisions. The Enquete-Kommission which is one of the most 
intensive form of parliamentary policy advising in Germany in the course of the 1980s advanced to the special 
form of parliamentary treatment of specific technologies.
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taken by parliament (Catenhusen & Neumeister 1987: 1-2)1®.
The working results of the Commission comprised, besides an extensive exposition of 
the scientific, political and legal relevance of the technology at issue, 150 recommendations 
ranging from proposals for supporting research to recommendations for legislative 
measures18 9. From the point o f view of danger aversion the following four proposals for 
regulation shall be emphasized: First, the Commission proposed that germ line gene therapy 
be prohibited by law. Second, it recommended five-year-bans on some of the experiments 
releasing genetically engineered organisms into the environment Third, the Commission 
proposed that genetic engineering research projects should not be carried out in military 
establishments or financed by the defence budget And fourth, the Commission recommended 
to give the Federal rDNA guidelines statutory force and thus make them generally binding 
also for the use of genetic engineering in private industry (Catenhusen 1988: 362).
The Commission's final report which recorded these and the other recommendations was 
approved by all of the commission members except the representative of the Greens. 
According to the Commission's chairman, the consent reached could have hardly been 
expected in view of experiences with other technology debates in Germany (Catenhusen 1988: 
362). The sociologist of science, van den Daele, who sat on the Commission, characterized 
the Commission's work as that of a "Große Koalition" (van den Daele 1987: 43). According 
to van den Daele, this »Great Coalition« did not simply arise from spontaneous agreement on 
the subject. Instead, it was the result o f a self-built ability to compromise, of the pressure of 
time under which the work had been carried out, and finally, of the dominating interest to 
secure for the jointly advocated recommendations the best chance of enforcement by 
parliament (Ibid.). Besides these factors, the timing of the Commission appointment - before 
extensive public debate had developed and before the established political parties had adopted 
a position on the new technology - is likely to have played a beneficial role in consensus­
building (Catenhusen 1988: 362).
18 The Green Party proposed to define the Commission’s task as the prohibition of the technology with 
exception proviso (Bundestagsdrucksache 10/1388). When it became clear in the course of the appointment 
debates that this definition was unacceptable for the Commission majority, the party devoted itself to the 
mobilization of the public by the »production of dissent« and declared the work in the commission as a means 
to that end (Gill 1991a: 415) (see point 2.1.1).
19 The Commission completed its work in December of 1986.
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The Greens who refused to approve the report of the majority advanced their position 
and political recommendations in a minority vote (Catenhusen & Neumeister 1987: 314-357). 
This requested no absolute ban on the technology but a research moratorium for several years. 
The moratorium was declared necessary to compare the strategies of problem-solution offered 
by genetic engineering with diverse alternatives for the handling of pressing ecological, 
technical, societal, and health problems in order to identify the ecologically, socially, and 
ethically most appropriate strategies (Ibid.: 320).
The work of the Enquête-Kommission firmly established the rDNA issue on the parliamentary 
agenda20. Yet it did not exert real influence on government policy on the technology. The 
Commission’s proposal to subject the technology to safety guidelines with statutory force, for 
instance, was put into practice in July 1990 when the Genetic Engineering Act entered into 
force. Parliament, however, played only a minor role in this matter. The decisive actors, as 
the next subchapter will argue, were citizens’ action committees, the Bundesrat and the 
Administrative Court of the Land of Hesse (Gill 1991a: 428).
While the Commission’s work did not prove very effective in the political arena, it 
had a major stimulating as well as structuring effect on public debate. During the working life 
of the Commission, the public debate on rDNA technology widened considerably, amongst 
others in the churches, in the environmental movement and in the women’s movement It was 
the publication of the Commission’s final report in January 1987, however, that caused the 
real breakthrough o f the genetic engineering issue onto the media and general public agenda 
(Ruhrmann et al. 1992: 63)21. The major frame in which the issue has since then been 
»packaged« is the Commission’s popular »translation« of the ambiguity of the development 
of modem biotechnologies: The opportunities and risks of genetic engineering. Gill provides 
a pointed description of these effects on public discourse:
Im Gegensatz zu seiner technologiepolitischen Wirkungslosigkeit war der Bericht in
der Öffentlichkeit sehr erfolgreich: Wie ein Ohrwurm, den man morgens am Radio
30 ln October 1989, almost three years after the report’s publication, the parliamentary committees submitted 
their resolution proposal (Bundestagsdrucksache 11/5320) on the recommendations of the Enquete-Kommission. 
Supported by the majority o f the Parliamentary Government Parties, the resolution concurred on most points with 
the proposals of the Commission report.
31 Radkau points to the fact that, in quantitative terms, the report’s mass media response even bettered the 
press response to the report of the first Enquête-Kommission on future nuclear energy policy (Radkau 1988:
344).
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gehört hat und den ganzen Tag unwillkürlich weitersummt, schwirrt die Rede von 
"Chancen und Risiken" seither durch die Lande. (Gill 1991a: 429)
On the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume that the Commission’s work had a reassuring 
effect on the German public. The Commission’s mere existence can be expected to have given 
the impression that the new technology was under political control. On the other hand, it 
clearly created a public climate that was rather critical of the development and exploitation 
of genetic engineering. Despite the fact that the public discourse it initiated was, so to speak, 
well-balanced, since it was structured according to the risk-opportunity dichotomy, it 
unquestionably not only increased the visibility of the issue of risk and uncertainty but 
significantly widened the scope of public risk discourse.
1.4 The Administrative C ourt of Hesse: Motor of a  Precipitated Process of Lawgiving
The regulatory policy proposals of the Enquete-Kommission gave fresh impetus to the policy 
debate on a legislative regulation of genetic engineering research and production. This debate 
was brought to an end in the spring of 1990 when the Genetic Engineering Act was adopted 
by the German Parliament22. However, as has been already mentioned above, it was not 
parliament which in the final analysis set off legislation but extra-parliamentary actors: 
namely citizens’ action committees, the Bundesrat and the highest administrative court in one 
of the Länder, the Administrative Court of Hesse.
On the initiative of the state of Hesse, which searched for a legal basis to approve the 
production of genetically engineered human insulin by the chemical enterprise Hoechst, the
22 The Act for the Regulation of Questions Concerning Gene Technology (Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen 
derGentechnik, Bundestagsdrucksache 11/6778) came into force on 1 July 1990. It covers all genetic engineering 
work including the work with genetically engineered organisms in genetic installations, deliberate release, and 
the distribution (Inverkehibringen) of genetically engineered organisms. The Act was designed to widely adapt 
to the two EU guidelines which were adopted in April of the same yean The Council Directive of 23 April 1990 
on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (90/219/EEC, Official Journal LI 17 8.5.1990) and 
the Council Directive of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms (90/220/EEC, Ibid.). The Act does not cover gene diagnostics or gene therapy with humans; the whole 
field of application of genetic engineering to humans is excluded from the law. This field of application comes 
under the Act for the Protection of Embryos (Gesetz zum Schütz von Embryonen, Bundestagsdrucksache 
11/8057) which came into effect on 1 January 1991.
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Bundesrat, in September 1988* by legal regulations (Rechtsverordnungen) had put genetic
engineering research and production partly under the control of the Federal Emissions Act
(Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz* BImSchG). This meant that the decision on the licensing of
production facilities using rDNA technology required a public hearing. The numerous
objections voiced in the context of these public participation procedures thereupon brought
to a halt nearly all major industrial genetic engineering projects in Germany (European
Chemical News, 8.5.1989, Handelsblatt* 10.10.1989). Until the second half of 1990 - that is
until the Genetic Engineering Law’s enactment - not one licensing procedure could be
completed this way. Referring to the difficulties with the insulin plant, the then head of
pharmaceutical resarch for Hoechst in an interview with the magazine Science stated:
At the moment, we are reluctant to invest more in genetic technology, at least on the 
production side, here in Germany. We must know that if we build a plan, it can be 
completed and put into use within a specific period of time; at present, we have a 
legal situation which causes major delays, because of the requirement for a public 
hearing before permission to build and operate a production plant is granted. (Ernst- 
Günter Afting, see Dickson 1989: 1252)
In November 1989, finally, the Administrative Court of Hesse decided to stop the further 
construction of the Hoechst plant (Handelsblatt, 8.11.1989). With this decision, the Court 
ruled in favor of the citizens’ action committee "Hoechster Schnüffler un’ Maagucker" (which 
for more than one and a half decades has acted as the »watchdog« of the Hoechst company 
with regard to safety and environmental issues). This group of local activists appealed in 
February 1989, after two years of legal struggle, against the Sofortvollzug for the construction 
and operation of Hoechst’s insulin plant which had been ruled by the Administrative Court 
of Frankfurt23 4. The Administrative Court of Hesse as the superior authority not only decided 
against the plant’s further construction but made new approval conditional on an adequate 
legal basis, A technology with far-reaching and, moreover, still disputed consequences for 
man and environment required a legal basis before it could be commercially used; the existing 
laws for danger aversion in view of these unsettled issues would form an insufficient legal 
basis for the granting of permission (Handelsblatt, 8.11.1989). As long as legislation did not
23 A public hearing was required under the terms of the fourth amendment to the Federal Emissions Act 
which came into effect on 1 September 1988.
34 The local protesters argued that nature- and health-hazards would emanate from the insulin plant.
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expressly permit the use of genetic engineering, the Court concluded, genetic engineering 
facilities could not be constructed and operated, independent of the evaluation of their 
dangerousness in the individual case (Die Zeit, 17.11.1989, p. 41). As other Länder followed 
the example of Hesse, the Court decision brought about a quasi-blockade of the industrial use 
of genetic engineering.
This quasi-blockade of the implementation of what government and industry considered a new 
key technology pressed for political action. Faced with a more and more impatient industry 
demanding legal certainty for the technology's commercialization, the political decision­
makers responded with a rapid revision of the first draft law (Referentenentwurf) which in 
the Spring of 1989 had been rejected by the Lânder with more than 250 amendments. Despite 
harsh criticism from the parliamentary opposition, the revised bill passed parliament on 29 
March 1990. The outcome of this precipitated process of lawgiving met with substantial 
political and public criticism23 *5. The main point of criticism was that the revised bill was 
favoring industry's interests too much. As the parliamentary opposition argued, this bias, most 
clearly expressed by the purpose of the Law, would contribute to an undifferentiated approval 
of the technology at issue (Handelsblatt 21.3.1990).
To put it in Theisen’s terms, the Law circumvented the "Dilemma zwischen 
industriegesellschaftlichen Expansionsansprüchen und risikogesellschaftlichen 
Sicherheitsansprüchen" (Theisen 1993: 81) by integrating both objectives. The purpose of the 
Law is twofold: On the one hand, it aims to protect man and the environment against 
potential dangers emanating from the use of genetic engineering; on the other, it is intended 
to secure a legal framework for the advancement of the technology. The Genetic Engineering 
Act thus presented not merely an expression of the state’s obligation for danger precaution; 
at the same time it presented a clear political commitment to the disputed technology26.
23 The Social Democrats reproached the parliamentary group o f the government coalition for a  "fieberhafte 
Flickschusterei" (feverish patchwork, Handelsblatt, 27.3.1990) in the genetic engineering committee. The 
objective behind this great haste, the Social Democrats argued, would have been to gain the support of the
CDU/CSU governed Länder and rush the bill through the Bundesrat before the forthcoming elections of the Land
of Lower Saxony could have brought about a change of the ratio of representation in the Bundesrat to the 
advantage o f the SPD and that way revived discussion on the technology.
26 This political decision in favor of the technology, as von Schömberg points out, was reflected by a change 
in argumentative strategy at the governmental level. To borrow von Schomberg’s terms, the argumentative 
strategy of a "Nein-Aber Politik" which gives priority to the technology's risks and argues for a restrictive
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Consequently, the Law was predominantly rejected by the technology’s protesters, while on 
the side of industry it widely met with a positive response. For the time being it complied 
with the needs and interests of this actor as it removed legal uncertainty regarding the 
technology’s use the detrimental effects of which had made themselves unpleasantly fe lt
Actually, the new Law considerably eased the way for companies to obtain approval 
for production processes. By limiting the public hearing requirement to high risk projects, the 
Law largely removed the public participation hurdle. As most systems envisaged for 
production fell under the lowest safety level defined by the Law, applications did not need 
to come before a public hearing as was the case under the Federal Emissions Act27. Thus, 
it was not surprising that industry, which until then had vigorously argued against any form 
of legislation, welcomed the new Law - at least at this point in time28.
The political decision to provide a legal framework for genetic engineering research and 
production generally initiated a down-swing phase in technical controversy. While the 
economic actors for the time being saw their interests safeguarded, the technology protesters 
reacted first and foremost with frustration and resignation. Legislation primarily had a de­
motivating and de-mobilizing effect on these social actors. With the Law the question of 
whether genetic engineering should or should not proceed had essentially become moot. The 
still prominent objective of an absolute ban on modem biotechnologies had turned into a non- 
realizable demand. Nonetheless, as the subsequent chapter will show, the protest actors 
remained active in attempting to keep the issue on the public and political agenda.
The regulatory debate temporarily came to life again in the autumn of 1992 when 
parliament proposed a resolution on changes of the Genetic Engineering Act designed to ease 
some of the Act’s restrictions. The request was supported by a majority of the coalition
regulation of research and market increasingly was superseded by the argumentative strategy of a "Ja-Aber 
Politik" giving priority to the technology’s social and economic prospects and arguing that restrictions should 
be exceptional and only be made in those cases in which there are clear hazards to human health or the 
environment (von Schömberg 1992; 52).
27 The mere existence of the law removed the legal objection to Hoechst’s production system for recombinant 
insulin.
28 Until then a special law on rDNA technology had been rejected on the grounds that rigid regulations would 
adversely affect the industrial Tnnovationsdynamik" (dynamics of innovation, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
17.12.1987) as put forward by a representative of the chemical industry at a  conference in the Evangelische 
Akademie Tutzing on the state of discussion concerning the final report of the commission of inquiry.
167
parties and the parliamentary opposition. This event must be seen against the background of 
an insistent and pressing criticism of both research and industry against the new Law as it had 
been voiced during the first months after the Law’s enactment; in fact, industry’s contentment 
with the new Law had not lasted very long. A public hearing on the implementation of the 
Genetic Engineering Act organized by the Committee for Research, Technology and 
Technology Impact Assessment and the Committee for Health of the Bundestag on 12 
February 1992, for instance, was taken as an occasion to thoroughly put forward criticism and 
objections. The focus of criticism advanced at the hearing was on overbureaucratic 
implementing regulations (Durchführungsverordnungen) which had entered into force shortly 
after the Act itself29. Long delays, compliance costs and the obligations of documentation 
were considered severe shortcomings. In short, the bureaucratic and restrictive character of 
the Genetic Engineering Act was defined as being anti-science and opposed to innovation 
0Handelsblatt 13/2/1992).
On 1 January 1994, the revised Law came into effect (Bundestagsdrucksache 720/93). 
For the benefit of science and industry the amendments provide for a streamlining of the 
regulatory process. One important amendment refers to public participation. This is once more 
restricted: Under the revised Law decisions on the release of genetically engineered organisms 
into the environment are to be taken after a written hearing procedure; unlike the initial Law 
the revised Law does not provide for an oral hearing30. The rationale on which government 
justified deregulation was that since the initial Law’s enactment experience with the handling 
of genetically engineered organisms would have greatly increased; the originally assumed 
risks in dealing with the new technology would have partly not proved to be true 
(Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 1993: 24).
So far I have expounded the political challenge that the chemical industry has faced in terms 
of public exposure by the established political and legal institutions. The political challenge 
that civil protest actors have presented to industry I have indicated by pointing out the role 
citizens' action committees have played in the process of lawmaking. The next chapter
29 The enforcement of these provisions is not earned out federally but by 50 different regional authorities 
(Regierungsbezirke).
30 For a  discussion of this amendment with regard to present environmental and technology law see Bora 
(1994).
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demonstrates in more detail the role that local protest groups have played in publicly exposing 
the industrial sector. It argues that citizens’ action committees protesting against industrial 
applications of genetic engineering form part of a network of technology protest acting at the 
local» national, and European level. This protest network, the chapter shall show, has brought 
significant pressure to bear on the chemical industry.
2. Collective Protest
It is a peculiarity of the German genetic engineering controversy that societal criticism of the 
technology - appearing on the public stage at about the time when the Enqucic-Kommission 
was set in - developed into much more intense and extensive collective protest than in 
comparable western European countries. As in the case of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
collective protest does not merely relate to safety issues; instead, it also refers to the ethical 
admissibility of the technology as such and socially, politically and culturally undesirable 
developments which could emanate from or be accelerated by the technology’s use. Possibly 
the most salient characteristic of technology protest in Germany is the persistence of ethically 
motivated fundamentalist opposition to the technology as such. This fundamentalist opposition 
has prevented genetic engineering from »getting lost« as an independent topic in the 
regulatory problems of the different fields of application. However, the fundamentalist 
discourse, with moral (foremost gesinnungsethische) qualms as its main argumentative basis, 
has increasingly lessened in importance in the course of controversy. They have given way 
to a specialized and sectoralized discourse on risk advancing equally moral (gesinnungs- and 
verantwortungsethische), political and scientific argumentation.
This chapter identifies the collectivity of initiatives, groups and organizations 
protesting against the technology as such or against specific applications of it as the most 
radical and most tenacious political challenger of the chemical industry in the German rDNA 
debate. It has brought significant pressure to bear on the industrial sector directly by impeding 
concrete genetic engineering projects and, indirectly, through public opinion-formation, that 
is, the creation of an unfavorable public climate for the technology’s commercialization. The 
chapter is organized as follows: The first two sections take a historical perspective and depict 
the formative stage of collective protest They point out the special role that the Greens have
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played in this initial phase of collective protest and the circumstances that forestalled the 
formation of an »anti-genetic engineering movement« towards which the Greens’ attempts at 
mobilization were geared.
Then, a structure-related portrayal of collective protest as it has developed in the last 
decade is provided in three sections. The first of these sections determines the network 
structure of collective protest and its twofold focus on the local and supraregional level as 
its most salient characteristics in terms of general structure. The other two sections provide 
a description of protest practice. While, firstly, nation-wide campaigning on single issues are 
determined as the most important type of protest action at the suipraregional level, secondly 
the seizing o f administratively regulated rights for participation and objection and symbolic 
single actions are identified as the major types of protest action at the local level.
The subsequent section expounds the above mentioned shift in argumentation from a 
predominantly fundamentalist-ethical protest discourse to a specialized and sectoralized risk 
discourse with fundamentalist elements criticizing rDNA technology equally on moral, 
political and scientific grounds. The last section of this chapter, finally, points out industry 
as a special target of both the ethically motivated fundamentalist discourse and the 
specialized risk discourse at both the local and the surpraregional level.
2.1 The Formative Stage
While in 1984, a debate over genetic engineering in terms of opportunities and risks started 
off in the parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, a fundamentalist discourse on the new 
technology commenced in the so-called »new social movement sector«. In the mid 1980s, the 
political actor that decisively encouraged extra-parliamentary protest to develop and 
accelerated the dynamic of protest discourse was the Green party. The social actor that most 
strongly responded to the Greens* effort at mobilization was the feminist wing of the 
women’s movement.
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2.1.1 The Making of a Counter-Issue: Genetic Engineering as the Declaration of W ar 
on Women, N ature, and Exploited Peoples
It was the Green institution of the Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Gentechnologie and 
Fortpflanzungstechnologie (BAG) from which the first attempts at protest mobilization 
emanated. With the Federal Working Group the Greens had established an organizational and 
discursive context for critical expertise on and assessment o f genetic and reproduction 
technologies. Originally, the BAG’S primary task had been defined as advising and assisting 
the Greens’ parliamentary party with respect to its work in the Commission of Inquiry. It soon 
had become clear, however, that there was little chance of mobilizing support for the Green 
policy on the new technology in this parliamentary forum. In line with its general policy the 
G reen party had deliberately narrowed down its technology-political focus exclusively to the 
fundamental and radical. It demanded prohibition of the new technology with exception 
proviso. The technology evaluation perspective of the Commission majority dissociated itself 
decisively from the Green point of view. It excluded the question of whether genetic 
engineering should be employed at all by society from parliamentary discourse and thrust the 
ethically based problem definition of the threat of a »total subjugation of nature« into the 
background. In view of the Commission’s technology-induced approach and the clear consent- 
orientation of the established parties, the jointly pursued strategy of Hickel, Jansen31 and the 
BAG became to see the work in the commission as a means of stirring up public debate and 
the BAG’S primary task to encourage the formation of extra-parliamentary collective protest. 
Recruiting its members from the, at that time, still rather small spectrum of left, green and 
green-associated critics, the BAG constituted the first condensating point of social opposition 
w ithin a major organizational framework. From this node the Greens started doing 
mobilization work32. This endeavor was significantly facilitated by the party’s then proximity
31 The Green parliamentarian Erika Hickel sat on the Enquete-Kommission, Sarah Jansen was Hickefs 
scientific collaborate».
32 In the first half of the 1980s, the Greens generally were the driving force, target, discussion forum, and 
pool o f ideas for proposals designed to produce a transformation of technology development as part of a »new 
politics«.
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to new social movement activists33 345and the organizational resources of its party apparatus*
Mobilization was especially successful with parts of the women*s movement The reasons for 
this are, first, the strong personal contacts between members of the BAG and activists of this 
social movement which made it easy to establish further contacts with affiliated groups and 
individuals. Then, with the political analysis of the rDNA issue in terms of a combination of 
a »Greenist« notion of nature as man’s partner54, basic criticism of science and feminist 
criticism, a high resonance was assured within an important branch of the women’s 
movement, the feminist wing. Consent could easily be mobilized, for instance, with the Gen- 
Archiv Essen, a newly formed archive of modem biotechnologies focusing on reproduction 
technologies and with a special emphasis on the new technologies as a women’s issue33.
In addition to this ideological bond it was, third, the thematic linkage of genetic and 
reproduction technology - as made manifest by the title of the Federal Working Group - 
which facilitated consent mobilization. The condemnation of both technologies on equal 
grounds guaranteed the attention and encouraged the accord of the many groups and 
individuals involved in critical discussion on the steadily developing reproductive 
technologies. Among the recent developments in the life sciences, it was these techniques 
upon which the critical discourse of the women’s movement so far had concentrated. The
33 The Greens as a political party arose directly from the activities of the diverse social movements that came 
together in the late 1970s, notably the anti-nuclear and environmental movement, citizens' initiatives, and other 
aJtcmative networks; for a  comprehensive historical and political analysis of the German Greens, see Wiesenthal 
(1993).
34 For a reflection on a Green concept of nature that views nature as "Partner" rather than as "Grenze", see 
von Gleich (1984).
35 The archive which developed from feminist-orientated discussion circles on the so-called »new 
technologies« radically opposes modem biotechnologies based foremost on a  fundamental criticism of modem 
science. It denounces the dominant mechanistic-technical idea of man and nature and the methodic reductionism 
of the natural sciences. The archive’s scientific ideal emphasized respect for nature and naturalness and was built 
on an orgasmic, evolutionary notion of nature. On the basis of this ideal, genetic engineering, determined as Ute 
search for general laws at the molecular level for the explanation, optimization, and improved exploitation of 
life, is condemned as the radicalization o f the dominant scientific paradigm. This paradigm viewed the organism 
as a machine within which individual parts can be combined, exchanged, and replaced and nature as an immense 
spare parts store, as a  reservoir for future combinations: "Ohne die Annahme, daß Mensch gleich Maschine and 
krank gleich Schraube defekt, ohne die Vorstellung, daß Krankes durch Ersatzteile auswechselbar ist, hätten sich 
die Fragestellungen and Arbeitsweise der Gentechnologie nicht entwickeln können” (Gen-Archiv Essen, seif- 
portrayal folder). The archive’s stated aims are to demystify the opposed technologies, to make them clear and 
intelligible to all lay people and to impede their aspired societal acceptance (Ibid.). Since 1984, the archive 
continues its work, gathers, and provides information about genetic and reproduction technologies.
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rDNA issue in this discursive context had not played an important role yet36. This changed, 
however, with the Greens’ pronouncement of a technology position that embedded the two 
technologies into the same technology-critical argumentative framework. Wide parts of the 
feminist wing responded to this junction with belligerent elan and promptly made it part of 
their cause. For instance, "raising public awareness about contraceptive and reproductive 
technologies and genetic engineering and the ways in which they are linked" became the 
explicit goal o f the Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic 
Engineering (FINRRAGE; self-portrayal folder) and its national contact in Germany. The 
former Feminist International Network on the New Reproductive Technologies (FINNRET), 
founded in 1984, accentuated the importance it ascribed to this aim by changing the network’s 
name into a statement of protest as regards both technologies (in 1985, on the occasion of a 
conference in Sweden37).
The mobilizing strength of the thematic linkage became clear with the first international 
conference on "Frauen gegen Gen- and Reproduktionstechnologie" (Bonn, April 1985). With 
the participation of some 2.000 instead of the expected 400 women (Schramm 1988:40) the
36 At that time, only a small circle of biologists, affiliated with the women's movement and with the science 
and technology critical journal Wechselwirkung, had already made some effort to trigger the debate on potential 
applications of genetic engineering, particularly on applications to humans. The Gcn-Archiv Essen had just 
started to do work on the whole range of modem biotechnologies with a clear preference for the modem 
reproductive technologies.
37 The grass-roots organization with associates in more than 35 countries defines the rDNA issue primarily 
as one of social inequality resulting from an evaluation of life on the basis of its genetic composition. According 
to FINRRAGE, genetic engineering is eugenic in its innermost nature in that it constitutes distinctions between 
»good«« genes and »bad« genes. The new technology, the feminist argumentation goes, would Fit a politically 
dominant ideology of eugenics employed to justify patriarchal, industrial, and racist domination over living 
beings and social groups. "In this ideology human beings arc viewed as inherently inferior or superior. This leads 
to degradation, discrimination and elimination of oppressed groups; be they women, disabled, people of certain 
colors, races, religions, class, or caste. Similarly, traits of animals and plants are arbitrarily valued as being 
desirable or undesirable and become subject to genetic manipulation. Eugenics justifies the political strategy used 
by those in power to divide and rule" (FINRRAGE 1989 - The quotation is part of a declaration adopted at the 
international conference on Reproductive and Genetic Engineering and Women; the conference which took place 
in Comilla, Bangladesh, in 1989 was jointly organized by FINRRAGE and UBINIG, Policy Research for 
Development Alternative, Dhaka, Bangladesh). The work of FINRRAGE activists in the different countries 
consists of a wide action repertoire including critical research, provision of information for the public and the 
media via seminars, publications, interviews, etc., lobbying, consultation, and self-help groups. For the 
organization of national, continental, and international conferences, FINRRAGE co-operates with different local, 
national, and supra-national organizations. A feminist hearing on genetic and reproductive technologies in the 
European Parliament in Brussels (6,7 March 1986) organized by the women’s section of the Green Alternative 
European Link (GRAEL) in co-operation with FINRRAGE represents one landmark of political opinion- 
formation on modem biotechnologies at the European level.
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"Aktionskonferenz" (Frauen gegen Gen- and Reproduktionstechnologie, folder) jointly 
organized by feminist scientists (around the journal Beitrage zur feministischen Theorie and 
Praxis) and the Greens* working group on Women’s Policy represents one of the fust 
landmarks of critical public debate on modem biotechnologies.
The congress confirmed that part of the Greens and the women’s movement 
unequivocally rejected the novel techniques. Its final resolution propagated definitive 
opposition to a technology development that was interpreted as a "declaration of war on 
women» nature and exploited peoples"38. The linkage of environmental, Third World and 
women’s issues was made possible by a feminist theoretical approach which conceives of 
industrial capitalism and modem science as tools of the male "techno-patriarchate" to not only 
exploit natural resources, but life as such, be it the female body or peoples of other societies. 
In this interpretive framework, genetic engineering became the peak of male hubris of 
domination of nature. Moreover, as it would treat all living beings - microorganisms, plants, 
animals and humans - as inefficient or outright defective and in need of technical 
»optimization«, it was denied value-neutrality and accused of an inherent eugenic tendency39. 
On these grounds the claim was raised that the technology as such was to be rejected, without 
there being a need to consider the question of how, by whom, and for what purposes it might 
be used. The congress thus established a Green/feminist technology opposition which rejected 
genetic engineering not on the balance of the potential benefits and risks in the different fields 
of application - a discussion which had not really started off at that time in the German public 
- but primarily on deontological, non-utilitarian grounds attributing all life-forms not only a 
right to exist but a dignity all of their own which was made the prime criterium for man’s 
intercourse with nature.
The Green/feminist definition of the rDNA issue on the grounds of a value-charged view of 
»nature« and »naturalness« was well suited to attracting the attention of a whole range of
38 Literally the statement says: "Für uns Frauen, für die Natur and für die ausgebeuteten Völker bedeutet 
diese Entwicklung eine Kriegserklärung". The quotation is taken from a  reprint of the conference resolution 
which called for the second congress of Women against Gene- and Reproduction Technologies which took place 
in October 1988 (Frauen gegen Gen- and Reproduktionstechnologie, folder).
39 The resolution denounces the technology development at issue as the "Fortsetzung sexistischer, 
rassistischer and letztlich faschistischer Auslese- and Ausmerze-Politik, diesmal jedoch im Weltmaßstab ..." 
(Frauen gegen Gen- and Reproduktionstechnologie, folder).
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groups and organizations - especially of the environmental movement • which since the 
establishment of the Enquete-Kommission had increasingly become watchful of the new 
technologies. However, as the next section will demonstrate, while the conceptualization of 
genetic engineering as an intrinsicly amoral technology greatly facilitated political 
consciousness-raising, it was not sufficient to unite the various technology critical groups into 
an »anti-genetic engineering« mass movement
2.1.2 Limits to Joining Forces
On the initiative of the Greens in the course of 1985 two major attempts were undertaken to 
form a nation-wide alliance against genetic engineering research and development40. Both 
attempts failed as the motley mix of activists affiliated to various groups and organizations 
of the new social movement sector "talked at cross-purposes" (Bernhard 1992) at the »strategy 
meetings«. The attempts failed because the activists’ criticism was directed at very different 
fields of application of the cross-sectional technology at issue and based on very different 
grounds and motives. The different critical approaches were impossible to unite under an 
overall common approach and action objective. Besides the technology’s cross-sectional 
quality it surely was the fundamentally critical stance of the meetings* initiator which was a 
handicap to these attempts at joining forces. It only allowed for the formation of a coalition 
of fundamentalists clearly opposed to the technology’s moral ambiguity (resulting from its 
cross-sectional quality).
2.1.2.1 The Cross-Sectional Quality of Genetic Engineering
The activists brought together at the two meetings were not solely radical opponents of the 
technology in question; instead, they included representatives of organizations and groups 
whose criticism centered on specific forms of application corresponding with their specific
40 This information is based on an interview with Jörg Bernhard (1992); Bernhard then was spokesperson 
for the working group Bio- and Gentechnologie of the environmental organization Bund für Umwelt and 
Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND).
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organizational or group programmatics. Basic concerns about a further denaturalization of 
nature and a reductionist image of life thus stood side by side with a selective problem 
perception: Representatives of environmental organizations wished to discuss the potential 
ecological consequences of an unintended or deliberate release of genetically manipulated 
organisms into the environment. They expressed concern about the possibility o f ecological 
disruption including alteration to global cycling of nutrients and reduction in local and global 
genetic diversity. While the principal claim of these activists was to research into the risks 
of environmental releases, representatives of consumer organizations advanced concern about 
lacking knowledge about the health risks emanating from the introduction of genetic 
engineering techniques into the production chain of consumer products. The criticism of 
adherents of alternative agriculture, in its turn, focused on the production of new high- 
efficiency-varieties and »super-cows« feared to encourage the use o f agrochemicals and the 
supplanting o f smaller firms. Activists of Third World groups were troubled about the 
possibility of modem biotechnologies giving multinational companies greater economic 
control and exacerbating economic inequities among nations, whereas participants affiliated 
to animal welfare groups stated opposition to the production of transgenic animals, as it could 
affect the sensitivity of these animals to certain diseases, thus increasing animal suffering. 
Supporters of initiatives of handicapped people, finally, expressed disquiet that the 
developments in human genetics could aggravate discrimination against disabled people and 
put social pressure on prospective parents, especially women41.
Evidently, these divergent types of criticism did not provide the most favorable basis for 
alliance-building. In any case, the technology’s cross-sectional quality is likely to have 
worked against the mobilization of a general and sufficiently unambivalent moral opposition 
to the technology as such (van den Daele 1990: 37). The main reason why the represented 
groups did not unite in an anti-genetic-engineering movement - towards which the interests 
of the Green/feminist coalition were directed - can be assumed to lie in this circumstance. To 
put it crassly, it is a more pleasant idea to protest against a special form of power production
41 In 1980, the issue of genetic counselling was taken up by a newly formed movement of handicapped 
people (the movement calls itself " Kriippelbewegung"). The movement protests against the application of prenatal 
diagnosis, genetic screening, and genetic counselling, as it is understood as a  bias and discrimination against 
disabled people (Kaiser 1990: 86).
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than to argue for a ban on a technology that is thought widely to promise to accelerate the 
progress of research on two scourges of civilization, AIDS and cancer. Such thoughts are 
likely to have guided especially those organizations with a formal membership and a 
participatory orientation not allowing them to advocate a position that dissociated them too 
far from the mainstream. The approach of the parliamentary commission, at least, can be 
assumed to have fostered reservedness as regards public commitment to radical technology 
opposition; by assessing the technology on the balance of opportunities and risks in each of 
the then expected major fields of application, the Commission’s work significantly increased 
the ambivalence of the subject
W hat the two attempts at joining forces did reveal was the main "ditch" ("Graben", Bernhard 
1992) between the extraparliamentary groups and organizations which had decided to enter 
the critical discourse on genetic engineering. On the one hand, there were the more formalized 
environmental and consumer organizations. Though taking a highly critical stance, they 
rejected a concentration on a fundamentalist discourse; instead, they favored a more 
specialized approach with fundamentalist elements42. On the other hand, there were the 
feminist initiatives. Without a formal membership and larger interest in established politics 
and a clear priority for political consciousness-raising, these groups saw no difficulties in 
propagating a radical minority position. They focused on fundamentalist reasoning and got 
ideological support from the Green party.
The new social movement related party increasingly became aware of the fact that its 
attempts at mobilizing consent for a radical-oppositional position outside the feminist 
movement was not proving very successful. Nonetheless, it decided to institutionalize the 
position to which it had itself committed with its first official statement on the technology at 
the parliamentary level; institutionalization occurred in the form of the Hagener resolution.
2.1.2.2 The Trap of Fundamentalism
The resolution on genetic engineering adopted at the Greens* eighth Federal Assembly in
42 Indeed, the organizations’ programs and proclamations usually contain, besides comprehensive specialized 
criticism, the note that there were also good reasons to reject the technology on fundamental grounds.
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February 1986 in Hagen began with a dramatic and fearful scenario: "Mit der rasanten 
Entwicklung der Gen- and Fortpflanzungstechniken droht die Menschenzüchtung in naher 
Zukunft Realität zu werden" (quoted after Schramm 1988: 41). It concluded with a rigorous 
policy definition that demanded an immediate stop to any genetic engineering research, 
development, and application. This was the only way, it was stated, in which the "Einstieg 
in das Zeitalter der Gentechnik" (Ibid.) could be permanently prevented. It was a policy 
definition reminiscent of the Greens* position on nuclear energy43. By contrast, the Green 
position on modem biotechnologies, however, was based neither on a preceding intense intra- 
party or public debate, nor, as I have pointed out, on a broad consent at the extra- 
parliamentary level. This basis was yet to be formed and the eighth assembly at Hagen was 
to be a significant step towards this aim. It primarily was to function as a mobilizing event.
Mobilization, however, did not prove very effective. As a consequence, the resolution 
of Hagen became to be widely viewed as "recht unglücklich" (Ruprecht 199144). For the 
work in the Enquete-Kommission it meant that the Green representatives definitely had 
adopted the role of the »naysayer on principle« and, as Schramm puts it with a flowery 
statement, despite of all their sensible questions were denied the court jester role and sent to 
Coventry (Schramm 1988: 4245). The possibility of credibly criticizing and changing the 
position of the Commission majority in the joint working context was hardly existent 
anymore. The dilemma that the Greens faced (which is the typical dilemma of movement- 
related parties consisting of fundamentalist orientations and pragmatic constraints) consisted 
of at the same time having to adequately, defend the "absolute moratorium" (Ibid.) in order 
to preserve the political support of the grass-roots membership and to continue to be open to 
the experts* opinion in order to preserve political justification for the continuing work in the 
Commission. For the Party’s minority vote which had been announced soon after the 
Commission had taken up its work, it meant the difficulty of finding a form that was credible 
in terms of content, without dissociating itself too clearly from the Hagener resolution with
43 As Wiesenthal points out, "catastrophic scenarios, apocalyptic forecasts, and an impassioned critique of 
civilization and capitalism were ... marked features of the ’philosophy’ of the early Greens" (Wiesenthal 1993: 
204).
44 Christoph Ruprecht then was spokesperson for the Green Federal Working Group on Genetic Engineering 
and Reproduction Technologies.
45 Literally: "Endgültig nach dem Hagener Beschluß wurde den Grünen-Vertretem trotz aller sinnvollen 
Fragen die Hofnarcen-Rolle aberkannt and die Trotzecke zu gewiesen".
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its demand of a complete stop to genetic engineering development46.
At the social level, the attempts at mobilization through exaggerated diagnosis and 
catastrophic scenarios had by no means been unsuccessful - at least at the outset Y et 
continuing mobilization could not equally successfully build on these first successes. As a 
result the question of whether the response to a cross-sectional technology could consist of 
the plain demand for an all-embracing prohibition became more and more conflictual. 
Concerns grew that people might interpret the resolution of Hagen either as a refusal to co­
operate in any way, as the inability to intervene in the political decision-making process (as 
these processes, always specialized, would remain untouched by the abstract generality of the 
Greens’ position) - or as proof of green self-centeredness and detachment from reality; there 
was the fear of the party’s political isolation in the rDNA debate. In short, the party consent 
surrounding the exigency of the technology’s ban began to crumble46 7.
Today, after more than two decades of genetic engineering policy, the technology still 
presents an issue in Green politics48. However, with the alliance with the Bündnis 90 party, 
which allowed for indirect representation in the Bundestag but implied the setting up of a 
different political agenda with newly weighted topics, the issue’s importance has largely 
shifted to the Länder and to the European parliamentary level. While attempts at extra- 
parliamentary mobilization have clearly decreased, internal party struggles on the political 
effectiveness of radical criticism and resolute rejection in the course of controversy have 
continuously increased.
46 The form eventually chosen was a minority vote that requested no absolute ban but a research moratorium 
of several years.
47 This became clear, for instance, in an interview of the magazine Science with Bhrbel Rust, then 
parliamentary representative of the Green Party: "As for the Greens, Rust says that their previous hard-line 
opposition to all forms of genetic engineering has recently been softening. Officially, the party is still demanding 
that a moratorium be placed on all industrial uses o f genetic engineering until more is known about the potential 
risks. But, says Rust, ’personally I would not be against certain applications, for example research for a vaccine 
against AIDS or into the treatment of cancer’." (Dickson 1989: 1252)
48 In an interview in 1991, Christoph Ruprecht denoted the issue a Green "millennium topic" (Ruprecht 
1991).
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2.13 The Networking Approach
In 1986, after the Resolution of Hagen, the uneasiness about the Green fundamentalist 
approach »materialized« with the foundation of a small non-governmental organization, the 
Gen-Ethisches Netzwerk (GeN). Benedikt Härlin, one of the founders of the network49, then 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for the Greens and rapporteur of the committee 
on energy, research, and technology of the European Parliament, criticized the decisions made 
at Hagen as follows:
Die waren so eng, daß man nur noch ein fundamentales Nein sagen durfte. And damit 
kann man keine Politik machen. Keine Bündnisse eingehen. And man soll auch nicht 
alles verbieten. (Härlin in Die Zeit, 15.4.1988, p.49)
The newly formed organization, instead, did not adopt formal positions on whether or to what 
extent the technology at issue should be developed and used. Interviewed by the magazine 
Biotech Europe, members of GeN admitted that "as a part of a democratic movement, they 
each spoke as individuals, and that indeed, there were many shades of opinion from 
’completely against biotechnology’ to ’proceed with caution” ' (Biotech Europe, Vol. 6, No. 
1., 1989, p. 17). The refusal to make a declaration of principle must be understood as partly 
a result of democratic principles, and partly as the attempt to work against the »fundamentalist 
self-blockade« of the Greens in genetic engineering politics. Härlin bluntly pointed to the 
latter motive stating that the network’s principal aim was "über die Fronten 
hinwegzukommen, auch über die Doofen-Fronten: hier Befürworter, hier Gegner" (Härlin in 
Die Zeit, 15.4.1988, p. 49).
While dissociating itself from a radical oppositional stance, the new organization declared 
itself to be founded on the conviction that genetic engineering would fundamentally change 
man’s relationship with nature and the concern about whether society would master this 
challenge (GeN, self-portrayal leaflet). In functional terms the organization presented itself
49 The co-founder, Linda Bullard, belongs to the »prominent personages« of the international rDNA debate. 
Bullard, who acted as the network's international co-ordinator, worked for some time for the American 
Foundation o f Economic Trends, the director of which is Jeremy Rifldn, the United States* most famous activist 
opponent of genetic engineering. Bullard established substantial contacts with non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) interested in modem biotechnologies in the United States and throughout Europe (in the United States 
the Washington-based Foundation of Economic Trends represents the GeN).
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as a kind of services undertaking for the generation o f information, debates, and alliances in 
all fields of the modem biotechnologies* development (Die Zeit, 15.4.1988, p.49). The 
provision of critical information not or not sufficiently considered and furnished by 
government and industry was defined as one of the network's major concerns (GeN, self­
portrayal leaflet): The GeN was established as a services enterprise for risk information and 
risk argumentation taking into account risks to the natural, moral, and social order.
Underlying the decision to concentrate on information provision and risk 
communication was the expectation that it was the pressure from an informed public and 
weight of public critical discourse which presented the most effective tool to promote a more 
democratic state technology policy50. The organizational basis for this aim came to be the 
Gen-Ethischer Informationsdienst (GID). The GID which had been established by two 
activists affiliated with the women’s and environmental movements was an information 
service working on the principle of a press agency. The GeN took on the editing of the GID 
and transformed it into a regularly edited journal on modem biotechnologies providing 
information on recent developments in science and technology, political regulation, protest 
politics, and essays on the most relevant topics committed to a technology-critical perspective. 
Meanwhile, the GeN employs a range of media to spread information including conferences 
and seminars. These and other informative events often form part of nation-wide issue-related 
campaigns organized by or carried out with the participation of the network (see point 2.3.1). 
The politics of campaigning is geared towards what constitutes the organization's second 
major objective: The building up of a national network o f critical persons, initiatives, 
organizations and institutions.
With GeN, an extra-parliamentary node for political mobilization on genetic 
engineering was created that was explicitly geared towards and organized for the purpose of 
pursuing a policy o f alliances. Negating a dogmatic political position as promoted by the 
Greens, the network founders Hârlin and Bullard made the new mobilization base open for 
sectoralized and specialized debates and that way opened up new opportunities for co­
50 This expectation was declared to be a realistic one as the technology’s use was not considerably advanced 
y e t Actually, as in the case of the Commission of Inquiry, the time factor contributed to image promotion. While 
the Commission’s chairman liked to emphasize the early institutionalization of genetic engineering as a subject 
of concern in parliamentary politics, Hürlin accentuated the (allegedly) early point in time at which the new 
social movements took up their »watchdog function«: "Eigentlich sind wir eher untypisch, normalerweise 
entstehen soziale Bewegungen erst, wenn ein Kind in den Brunnen gefallen ist. Wir sind eher zu früh." (in Die 
Zeit 15.4.1988, p.49)
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ordinating the different critical approaches to the technology at issue under jointly defined 
action goals. In short, the network’s organizational design allowed for action on selective 
issues and with specific policy goals - action, for instance, in the form of single-issue 
campaigns. (It is worth noting, however, that the GeN soon came to be considered the m ost 
radical extra-parliamentary protest group besides the feminist initiatives and, actually, soon 
started to cultivate this image; this may be explained, first, by the foremost fundamentalist 
individual convictions of the network’s staff standing from the outset behind the official »non­
position«; second, the relatively high fluctuation in the network’s staff51 which increased th e  
rate of radical technology opponents; and third, the emergence of more and more competitors 
on the protest scene mostly pursuing pragmatic politics which suggested taking up the ro le  
of the »incorruptible« to retain a place in the activist limelight)
Unlike in the case of the nuclear energy issue, the rDNA issue did not produce a protest 
policy of mass mobilization and demonstration. It generated, instead - as the subsequent 
sections will demonstrate - a nation-wide protest network that at strategic points in time 
mobilizes into collective action52. Collective protest at the national level is typically triggered 
by a small number of what may be called network »centers«, organizations which are o f  
special importance to the maintenance of the protest network; the GeN clearly forms one o f  
these centers. Collective protest at the local level, on the other hand, is usually initiated by 
citizens’ action committees.
2.2 Organizational Structure
Fostered by GeN’s policy of alliances in the second half of the 1980s, there developed a 
loosely tied information, contact, and action network which, through public information, 
scientific expertise and political campaigning, aims at influencing the formation of public 
opinion as well as political decision-making.
31 Both founders of GeN in the meanwhile have left the organization. Bullard has taken up a position at die 
International Coalition for Development Action in Brussels; the journalist Härlin currently works for Greenpeace.
52 For an activist discussion on why the issue "bewegt nicht die Massen auf der Straße" (Gill 1990:39) see 
Gill (1990) and Göttinger Arbeitskreis gegen Gentechnologie (1991).
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This network, which ranges from the local to the national level, consists of a great 
deal of initiatives, groups and organizations of varying size, structure, scope, and ideological 
orientation, and different frames and action strategies concerning the issue at stake. Integration 
of these initiatives, groups, and organizations occurs on the basis of various structural, 
personal, and issue-related thematic ties.
One salient characteristic of the protest network, as Kaiser (1990: 85-94) explicates, 
is its dual structure. On the one hand, there are independent local citizens’ groups either 
founded on the concern about health and environmental hazards that might emanate from 
specific public or private genetic engineering projects or advancing this concern as part of a 
broader political program.
On the other hand, there are supraregional organizations which, similarly, were either 
expressly founded on the rDNA issue or have identified specific issues of rDNA technology 
as important for their overall field of interest and, therefore, have taken up these issues in 
their programs. The former groups and initiatives which constitute the more radical branch 
emerged from the organizational context of the anti-nuclear energy movement, on the one 
hand (e.g., GeN), and the feminist wing of the women’s movement, on the other (e.g., Gen- 
Archiv Essen, national contact of FINRRAGE). The latter organizations are more formalized 
and professionalized. They include eminent organizations of the environmental movement 
(such as the Green Party, Öko-Institut Freiburg, Umweltinstitut München, Bund für Umwelt 
and Naturschutz Deutschland, Deutscher Naturschutzring, and, since recently, Greenpeace) 
as well as »established« pressure groups concerned with animal welfare, consumer protection, 
and alternative agriculture (for instance, Deutscher Tierschutzbund, Verbraucher Initiative, 
Bundesverband Naturkost Naturwaren Einzelhandel, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft) (Bradish 1988: 285-291).
Though being part of very different organizational settings, the two "poles" (Kaiser 
1990: 90) are strongly interlinked. The supraregional organizations, on the one hand, 
document, publish, and file the work of local groups, and represent their interests towards a 
major public and the political institutions. By doing so, they capitalize on the local protest 
activities insofar as they serve as evidence of an unfavorable public opinion calling for a more 
restrictive technology policy. On the other hand, the local groups are supplied with scientific 
expertise, legal advice, relevant information, and issue-related thematic support for the pursuit 
of their specific protest objectives.
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Some of the supraregional organizations occupy the position of »network centers«. 
They are of special importance to the sustenance of the protest network as they are either 
active in initiating and/or organizing joint campaigning (esp. GeN53, Green Party54, 
Verbraucher Initiative55) or provide the network with particularly important protest capital, 
such as scientific and legal expertise (esp. Öko-Institut Freiburg56), financial and 
organizational resources (esp. Green Party), or general information on the development, 
application and critical assessment of the technology at issue (esp. GeN). Despite their special 
role, none of the organizations takes up a hegemonic position and dominates the processes 
of opinion-formation and decision-making of collective protest as a whole.
There are two major contexts within which since the second half of the 1980s temporarily 
stable coalitions of the various initiatives, groups, and organizations have been formed to
53 The GeN has acted as co-organizer of the campaign against the recombinant hormone bovine somatotropin 
("Kampagne gegen das Rinderwachstumshormon and den Einstieg der Gentechnik in den Tierställen") and co­
ordination center of the campaigns "Keine Patente auf Leben" and "Essen aus dem Gcnlabor? Natürlich nicht!". 
Currently, it is co-ordinating a campaign against the deliberate release o f genetically modified organisms and 
two campaigns against the application of genetic engineering to humans entitled "Ächtung der 
Keim bahn manipulation" and "Genomanalyse - der Gesetzgeber muß handeln!".
M According to Ruprecht (1991), the initiatives for the campaign against the recombinant hormone bovine 
somatotropin (rBST) and the campaign against the patenting of life forms both came from the Green’s BAG.
iS The Verbraucher Initiative (VI), founded in 1985, is concerned with all issues concerning ecological 
consumer protection. In the field of modem biotechnologies, the consumer organization’s work has focused on 
the fight against the use of genetically engineered growth hormones, like rBST, in animal husbandry and the use 
of genetic engineering techniques in the production of foodstuffs. The VI has acted as the co-ordination center 
of the anti-rBST-campaign and co-organizer of the campaigns against the patenting of life forms and genetically 
engineered foodstuffs.
56 The Öko-Institut Freiburg, founded in 1977, has gained its reputation foremost with well-founded critical 
studies on the safety of nuclear reactors, the disposal of nuclear waste and related problems, and with its work 
on an alternative energy supply. Its foundation in the context of the controversy about the Wyhl nuclear reactor 
is repeatedly referred to as the birth of »alternative science«. In 1986, the Institute established a special working 
group on genetic engineering with the task of directing public attention more intensely to the ecological and 
social effects of the technology’s application to non-human nature. To this end, the organization has been 
working on the clarification of the different levels of risk involved and the explication of criteria for safety 
research. Emphasis is placed on the investigation of ecological consequences and risks to human health 
associated with the deliberate or non-deliberate release of genetically modified organisms as used in industry and 
agriculture. In the spring of 1986, the Institute, in co-operation with other ecologically orientated organizations, 
held a public symposium on "Die ungeklärten Gefahrenpotentiale der Gentechnologie" (Koliek, Tappeser & 
Almer 1986). This conference represents a major landmark of public risk discourse. As an independent research 
institute the Öko-lnstitut provides other critics’ groups with expert opinions on specific genetic engineering 
issues. Moreover, it brings its critical expertise to bear in the half-public/half political sphere of commissions 
like the parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and the Bioethics Commission Rheinland-Pfalz, which called in 
experts of the research institute.
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organize co-ordinated action on selected matters. These arc, first, nation-wide single issue 
campaigns and, second, local protest against specific public and private genetic engineering 
projects. In the following, these two contexts shall be depicted.57 *
2.3 Protest Practice
The dual structure of collective technology protest does not merely refer to the existence of 
interconnected local and supraregional network »poles«. It also characterizes the action 
repertoire of technology protest: Local protest against concrete genetic engineering projects, 
on the one hand, and nation-wide campaigning on selected technology issues, on the other, 
represent the core of this action repertoire.
2.3.1 Supraregional Protest and the Politics of Campaigning
Due to their weak strategic location38, public interest groups have little chance of influencing 
political decision-making directly. Even if they are conceded formal access to the policy 
making process, they only rarely have much influence. In January 1994, the DNR put an end 
to its participation in the Central Commission for Biological Safety (ZKBS). With the Genetic 
Engineering Act, the ZKBS had been established as a permanent body to judge on the safety 
of projects. The new law required that the ZKBS’s membership be extended by the addition 
of an expert and his alternate from the environmental organizations; in autumn 1991, two 
BUND members took over these expert positions59. The reason stated for the decision to
57 As this short portrayal points out, the basic structure of collective protest in the field of genetic engineering 
fits the organizational pattern which new social movement theorists have identified as distinctive of their subject 
of investigation. Neidhardt’s pertinent characterization of this pattern as "mobilisiene Netzwerke von 
Netzwerken" (Neidhardt 1985: 197) is very much to the point also with respect to this protest actor.
38 An organization occupies a strong strategic position if it commands resources - energy, money, food - that 
are indispensable to the operation of society.
59 The BUND is a member of the parent organization Deutscher Naturschutzring Bundcsverband fur 
Umweltschutz (DNR) which represents about 2,8 million members of organizations in the fields of animal 
welfare and nature and environmental protection (Ltihr 1994; 92). The DNR has a right of proposal for the 
appointment o f the two ZKBS experts in the field of environmental protection. The experts appointed in 1991
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give up participation was that it had not been possible to shape the Commission’s work to the 
advantage of environmental protection. The environmental organizations determined the main 
reasons for this lack of influence as the ZKBS’s structural conditions and the strict rules of 
confidentiality (Lohr 1994: 10).
The chance of influencing corporate decision-making directly are even smaller. 
Technology protesters may be able to impede and protract specific industrial projects by the 
legally provided possibility of filing objections or by destructive action (as the next section 
will show). Rarely, however, have they the possibility of entering into formal negotiations 
with company representatives enhancing (even though only slightly) the chance of influencing 
corporate technology policy more directly. In the German rDNA debate, such round tables 
talks, as they were carried out by the German subsidiary of Unilever and the 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), still are the exception to the rule.
In view of their limited bargaining power and the fact that the fundamentalist politics of their 
parliamentary »mouthpiece«60 in state technology policy did not prove very effective, protest 
actors in the genetic engineering controversy - as is typical of civil protest actors - have relied 
on public opinion as their primary avenue of pressure. That means, their main protest tool has 
been persuasive appeals designed to influence people’s opinion directly via face-to-face 
communication and/or indirectly in the form of protest documents or by attracting the 
attention of the mass media. Among the different types of action geared to the mobilization 
of legitimacy for their cause by gaining popular support, campaigning on selected issues at 
a nation-wide level is the most elaborate61 *. The struggle for the public’s attention through 
the media, publishing literature, the staging of symbolic events and by setting out protest
were the biologists Martha Mertens who acted as full member and Christa Knorr who acted as Mertens* 
alternate.
60 Actually, the Greens participated only sporadically in parliamentary politics. In the 12th legislative period 
(1990-94) they did not manage to get into parliament. In the 13th legislative period they re-entered parliament 
in alliance with the Bündnis 90 party.
61 The joint drawing up of a memorandum on the draft law on rDNA technology and the performance of
»action days« against this law (comprising amongst others the organization o f information stands and discussion 
meetings o f critical groups) present another landmark of collective technology protest. The initiative for the 
"Memorandum für ein Gesetz zum Schütz von Natur and Menschen vor den Gefahren der Gentechnologie" 
(DNR & BUND 1989) came from BUND and DNR and consists of a comprehensive and detailed criticism of 
the draft law and the critical organizations* specific demands regarding a law on genetic engineering.
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concerns at meetings» specialists* congresses, and information stands (for instance, at the 
"Grüne Woche") has been largely integrated into the politics of campaigning.
Since 1987, one major campaign has been launched respectively on the subjects of 
recombinant hormones in agriculture62, patenting of life forms, the deliberate release of 
genetically modified organisms into the environment, germ line therapy, and genome analysis, 
and three major campaigns were started on the issue of genetically engineered foodstuffs63. 
In fact, in three different organizational contexts genetic engineering currently is campaigned 
on as a matter of consumer protection against unhealthy diet and nutritional health risks: 
Genetically engineered foodstuffs is the subject of a joint campaign co-ordinated by the GeN 
and of two campaigns carried out independently by the big environmental organizations 
BUND and Greenpeace (Der Spiegel, 15/1997, pp. 210-221).
One distinctive characteristic of the campaigns is the production of multifarious 
information material. The information material spread includes memoranda, brochures, 
folders, posters, postcards, and stickers64. It seems fair to state that the campaigns are 
distinguished not only by the multifariousness of the information material but also by its 
professional layout65 and information processing. The use of condensing symbols (of which 
the "Turbo-Kuh”, the "Krebsmaus", and the "Killertomate" are probably the most popular
63 It was the impending EU-approval of a dairy product, genetically engineered bovine growth hormone 
(commonly known by the acronym rBST following from its scientific term recombinant bovine roma/otropin) 
which prompted the first alliance and collective action of groups critical of genetic engineering. At a  press 
conference held on 19 August 1987. the "Kampagne gegen das Rinderwachstumshormon and den Einstieg dcr 
Gcniechnik in den Tiers till en" introduced itself to the public. The campaign's aim was to stop the 
commercialization of one of the »flag-ship« products of the biotechnology industry and the first genetically 
engineered agricultural product to be licensed in the European Union.
63 The selection of the campaign issues concerning the non-human applications of genetic engineering was 
significantly influenced by the developments at the European level. Recombinant BST, deliberate release, 
patenting of life forms, and novel food are issues which in the late 1980s were placed on the agenda of the 
European Union for regulatory decision-making.
64 Some of the campaigns were started with the publication of the campaigns' manifesto in several 
supraiegional newspapers. This publication, expounding the protest case, included a list of the campaign's 
"Miuriiger” (supporters) counting up to 30 or 40 groups and organizations mostly from the environmental-, 
consumer-, alternative agriculture-, and animal welfare movement To be a campaign supporter can imply 
different degrees of involvement Support may be restricted to the provision of a signature for the campaign 
cause or financial aid: it may imply participating in strategy discussions in the preparatory phase; or it may take 
the form of active involvement in all stages of the campaign.
63 The professional layout is the result, among other things, of the financial resources that the Green 
European parliamentary party furnished for the material's production.
187
ones) is one major expression of this professionally.
Another salient characteristic o f the campaigns is the staging o f symbolic events. In 
the context of the anti-rBST-campaign, for instance» the Verbraucher Initiative, in co-operation 
with the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bäuerliche Landwirtschaft, blocked the entrance to the head- 
office of the U.S. pharmaceutical enterprise Monsanto in Düsseldorf propagating "Unsere 
Kritik: Monsanto macht die Milch zur Sau" (non translatable German play on words stating 
that Monsanto was wrecking the milk). Another more current example is the "BUND- 
Killertomaten-Tournee" (Lehnen 1997: 9). From July to October 1997 BUND in co-operation 
with the parent organization of the health shops (FdR) went on a tour of Germany with a 
"terrifying" (Ibid.) giant inflatable tomato (which is seven meters by seven and equipped with 
immense teeth). BUND stopped in more than 50 towns to present the symbol of its food 
campaign to the public (see appendix IV. p,285).
Mobilization in the context of the campaigns also includes activities aimed at exerting more 
direct pressure on the political system. These activities, mostly carried out by the campaigns* 
co-ordinating centers (see fts. 53, 55), range from the collection of signatures against the 
respective technology application and the distribution of protest letters addressed to the 
responsible authorities, to participation in public hearings and the joint filing of legal 
objections.
The campaigns (except the food campaigns by BUND and Greenpeace) represent the action 
contexts within which the most wide-ranging and enduring protest alliances have been built 
in the German rDNA controversy. At least during the time of planning thematic, 
organizational, and action related matters, they intensively co-ordinate and fully utilize the 
informational, personal, scientific, and financial resources of the various groups and 
organizations involved in the debate over genetic engineering. Nation-wide campaigning 
constitutes the major technique both to face the established institutions with a unified 
opponent and to recruit new adherents. However, alliances are built also at the local level to 
enhance protest effectivity.
233. Local Protest as Symbolic Action and the Seizing o f Administratively Regulated
Rights of Participation and Objection
Up to the 1990s, collective protest at the local level was directed above all against specific 
genetic engineering projects of the chemical industry; in the 1990s, public and private projects 
have been equally protested. The main initiative for collective action has come from citizens* 
action committees concerned with nature and with health hazards feared to be associated with 
the projects planned to be carried o u t The search of these local groups for financial and 
specialists* support for their protest (esp. scientific expertise and/or legal advice) has 
generated ad-hoc coalitions of local, regional and supraregional groups and organizations. 
Those who act on the spot, however, are first of all the citizen activists; the bigger 
organizations usually provide their support from the background. The major types of action 
that collective protest at the local level includes are participation in public hearings, the filing 
of legal objections and the staging of symbolic events.
The focus and nature of local protest has significantly been shaped by the process of 
regulatory decision-making. Before the Genetic Engineering Act came into force, collective 
protest focused on opposition to the approval of facilities fo r  the production o f  genetically 
engineered pharmaceuticals - the only industrial projects at that time. Protest was largely 
restricted to the seizing of administratively regulated rights for participation and objection. 
As has been explicated under point 1.4, the numerous objections filed in writing and those 
voiced at the public hearings. (then provided by the Federal Emissions Act) and the 
subsequent decision of the Administrative Court of Hesse to make permission to build and 
operate genetic engineering facilities conditional on an adequate legal basis brought about a 
quasi-blockade of industrial activity in the technology field.
Almost all of the leading chemical enterprises were confronted with some form of ad- 
hoc coalition protesting against their plans to use genetic engineering in pharmaceutical 
research and/or production. In the case of Bayer it was the local initiative Coordination gegen 
Bayer-Gefahren which organized for collective protest66, in that of Schering the local action 
group Schering Aktions-Netzwerk, and in the case of Behringwerke Marburg (a subsidiary
66 For this group’s position on genetic engineering, see Coordination gegen Bayer-Gefahren (1991: 38ff.).
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of Hoechst) it was the citizens* group Fra-GEN. The Hoechst company was itself faced with 
the Aktionsbündnis gegen Gentechnologie Hoechst, a coalition of technology critical groups 
which had been formed on the initiative of the citizens* action committee Höchster Schnüffler 
un* Maagucker, the company’s long-standing local »watchdog« on safety and environmental 
matters67. The coalition comprised GeN, BUND, the Bundesverband der Tierversuchsgegner, 
the Öko-Institut Freiburg and other environmental organizations which the citizens* action 
committee had successfully mobilized for its interests. Hoechst actually is the company which 
found itself in the most serious trouble in the late 1980s: It was involved for several years in 
a legal battle with the Aktionsbündnis objecting to the construction of a factory to produce 
genetically engineered human insulin68.
While the citizens’ groups Schering Aktions-Netzwerk and Fra-Gen were founded 
around a specific concern about rDNA technology, the local groups Höchster Schnüffler and 
Koordination gegen Bayer-Gefahren identified the technology as important for their overall 
field of interest and, therefore, took up the issue in their action programs.
With the Genetic Engineering Act, which largely removed the public participation hurdle for 
the construction and operation of industrial production plants, the focus of local protest shifted 
to participation in written and oral authorizing procedures concerning planned releases o f  
genetically modified plants into the environment applied for by public and private institutions 
(see GID 1993, No. 83, p. 3). Indeed, since that time, local protest against the use of rDNA
6?.Thc Höchster Schnüffler un' Maagucker are a small group of environmentalists in the Frankfurt/M. quarter 
Höchst which, for more than 15 years, speaks up for local environmental interests. "Zwangsläufig" and "ständig" 
the group is confronted with the "größten Emittenten" of the vicinity, the company Hoechst (personal 
correspondence with the group in 1991). The group's response to this confrontation mainly consists in seizing 
administratively regulated rights of participation and objection, continuously collecting and processing relevant 
company data and continuously scrutinizing installation-related corporate policy on the basis o f this data. The 
aim is to reveal imperfections in installation-related corporate safety and environmental policy, to make them 
public, and to initiate the required measures. The »watchdog« function corresponds with the group's self-image 
and also is perceived as such by the »subject of control«; according to Hoechst’s press and public relations 
officer in the area o f environmental protection/local policy the citizens’ initiative was brought into being for the 
company’s public control (Schönefeld 1994: 16). For an interview with the group concerning its history, 
development and future on the occasion of its fifteenth anniversary, see Frankfurter Rundschau, 6.10.1995.
68 The Höchster Schnüffler un' Maagucker initiated the first lawsuit concerning a large-scale experimental 
plant for the production of a pharmaceutical, human insulin, in Germany. For a contemporary assessment of this 
conflict by the managing director Hansgeorg Gareis, see manager magazin 4/1988, pp. 190-194; for a look back 
on the conflict by the Hoechst manager Alexander Dahmen on the occasion of the local action group's fifteenth 
anniversary, see Frankfurter Rundschau, 6.10.1995.
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technology in pharmaceutical production ceased to play a role. Being deprived of the 
possibility of advancing objections in public hearings in this field of application opposition, 
however, did not translate into other forms of action. The issue may come up again from time 
to time, but then it is likely to become a subject of discussion, for instance, in the context of 
the company organized "Gesprächskreis Hocchster Nachbarn" rather than as a subject of 
protest69. In fact, research and production in the pharmaceutics field have significantly 
gained in acceptance at the local level (and at the national level as well as is pointed out 
under point 2.4). Things are looking very different, however, in the agricultural sector. 
Numerous objections to outdoor research on and production of genetically modified plants 
have been raised in writing and public hearings. It was, in particular, the complexity and 
lengthiness of the public hearings which gave cause for complaints on the side of the public 
and private institutions that had applied for field trials.
Since the Act’s revision abolished the requirement of an oral hearing before permission to 
carry out field trials, these institutions are faced with a different but not much less difficult 
situation. Ad-hoc coalitions of environmentalists and local citizens’ groups70 have not 
contented themselves with filing written objections. Instead, they have increasingly engaged 
in symbolic actions. These range from the positioning of »sentries« and danger signs near 
testing grounds to the forming of torch chains (Fackelketten) around testing grounds to 
occupations and blockades of fields intended for trials, made visible over a wide distance by 
the raising of huge banners (Muhlenberg 1997, Strodthoff & Riewenherm 1996; see appendix
IV. p.286). The magazine Der Spiegel reports:
Eine neue Protestform gegen Freilandversuche mit gentechnisch manipulierten
Pflanzen breitet sich aus: Im mittelhessischen Wölfersheim and im südbadischen
Buggingen blockieren and besetzen Naturschützer die Äcker, auf denen genveränderter
Mais and Raps ausgebracht werden soll. (Der Spiegel 25/1995: 16)
69 Genetic engineering has already been the subject of discussion in the local round table that the Hoechst 
company established in 1993 to discuss safety and environmental questions with its neighborhood including the 
Höchster Schnüffler and other citizens’ initiatives (Dreycr & Kesselring 1996; see also Höchster Kreisblatt, 
28.1.1995, Frankfurter Westlicher Stadtanzeiger, 15.2.1995).
70 Actually, these citizens* groups are not the same as those of the late 1980s. This is partly due to the 
different locations of the protested projects, partly due to the different field of technology application protested 
which has not only attracted environmental groups and citizens concerned about their safety in living within the 
sphere of chemical companies but also citizens from very different contexts, such as anthroposophic circles or 
parent initiatives for a healthy diet.
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Recently, there have also been actions of a more radical kind: Several fields on which 
genetically modified plants had already been brought out were completely destroyed. It is not 
the citizens* groups or the bigger environmental organizations which is supposed to have 
carried out these illegal actions but a protest minority vaguely described as composed of 
militant environmentalists and "Autonome" (Focus 49/1996, p.72)71.
In the chemical industry, Schering and Hoechst, or more precisely, their subsidiary AgrEvo, 
is most affected by the legal and illegal forms of protest against deliberate releases72. 
AgrEvo is currently the only domestic chemical enterprise in Germany that carries out field 
trials with genetically engineered organisms, namely plants in the context of agrochemical 
research and product development. Via AgrEvo, the two big companies Hoechst and Schering 
seek to ensure two markets: that for genetically engineered seeds and that for plant-protective 
agents to which the seeds are adjusted. The destructive activities, however, significantly retard 
the evaluation of the field trials regulated by the Genetic Engineering Law and thus the 
marketing of the genetically modified seeds.
The massive - legal and illegal - local protest against field trials with genetically 
modified plants all over Germany to some extent reflects the sentiments of a population, that 
in most part, is strongly opposed to the use of rDNA techniques in the foodstuffs production 
chain; the fact that one of the foremost projects in this field of application are plants made 
resistant to herbicides (for instance, to the Hoechst herbicide Basta) surely does not enhance 
public acceptance.
With the curtailment of formalized public participation, both the form and argumentation of
71 In 1996 alone, fourteen testing grounds were destroyed (Der Spiegel, 46/1996, p. 96). For instance, in May 
genetically modified rape in Tamow (Mecklenburg) was uprooted by a  group called "Autonome Genome", in 
June genetically modified maize in Friemar (Thüringen) was »beheaded« over night. In October of the preceding 
year in Wölfersheim (Hesse) unknown persons destroyed genetically modified rape by using a herbicide. The 
damage for each destroyed field amounts to approximately DM 150.000 (Ibid.); see also Focus, 49/1996, p. 71* 
72.
72 The company AgrEvo was founded on 1 January 1994 as a fusion of the two plant protection sectors of 
Hoechst and Schering. According to AgrEvo’s head of management, Gerhard Frame, the company aims, among 
other things, at consolidating its position as the world’s second biggest producer of plant-protective agents (first 
place is held by Ciba Geigy; Frankfurter AUgemeine Zeitung, 14.1.1994). AgrEvo holds a  ten per cent share in 
Germany’s most important seeds producer, the Kleinwanzlebener Saatgut (Die Zeit, 8.12.1995, p. 25).
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local protest has to some extent »radicalized«. However, protest discourse at the local level 
never has been dominated by an all-embracing fundamentalist approach. Instead, it has always 
focused on the issue of risk, more precisely, on the potential »classical« risks to human health 
and environment which could result from the respective private and/or public genetic 
engineering project at issue. While this looks different in the case of supraregional protest, 
the argumentation of this nationally oriented collective actor has clearly shifted from an 
ethically motivated fundamentalist discourse to a more specialized and sectoralized discourse 
on risk.
2.4 From  Fundam entalist Discourse to Discourse on Risk
Taking a look at the development of the general thrust of protest argumentation since the mid 
1980s one can observe that, with the growing concretization of individual forms of 
application, the culturally and ethically motivated debate of principle has given way more and 
more to a sectoralized and specialized discourse on risk in the different fields of application.
Cultural and ethical argumentation criticizing genetic engineering in terms of a 
scientifically based conception of truth, a de-moralization of nature, and a subjectivist 
conception of morality - that is, in terms of prevailing societal value orientations favorable 
to the technological modernization in highly industrialized Western society (van den Daele 
1990: 14) - is still an important resource in protest discourse. However, it is no longer 
predominant. Today, the principal line of reasoning is political and cognitive-empirical 
argumentation about potential risks to generally appreciated societal values such as human 
health and safety and a clean environment and, on the basis of a broadly defined concept of 
social compatibility (Sozialvertraglichkeit), to the social and political structure of society 
(defined, for instance, as the introduction or reinforcement of wrong priorities in Public 
Health, discrimination resulting from identifying genes that produce diseases, exacerbation of 
economic inequities among nations, or a further concentration o f power in the hands of larger 
companies). Risk in the late 1980s has developed into the central theme, slogan, and impetus 
for commitment in social protest against rDNA technology. Since then, even fundamental 
objections are typically operationalized politically as opposition to risk (van den Daele 1990: 
13).
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Correspondingly, claims for political regulation predominantly are justified by pointing 
to the governmental responsibility for protecting against danger. In contrast with the ethically 
based fundamentalist discourse, risk discourse is not in the first place a moral appeal to have 
respect for nature and naturalness. However, its special political appeal lies in the moral 
imperative it conveys: Society has a moral obligation to protect people from risks. Arguing 
that people get involuntarily exposed to technology-induced risks protest actors call into 
question the morality of industry officials and the legitimacy of current systems of control.
The reason for this change in protest argumentation can be assumed to lie at least 
partly in a special experience of controversy; the experience that ethically motivated 
fundamentalism is effective in accelerating the dynamics of technological controversy at the 
outset but in the long run can only be a politically effective protest resource when it is backed 
by references to potential hazards for man, environment, and society.
As far as the big environmental and consumer organizations and parts of the Green Party are 
concerned, the shift to a risk focused perspective on genetic engineering has gone along, first, 
with a more differentiated evaluation of the technology and the declared acceptance of some 
of the technology's applications73. The latter holds especially true for the field of 
pharmaceutical research and application (JunghanB 1990: 12). Second, it is linked to the 
pursuit of a more »pragmatic« policy allowing negotiation and compromise (for instance, in 
the Unilever round table talks). In view of the fact that more and more genetic engineering 
products entered the market, the widely stated argument of this portion of the technology 
protesters goes, the goal could no longer be to stop the technology but to positively influence 
its consolidation in science, industry, and society. Not merely public opinion-formation but 
negotiation with political and industrial actors as well would represent a major strategy for 
reaching this goal. By contrast, some other protest actors such as the feminist groups and the 
GeN still proclaim fundamentalist opposition and refuse to make formal compromises on
71 For a plea for a differentiated assessment of genetic engineering by environmental organizations in the 
context o f the debate on »sustainable development« see Katzek (BUND) & Spangenberg (Institut Klima Umwelt 
Energie) (1994). For a  »Green plea« for a differentiated evaluation and a  pragmatic political approach see Kiper 
(1996); Kiper is a member of the Bundestag and spokesperson for research and technology policy of the 
Parliamentary Bündnis 90/Die Griinen Party. Several individual members in parliament and some of the Greens* 
regional associations have modified their position of unequivocal opposition to genetic engineering. Note also 
that in about 1989 the ethically motivated fundamentalists generally lost their dominant position in the formation 
of the Greens* political goals and objectives.
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programme and strategy (the former technology opponent, however, plays hardly any role in 
current public debate). Not surprisingly, the »pragmatic turn« of a portion of technology 
critics has generated intense intra-protest debates along the lines of
fundamentalism/pragmatism74.
While protest argumentation to some extent has »de-radicalized« and negotiation and 
compromise have gained more weight in protest policy - at least at the national level - the 
primary target of technology protest has not really changed; now as before it is industry.
2.5 Industry as a Priority Topic and Target
All of the principal technology promoters and users, government, the scientific community 
and industry, are major targets of genetic engineering protest in Germany. The latter, 
however, clearly represents the priority target and topic of collective protest. The way in 
which industry uses the technology and the potential risks associated with this use form the 
core of protest discourse and activities.
Written documents and oral declarations typically define protest causes and opponents 
in industry-related terms such as multinationals, genetic engineering industry, industrial 
society, and industrialism and/or as the different industrial enterprises involved in genetic 
engineering activities. Simultaneously, industrial projects are the focus of protest action 
directed against concrete technology projects. In the case of »indoor« research and production, 
industrial projects clearly have been the favorite protest target; in the case of »outdoor« 
research and development, protest has been directed equally against projects carried out with 
industrial and with public funds.
The special target in private industry, in its turn, is the big industrial enterprise; as Gill puts 
it in more drastic terms: "Der Teufel ist immer der Multi!" (1990: 4175). To be more precise, 
it is the big chemical enterprise which is the priority target It is this economic actor who
74 For this debate see, among many others, Katzek & Spangenberg (1994) and the reply by Haas 
(GeN/Umweltinstitut München) (1995).
75 This comment forms part of Gill’s criticism of the fact that protest largely leaves aside the projects in the 
more than a thousand laboratories and facilities of universities and Max-Planck-Institutes.
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finds itself especially exposed to collective protest, particularly to company-specific criticism 
and symbolic and legal actions.
The characteristics that make big enterprises a favorite subject of protest discourse and 
action are, on the one hand, their very »bigness« and, on the other, their seemingly 
pronounced profit-orientation; both characteristics are instrumental to the strategy of public 
mobilization. While their bigness, that is, their increased visibility, assures some general 
public attention, their profit-orientation promotes a moralization and popularization of the 
genetic engineering issue: It allows the rDNA issue to be defined as a question of social 
justice. In this definition the societal consolidation of genetic engineering as a high-risk 
technology is the result of the economic strategies of a few multinationals which trade public 
safety, a clean environment, and morals for private profits - and of political decision-makers 
that act as the »agent« (»Erfüllungsgehilfe«) of these alleged pillars of the German 
economy76. In other words, private profit is represented as the guiding motive for technology 
application and risk taking and thus that what constitutes the real hazard to society. The 
means of mobilization is to point out the winners (industry) and losers (the rest of society) 
of the technology’s use and to declare this use a zero-sum-game: The economic actor gains 
at the expense of the rest of society. The following quote by GeN illustrates this Profits 
versus Public Good argumentation:
Um die wirtschaftlichen Interessen der Gen-Tech-Industrie zu sichern, wird der
Bevölkerung das "genetische Restrisiko" zugemutet. (GeN folder)
With this type of risk communication, collective protest successfully avoids getting entangled 
in the moral ambivalences that are almost inevitably implied with objections to the 
technology’s use in public medicinal research and human genetics - provided that it leaves 
out the industrial health care sector, something that it has actually widely done in the 
1990s77. It is also due to these moral ambivalences that collective protest since that time has
76 In this sense the Verbraucher Initiative in a position paper on modem biotechnologies states: "Die Industrie 
schafft Zwänge, denen die Politiker nur gesetzgeberisch ’hinterherhinken’. ... Eine öffentliche Diskussion über 
die Gentechnologie soll nicht stattfinden, um die Expansion der Industrie nicht zu behindern" (Verbraucher 
Initiative 1988).
77 On the one hand, it is one’s own sympathy with the sick, on the other, the generally highly appreciated 
individual right of self-determination and the claim to unrestricted medicinal treatment which make this field of 
application a rather intricate protest issue. To counter the claim that people should have the right to freely decide 
on their own body according to their own judgement with the demand for respect for the naturalness of human
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concentrated on issues pivotal to the technology’s commercial exploitation outside the health­
care sector.
The main reasons for the decision to focus on big chemical enterprises can be 
determined as the following: First, there is the simple fact that from the outset the private- 
sector activities in the commercial exploitation of genetic engineering have been concentrated 
in these companies (see Chapter I. point 3); consequently, they have largely absorbed social 
protest (today, in view of the fact that the food industry has definitely entered the genetic 
engineering business, protest actions are increasingly directed also against this industrial 
sector). Second, these companies belong to an industrial sector which, since the 1970s in the 
context of an ever intensifying and extending environmental debate, has time and again been 
the focus of public criticism; consequently, the public is particularly susceptible to criticism 
directed against them. As the economic pioneer in the new technology field and object of a 
relatively high public scrutiny, the big chemical companies present »rewarding« protest 
targets. For reasons of illustration one more quote, this time by the consumer organization 
Verbraucher Initiative:
Mit herbizidresistenten Pflanzen and der Entwicklung von Totalherbiziden ("Basta"
von Hoechst) wird die Giftlawine in der Landwirtschaft trotz gesundheits- and
umweltgefährdender Auswirkungen beschleunigt. (Verbraucher Initiative 1988)
The most direct effects of the strategy of embarrassment and confrontation employed against 
the chemical industry have been delays in the approval of production facilities and products 
and subjection to a Law which, without this protest policy, might have been less restrictive 
in its original form or even would have not been passed at all. As a more indirect effect the 
sector - once again - has been made a public issue. By direct activist mobilization and mass 
media resonance, collective protest has exposed the sector to the inquisitive looks of a critical, 
sometimes hostile public. In terms of mass media resonance, it is local protest against 
concrete technology projects and the two campaigns of BUND and Greenpeace on genetically 
engineered food which have been the most effective protest events. It seems reasonable to 
assume that it is above all the spectacular nature of these events and the socio-cultural
nature or forestallment of more general undesirable social and political developments implies taking the risk of 
being put into »moral offside«.
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saliency of the food issue which have attracted mass media attention. By contrast, one can 
hardly find any press reporting on the other campaigns. The main reason here might lie in the 
fact that these jointly organized campaigns have been run with a much lower budget and 
therefore have deliberately concentrated on opinion-formation in smaller »publics« instead of 
the larger public via extensive and expensive mass media work.
However, as the next chapter aims to demonstrate, up to now, mass media discourse 
from the outset of industrial uptake of genetic engineering has been a critical political factor 
for the chemical industry. Also in those times in which the industrial sector did not represent 
the focus of genetic engineering reporting, the mass media provided a forum for a rather 
critical assessment of the new technology and its different fields of application and thus at 
least did not necessarily encourage a favorable public climate for the technology’s 
commercialization.
3. Mass Media Discourse
It forms part of the »standard complaints« of the chemical industry that mass media reporting 
overemphasizes potential technology risks and downplays potential technology benefits78. 
While the following exposition does not aim to verify or falsify this claim, it intends to point 
out that mass media discourse actually has been a critical factor for the commercialization of 
rDNA technology. The continued prominence of artificial-life themes in mass media reporting 
and the intensive and extensive discussion of the technology’s risks - although well balanced 
by typically weighing them against the technology’s benefits - has contributed to the creation 
of a rather unfavorable public climate. It will also be argued, however, that mass media risk 
discourse of the mid 1990s is much less sympathetic to technology protest as the main 
»sponsor« of the risk issue than it was in the late 1980s.
78 For this view see, among many others, Bayer AG (1993) and Brauer (1994); Brauer is the official 
responsible for biotechnology and research in the central public relations office of the Hoechst company.
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3.1 The Artificial-Life-Discourse
Genetic engineering attracted its first mass media attention in the early 1980s. At this time 
the rDNA issue formed part of reporting on the rhetorically rich topics of modem 
reproduction technologies. »Test-tube baby«79, »surrogate motherhood«, »sperm banks« etc. 
were the typical catchwords in the context of which the first references to genetic engineering 
were made. These first references were mostly concerned with the technology’s application 
to humans, such as human genome analysis, genetic testing, and germ line therapy.
Many of these first press reports embedded the rDNA issue into the same socially 
highly resonant horror scenarios which since the late 1970s formed an integral part of media 
reporting on reproductive technologies. The literary context of these horror scenarios ranges 
from Shelley’s "Frankenstein" over Goethes "Zauberlehrling" (sorcerer’s apprentice) to 
Huxley’s "Brave New World". Rhetorically rich and well embedded into the popular culture, 
the blasphemous products of a presumptuous science - artificial homunculi, standardized and 
cloned human beings, monstrous combinations of man and animal, or even man and machine 
- had been identified as rewarding themes of reporting on the progresses in reproduction 
technologies80. In the early 1980s, when first opinions in favor of a political perspective that 
views both reproductive and genetic technologies as the peak of man’s hubris of domination 
of nature were expressed, they became also popular themes of news reporting on genetic 
engineering81.
Today, the artificial-life discourse constitutes an integral part of mass media reporting on 
genetic engineering82. It is employed to provide reports with a technology-critical thrust as
79 The event which caused reproduction technologies to become an essential part of media reporting on the 
progress of the life sciences was the birth of Louise Brown, the first baby produced by in vitro fertilization (that 
is, by adding spermatozoa to egg cells growing in laboratory glassware) in July 1978.
80 Besides the »negative heroes« Frankenstein and the Zauberlehrling, continuously used catchwords of the 
artificial-life discourse are "scientists playing God", "the eighth Day of Creation" and "man made to measure".
81 In these early press reports references to the misuse of human genetics in the Third Reich and concerns 
about a technologically induced new type of eugenic selection of "life not worth living" (lebensunwertes Leben) 
played an important role.
82 Most recently, this discourse has received a  fresh impetus when on 23 February 1997 "Dolly" was 
presented to the public. "Dolly" is a cloned sheep and the product of a worldshaking experiment; For the first 
time scientists succeeded in cloning a mammal from a somatic cell (namely an udder cell). Up to then mammals
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well as to provide reports with a technology-supportive thrust On the one hand, the monster 
scenarios are represented as a warning against an eugenic rationalization of nature and human 
evolution and the incalculable and uncontrollable consequences of an »industrialized« 
molecular biology; here, the artificial-life discourse serves to question an idea of nature that 
emphasizes human intervention through a process of design, a process of a synthesis of »aits« 
and life. On the other hand, references to the »first« and "second generation of the monsters" 
(Brittnacher 1988) are used either to illustrate the fantastic and thus (allegedly) unfounded and 
irrational objections of the technology’s critics and/or to impute to these a hidden biologism 
(allegedly) expressed by the visions of an omnipotent technology.
In either case the artificial-life theme first and foremost is a discourse on fear and can be 
assumed to create, if not fear, then a certain uneasiness among readers. The most widely and 
often used motive of fear are the Frankenstein rhetorics?*. Deeply rooted in the popular 
culture by literature and film, it spontaneously evokes the idea of scary as well as pitiable 
new creations, products of a scientific hubris, which, by the process of self-empowerment, 
escape the control of their scientific creators, and terrorize them as well as their 
environment83 4. It is the cultural-historically rooted misgivings about scientific and 
technological progress that the Frankenstein myth evokes. Its continued use in mass media 
discourse is likely to have an effect which complies with the interests of the technology’s 
protesters; It is likely to render more difficult the social acceptance of the new technologies
had been cloned exclusively from embryonic cells. That means, while thus far scientists could »merely« produce 
multiple births, they now for the first time succeeded in cloning a full-grown mammal (Der Spiegel, 10/1997. 
pp. 216-225).
83 In the 1990s, it is above all in the context of reporting on genetically engineered food in which 
Frankenstein rhetorics are used. Among the numerous usages of this specific genetic engineering frame, note the 
following two: The heading "Frankenfood im Tiefkühlfach" in the political magazine Der Spiegel (15/1993, p. 
202) and the heading "Angst vor Frankensteins Pflanzen" in the supraregional newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(20721.3.1993).
M The emotional imagery evoked by the familiar monster myth still gets enriched by the media’s visual 
presentation of some rather pitiable transgenic animals: for example, the transgenic »super pig«, carrying the 
gene for the production of growth hormone in humans, which suffers from arthritis, is susceptible to infections 
and given to infertility and to squinting (Weidenbach & Tappeser 1989: 176), the transgenic »oncomouse« the 
hereditary material of which includes human genes predisposing it to develop cancer (British Medical Association 
1992: 108), or the transgenic »mighty mouse«, carrying the gene which codes for the production of growth 
hormone in rats (see Rosenbladt 1988: 59). (The term transgenic is used to describe organisms which have been 
altered to carry and express genes from another species; the »geep« though not a product of genetic engineering 
usually is dealt with in the context of transgenic animals.)
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and its products85.
It is worth noting, that, though heavily relying on the monster symbolism, it was not 
the technology protesters who introduced this specific framing of the rDNA issue into mass 
media discourse. Instead, it was used by the media some time before collective protest 
developed (Viehover 1992: 50-51). The strong reliance of collective protest on artificial-life 
themes suggests, however, that mass media use of these »condensing symbols« soon became 
no longer the exclusive result of internal media criteria of good journalism but also a 
representation of fundamentalist protest discourse and was influenced by protest mobilization 
strategies86.
While the artificial-life theme still enjoys great popularity in the mass media in the 1990s, it 
is no longer the dominant »frame« as it was until about the late 1980s. Instead, since then 
most media reports are structured according to the opportunity/risk dichotomy87.
85 The following anecdote suggests that the concern about the effects of the use of monster-rhetorics in public 
discourse represents a concern particularly strongly developed among some of the German technology promoters 
facing widespread technology protest and concentrated public debate. In its 1 April 1993 issue, the British 
scientific journal Nature published an article that in scientific gibberish reported on the production of a 
genetically engineered ageless and ever-growing mouse-species, the "Dorian Gray mice". In the June issue the 
journal published the statements of some scientists on the April fool joke. While the US, French, and Spanish 
scientists obviously had been amused by the joke and had developed it (Der Spiegel, 27/1993, p. 175), the 
German genetics professor, Peter Starlinger, warned against potential "schwerwiegenden Konsequenzen" (quoted 
after Ibid.) of the satirical mouse story. Nature, the scientist exposed, was known as a scientific publication and 
as such also red by many journalists, which could not dilTcrentiate between "wirklichen and fiktiven Daten" 
(Ibid.) and thus, would be misguided.
86 According to Brittnacher, the use of literary horror in the rDNA debate is to be put down to the "kurrentes 
Vorurteil" (1988: 105) of the technology’s critics that "die vorläufigen Einsichten der Literatur jenen 
Wissenschaften, die sich erst später konstituieren, oft schon voraus seien, and daß man gut daran täte, den 
literarischen Antizipationen der verheerenden Folgen von Wissenschaftsfreveln Glauben zu schenken" (Ibid.). 
This perspective, I shall claim, fails to distinguish between individual or collective conviction and the 
communication-strategic use and reproduction of cultural symbols. For a discussion of the role of »condensing 
symbols« (Kollektivsymbole) in public discourse on the risks and opportunities of genetic engineering, see 
Viehöver (1992). "Sie [the condensing symbols] erlauben Verstehen ohne Expertise. Das macht ihre Verwendung 
im öffentlichen Diskurs (speziell im Mediendiskurs) wahrscheinlich." (Viehöver 1992:4)
87 Thus, unlike Heins (1992: 389), I do not regard the Frankenstein rhetorics as that interpretation of genetic 
engineering which since the mid 1970s determines public debate.
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3.2 The Uisk-Opportunity-Discourse
The risk-and-opportunity frame started gaining ground when in 1987 the final report of the 
Parliamentary Commission was published. As I have argued under point 1.3, the issuing o f 
the report had a major stimulating as well as structuring effect on public debate, especially 
on mass media discourse.
The publication of the final report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Opportunities 
and Risks of Genetic Engineering brought about the rDNA issue’s real breakthrough as a  
media topic (Ruhrmann et al. 1992: 63). Genetic engineering surpassed its status as an 
»appendage« of modem reproduction technologies and became an independent media topic. 
Up to then, media coverage had been largely restricted to the possible applications of the 
technology to humans and to the discussion of ethical questions: now, reporting increasingly 
dealt with all fields of application and dimensions of potential benefits and hazards. Though 
composed as a textbook and manual rather than a discussion stimulating account, the 
Commission’s report gave the critical assessment of rDNA technology in the mass media a 
clear impulse. Much broader media attention was attracted by the legal and ethical aspects 
of gene therapy and human genome analysis and the »classical« risks to human health and 
the environment associated with the technology’s use in industry (Hennen & Stockle 1992: 
3). Media reporting on the latter topic in the course of the late 1980s continuously received 
new impulses by the massive local protest against the construction and approval of genetic 
engineering facilities in the chemical industry.
The comprehensive consideration of the risk issue in the mass media after the Commission’s 
report had been issued can be explained, on the one hand, as the result of the Commission’s 
intensive and extensive treatment of the issue. At least to some extent, however, it must be 
put down to a more specific event, namely the experts’ agreement that precautionary 
restrictions on freedom of research and general freedom of action were also justifiable in 
cases referring to the aversion of still unknown, unproven but potential dangers. With this 
agreement the technology critics’ reference to hypothetical risks - usually downplayed by the 
technology proponents as the incalculable and uncontrollable and thus negligible residual risk 
(Restrisiko) - underwent a significant upgrading in terms of argumentative persuasiveness. At
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the same time, the "uncertain peril and certain promised-argumentation of the technology 
promoters lost some of its persuasive power.
Though acting as a stimulus to risk discourse, the Commission’s report did not give rise to 
. a purely negative framing of the rDNA issue in news reporting. This was forestalled by the 
report’s risk-opportunity-approach which was widely adopted by the media. The report 
provided a discursive structure which defined the weighing of risks and prospects against each 
I other as the argumentative basis for a rational evaluation of the technology at issue. This
I structure was reproduced by every newspaper article which responded to the issuing of the
i report with the stereotype heading and discussion of "the opportunities and risks of genetic
, engineering". As Gill somewhat ironically puts it, the slogans of the Enquête-Kommission
rested like anathemas on the consciousness and the fantasy of the public actors (1991: 429). j  Certainly already before 1987 the risks and benefits perspective had formed part of political
| and public debate on genetic engineering; after the Commission’s report had been issued,
| however, the alarming discourse on potential risks and the reassuring presentation of the
| technology’s potential benefits appeared as necessarily attached to each other. Thus the
1 Commission’s work gave rise to a, so to speak, »well-balanced« reporting on modem
i
j biotechnologies (van den Daele 1990: 40).
I
j Still today the risk-opportunity-perspective presents the basic structure of mass media
I reporting on genetic engineering. However, since the decision of the Bundeskabinett to pass
! a law - signalling the issue’s definite political settlement - news coverage on the technology’s
| actual and potential benefits has significantly increased. Particularly reports on the factual and
| likely contributions of genetic engineering to medicinal progress have since then constitutedj  a good deal of press reporting on the technology8 9. The increasing prominence of the
| technology’s benefits does not imply, however, a steadily decreasing attention to the
 ^ technology’s risks. On the contrary, in the mid 1990s, the risk issue in the context of
88 "DNA Research: Uncertain Peril and Certain Promise" is the tide of an article by Joshua Lederberg of 
1975 reprinted in Watson & Tooze (1981: 56).
89 In the time period covered by the media analysis of Ruhrmann et al. (January 1988 - June 1990), the 
technology's contributions to medicinal progress actually developed into the preferential focus of media reporting 
on genetic engineering (1992: 38).
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i
regulatory debate on genetically engineered foodstuffs and the associated series o f spectacular 
protest events - local opposition to field trials and the campaigns by BUND and Greenpeace 
(see point 2.3.1) - has regained prominence. At the same time, "Dolly”, the sheep cloned from 
somatic cells, has once more brought the potential adverse socio-cultural consequences of the 
technology’s use (if combined with modem reproductive technologies) to the forefront o f 
mass media discourse.
Still, the general thrust of current news reporting is technology-supportive rather than 
technology-critical. There is a clear tendency also in those newspapers and magazines known 
to be sensitive to the ambiguity of scientific and technological progress to represent risks as 
negligible and portray protest risk discourse as overdramatization and protest demands as 
unrealistic (see for instance, Focus, 49/1996, pp.71-72 and Der Spiegel, 15/1997, pp.210-221). 
While, in the late 1980s, news reporting, especially in the context of local opposition to the 
industrial use of genetic engineering, was somehow sympathetic to technology protest, this 
looks very different in the mid 1990s. The mass media no longer act as an »ally« o f 
technology protest; for the chemical industry this implies being to a much lesser extent the 
subject of negative headlines as was the case up to the 1990s. So
So far in this second part of the study I have sketched the commercial interests that the 
German chemical industry has in genetic engineering and the political environment in which 
the industrial sector has found itself embedded in its attempt at commercializing a technology 
that it considers key for its present and future economic success. In the next chapter I shall 
outline the sector’s political response to the various and changing challenges from its wider 
societal environment.
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in .  TH E CHEM ICAL INDUSTRY AS POLITICAL ACTOR
The preceding chapter pointed out that rarely has one technology and one industrial sector 
using that technology attracted such public scrutiny from so many angles and actors and from 
such an early stage of the technology's industrial uptake. The special political challenge that 
this has meant for the industrial sector suggests a special industrial political response - and 
it is this special response that the present chapter aims to examine. The explanation is 
organized as a phase-based exposition of the German chemical industry’s policy on the rDNA 
issue. It covers the same time period as the exposition of the political context (from the mid 
1970s to the mid 1990s). The changes in industrial political activity that the chapter discusses 
as regards extent, arena choice, argumentative thrust, and interactive nature arc related to the 
contextual factors outlined in the preceding chapter. It is the crucial point in the following 
analysis to show that these factors have decisively shaped the specific development of 
industrial political involvement
The phase-based exposition is preceded by a short portrayal of the major 
characteristics of the chemical industry as a "policy community". The basic idea expressed in 
this concept as defined by Grant, Paterson & Whitston (1988: 10), is that industrial sectors 
are characterized not only by distinctive production processes, technologies, and forms of 
market organizations, but also develop a specific political identity and life of their own which 
is to some extent distinctive and insulated from that of other sectors. The first section of this 
chapter broadly draws on this concept and its underlying idea to demonstrate the role that two 
main characteristics of the German chemical industry, namely a high degree o f organizational 
development and a strongly developed sectoral culture in terms of sectoral identity and 
solidarity, have played in the specific organization of industrial political activity. These 
characteristics and the fact that public exposure has not merely affected a few companies but 
a large part of the sector (including the giant companies) are identified as essential factors in 
accounting for the special role that collective action through the industry association, the 
Verband der Chemischen Industrie (VCI), has played in the rDNA debate.
Next, individual subsections are devoted to the four phases of industrial political 
activity that have been distinguished. These phases are: 1) corporatist negotiations (1975- 
1983), 2) deliberation at the parliamentary level (1984-1987), 3) public education and  
reassurance (1988-mid/1990), and 4) public dialogue (mid/1990-1994) (table 3). The
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empirical focus is on the latter two phases, the phases of continued public appearances by the 
chemical industry on the rDNA issue.
The specification of the phases is intended to express the sector’s »moving forward« 
into the public arena and the increasing importance of two-way-communication in this arena. 
It is not intended to indicate an exclusive or dominant form of political involvement in the 
respective phase. In all phases all forms of political activity denoted by the phases* 
specification have to some extent played a role (very evidently this holds true for corporatist 
negotiations). Nonetheless, in the phase that it specifies, the respective activity has played a 
particular role as its relative significance, compared with the preceding phase, has clearly 
increased. Consequently, the phase description focuses on this activity, if  considered 
worthwhile, however, it also refers to the other forms of political involvement Special 
emphasis is placed on examining which role is played by the five types of communicative 
action presented in the theoretical part of the study (Part A, III.2) which in part are indicated 
by the phases* specification (the five types of communicative action that have been 
distinguished are corporatist and post-corporatist negotiation, informatory education, 
confidence-building, and identity-building).
Note that I am certainly aware of the fact that all attempts to divide sequences of 
activities or events into phases are subject to objection. Indeed, it is generally problematic to 
impose any scheme on social reality. All such schemes are derived from particular theoretical 
or conceptual starting points, thus, they never meet with unanimous approval. Nevertheless, 
there are often good reasons to resort to this way of making sense of reality. In the present 
case study, I shall claim, the terminology of political action arena and dialogical drift provides 
an appropriate framework for identifying phases of industrial political activity.
Corporatist Deliberations Public Education Public Dialogue
Negotiations at the Parlia- and Reassurance
mentary Level
(1975-1983) (1984-1987) (1988-mid/1990) (mid/1990-1994...)
table 3: Phases of Industrial Political Activity in the German Genetic Engineering Controversy
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1. The Sector as a Policy Community
As the phase-based exposition will show* the chemical industry’s specialist peak federation 
(Fachspitzenverband)* the VCI, constitutes a very important »player« in genetic engineering 
political activity in the industrial sector. Especially in the Field of public communication, it 
displays the greatest variety of activities. Many of the small and medium-size companies 
applying genetic engineering methods and procedures have largely abstained from individual 
political involvement. Either they have not felt the need to take action in view of minor or 
absent direct public pressure1 and/or they simply have lacked the personnel and financial 
resources necessary for costly political activities of their own. Many of these companies have 
practiced a »wait-and-see« strategy or have relied on the policy of the trade association which 
acts as their common mouthpiece. The large chemical firms, however, especially those which 
at some point in the controversy have faced direct pressure from their local environment, such 
as BASF, Hoechst and Hoechst’s subsidiaries Behringwerke and AgrEvo, also have developed 
independent political capabilities. Since the late 1980s, they have been increasingly active in 
rDNA policy on their own behalf rather than exclusively relying on the industry association. 
Independent action especially concerns communication with the local community within the 
sphere of the company and contacts with the Länder governments1 2; contacts with the federal 
political institutions remain to be conducted primarily through the VCI3. In general, collective
1 An example of such a case is the Dr. Karl Thomae GmbH (a 100% subsidiary of Bochringcr Ingelheim). 
The company produces T-PA (tissue plasminogen activator), a drug for cardiac arrest and thromboses (T-PA is 
produced by genetically engineered hamster cells). The respective authorization procedure involved public 
participation but passed off without causing any delay for the production plans of the company. A spokesperson 
o f the parent company explained that the subsidiary did not undertake any special political activities concerning 
genetic engineering as there had been no "harter Zwang" (Pollmann 1992 in interview) to act; genetic engineering 
would not have constituted a matter o f central concern (Ibid). Pollmann works in the department of research 
and development of Boehringcr Ingelheim.
2 In their respective Linder - BASF in Rhineland Palatinate, Bayer in North Rhine Westphalia, and Hoechst 
in Hesse - the big three are substantial factors in their local economies. They expect to be and are treated 
accordingly. The Land level is of major importance for planning agreements on plant constructions and in a great 
deal of other functions such as health and safety and plant-related environmental policy.
3 In Germany, there is a general political-administrative culture of reliance on consultation with associations 
which have an ability to engage in effective interest aggregation. Only in exceptional cases in which the 
government is a major customer and one firm is highly dominant, government might approach a single firm 
rather than a trade association. The policy of formal consultation is meant to help the state in implementing its 
public policies. Consultation together with agreement or compromises before government gets committed to a 
law or regulation should lead to better compliance of the societal sectors represented by the consulted interest 
groups once the public policy is announced by the state.
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action through the VCI has continued to loom large in the sector’s dealings with the rDNA 
issue. In a historical perspective» this observation is not really astonishing; the German 
chemical industry is characterized by a traditional predominance of VCI co-ordinated 
collective action.
Despite pronounced sector co-operation and co-ordination» there is no such thing as 
a standardized procedure according to which genetic engineering political activities in the 
chemical industry have been carried o u t Rather» a differentiated strategy has been pursued» 
one which at the association level is oriented to common interests of the member firms 
(probably with special consideration of the giant companies* interests)» one which at the 
company level is oriented to the size of the company, the situation of the company (pressure, 
products)» and the corresponding target groups. However, the general thrust of political 
involvement by the VCI and the big companies has been very much the same, in all of the 
different phases of the debate; to some extent this can be put down to the dominant position 
of the large firms in the trade association (see point 1.1). Therefore, the phase-based 
exposition often simply speaks of the sector*s political activity; activities at the company and 
associational level are specified when they are of a particular kind or weight.
1.1 Predom inance of VCI Co-ordinated Collective Action
It is not the concern of this section to go deeper into the structural and societal conditions that 
are required, given the individualistic and competitive nature of business interests, for 
economic organizations to be able to associate with each other; after all this is not a study 
about how industry-level political action is hobbled by the free-rider problem. However, the 
fact that companies to a high degree relied on collective action through the trade association 
shall not remain untackled. I shall point out three explanatory factors with respect to this. 
First, chemical companies have not been exceptionally affected by public pressure; instead, 
public actors have brought pressure to bear on wide parts of the sector. In short, the rDNA 
issue presents a sectoral issue and thus, has suggested collective action. The other two factors 
are not merely essential for explaining collective action in the field of genetic engineering. 
Instead, they largely account for the general predominance of highly co-ordinated collective
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action through the VCI4; they are general characteristics of the German chemical sector. 
There is, on the one hand, a strongly developed sectoral organization. That is to say, the trade 
association has a high degree of organizational development and the companies put 
considerable effort into the VCI and its associated specialist associations (Grant, Martinelli 
& Paterson 1989: 76). On the other hand, there is a pronounced "Branchenkultur" (Longolius 
1993: 142ff.) which has developed over more than 100 years. As Longolius' studies on the 
German chemical industry have shown, there are two major roots of this pronounced sectoral 
culture. The first is the historical tradition of co-operation between the very large companies, 
for example, from the times of the IG Farben. The second is collective conceptions of the 
world and the sector itself (the latter largely refers to the sector’s achievements in the natural 
sciences), from which a strong sectoral identity and solidarity have resulted (Ibid.: 156). It 
is worth noting, that the IG Chemie, the chemical workers’ union5, is fully integrated into 
this sectoral culture. The generally harmonious relationship between lG-Chemie and the 
employers is not only illustrated by the close co-operation in the environmental field but also 
by the fact that since the first World War there has been only one strike, in 1971 (Ibid.: 142; 
see also Paterson 1991: 241). As will be shown, this harmony also prevails in relation to 
genetic engineering policy.
It seems reasonable to assume that these two characteristics, the high degree of 
sectoral organization and the strongly developed collective identity, have loomed large in the 
pronounced endeavor of the chemical sector to form - via the VCI - a joint opinion on rDNA 
technology and to advocate this opinion to its closer and wider societal environment.
The Verband der Chemischen Industrie
The VCI, as the specialist peak federation of the German chemical industry, represents the 
interests of about 1.600 member firms on the national and international level. It comprises *1
4 The thesis that in the German chemical industry highly co-ordinated collective action through the V O  
predominates has been defended by Grant, Martinelli & Paterson (1989). The authors argue that the importance 
of the VCI was reflected in the fact that it was better resourced than its Italian and British counterparts, and in 
the "deference" (Ibid.: 78) which was shown to it by the individual firms.
1 Germany has one major union in the chemical industry, the IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik, in short, IG 
Chemie.
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twenty-one specialized subsector associations (Fachverbände), nine Länder associations, and 
ten specialist associations (Fachvereinigungen) (VCI 1994a: 7). The Fachverbände 
representing the various subsectors within the chemical sector as far as the traditional political 
institutions are concerned take their own specific initiatives in relation to issuing material in 
defence of contested issues: still, they rely heavily on the VCI as they have no presence in 
Bonn6. In the field of public communication, some of them are very active on their own, 
such as the trade associations for the pharmaceutical industry (Bundesverband der 
Pharmazeutischen Industrie, BPI).
An important point as regards the power structure of the VCI is the fact that the 
organization is largely dominated by the big three, BASF, Bayer and Hoechst, with the VCI 
Präsidium functioning as a "convenient forum for the co-ordination of positions" (Grant, 
Martinelli & Paterson 1989: 76). All three giant companies put considerable effort into the 
trade association and the specialist associations7 8.
The first two decades in its history the VCI (which was founded in December 1950) devoted 
relatively little policy attention or personnel to technology and environment related issues and 
regulation. The focus of its work rather was on trade policy, protection of patents and the 
forging and management of links between the chemical industry and the wider scientific 
community (Paterson 1991: 228). Environmental and technology policy did not constitute 
issues of central concern; generally, the industrial sector enjoyed pronounced public 
acceptance and (like other business interest associations in the European chemical industry) 
a harmonious relationship with government*. Its significance for the German economy, its 
technological achievements and good labor relations combined to ensure that it was largely
6 Because the offices of the VCI arc in Frankfurt (Hesse), the association maintains a Bonn representative. 
The representative’s function is to keep contact with the bureaucracy and with the Bundestag and Bundesrat.
7 Despite their generally dominant position, as Allen (1989: 162) points out, the big three must remain 
sensitive to the concerns and needs of the smaller firms many of which are either suppliers or customers.
8 Legislature is usually a secondary target for the VCI in comparison to the bureaucracy. Legislative 
proposals normally emerge as a product of the interaction between interest groups and the bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, it is bureaucrats rather than legislators who are the decisive actors at the critical implementation 
stage. However, since the 1990s, as Paterson points out (1991: 239) and as the rDNA debate confirms, the 
perception of the parliament as marginal is changing. The high political visibility of environmental policy pushes 
the association much further into the direct political arena and away from its former neutral-bureaucratic arena. 
Consequently, the views of the political parties gain in importance and the need increases to spend time 
cultivating them and parliamentary opinion.
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insulated from political turbulence and unwanted governmental intervention (Ibid.). This 
changed in the 1970s with the rise of the new social movements. To the extent that these 
targeted the industry for criticism it began to face increasing regulatory scrutiny (Allen 1989: 
174) - a difficult process for the chemical industry since for one hundred years it has 
jealously guarded its ability to self-regulate; traditionally the sector has had a high capacity 
to preserve its autonomy from governmental intervention (Paterson 1991: 232).
The VCI reacted to the new political challenges with two major organizational changes: The 
fust was to create a new department of technology and the environment to work under the 
direction of a new similarly named committee, which superseded the long-established 
Technology Committee9. Second, the VCI established a special fund, the Initiative 
"Geschützter leben" - Aktionsgemeinschqft der Chemischen Industrie (IGL), for the systematic 
improvement of the sector’s public acceptance (Dreyer 1997)10. This organization has 
developed into an important element in the public communication work of the VCI and, as 
the next chapters will show, has also figured strongly in the VCI’s public communication on 
the rDNA issue.
In short, the range of functions of the trade association has significantly changed in
the last two and a half decades:
Das Aufgabenprofil des Verbandes hat sich in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten erheblich 
verändert. Es beschränkt sich nicht mehr nur auf die klassischen Wirtschaftsthemen. 
... Das Thema Ökologie durchdringt jedoch zunehmend wesentliche Bereiche unserer 
modernen Industriegesellschaft ... Umweltschutz ist für uns alle zu einem neuen 
Maßstab für unsere Ziele und unser Handeln geworden - und damit auch zu einer 
wichtigen Aufgabe des Verbandes. ... Als Schlüsselindustrie wird die Chemie oft zur 
Zielscheibe der Kritik und gerät immer stärker unter Erklärungszwang. Der Dialog mit 
der Öffentlichkeit gehört somit zu einem wichtigen Aufgabengebiet des Verbandes... 
(VCI 1994a: 5-6; emphasis added)
9 As Paterson points out (1991: 236), this department is now the largest in the VCI, servicing eight 
committees, fifty-three working groups and eighteen technical working groups on individual substances.
10 Quoted literally, the initiative’s task reads as follows: "Sympathiebeschaffung in Form institutioneller 
Werbung und sachlicher Aufklärung" (IGL, Chemie auf Ihrer Seite). The IGL was established on 26 January 
1979 and is financed on a voluntary basis by about seventy chemical firms, seven specialist associations and by 
the VCI (VCI 1994: 21). Its chairman is usually the Vice-president who is also the immediate past President of 
the VCI.
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1.2 First »Signs of Erosion« of the Reliance on the VC I
In general, the big firms basically welcome trade association activities - which are, as stated 
above, strongly influenced by them. Nonetheless, they also criticize them as being too slow, 
requiring a lot of co-ordination, and not being suitable for all purposes because of diverging 
opinions among the companies represented11. The decision of most of the big companies to 
engage in rDNA political activities on their own1 2 surely is based to some extent on this 
criticism. Especially for those companies faced with an especially turbulent local environment, 
protracted negotiations did not constitute an appropriate solution; direct local pressure called 
for direct and individual action.
There are two other factors not specific to the rDNA controversy which have to be considered 
when accounting for independent political action; personnel changes in the senior 
management o f  the big chemical companies and the increasing importance o f the European 
Union (EU) as an economic and political arena fo r  the chemical industry. Mainly due to 
these developments, chemical firms in the late 1980s have started to develop their own 
political capabilities for the first time (Grant, Martinelli & Paterson 1989: 74).
By the mid 1980s, at the company level, the chemists who traditionally have 
dominated the senior management were starting to be displaced by executive officers whose 
primary academic training was in other disciplines such as economics and applied economics 
or jurisdiction. The belief was that generalists rather than specialists might be more politically 
sensitive to unfavorable developments in the sector (Allen 1989: 17413). The new company
11 In voluntary associations decisions have to be accepted by the majority of members and therefore are often 
the outcome of very lengthy and complicated negotiations. For a discussion of the problem of interest mediation 
in chemical business interests associations in terms of conflicts arising between the logic of membership and the 
logic of influence, see Chiesi (1991).
12 In most cases, political activities in the genetic engineering field represent only one task in the workload 
of the relevant employees. Typically, a few people share the different responsibilities in the field.
13 This belief was also expressed by the official responsible for pharmaceuticals and health in the public 
relations department of Hoechst, Joachim Pietzsch, in an interview carried out in 1996. The Hoechst company 
decided much later than its competitors to act on this belief in the choice of its Vorstandsvorsitzenden. Only in 
1994, after a series of accidents had seriously damaged the company's image, a non-chemist was chosen as the 
chairman of the Board. The change in presidency from the chemist Hilger to the economist Dormann is widely 
regarded as a symbol for the company's reorientation towards transparency and dialogue. While Hilger was 
considered to be an exponent of the company's traditional Wagenburgmentalitdt, Dormann has the reputation 
of being a declared advocate of an open, society-oriented corporate policy (Dreyer & Kesselring 1996:51; Der
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leaders evidently have felt that the reliance on the VCI provides too narrow a platform to deal 
with the pressures imposed on the chemical industry by environmental and technology issues. 
In their view, the politically exposed position of the sector in relation to these issues requires 
a much broader involvement with the political élite and other public actors in order to prevent 
an unfavorable climate of opinion from developing - even if this means moving away from 
national patterns of action (Ibid.: 77)14. With the increasing importance of the EU in the key 
fields of economics and environmental regulation, the big companies have also taken steps 
towards establishing their own political capabilities at the European level (Ibid.)15. As 
regards the rDNA issue, these are organized in the form of the European Association for 
Bioindustries (EuropaBio). EuropaBio was founded in September 1996 by integration of the 
national biotechnology industry associations and the Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology 
(SAGB)16. The Brussels-based Association acts as the transnational lobby of the European 
biotechnology industry and includes all major German companies using rDNA techniques17.
Summarizing the above, one can conclude that corresponding with the decision of the large 
chemical companies in the late 1980s to build up an "’in house* political capability" (Grant, 
Martinelli & Paterson 1989: 74), independent political activity has played a role in the 
German genetic engineering controversy: however, independent action did not break the
Spiegel 1/1996. p. 67-71).
H As elaborated by Grant, Martinelli & Paterson (1989: 77), the new senior management was much 
strengthened in this view by the difficulties that the sector had experienced in reacting to the demands for much 
tighter regulation generated by the coincidence in 1986 of chemical spillages in the Rhine and the federal election 
campaign.
15 As Grant, Martinelli & Paterson (1989: 77) point out. in 1986 the VCI Präsidium approved guidelines for 
the appointment of European co-ordinators in the three giant companies. Their task is to establish direct links 
between their boards and the EU level. The authors take the guidelines’ approval by the VCI as a reflection of 
the Mdeference" (Ibid.: 78) shown to the association by the individual companies; it constituted a degree of 
intervention in company personnel policy which in Britain, for example, would not be tolerated (Ibid.).
*6 The SAGB was founded in 1989 by the EU-parent organization of the chemical industry, the European 
Chemical Industry Federation (CEF1C), in order to "promote a supportive climate for biotechnology in Europe" 
(SAGB. Community Policy...). The Group originally comprised senior executives from ICI, Monsanto Europe, 
Hoechst, Rhône-Poulenc, Ferruzzi Group, Sandoz, and Unilever. Since 1992, it had expanded its membership 
to incorporate numerous other companies working with genetic engineering.
17 EuropaBio is aiming to address in the course of its work specific policy issues, legislative initiatives and 
regulatory practices, and to make specific recommendations. Its main objectives are to convince the European 
public and legislature o f the potentiality of modem biotechnologies and to create conditions which make Europe 
become a world leader in biotechnology (Lehmann 1997: 13).
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sector-typical predominance of collective action through the VCI.
2. Industrial Political Activity in the Genetic Engineering Controversy: A Phase- 
Based Exposition
The historical reconstruction of the chemical industry's political involvement relating to the 
rDNA issue shows two main developments: The exposition of the first two phases describes 
how the sector was pushed much further into the direct political arena and away from the 
arena of corporatist negotiations shielded from the public eye once the rDNA issue became 
an issue of parliamentary scrutiny. The establishment of the Commission of Inquiry gave the 
views of the political parties a much heightened importance and generated an increased need 
to spend time cultivating them and parliamentary opinion. The exposition of the latter two 
phases shows how in a »situation of crisis« - in the fust place consisting of a quasi­
production blockade brought about by risk sensitive local citizens and legal and political 
authorities - the chemical industry was pushed into the public arena, towards communicating 
genetic engineering to the public. It is at this point in time that industry itself becomes a 
public actor who involves itself in public opinion-formation at first focusing on one-way- 
communication in terms of public education and reassurance and then increasingly moving 
towards two-way-communication, towards public dialogue.
In the first two phases, communication in the public arena clearly was an exception and not 
the rule. In this time of public indifference as regards the newly developed technology, the 
chemical industry heavily relied on its strategic location in the system of political 
intermediation to safeguard its interests; industrial political activity took place in the arena 
of institutionalized politics.
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2.1 Corporatist Negotiations: 1975-198318
From the mid 1970s until the early 1980s, industrial political activity was largely restricted 
to negotiations in a corporatist framework o f policy formulation; that means, to negotiations 
in camera between government, VCI and BPI and other major interest groups.
In this first phase, the state’s corporatist policy formulation approach gave industry 
the opportunity to strongly influence federal technology policy since economic interests had 
a particularly strong bargaining position vis-à-vis national government. This strong bargaining 
position was largely the result of a lack o f  parliamentary and public interest in the new 
technologies. A further factor which strengthened industry’s bargaining position was the 
state’s interventionist industrial policy aimed at furthering high-technology development19. 
Indeed, the driving force in promoting modem biotechnologies at that time was not industry 
but the state. To put it in Theisen’s terms, federal support for the new technologies "hurried 
ahead the interests of industry" (Theisen 1991: 109)20. The responsible ministry, the Federal 
Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT) - responsible for regulation and support of 
modern biotechnologies21 - was concerned, in the first place, with establishing the 
infrastructure for a new technology in an industrial milieu that did not seem particularly 
receptive to the new biological processes. And, third, there is the fact that the BMFT had 
been established only very recently (in 1972); this provided industry with a substantial 
knowledge advantage over the responsible ministry.
18 The outline of industrial political activity in this period of time heavily relies on the 1985 article by 
Jasanoff. This article examines the impact of corporatist patterns of decision-making on industrial policy in the 
first decade of federal support for biotechnology in Germany.
19 The interventionist industrial policy approach replaced in the late 1960s the laissez-faire approach of the 
immediate postwar period. The central mission of the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology 
(Bundesministcrium fur Forschung und Technologie, BMFT), created in 1972, was to promote industrial 
competitiveness through directed use of R&D funds and to develop effective research programs. The field of 
biotechnology became an early beneficiary of this activist R&D strategy. It was designated a »core technology«, 
a status that ensured steady federal support for the field since the early 1970s (as early as in 1970 the BMFT 
established a "Forderbereich Biotcchnologie") (Jasanoff 1984: 23). Since 1975, at the latest, the ministry (now 
BMBF, Bundesministcrium fiir Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie) also promotes the use of 
genetic engineering.
20 Modem biotechnologies are primarily promoted by the BMFT until the 1980s.
21 The integrated control exercised by BMFT over both regulatory and promotional strategies is one of the 
interesting features of German biotechnology policy in the 1970s.
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These favorable political conditions did not necessitate any political »experiments« in 
the public arena. Instead, it rendered possible adherence to the chemical industry’s traditional 
policy of self-regulation. The sector successfully prevented impending state regulation by 
declaring to »voluntarily« abide by the government’s rDNA guidelines.
2.1.1 Negotiating Promotional and  Control Strategies
As Jasanoff has argued, corporatist institutional mechanisms in this early stage of technology 
development took effect in negotiations about both public initiatives designed to promote the 
new technology and those aimed at controlling the technology’s potential risks. These 
mechanisms forestalled a regulatory policy seriously interfering with the pace o f 
biotechnological innovation.
The process leading to the formulation of the first federally funded R&D program in 
biotechnology complied with many of the norms of corporatist decision-making though it was 
carried out under the auspices of a private organization, the DECHEMA22 (Jasanoff 1985: 
28). The principle actors in the definition of the scope and specific objectives of the program 
were large businesses, the state, and to a lesser extent, the academic research community. 
Industry representatives were only selected from the leading chemical-pharmaceutical 
companies with a capacity for intensive research and development. In short, dominant interest 
groups with a direct interest in allocating and spending research funds were well represented; 
interests viewed as marginal to the project of opening up a new core technology were 
excluded. At this stage, it was actually not just environmental groups which were considered 
marginal but basic science and the labor unions as well.
A more traditional form of corporatism, including organized labor23, was employed in the 
debate on control strategies. The BM FT’s expert committee which recommended the safety 
guidelines for rDNA research included neither labor nor industry representatives. However,
22 DECHEMA is the German Society for Chemical Engineering (Deutsche Gesellschaft für chemisches 
Apparatewesen e.V.).
23 The traditional tripartite structure of German corporatism includes organized labor, industrial interests and 
the state.
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the guidelines, as adopted, provided for participation by these interests in the implementation 
phase. The Central Commission for Biological Safety (ZKBS), established to review 
applications concerning rDNA research, conformed closely to German corporatist norms24. 
The rDNA guidelines prescribed that four of the twelve ZKBS members had to have worked 
in the field of recombinant nucleic acids, four had to have experience in biosafety issues, and 
four had to be drawn from affected interest groups, such as labor, occupational health 
professionals, research-supporting institutions or industry; when the ZKBS was established, 
industry was represented by the BPI. Environmental organizations or the unorganized lay 
public were attributed no role in ZKBS’s review process25.
The fact that risk debate came to be channelled through this tightly organized 
pluralistic forum with the task of safeguarding biological safety and composed of scientific 
experts and representatives of technology-supportive rather than technology-critical interest 
groups had one obvious advantage for industry. Risk debate at the political system level came 
to be restricted to the kinds of risk that experts can easily identify and that readily lend 
themselves to technical control. Wider social impacts and corresponding wider forms of 
regulation were excluded from debate - at least for the immediate future.
2,1.2 Adherence to the Policy of Self-Regulation
As Jasanoffs analysis has shown (1985: 32-33), corporatist norms not only influenced 
institutional structure, as in the case of the ZKBS. Instead, they also determined the 
organization of political debate on principal matters. Industrial interests profited from the 
corporatist tradition in particular when BMFT drew upon this in averting pressure from the 
labor unions for more stringent regulation of genetic engineering research and development. 
As has already been argued under point II. 1.1, the BMFT proposed legislation, authorizing
24 The guidelines prescribe that four of the twelve ZKBS members must be experts in genetic engineering, 
four must have experience in biosafety issues, and four must be drawn from affected interest groups, such as 
labor, industry, occupational health professionals or research-supporting institutions.
25 As distinguished from the rDNA guidelines the Genetic Engineering Act makes provision for the 
participation of environmental organizations (see point 2.3.1). The number of members has been reduced to ten. 
At least six of these members must be experts in genetic engineering. One expert each must be drawn from the 
following interest groups: trade unions, occupational health professionals, economy, environmental organizations, 
and research-supporting organizations.
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the federal government to regulate genetic research in all sectors (both public and private)* 
was thrown out at a BMFT organized, international, non-public hearing in which the German 
group constituted a typical negotiating forum for corporatist decision-making. The hearing 
generated a substantial record against the planned bill. The German chemical-pharmaceutical 
industry stressed above all damages to the competitiveness of the German industry posed b y  
rigid regulation and pointed to the lately relaxed NIH Guidelines. Faced with a great deal o f  
criticism, BMFT dropped the bill, to the satisfaction of both industry and the research 
community.
Due to the fact that private industry together with the universities agreed to ab ide 
voluntarily by the government guidelines this event did not provoke massive opposition -  
especially from the labor unions. The BPI took the lead in mobilizing industry support for th e  
guidelines. As an agent of government, so to speak, it used the threat of legislation to  
convince its members that voluntary compliance with the more flexible guidelines would b e  
the lesser of two evils.
Indeed, this procedure was typical of the chemical-pharmaceutical industry’s relations 
with government on regulatory issues. Unlike in the U.S., for instance, in Germany, industry- 
govemment-relations depend largely on trust. Before a bill is passed, the if and how is  
worked out in co-operation between the affected associations and the government. T h e  
industrial actors expect that government will not impose particularly restrictive regulation, an d  
the state expects that the industrial actors will act out of a sense of »collective self­
responsibility«. To do so, the associations have to speak for their entire industries.
Summarizing the above, one can conclude that, in the given period of time, the chemical 
industry could rely without any major difficulties on its strong strategic location in the system 
of political intermediation to influence public technology policy according to its interests. 
Attestation of industrial social responsibility through voluntary self-regulation was exclusively 
targeted at a restricted spectrum of societally dominant interests. (In later political and public 
debate this self-regulatory effort - which is indeed »blackmailed« voluntary self-regulation - 
has served as a major confidence-building argument) This favorable situation did not change 
significantly in the next phase that I distinguish. However, public pressure in terms o f 
parliamentary scrutiny clearly increased.
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2.2 Deliberations at the Parliamentary Level: 1984-1987
A different form of political involvement was required when, in 1984, the rDNA debate 
definitely reached parliament - the principal forum of an organized political public, at least 
according to constitutional theory. As the political parties, first of all the Greens, started to 
deal more intensively with the rDNA issue, eventually leading to the establishment of the 
Commission of Inquiry (see point 11.1.3), the chemical industry felt the need to change its 
perception of the Bundestag as being marginal to the technology enterprise. At this point in 
time it started to spend much more time cultivating the political parties and parliamentary 
opinion.
An effective way of doing so was to participate in the Enquite-Kommission. While five of 
the eight external commission members were appointed with reference to scientific reputation, 
three were nominated as representatives of affected interest groups. The latter three were: One 
representative of the Federal General Medical Council (Bundesarztekammer), one 
representative of the IG Chemie, and one representative of the chemical-pharmaceutical 
industry (Hans-Jurgen Quadbeck-Seeger, the chief executive officer of the BASF subsidiary 
Knoll).
With party proportional representation and the inclusion of a moral theologist, a 
scientist, and a civil lawyer, the Commission’s rDNA debate strayed from the more exclusive 
corporatist interest mediation as had been predominant until then. As distinguished from the 
preceding phase, negotiation as a specific type of industrial political activity took place in a 
significantly more open forum and approached the issue of risk in a much broader framework 
than had been the case in the previously established expert forums. While policy formulation 
in the latter forums was largely treated as an "apolitical exercise" (Jasanoff 1985: 37), it was 
definitely organized as a political undertaking in the parliamentary commission. It was not 
only that the Commission discussed genetic engineering in its various dimensions and also 
explored larger socio-political questions associated with the technology’s future, such as the 
possible impact of the new technologies on employment or the Third World. In accordance 
with its assignment, the Commission formulated recommendations for concrete political 
actions to be taken by the parliament In short, there was quite a lot at stake for industry and 
the effort to lend industry’s issue positions weight in the Commission’s decision-making
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processes was correspondingly pronounced.
This effort might have been rather successful. At least, the Commission's conclusions largely 
safeguarded the interests of industry just as they safeguarded those of the scientific 
community. The final consent reached by the Commission majority was characterized by  
compromise and did not really consider any extreme viewpoints and recommendations. M ainly 
two factors had facilitated consent-formation and the joint formulation of a group of rather 
moderate political recommendations (with some more far-reaching exceptions). First, the  
Social Democrats, as the main opposition party, were oriented towards compromise an d  
consent rather than the party political elaboration of dissent; consent-formation was in  
particular the strategy of the Social Democratic chairman of the Commission. Second, the  
rigorous fundamentalist stance of the Greens shifted from the outset the technology-critical 
minority into the discursive »offside« from which the exertion of real influence was no longer 
possible.
In their statements on the Commission’s report, the VCI and the Federation of German
Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI) expressly welcomed the fact that th e
Commission had taken a differentiated view of the technology (VCI 1987: 1, BDI Chancen
und Risiken...: 1). The VCI also approved the majority’s willingness to compromise.
According to the association, the Commission’s work actually demonstrated that there w as
a majority that, in essence, accepted the technology:
Insbesondere die "Empfehlungen” zeigen auf, daß diese neue Technologie im  
Grundsatz mehrheitlich akzeptiert wird und sich die Beteiligten bei der Einschätzung 
dieser neuen Technologie auch mehrheitlich um einen politischen Kompromiß bemüht 
haben. (VCI 1987: 1)
The associations expressed disagreement, however, with the more far-reaching regulatory and 
political actions that the Commission had proposed: The five-year moratorium for some o f  
the deliberate release experiments, the establishment of a central advisory committee, and, 
above all, a legislative anchorage of the rDNA guidelines.
Legislation was not required, the associations claimed, as it was possible to reach a 
high degree of safety and ethical responsibility with instruments of self-regulation in science 
and industry. As proof of this they pointed to the fact that it was the (American) scientists
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themselves, leading in the field of genetic engineering, who were the first to publicly discuss 
potential dangers associated with genetically manipulated microorganisms. They also pointed 
to industry’s voluntary acquiescence to the government rDNA guidelines (BDI Chancen und 
Risiken...: 21). Moreover, it was argued, as compared to legislation, these instruments would 
have the advantage of not stipulating rigid standards but would make possible a continual 
adjustment of the regulations to progress in science and technology (Ibid.; VCI 1987: 2-320).
As the procedure and the outcome of the Enquête-Kommission turned out to be widely 
satisfactory, and in view of a still negligible public debate, industrial political activity in this 
second phase did not go beyond participation in the half public/half private sphere of the 
parliamentary commission and rather »moderate« lobbying by the trade association. It 
remained restricted to activities in the political arena referring now to both executive and 
legislative.
As far as public opinion is concerned, it seems reasonable to assume that the chemical 
industry regarded the mere existence of the Commission and its own participation as valuable 
public relations for the technology and its use by industry. The Commission as such - the core 
of the German rDNA debate at this point in time - was likely to have a reassuring effect by 
signalling to the public at large that technological innovation was under public control. 
Industry's participation and its willingness to compromise, indicated by the majority consent, 
on the other hand, could be assumed to suggest that the sector took responsibility for a 
socially compatible use of the technology.
2.3 Public Education and Reassurance (1988-mid/1990)
In the phase to which the present section is devoted, the chemical industry decisively 
expanded its field of political activity: Faced with a situation of »crisis«, the sector entered 
the public arena in order to meet more effectively the political, legal, and social challenges 
critically impinging upon genetic engineering operations of several of its companies. 26
26 The VCI in this context speaks of a "stürmische Fortschrittsdynamik" (V G  1987: 1).
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2.3.1 The Crisis - Industry »Goes Public«
With the publication of the final report of the Commission of Inquiry, the rDNA debate 
definitively moved into the public arena. It was above all public discourse on technology risk  
which was stimulated by the Commission’s report (see point n . 1.3). At the same tim e, 
technology protesters increasingly appeared on the scene. In 1987, when the Commission’s 
report was published, the anti-rBST-campaign was launched. According to the motto »nip 
things in the bud« the campaign aimed at stopping the commercialization of one of the »flag­
ship« products of the genetic engineering industry. At the local level, the first direct action 
was taken against a chemical company engaged in the construction of a genetic engineering 
facility: The citizens’ action committee "Höchster Schnüffler un’ Maagucker" filed a formal 
objection against the construction of the second phase (Chemtec) and retroactively against the 
approval of the first phase (Fermtec) of the three-phase insulin complex of the Hoechst 
company (see point II.2.3).
In short, the chemical industry faced an extended and intensified public debate. When, 
in September 1988, the Bundesrat subjected the approval of production facilities using rDNA 
technologies to a public hearing procedure, the public exposure of industry began to produce 
severe detrimental effects: non-assessable delays in the approval of production facilities, 
damages to the public image, a weakened bargaining position vis-à-vis national government, 
and absorption of time and manpower. With the decision of the Administrative Court of Hesse 
in November 1989 to make approval of rDNA production facilities conditional on an adequate 
legal basis, occasioning a quasi production blockade, the detrimental effects reached crisis 
proportions (see point II. 1.4).
This transformation of a supportive political climate into a turbulent and uncertain political 
environment called for a new political strategy. This strategy was built on two pillars. The 
first consisted of lobbying fo r  a genetic engineering law. At this point in time the sector came 
round to accepting the need for a certain extent of legislative authority to replace self­
regulation in a charged political and public climate.
The second pillar consisted of expanding the field of political activity by entering the public 
arena. The chemical industry began increasingly to engage in public communication designed
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to improve public acceptance of the technology at issue and its use by industry. The biggest 
effort was made by the big companies - directly affected by local technology protest With 
the composition of the Genetic Engineering Guidelines by the VCI (issued in 1990), the sector 
commenced to co-ordinate its activities in the field and to develop joint strategies.
The chemical industry responded to expressions of public concern in two different 
ways based on two different approaches to the problem, approaches which until today form 
the basis of genetic engineering communication. The first approach is to view public concern 
as largely or wholly the result of public ignorance. The idea here is that a lack of 
understanding of scientific-technical facts and scientific-technical history among the public 
has fostered a »fear of the unknown«. In the given period of time this was the commonest 
view of the problem amongst industrialists (as well as amongst scientists). It provided the 
basis for a pronounced effort to educate the public. The second approach - not necessarily 
contradicting the first - is to view public concern as partly the result of general losses in 
public trust and credibility (in the early 1990s, this view became widely held). In the given 
phase, this perspective provided the basis for first attempts at confidence-building. These 
attempts, which considerably increased in the subsequent phase, rely on demonstrating that 
industry is aware of its social and political responsibility to society and is willing to take this 
responsibility. In the late 1980s, industrial socio-political responsibility was primarily 
operationalized as transparency, openness, risk sensitivity, and self-set commitment to the 
promotion o f the public good (in the subsequent phase it is »willingness to engage in 
dialogue« which constitutes the principal operationalization).
The priority targets of the educational and trust-building effort at this time were opinion 
makers at the local level and the wider interested and/or concerned public (VCI 
communication policy also commenced to target opinion makers and groups endowed with 
an especially high public credibility beyond the local level). The attitude towards the local 
protesters was partly conffontationist and partly geared towards a constructive debate. As far 
as the supraregional protest groups are concerned, industry predominantly took a 
confrontationist stance - the talks between VCI and BUND in 1990 were an exception in this 
phase. Frequently applied attributes for these protest actors were: incompetent, incoherent, 
emotional, politically motivated, ideologically impelled. It was not exceptional for them to 
be denounced as fringe groups fighting on principle against technological progress and, in
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doing so, contributing to a distortion of public opinion (see e.g. Büchel 1989: 2817). D uring 
this time, the chemical industry made it quite plain that it was convinced of taking the o n ly  
»reasonable« view in technical controversy.
The media that public relations officers and scientific experts27 8 in the given phase used to  
communicate genetic engineering to the public include: Lectures, plant tours, publications29, 
press forums, media interviews, advertising in the print media30, discussion panels31 an d  
target-oriented seminars. The emphasis in this phase is on one-sided communication flow ing 
from the industrial actors to the targeted groups and organizations. At the level of th e  
individual firm, entry into public debate was accompanied in a few cases by structural 
changes and innovations. In 1989, Behringwerke, for instance, established a public relations 
division in the context of the authorization procedure for its EPO-facility,
weil wir festgestellt hatten, wir können das nicht nebenbei machen. Wir brauchen
Profis. (Johannson 1991 in interview32)
27 Büchel expressed himself in these terms at a press forum organized by the Bayer company in September 
1989 in Wuppertal-Elberfeld on the subject of "Gentechnik bei Bayer". Karl Heinz Büchel is one of th e  
managing directors of the Bayer company.
28 It is not exclusively the public relations departments which are engaged in genetic engineering 
communication. At the company level their work is supported by the communication activities of members o f  
the research staff, at the level of the trade association by the communication activities o f members of the 
different specialist departments (Fachausschüsse). In the interviews carried out with trade association and  
company representatives, it was usually pointed out that both genetic engineering communication b y  
communication experts and genetic engineering communication by scientific experts had specific advantages and  
disadvantages. The public relations officers would have a good command of the different »techniques« o f  
communication but would enjoy little public credibility; the scientists or researchers, on the other hand, would 
have more public credibility but would lack communication skill and experience.
29 The longest publication list on genetic engineering issues by a  single firm in the late 1980s is probably 
that of the Hoechst company (including the publications by its official responsible for biotechnology and 
research, Dieter Brauer), reflecting the special pressure that involvement in the longest and most noticed lawsuit 
brought to bear on the company (see, among others, Hoechst 1988; Brauer 1988,1989a,b, 1990).
30 Ads on genetic engineering have been run at company and at industry level. While company run ads 
combine product and image advertising, VCI run ads (for obvious reasons) are restricted to image and issue 
advertising.
31 To give an example: According to in-house information, staff members of Behringwerke (Marburg), in 
the context of the authorization procedure for the EPO-facility, participated at about 25 discussion and lecture 
events (Blickpunkt Behring 5/1989. p .ll) .  Erythropoetin (EPO) is a  hormone-like messenger substance of the 
cells which stimulates the endogenous production of read blood cells.
32 Rolof Johannson is director of the department Cell Technology o f Behringwerke.
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Hoechst, the company with the earliest and biggest trouble* in 1987 had already repositioned 
a staff member from molecular biological research to public relations. The molecular 
biologist’s new job was to advocate company issue positions towards the public and the 
public authorities (Brauer 1991 in Interview” ).
2.3.2 Education About the »Facts«
The key concept of industry’s informatory communication is objectivity (Sachlichkeit). This 
most respectable principle demanded the sober* dispassionate weighing of risks and benefits 
and* as the necessary basis for such a differentiated assessment* the relevant factual 
knowledge. As wide parts of the public obviously would lack this knowledge - indicated by 
the overemphasis of the technology’s risks - information about the »facts« was required. Only 
in this way could misperceptions and irrational fears be overcome. The arguments and 
rhetorics employed in educational communication are directed at the technology’s de­
dramatization* de-mystification* and de-emotionalization.
The »facts« imparted are not exclusively scientific and technical details which are to 
give proof of sufficient research on and control of technology risks. Informatory 
communication refers* among others things, to the historical technological development of 
genetic engineering and provides a specification of the differences between the technology’s 
use in industry, on the one hand, and potential applications in human reproductive biology 
and other aspects of human medicine* on the other. While the former explanation is meant 
to demonstrate that genetic engineering is a neutral science built upon concepts and practices 
handed down through the ages, the latter is to point out the ethically unquestionable character 
of the technology’s industrial use. Indeed, the confusion of categories and the mixing of 
human genetic engineering and modem reproduction technology - evoking the dreadful sight 
of a »man made to measure« - and the »mundane« practices of industrial enzymology or 
pharmaceutical production is considered one of the main reasons for public concern about 3
33 Dieter Brauer* Hoechst's official responsible for biotechnology and research (see ft. 27)* from 1987 until 
1994 worked in the public relations department. Since then he has been working in this function in the research 
management department. Brauer chiefly acts as a lobbyist at the national and European level (Pietzsch 1996 in 
interview; Joachim Pietzsch is official responsible for pharmaceuticals and health in the public relations and press 
department of the Hoechst company).
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rDNA technology. Another focus of industry’s educational effort is the provision o f 
information on pressing societal problems and the potential contribution of genetic 
engineering to solving these problems. The message to be conveyed by this type o f  
information is not only that potential benefits outweigh potential risks; the main message is 
that there exists a socio-political obligation to use genetic engineering.
2.3.2.1 Communicating Genetic Engineering as a  Core Technology
Die Gentechnik ist für neue Behandlungsformen von Aids, Krebs und anderen bisher 
nicht heilbaren Krankheiten unverzichtbar, (advertisement text)
This statement is taken from the first VCI advertisement on genetic engineering that the trade 
association ran in the first half of 1990 (VCI 1991a: 61; see appendix n . p.278). It forms part 
of industry’s effort to foster an image of genetic engineering as a core technology for the  
further development o f modern industrial society. In order to give evidence that genetic 
engineering is vital to a ’’future worth living” (lebenswerte Zukunft, Bayer magazin, 1/1994, 
p.2) industrial actors have provided comprehensive and information-rich expositions on the 
nature of some of the key problems of industrial and global society - from AIDS and cancer 
to environmental pollution and ever decreasing resources to malnutrition in the Third World - 
and the way in which the new technology could contribute to solving these problems. In  
these expositions genetic engineering is characterized as a fundamental means o f advancing 
science and technology (Bayer 1989), as an increasingly active force in caring for the 
environment (Brauer 1991, Bayer AG 1995: 102) and realizing the idea of a »sustainable 
development« (Stadler 1995: 102), and as one of the "most valuable assistants in the fields 
of health and nutrition” (Bayer magazin, 1/1994, p.3).
As the following two quotations shall illustrate, the exposition of the technology’s problem
solving potential is sometimes flanked by the claim that not using the technology in view of
this potential would not be justifiable or acceptable on ethical grounds.
Als einer der größten Anbieter von chemischen Pflanzenschutzmitteln sehen wir es 
angesichts von Hunger und Unterernährung in der W elt geradezu als Verpflichtung an, 
alle Möglichkeiten des modernen Pflanzenschutzes - einschließlich Gentechnik - für
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unser Gesamtkonzept zum Schutz der Kulturpflanzen zu nutzen. (Bayer AG 1989: 25)
Und dennoch empfände ich es im tiefsten Sinne als unethisch, ja als unredlich, würden 
wir über solche Argumente [mögliche Zunahme der Überalterung der Bevölkerung, 
mögliche Nicht-Verbesserung oder Verschlimmerung der sozialen und politischen 
Spannungen in der Dritten Welt) vor einer Medizin warnen, die das Potential in sich 
birgt, in entscheidender Weise zur Verbesserung des Gesundheitszustandes der 
Menschen beizutragen, (zur Hausen 1989: 10M)
By these statements, the use of genetic engineering was communicated as a socio-political and 
moral duty.
2.3.2.2 Communicating the rDNA Issue as a Negligible Residual Risk
Substantial efforts of the chemical industry have focused on disassociating the new core 
technology from the issue of risk which in its view is considerably overemphasized in the 
German rDNA debate - underlining the technology’s real and potential benefits forms part of 
these efforts. There are two major lines of reasoning that, in numerous speeches, brochures 
and publications, the sector has employed to achieve this goal.
The first set of arguments holds that physical and biological safety measures (in the 
given phase regulated by the rDNA guidelines) had minimized potential risks and brought 
them under control. Due to this safety system the rDNA problem had been transformed into 
a negligible residual risk.
In confirmation of this statement industry has employed a second line of argument. 
This holds that there are no novel or specific safety risks associated with the new technology. 
In response to the »synergist« or »contextualist« safety model of the technology critical 
»counter-experts«35 the industrial actors have insisted that the risk associated with a *3
34 This statement is part of a speech that zur Hausen, president of the German Cancer Research Center in 
Heidelberg, gave on a BASF lecture event in March 1989.
33 Industry’s safety concept formulated under the "restricted conditions of the laboratory" (BonB, Hohlfeld 
& Kollek 1990: abstract) is judged by the expert technology critics as being insufficient to predict the complex 
interrelationships of genetically engineered objects when - deliberately or by accident - released into the 
environment. They advance in contrast to this "additive safety model" - as the predominant safety concept in 
industry and established science is known - a "synergist" or "contextualist" safety model (Kollek 1988). This 
latter model claims the context dependency of the biological significance of genetic information. It rejects the
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genetically modified organism could be determined on the basis of the sum of the
characteristics of the used components (that is, organisms and nucleic acids):
Hin gentechnisch modifizierter Organismus ist nicht gefährlicher als d e r 
Ausgangsorganismus und die Erbinformation, die in den Mikroorganismus 
eingeschleust wurde. (Schenk 1989: 830)
Since experts knew the recombinant biological production systems perfectly, the argument 
goes, unforeseeable events were practically impossible. In order to substantiate th is  
argumentation industry actors have commonly referred to corresponding research results o f  
generally acknowledged expert organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and by doing so  
determined it as »international knowledge« (see, e.g. Truscheit 199037). Probably the m ost 
frequently used quotation in this context is taken from the WHO’s Laboratory Biosafety 
Manual:
There are no unique or specific safety risks associated with recombinant DNA work; 
the risks are no greater than those associated with work with known pathogens and  
do not necessitate special laboratory design or practice. (WHO 1983: 3)
Besides scientific expertise and authority, industry has resorted to experiential knowledge to  
prove the technology’s controllability and safety. The reference to the fact that since the 
»birth« of genetic engineering (which at the given point in time was one and a half decades 
ago), not one genetic engineering-specific accident has been reported worldwide, constitutes 
an integral part of industrial risk communication. It provides proof of the functioning of the 
experts’ system of risk control (see e.g. Brauer 1990: 139).
assumption that the characteristics of a biological agent can be predicted wholesale and holds, instead, that these 
characteristics can only be grasped relative to their specific genetic, physiological, and ecological context
36 Hans-Uwe Schenk is director of the "Zentralbereich Hauptlaboratariumn of BASF.
37 Ernst Truscheit works in the pharmaceutical research centre of the Bayer company.
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a
2 3 2 3 Communicating Genetic Engineering as a Natural and Evolutionary 
Matter
The need to emphasize the social acceptability of genetic engineering has also led industry 
actors to equip scientific-technical communication with portrayals of the new technology as 
rooted in both natural and familiar processes. These portrayals form a response to the critics’ 
claim that the new techniques entailed a qualitative change in the nature of scientific inquiry 
and were associated with so far unknown and unassessable risks. They are meant to facilitate 
the conveyance of the message of safety and reassurance by depicting the technology as an 
incremental technology rather than a turning point in science history and as an imitation of 
nature rather than an insult to nature.
Naturalization seeks to minimize public attention given to the rDNA issue by comparing the
production of genetically modified organisms with a similar phenomenon of natural origin,
which is nothing more or less than the process o f evolution. The Hoechst manager Hansgeorg
Gareis resorted to this issue definition when he observed:
Die Evolution ist nicht am Ende: Ständig geschehen in und um uns 
Fehlinterpretationen und Veränderungen der genetischen Information und führen zu 
ständig neuen Varianten. Die Natur selbst ist der aktivste Gentechnologe. (Gareis 
1985, emphasis added)
Another method of de-dramatizing the rDNA matter is to portray the technology in a manner 
analogous to the ancient cornerstones of modern agriculture and food processing - selective 
breeding, beer-brewing and yoghurt-making, techniques with which mankind has been familiar 
for thousands of years and from which it has derived substantial benefits38. It says the 
following in the introduction of a Bayer brochure on genetic engineering in pharmaceutical 
research:
Biotechnische Prozesse sind seit den Anfängen der Zivilisation bekannt. Der Wunsch, 
die Nahrung vielfältiger zu gestalten, führte im Laufe der Jahrtausenden dazu, meist 
unwissend, Hefen und andere Mikroorganismen zur Herstellung, Geschmacksentfaltung 
oder Qualitätserhaltung z.B. von Brot, Käse, Bier und Wein zu verwenden. Erst die 
naturwissenschaftliche Erkenntnis, daß Kleinstlebewesen für den Menschen nützliche 
Stoffe bilden können, erklärte vor mehr als hundert Jahren die seit altersher
38 For a comprehensive explication of this communicative strategy, see Levidow & Tait 1991.
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gebräuchlichen Praktiken. (Meyer 1995 :8)
This common line of argument holding that modem biotechnologies were nothing more th a n  
a »refinement« of older biotechnologies, dating back to the dawn of civilization when th e  
process of fermentation was discovered, has been nicely captured by Levidow & T a it " T h e  
promoters’ language", the authors state, "has largely shifted from biological revolution to  
evolution" (1991: 247). By defining genetic engineering as a logical step in the evolution o f  
science, the chemical industry has sought to transform the image of modem biotechnologies 
from one of a perilous and alien science to one of an incremental and benign technology 
(Plein 1991: 481).
The language of sensation and novelty typical of the 1970s when, especially in th e
United States, new biotechnology firms were seeking large injections of venture capital -
enthusiasts employed analogies to both the industrial and information revolutions - has c o m e
to be reserved for "selective occasions, such as arguments for extending patent rights to
GMOs39, or in appeals for public funds" (Levidow & Tait 1991: 247). Indeed, in the la te
1980s, it is highly improbable to find revolutionary-pathetic proclamations such as th e
following statement by the Hoechst manager Gareis in industrial public communication:
Der Mensch ist damit in der Lage, gezielt in die Vererbungsmechanismen der N a tu r  
einzugreifen! Das ist das wirklich Neue, das jede bisherige Dimension tibersteigt. D e r  
Mensch hat sich die Natur untertan gemacht! Er hat das Bibel-Wort wahr gemacht! 
(Gareis 1985)
2.3.2.4 Communicating Industrial Genetic Engineering as an Ethically 
Unquestionable Business
Another commonly employed means of fostering an image of a benign technology is th e  
disassociation of industrial genetic engineering from potential applications in hum an 
reproductive biology and other aspects of human medicine and applications in the field o f  
human reproductive biology not relying on rDNA technology. The exposition of the different 
technology fields and applications constitutes the attempt to disassociate industrial genetic
34 GMO is the abbreviation for genetically modified organisms.
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engineering from the issue of ethical ambiguity - an issue cultivated equally by the mass 
media and technology protest.
Industry actors have felt that a great deal of public concern about the technology's
industrial use were constituted by moral doubts that were in reality aimed at other hotly
disputed techniques of the life sciences such as cell fusion, artificial insemination, genome
analysis, or prenatal diagnostics. In this view, only through the confusion of different matters
had industrial genetic engineering become one of the subjects of these doubts. The remedy,
thus, has been to focus substantial efforts on exposing the differences in technologies and
applications and on explaining why it was only the latter techniques and applications which
called for debate on ethics and socio-political regulation. This line of argument determines
industry’s use of genetic engineering as a, so to speak, »moral free zone«. According to a
genetic engineering information sheet of the BASF company:
Die Reproduktionsbiologie, die unter den Stichworten "Retortenbaby",
"Reagenzglasbefruchtung" und "Embryonentransfer" bekanntgeworden ist, wird immer 
wieder fälschlich mit der Gentechnik in Verbindung gebracht. Sie ist kein 
Tätigkeitsfeld der chemischen Industrie. Reproduktionsbiologie und gentechnische 
Eingriffe in die menschliche Keimbahn werfen ethische, religiöse und 
gesellschaftspolitische Fragen auf. Diese Probleme gehören deshalb in die 
Verantwortung von Ethik und Medizin und müssen unter Einbeziehung aller 
gesellschaftlichen Gruppen diskutiert und politisch entschieden werden. (BASF 1991)
Another example of this line of reasoning is the following statement which the Bayer
company made in an advertisement run in 1990:
Entwicklungen, die Fragen der Ethik aufwerfen, wie gentechnologische Experimente 
an menschlichen Keimzellen werden bei uns grundsätzlich nicht betrieben.40
By defining industrial technology use as a morally irrelevant field of application and at the 
same time acknowledging the existence of ethical problems in other technology fields of the 
life sciences, the chemical industry has sought to provide a defense from the morally based 
attacks which it has faced from the outset of the technical controversy. At the same time, this 
type of issue definition has constituted an attempt to restrict public and political debate on the 
commercialization of genetic engineering to safety issues, that is, to questions dealt with
40 For this type of industry informatory communication see also Brauer (1989a: 172; 1993: 317-18), Bayer 
(1993: 9). and Schering (Gentechnik bei...: 4).
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above all on the basis of scientific-technical expertise. It has been meant to assure the 
maintenance of an expert status facilitating the exertion of influence on regulatory decision­
making.
2.33 (Re)producing Trust and Credibility
The advantage that industry gains from focusing debate on safety issues is that these questions 
can be dealt with in the framework of scientific approaches. On these argumentative grounds 
industry actors are sure of themselves and believe themselves superior to the technology 
protesters. Still, scientific-technical resources have lost some of their utility in public risk 
debate. First, in the general process of institutionalization and professionalization of the new 
social movements, there have emerged several »alternative« science institutes challenging 
industry experts with a steadily growing counter-expertise. Second, public risk perception and 
evaluation are increasingly influenced by losses in credibility and trust on the part of the risk 
producing and controlling institutions. This has reduced the persuasiveness of »facts«, 
especially of those in the narrow framework of science and technology, of industrial risk 
communication.
In the late 1980s, after two decades of recurrent minor and major conflicts about 
technology and environmental issues, this fact was brought home to wide parts of the 
chemical industry. In the interviews carried out with company and association representatives, 
the interviewees usually referred to the difficulties involved with advocating industrial genetic 
engineering positions on the grounds of factual knowledge, to the emotions involved, to the 
public’s generally increased sensitivity regarding technology risks and its growing mistrust 
of the chemical industry which it viewed as a key polluter of the environment. As a 
consequence, at that point in time at which genetic engineering became an issue of major 
concern for the chemical industry, the sector reacted not exclusively with the provision of 
information but also engaged in communication designed to improve public trust and 
credibility.
The way in which the chemical industry has attempted to progressively develop 
confidence is by illustrating that the sector assumes a high degree o f socio-political 
responsibility in using the technology at issue. The method is to give evidence that the sector
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is a morally behaving agent A socially compatible technology policy is defined as a policy 
that is not merely committed to economic welfare but at the same time safeguards and 
promotes human safety and health and environmental soundness and that is open to public 
debate. In order to demonstrate its commitment to such a technology policy, the chemical 
industry has resorted to self-regulation in terms of codes of conduct dedicated to the policy’s 
underlying social values and objectives; it established the Genetic Engineering Guidelines. (In 
the subsequent phase, when genetic engineering turns out to be a long-lived critical issue for 
the chemical industry, the sector considerably expands its confidence-building effort which 
is then focused on direct communication with opinion making, credibility, and local protest 
groups.)
2.3.3.1 Transparency and Openness to Public Debate
"Acceptance and trust one only gains through openness" was one of the mottos of the above
mentioned press forum on rDNA technology that Bayer held in 1989 (Strenger 1989:4). With
the same tenor it says in one of Hoechst’s brochures, that the public debate on rDNA
technology was a usual or even necessary process in a democratic society, and that it was a
matter of course for industry to participate in this debate with great openness (Hoechst AG,
Gentechnologie in...: 4). To present one’s company as open to its societal environment and
willing to communicate about its technology activities and the different issues involved forms
part of a collective communication strategy of the German chemical industry; a collective
strategy that in the late 1980s was still in an early stage of development, as the following
statement by the then public relations officer of Hoechst points out:
... wir versuchen das, was Biotechnik, Gentechnik betrifft, natürlich einzubinden in so 
eine Art, ja , neue Kommunikationsstrategie, die die chemische Industrie ja insgesamt 
m acht Daß man sagt, okay, wir haben nichts zu verbergen, wir haben früher nicht 
darüber gesprochen, aber wir haben nichts verborgen. Und wer jetzt will, der kann 
kommen; und da gibts ja verschiedene Aktionen. ...
Wir müssen versuchen,... einfach sauber darzustellen, was wir tun, was wir nicht tun, 
und warum wir etwas tun, und warum wir etwas nicht tun. Einfach, um auch im 
Gespräch zu bleiben und um zu zeigen, daß hier hinter den Mauern nichts 
Geheimnisvolles passiert. (Brauer 1991 in Interview)
»Openness«, »open information«, and »transparency« are the key concepts that industry
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employed in this phase to express its sensitivity as regards public and political techno logy
debate. The concept which in the late 1980s only started its »career« as an expression o f  th i s
society-orientation is dialogue. At least in »theory«, dialogue in this phase constitutes a n
educational effort rather than an argumentative exchange based on reciprocity and th e
willingness to revise positions. The following passage of the VCRs Genetic E ngineering
Guidelines exemplifies the typical interpretation of the dialogue concept of this time:
Wir sehen im sachlichen Dialog mit der Öffentlichkeit ein wichtiges Instrument, u m  
die Kenntnisse über die Gentechnik zu verbessern und damit die Akzeptanz für d ie s e  
Technik zu erhöhen. Wir hoffen, daß uns die im Gesetz vorgeschriebene B eteiligung  
der Öffentlichkeit bei der Genehmigung gentechnischer Produktionsanlagen in d ie se m  
Bemühen unterstützt. (VCI 1990: 5)
The way in which openness and dialogue were practiced at the fum level includes in v itin g  
interested persons and groups for tours of a disputed plant, smaller-scale meetings w h e re  
representatives of companies were available for questioning, lecturing, and participation in  
panel discussions. To give an example of the former: According to Brauer, by 1991, th e  
Hoechst company had given more than 8.000 visitors tours of its insulin facilities. T h e s e  
would have comprised school classes, church groups, politicians, and representatives of t r a d e  
unions and various associations (Brauer 1991 in interview).
The companies Grünenthal and Behringwerke expressed openness to public debate in  
yet another way which in view of the charged political and public climate was both q u i te  
understandable and striking at that point in time. Faced with the Hoechst case the tw o  
companies decided to voluntarily subject their genetic engineering units to a public hearing. 
In an attempt to allay public fears, Grünenthal puiposively submitted its application for th e  
construction of a unit for genetically engineered pro-urokinase41 only after the F ourth  
Amendment to the Federal Emissions Act (European Chemical News, 16.1.1989). 
Behringwerke, which in March 1988 had applied for approval of its EPO production p lan t, 
in September 1988, when new legislation took effect, asked for its application to be treated 
according to the new legal provisions. Thus, it was the express wish of the two companies 
to have the public involved in the approval of their plants. As a Behringwerke spokesman 
explicated, the deliberate involvement of the public was to prevent exposing the company to  
"the suspicion of mysterymongering" (Frankfurter Rundschau, 17.10.1990) and, as the head
41 Pro-urokinase is a substance used for the dissolution of blood clots.
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of the Cell Technology depaitment of Behringwerke pointed out, to avoid running into the
same difficulties as the parent Company:
Wir standen damals stark unter dem Bindruck der Querelen um die Hoechster 
Insulinanlage und hatten das Gefühl, daß eine Genehmigung nach derzeit gültigem 
Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz ohne Beteiligung der Öffentlichkeit eigenüich kein Ziel 
sein könnte für uns, weil ganz klar erkennbar war, die Akzeptanz gegenüber der 
Technik war so minimal, daß, wenn man eine Genehmigung ohne Beteiligung der 
Öffentlichkeit erhalten hätte, man sicherlich auf Jahre, um nicht zu sagen Jahrzehnte, 
mit Schwierigkeiten rechnen müßte. ... Also, juristisch hätten wir die Möglichkeit 
gehabt, es anders zu machen. Aber wir waren, wie gesagt, von vornherein der 
Meinung, die Öffentlichkeit können wir hier nicht draußen vorlassen. (Johannson 1991 
in interview)42
At the trade association level, the organization of seminars for selected target groups 
presented the most pronounced form of practicing openness and willingness to communicate. 
In May 1989, the VCI organized a seminar on the methods of genetic engineering and its 
industrial use for the information of journalists. The seminar included a visit to a genetic 
engineering facility. In March 1990, the trade association invited representatives of different 
church groups. This seminar focused on questions about the ethical limits of the use of 
genetic engineering. With the respective official invitation of the BUND, an environmental 
organization also participated in these two VCI organized discussion events (VCI 1990a: 53).
2.3.3.2 Safeguarding and Promoting Public Health, Safety, Morals, and a Clean 
Environment
Wir wollen die großen Chancen der Gentechnik verantwortungsbewußt nutzen. Die 
Chemie handelt, (advertisement text)
This is the heading of the advertisement that the VCI ran in the fust half of 1990 (VCI 
1991a: 61; see appendix II. p.278). The ad’s main text makes clear that the term ’’responsible 
use" as it is employed in the heading refers to industry’s technology use in two different
42 To give an impression of the »dark side« of this trust seeking measure: In the case of Behring werke, the 
public disclosure of the documents led to 1.800 objections against the company’s plans (Company Profile: 
Behring werke. Biocompany Updates, Biopharmaceutical Company Profiles Series, September ¡990, Order No. 
B-CP0003, 1-7).
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ways. The heading is meant to express that industry acts responsibly because it uses genetic 
engineering (see point 2.3.2.4) and in the way it uses the technology. The first argument 
implied holds that the technology’s use as such was responsible behavior as it sought to seize 
the opportunities that the new technology provided for promoting the public good. The second 
argument holds that the way in which the technology was used was responsible as it gave 
priority to people’s health and safety* environmental protection, and public morals.
This twofold responsible use of genetic engineering is also the content and message 
of the Genetic Engineering Guidelines which the VCI issued in the summer of 1990 (VCI 
1990b)43. According to the Guidelines’ tenor, it is not in the first instance the very sectoral 
goal of commercial efficiency which the chemical industry pursues by using the technology. 
The objectives of the Guidelines are instead: To better research diseases and their causes in 
order to develop better diagnostic methods, drugs and new vaccines; to improve the basis o f 
nutrition and plant protection; to save energy and resources and to find environment friendly 
production procedures and products by using biochemical processes44 (Ibid.: 5).
The message to be conveyed is here that industrial genetic engineering is not done 
exclusively for profit reasons but also or even in the first instance for contributing to the 
solution of pressing societal problems. Industry awards itself, so to speak, the label of a 
public-interest-institution.
The major messages in industry’s attempt to enhance public trust and credibility by pointing 
out commitment to the generally appreciated social values of public health, safety, morals, 
and a clean environment, however, are those that refer to the prevention of a violation of 
these values. There is, first, the message that the chemical industry acknowledges ethical 
limits to the use of genetic engineering and views germline therapy and the production of 
biological weapons as being beyond these limits (see point 2.3.2.3). Second, there is the 
message of the widest possible exclusion o f risk. In the main text of the 1990 advertisement 
it says, that public information was important for the chemical industry as the sector wanted
43 About one year before the Genetic Engineering Guidelines were established as a collective code of 
conduct, the Bayer company had established similar guidelines at the company level (Bayer 1989).
44 For a characterization of genetic engineering as a new approach to environmental protection, see Brauer 
(1991) and Stadler (1995: 102).
236
to show that it did everything possible to exclude risks to man and the environment in 
industrial genetic engineering.
The major activities that have been communicated to form part of this effort are» first, 
support of »outside regulation« - here industry has stressed its »voluntary« compliance with 
BMFTs rDNA guidelines and its support for a legislative anchorage of the Guidelines (see 
point 2.3.4); second, industry’s effort at self-regulation by the establishment of codes o f  
responsible conduct, the chemical industry’s Genetic Engineering Guidelines; and third, the 
organization or support of research on genetic engineering risks.
To give an example of a substantial effort in risk research: In September 1989, the 
Bayer company called into existence a research project on safety aspects of genetic 
engineering work. The project’s objective has been to promote an experimental ecological 
evaluation of genetically engineered microorganisms of special importance in research and 
production. The experimental work has been carried out by three external institutions - the 
Institute of Microbiology at Düsseldorf University, the Institute for Environmental Technology 
at the Jülich Research Center, and the Institute for Soil Biology of the Federal Agricultural 
Health Institute in Brunswick. The results of the study have been examined by a commission 
composed of representatives from each of the three institutes, the ZKBS, and Bayer. The 
company purposively decided against typical commissioned research (Auftragsforschung) 
(Bayer AG 1993: 29). Supposedly, the reason for this has been the wish to ensure that the 
project was considered to be »neutral« research by the German public.
By stressing the governance of industrial genetic engineering by ethical values and the 
attachment of highest priority to the safety aspects of any genetic engineering work being 
carried out or envisaged the chemical industry has sought to invalidate the protest argument 
that industry traded public safety, a clean environment, and morals for private profits. As the 
exposition of industrial political activity in the early 1990s will demonstrate, communication 
on industrial socio-political responsibility has been used not merely in a defensive but also 
in an offensive way. In a favorably changed political and public climate moral defense has 
been supplemented by moral attacks on those who, in industry’s view, are obstructing the use 
of a socially and environmentally compatible technology.
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2.3.4 Strategic Use of Legislation
Public communication partly designed to educate about technology-related »facts«» partly
designed to cultivate trust and credibility, constitutes one focus of the chemical industry’s
substantial efforts to respond adequately to the situation of crisis that it faced at the end of
the 1980s. The other focus was on lobbying for and negotiation about a genetic engineering
law45. Up to then, lobbying had pursued the very opposite goal. Massive local opposition
and the subsequent decree of the Administrative Court of Hesse, however, had made
legislation transform into the principal means to bring to an end a situation in which the
sector’s performance in a core technology was strongly impeded. Rolof Johannson of the
Behringwerke company describes that situation as follows:
Und dann hat man aber immer mehr gemerkt, wir kommen ohne ein Gengesetz nicht 
aus, weil die Gegner der Gentechnik ... die wurden immer stärker. Sie haben sich 
immer stärker zu Wort gemeldet, und das ging gar nicht mehr in unserem Falle um 
Erythropoetin. Es ging darum, den Einstieg in die technische Nutzung der Gentechnik 
zu blockieren - eindeutig. Und wir brauchten eine bessere Rechtsgrundlage für diese 
Diskussion. Und deshalb waren wir dann irgendwann auch dafür, daß ein 
Gentechnikgesetz so schnell wie möglich kommen sollte. (Johannson 1991 in 
interview)
Industry’s patronage of a special law on genetic engineering and its speedy passing was 
evidently tied to concrete expectations. The strategy changed from one of defending self­
regulation to one of working to ensure that new regulation is tolerable and at the same time 
a bulwark against calls by protest groups for tighter restrictions as well as beneficial to the 
technology’s public acceptance. Among the prime, more concrete objectives that the chemical 
industry pursued by its lobbying and negotiation efforts was the inclusion of the objective of 
technology advancement in the Act’s definition of purpose; a reduction of the public 
participation hurdle; and the regulation of questions of industrial genetic engineering, on the
45 While the chemical industry throughout the given period of time heavily engaged in lobbying at the 
national level, it also started to build up a lobbying position at the European level. The latter obtained importance 
in the field of geneuc engineering regulation in 1988, when the European Commission proposed taking specific 
legislative initiatives (on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms, on the field release of 
genetically modified organisms, and on worker safety vis-à-vis biological agents; the initiatives were adopted 
in 1990 for implementation in subsequent years via national legislation, the first two in October 1991). In 1989, 
with the establishment of the SAGB, lobbying at the European level was turned into a  joint undertaking of 
European companies (see point III.1).
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one hand, and aspects of human medicine (that is, of reproduction biology and gene therapy), 
on the other hand, in different laws. The Act as it was passed in 1990 conforms with all three 
objectives46.
The trade associations VCI and BPI made a particular effort in shaping legislation to further 
the goals of the chemical-pharmaceutical industry in the field of genetic engineering (VCI 
1990a: 39-40). In defending the industry’s core positions, two main lines of argument were 
deployed. The first set of arguments stressed the damage to the competitiveness o f  the 
German industry posed by overly stringent regulation (VCI, Chemie-Nachrichten, 15/11/89). 
The second set of arguments stressed the threat to the attractiveness o f Germany as a 
research and technology location imposed by overly restrictive legislation. The latter line of 
reasoning was typically tied to the statement that in the case of over-regulation and adherence 
to broad public involvement in licensing decisions, German corporations might choose to site 
at least some of their new genetic engineering facilities abroad.
It is noticeable that, in the given phase, the threat of locating research and production abroad - 
which in the chemical-pharmaceutical industries has a long tradition and time and again is 
used as an approved means to enforce political objectives - was a well-calculated »lobbying- 
argument«; that is to say, its priority target was the political decision-maker. Assumedly for 
image reasons, in public statements industrial actors were rather guarded with this 
argumentation47. It was evidently an integral part of the public relations strategy of Bayer 
and Hoechst - who had already located essential parts of research in the United States as part 
of a strategy of globalization rather than as a reaction to a hostile public climate (see point
46 According to a member of the department Research and Development of Boehringer Ingelheim, the 
Genetic Engineering Act met with widespread approval in the chemical industry (Pollmann 1991 in interview). 
Correspondingly, it says in the VCI annual report 1989/1990: "ln dem verabschiedeten Gesetz sind für die 
industrielle Anwendung wichtige Teilaspekte sachdienlich gelöst" (VCI 1990a: 40).
47 An exception is the BASF company. On the occasion of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Emissions 
Act (BImSchG) the company vociferously and publicly threatened to relocate research and production abroad. 
At a press conference in this mauer (on 15 September 1988) one of the managing directors explained that, for 
the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering, the Federal Republic of Germany, at the latest since the 1 
September of that year, was no longer the optimal location ((Die Zeit, No. 217, 17/9/1988). A possible 
explanation for this exceptionally »offensive« corporate behavior in an extremely sensitive public climate is that 
the tightening up of the BImSchG provided the company with a welcome occasion to revise a wrong decision 
without Gesichtsverlust; the decision to concentrate on the research location Germany (Die Zeit, No. 47, 
18/11/88, p. 25).
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1.3) - to stress that the multinationals were firmly resolved upon remaining faithful to the 
Standort Deutschland. The then head of the Bayer company, Stronger, on the occasion of a 
press forum on genetic engineering declared that the company believed in the future of its 
home country as a location of modem technologies (Stronger 1989: 9). And the then head of 
the Hoechst company, Hilger, played the role of the "Musterknabe" in public statements (Die 
Zeit, No. 47, 17/11/89, p. 42), who even by the most unfavorable conditions would not be 
driven out of the country.
The chemical industry’s general reservedness with economy-related reasoning in the 
public arena was abandoned in the early 1990s, when a difficult national economic situation 
considerably strengthened the political appeal of such arguments.
2.4 Public Dialogue (mid/1991-1994)
This last phase that I distinguish is characterized by continuity as regards the main feature of 
industrial political activity in the preceding phase: In the early 1990s, the chemical industry 
increasingly engaged in public communication. In particular, it expanded communication on 
the way in which it views the sector taking its socio-political responsibility in industrial 
genetic engineering, and intensified its efforts to earn public support through willing 
engagement in open dialogue.
The two phases differ above all in the following two respects. First, »open dialogue« 
was no longer predominantly defined and practiced as one-way-communication. Instead, open 
dialogue defined as two-way-communication changed from being a minor element in 
industrial public communication to being its key concept. The chemical industry also acted 
on this new definition of dialogue: It considerably expanded direct contacts and active 
discussion with relevant groups, organizations, and the population. The sector attached greater 
importance to interactive methods, and one-sided communication lost its prior dominance. The 
new communication policy was also pursued in relation to parts of the supraregional protest 
actors (especially in relation to those groups that in the given period of time either changed 
to a more pragmatic protest policy or continued to pursue such a policy). The antagonistic 
stance towards these social actors in the 1990s lost its prior dominance. Direct contacts and 
active discussions with environmental and consumer organizations became no longer an
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exception.
Second, while in the preceding phase public communication, without any noticeable 
exception, was designed to work at reassuring and de-dramatizing, in the given phase an 
essential part was of a dramatic, moralistic, and offensive design. The most important 
example of this type of public communication is the nation-wide four-month issue advertising 
campaign that the chemical industry launched in November 1992 and denoted "Initiative Pro 
Gentechnik". In IGL documents this campaign is pertinently referred to as the "Meinungs- 
Offensive Gentechnik" (IGL 1994: appendixes). The main set of arguments of the ads run in 
the context of this campaign stress the irresponsibility o f  an impediment o f the use o f genetic 
engineering caused by over-regulation or political motives as this endangered not only 
Germany’s chemical industry and science but Germany’s jobs and prosperity, and the high 
standard of living and quality of life. The primary purpose of the campaign was to mobilize 
political and public support for less restrictive legislation. The political decision for an 
amendment of the Genetic Engineering Act at that time was already taken. In the same month 
in which the campaign was launched, parliament passed a resolution to change the Act in 
order to ease some of its restrictions. The purpose of the campaign was to cultivate political 
support and to bring its interests to bear as broadly as possible on the deregulation initiative.
Indeed, the chemical industry’s contentment with the Act had been of a very short 
duration. Only a short time after the Act had come into force, the sector had started to lobby 
fo r  the Act's deregulation. This lobbying effort reached the critical point when in October 
1992 the VCI, the BPI and other specialist associations, the IG-Chemie and scientific 
associations jointly published the "Memorandum zur Gentechnik in Deutschland". In similar 
moralistic terms as employed in the advertising campaign this position paper targeted the 
political decision-maker with claims regarding the irresponsibility of not seizing the 
technology’s opportunities.
The campaign’s and memorandum’s resort to rather drastic tools of persuasion must be seen 
against the background of a favorably changed political and public climate at that time. Two 
years after the Genetic Engineering Act had came into force, a range of factors coalesced to 
provide support for genetic engineering while eroding the position of the opponents: These 
factors include, besides parliamentary support for deregulation, a changing climate of public
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opinion (Hennen & Stòckle 1992: 53), scientific advances (particularly in the medical sector), 
and last not least, the problems associated with Germany’s reunification and an increasingly 
evident economic recession. The latter events did not merely help to shift attention from the 
rDNA issue. W hat is more, the widespread emphasis placed on economic development 
presented an opportunity to establish linkages with a popular theme.
In short, the fortunate contextual conditions provided industry with a special 
opportunity to cultivate government and public support for the technology at issue. Industry 
seized this opportunity in two ways: First, by expanding interactive public dialogue designed 
to build trust and credibility; and second, by a mass media performance designed to win 
public and political support by moral appeal and moral identification.
The increased importance of interactive methods and the engagement in identity-building 
communication are the major characteristics of industrial public communication in the given 
phase. As far as the communication media are concerned, it can be noted that these are as 
diverse as in the late 1980s. Corresponding with the new emphasis on direct contacts the 
chemical industry uses discussion events of a various kind for communicating genetic 
engineering; among these are for the first time nation- and sector-wide Open Days and 
discussion forums o f a more complex structure geared towards agreement among the 
participating actors. Further, with the advertising campaign and the additional resort to sound 
broadcasting48, the sector has significantly expanded mass media communication.
As compared to the late 1980s, industry in the early 1990s attaches greater importance to 
target-specific public communication. The priority targets are political decision-makers, 
opinion making professions and social groups such as journalists, politicians, top executives 
of science and economy and credibility groups such as environmental organizations, teachers, 
students, professors, church representatives, and practitioners. Local communities remain a 
major target, evidently, specific to the company level. As will be argued below, the 
Hoechst/Schering subsidiary AgrEvo has been the most committed to mobilizing local support 
for its genetic engineering projects. As the only German chemical company carrying out field
48 It is a  new younger target group which the VCI has sought to reach via radio since 1993. In sound 
broadcasting the subject of genetic engineering is presented in matter-of-fact, news-like dialogues without musical 
background (Chemie und Verantwortung ..., folder).
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trials, it has been a priority target of protest against deliberate release experiments and thus, 
has been very active in public communication at the local level.
Altogether, it can be summarized, industrial public communication in the 1990s does not 
merely expand but also reaches a new stage of organization and professionalization. The 
sector makes a substantial effort at organizing collective action through the trade association. 
The professionality of this joint action consists of target-specific communication, the great 
diversity and target-specific use of communication channels, and coalition-building with major 
economic and social groups. And last but not least, it consists in the politically sensible 
timing of the use of specific communication channels and lines of argumentation. Seizing the 
opportunity to establish an association with an issue prominent on the political and public 
agenda, the chemical industry has expanded economic argumentation - previously reserved 
for the political arena - to comprise the public arena, and seized its »home-field advantage« 
by engaging in a »moral crusade« for the national economy.
2.4.1 Dialogue as a Communication Program
In the mid 1990s, »dialogue« advanced to the overarching and integrating communication 
approach of the chemical industry (IGL 1991a: 36). The VCI and its public relations 
organization, the Initiative "Geschützter Leben" (IGL, see point 111.1.1), brought into being 
the communication program "Chemie im Dialog". The rDNA issue formed from the outset 
part of the new program; in 1991/1992, when the VCI determined the amendment of the 
Genetic Engineering Act as a major political objective, it came to present one of its (three49) 
key subjects (IGL 1991a: 36).
The concept of dialogue, as a VCI brochure states, stands for the efforts of the 
chemical industry not only to fulfill its information duties but simultaneously to produce 
consent regarding present and future actions by public dialogue (VCI 1992b: 26). The 
objective of the new communication program would be "to learn from each other" (Ibid.: 27). 
These definitions well illustrate the new approach in communicating genetic engineering: It
49 The other two subjects are »environment« and »chlorine«.
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is the attempt to earn public support by willing engagement in direct contacts and active 
debates and conveyance of the message that this engagement is geared towards finding 
agreement on those aspects o f genetic engineering about which the public expresses concern. 
Industrial public communication has banked on the trust- and image-building quality o f 
»deliberative« communication.
As the communication program "Chemie im Dialog” intended, genetic engineering dialogue 
has been performed on two levels, ”in order to demonstrate that the chemical industry’s 
willingness for dialogue is as broad as possible” (Mariacher 1991: 30). The two levels are the 
direct physical level and the level o f  mass communication. The dialogical effort has focused 
on face-to-face communication - so-called "direkte Dialog- und Konsensinitiativen” (IGL 
1993: 3) - on immediacy and Tealness of encounters with industry’s traditional and new 
»stakeholders«.
VCI-organized dialogue on the direct physical level includes, first, holding broadly 
advertised big events. The central event is here the Bundesweite Tag der Offenen Tiir. The 
first of these nation- and sector-wide Open Day events was organized in September 1990 as 
the prelude to the new communication program. Genetic engineering was a major subject o f 
discussion of this event as well as of the next Open Day in 1993. Second, the VCI has 
organized so-called Dialogveranstaltungen for the above defined target groups. Furthermore, 
a series of regional discussion events has been organized. The targets of this »dialogue on the 
spot« have been the interested public, environmental consultants and its own line of business: 
industry, producers, processors, and purchasers (IGL 1992: 24). And last but not least, the 
trade association organized so-called Dialogpartner-Veranstaltungen for the group of persons 
which acceded to the advertisement invitations for written dialogue (see below). The groups 
were offered information on and discussion about genetic engineering and a visit to a genetic 
engineering plant (IGL 1991a: 3ff.).
On the level of mass communication, the public was asked by ads run under the motto of 
"Chemie im Dialog" to enter into dialogue with the chemical industry. The first advertisement 
which the VCI launched in the transitory phase of the dialogue program asked the reader via 
a response coupon to get into touch with the economic actor. The coupon’s heading "Ihre 
Meinung ist uns wichtig" was meant to signal industry’s willingness for such a contact (see
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appendix II. p.278). A second ad, launched in 1992, was itself designed as dialogue: It was 
composed of industry’s answers to the questions prominent in public debate. Again the reader 
was asked to enter into a personal dialogue on these matters by letter, telephone or by 
participation in specific dialogue actions offered by the association (see appendix n . 
p.279).50
At the single-firm level dialogue generally has been performed by an increased effort to keep, 
in one way or another, in touch with major local groups, both technology-critical and 
technology-supportive. In some cases, dialogue has been organized in a much more elaborate 
way. As the next section will illustrate, some of the chemical companies have initiated or 
participated in discussions of a more structured and result-oriented kind. The present section 
provides still another example of an elaborate form of company dialogue: The dialogue, based 
on a multi-level communication program , that the Hoechst/Schering subsidiary AgrEvo led 
with local communities located near to test sites.
AgrEvo was founded on 1 January 1994 as a fusion of the two plant protection sectors of 
Hoechst and Schering. The company is currently the only domestic chemical enterprise in 
Germany that carries out field trials with genetically engineered organisms, namely plants in 
the context of agrochemical research and product development Via AgrEvo the parent 
companies Hoechst and Schering seek to ensure two markets: the market for genetically 
engineered seeds and the market for plant-protective agents to which the seeds are adjusted. 
In view of the past experiences with local and national protest in the field of pharmaceuticals, 
AgrEvo decided to accompany the field trials with specific communicative measures. It 
developed an elaborate program of proactive communication specifically designed for test 
sites. This program provides for three levels o f communication referring to the different local 
groups targeted and ranked for communication according to their significance as decision­
makers, opinion makers and credibility groups. Since 1993, AgrEvo has put this program to 
use. At the first level, the company has addressed the mayor and the municipal council. At 
the second level, the circle has been expanded by the inclusion of opinion makers such as 
teachers, church representatives and environmentalists. A t the third level, finally, the company
30 The ads were issued in all supraregional daily and weekly newspapers and in selected regional dailies.
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has organized public events such as town-meetings. In the first year that AgrEvo applied its 
communication program, it ran, according to their own information, 300 different events 
referring to four different test sites (Waitz 1996 in interview).
After three years of a pronounced effort at mobilizing support for field releases, the 
situation is more relaxed than two years ago but it is still difficult (cp. point 2.3.2). According 
to one of AgrEvo’s officials responsible for corporate communication, the major reason for 
the difficulties that the company has faced is the following: The company started its field 
trials with the "most disadvantageous biotechnology product" (Waitz 1996 in interview), 
namely herbicide-resistant plants. It was almost impossible, the AgrEvo official (who regards 
himself as an "Industriepolitiker", Ibid.) concludes, to communicate the reasonableness of the 
use of a still hotly disputed technology for a more effective treatment of plants with 
herbicides, that is, with a product that had the extremely negative connotation as a polluter 
of drinking water and the environment.
This new assessment of the situation has not gone along with an abandonment of the 
dialogue strategy. What has changed is the goal definition. It changed from the production 
of acceptance to the progressive development of tolerance (Ibid.).
2.4.2 Post-Corporatist Negotiations
In the German rDNA debate chemical companies have instigated and participated in some 
discussions of a pluralist, more structured and result-oriented kind in the noninstitutional 
political arena. In this section I shall present three of these »round table« talks. Two have 
been instigated by chemical companies, the third by an academic institution and held with the 
co-operation of the chemical industry. These discussions have a pluralist character as they 
involve representatives of different social groups including new social movement actors. They 
have a more pronounced structure in so far as the number of participating actors is limited 
and as they follow some form of discussion procedure. They are result-oriented as they are 
keyed to finding agreement on specific genetic engineering issues.
The first example that I shall give of post-corporatist negotiation is the Genetic Engineering 
Dialogue instigated and organized by the German subsidiary of Unilever. Faced with a low
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consumer acceptance of the application of genetic engineering in the agro-food sector, the 
dutch company Unilever, one of the biggest food companies of the world, has initiated »round 
table« talks in different countries concerning the issue of novel food. These talks have as an 
objective to work out lines of consent in this area of application of genetic engineering and 
were first established in the Netherlands. As the negotiations here proved successful, Unilever 
decided to instigate them as well in Great Britain and Germany. In Germany, the Unilever 
’’Gen-Dialogue" was started in 1994 and has recently been brought to an end. The key subject 
of the negotiations has been an enzyme produced by the use of genetic engineering, xylanase, 
an enzyme that is used in bread baking mixes and prevents the bread from becoming sale. Up 
to now the enzyme is not on the German market. The objective has been to reach a joint 
assessment of the product. Unilever has made available all data on the product, also 
confidential data, and has laid bare the production process. Further negotiation topics have 
been herbicide-resistant plants, labelling, and the EU-novel-food-directive (Lohr 1995: 6).
The organizations that have participated in the Unilever dialogue are the environmental 
organization BUND, the consumer organization Verbraucherinitiative, the trade union 
Gewerkschaft Nahrung, Genußmittel, Gaststätten, the alternative research institutes Katalyse 
and Öko-Institut Freiburg, and an association of housewives, the Hausfrauenbund. In the 
course of the negotiations the round table was extended by the Swiss company Nestlé and the 
chain Spar in order to increase the reach of potential compromises (Behrens, Meyer-Stumborg 
& Simonis 1996). The German consumer organization "Arbeitsgemeinschaft der 
Verbraucherverbände" (AgV) and the critics’ organization Gen-ethisches Netzwerk were 
invited to participate but refused to do so. The reasons stated for the refusal included the 
participation of only one representative of industry, the lack of ethical and social discussion 
aspects, and the requirement of keeping all discussion topics and results confidential (Menrad 
et al. 1996: 39) - the "Gen-Dialogue" took place »behind closed doors«; even its existence 
was made public only after about one year of debate (Die Zeit 7.7.1995, p.25). Due to 
increased work load, the Öko-Institut moved in the course of the negotiations from active 
participation to advising the participating organizations (Ibid.). The BUND left the talks 
shortly before they were brought to an end. The reason the environmental organization has 
stated for this decision is that the debate exclusively dealt with safety questions and did not 
discuss wider economic and social consequences of the technology’s use in food processing.
The consensus reached by the remaining participants is that all food-enzymes should
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be examined for their production- and product safety before they are introduced to the market 
(Riewenherm 1996: 16). Although this »minimal consensus« falls short o f the targeted 
consensus, it is not just confirming reality; at present, enzymes, no matter whether genetically 
engineered or not, can be introduced to the market without any examination in Germany.
In and among the consumer and environmental organizations, the opinions on the 
course of the negotiations and their results vary. While there is, on the one hand, the opinion 
that the negotiations were an extremely exhausting but still rewarding experiment as expressed 
by the representative of the Verbraucher Initiative (Riewenherm 1996: 115), on the other, 
there is a clear-cut negative assessment This is based on discontent with the fact that it was 
not possible to build a consensus about an uncompromising labelling policy51 and the fact 
that economic and societal consequences of the use of genetic engineering in the food 
industry were excluded from debate.
Unilever Germany obviously does not engage in public criticism of its own project. 
It has made the statement, however, that the dialogue initiative so far has not proved very 
effective as far as positive effects on the acceptance among the German population of 
genetically engineered food was concerned (Unilever, Umweltaktivitaten: 17). At present at 
least, the company, nevertheless, continues to bank on »dialogue«. On the proposal of the 
Verbraucher Initiative the participation in a further dialogue project dealing with genetically 
engineered soya is already envisaged (Riewenherm 1996: 16). J
-I
The second example that I shall mention is the Gesprachskreis Hoechster Nachbarn (GHN) 
which has made genetic engineering one of its subjects of debate. This »local round table« 
has been established by the Hoechst company as a response to the severe image damages 
incurred after the series of accidents in the spring of 1993 (Dreyer & Kesselring 1996, 
Kesselring 1995). It differs from the Unilever project in so far as the meetings in principle 
are not held »in camera« but are public. The discussion parties are selected according to 
specific rules, the interested public, however, as well as journalists are invited to join the 
meetings. The Gesprachskreis which includes a moderator who acts as a »neutral mediator« 
is to deal primarily with safety and environmental matters. In January 1995, it chose genetic 
engineering in the pharmaceutical and agricultural sector as one subject of debate. The
51 The company’s agreement as regards the issue of labelling is restricted to advocating a consumer right 
for all information relevant for and of interest to the consumer (Riewenherm 1996: 16).
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discussion basis was constituted by Hoechst’s genetic engineering program which was 
presented by two company officials. While the technology’s application for the production of 
pharmaceuticals met with wide approval, there was vehement debate about its use in the 
agricultural field.
According to the forum’s statutes and articles, the forum has the possibility to 
formulate recommendations for measures that the company should take in the field of safety 
and environmental protection. These recommendations which are to be formulated in principle 
on the basis of the consensus-principle (GHN-statutes and articles) are to contribute to the 
opinion-formation and decision-making process of the chemical enterprise (Ibid.)52. In the 
case of the genetic engineering debate, recommendations did not come to be formulated. Most 
of the discussion dealt with the issue at a more general level so that negotiations about 
concrete applications soon got stuck (Höchster Kreisblatt, 28.1.95; Frankfurter Westlicher 
Stadtanzeiger, 15.2.1995).
The example that I shall give of an »externally« instigated dialogue project, in which 
representatives of the chemical industry have acted as participants, is a »round table« project 
initiated and organized by the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fiir  Sozialforschung (WZB). The 
"WZB-Verfahren" which was funded by the Ministry for Research and Technology was 
started in 1991 and brought to an end in 1993. It presents a participatory technology 
assessment project and moreover a social scientific experiment concerning the chosen 
participation model. The research institute asked industrial and environmental representatives 
and representatives of the politico-administrative system and the research community to 
participate in joint discussions about the cultivation of herbicide-resistant plants. The 
objective was to discuss risks and benefits of this application of rDNA technology and to 
formulate joint recommendations for action to be taken regarding the field of application. 
While the discussion meetings were held »in private«, the course of the negotiations and their 
results have been comprehensively documented and published - basically a result of the 
project’s organization as a social scientific experiment (see e.g. van den Daele 1994, van den 
Daele & Bora 1996).
The participants in this first »experiment« of a participatory technology assessment
33 The GHN statutes and articles determine that the company has a duty to inform the forum about whether 
or not it has complied with the recommendation and to justify the respective decision.
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project in the field of rDNA technology did not reach an agreement: at the beginning of the 
final session (in June 1993), the participating eight environmental organizations jointly left 
the project53. The occasion for this step was the final evaluation of the past two years of 
discussion that the project organizers presented the participants. According to the 
environmental organizations, the project organizers had totally pushed aside fundamental 
concerns about the use of herbicides and chemicalized agriculture as such which the 
environmentalists had put forward in the preceding two years of discussion. The reproach was 
that on the grounds of a basic acceptance of the present structure and methods of modem 
industrialized agriculture, the evaluation had solely taken into consideration the advantages 
and disadvantages of the technological application at issue. That meant, the environmental 
organizations argued, that the WZB project had chosen the same misleading approach as the 
Commission of Inquiry on the Opportunities and Risks of Genetic Engineering, namely a 
technology-induced approach instead of a problem-induced approach (L6hr 1993: 12). 
According to the environmental organizations, the latter approach is the more appropriate one 
as it assesses a technology on the basis of a more complex scenario of societal development.
Industry, by contrast, saw its positions in these negotiations widely confirmed. Thus, 
not surprisingly, one of the Hoechst participants whom I asked for an evaluation in an 
interview appreciated the project. The discussions had been constructive and fruitful (Waitz 
1996 in interview).
These examples of »post-coiporatist negotiation« indicate that there is a high probability that 
new social movement organizations participating in such negotiations become disappointed. 
The organizations tend to attempt to lead the discussions at a more fundamental and society- 
related level. This attempt is doomed to failure, when the majority of the negotiation partners 
is interested in restricting the discussion to a debate on technical safety or in adopting a 
technology-induced approach. The company which instigates or voluntarily enters into 
interorganizational negotiations obviously is not interested in discussing about wider societal 
consequences of genetic engineering applications. For the chemical industry the repeated 
frustration of its major political challenger in the context of such negotiations implies a 
problem in so far as it may transform into the challenger’s increased resort to the strategy of
53 The Gen-ethisches Netzwerk left the negotiations after the very first meeting.
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pconfrontation and may have a negative effect on the industry’s public image which engaging 
in interorganizational negotiations is actually meant to cultivate. However, at the moment at 
least, the willingness to engage in such negotiations on (parts of) both sides seems 
undiminished.
2 A 3  Taking the Initiative: The "Meinungs-Offensive Gentechnik"
The use of interactive methods and directly responding to public concerns constitutes one 
major political effort of the chemical industry in the given phase. Another major effort is the 
nation-wide four-month advertising campaign which the chemical industry ran between 
November 1992 and February 1993 and which called for the technology’s support with self- 
evident and aggressive argumentation.
The campaign was designed as advertising for a beneficial technology, not as 
institutional advertising. The advertisements were displayed as an "Informationsangebot" by 
the German chemical industry denoted "Initiative Pro Gentechnik". The campaign’s 
designation as information provision and the use of wording typical of a new social 
movement to denote the campaign can be understood as the attempt to convey the message 
that the campaigning industry did not simply stand up for its own benefit but also, or even 
in the first place, for the public good.
This impression was to be fostered by the use of "Testimonial-Anzeigen" (IGL 1994: 
4). It was not in the first place industry itself which spoke out in the advertisements, but 
eminent persons being »interviewed« by the industrial actor; the chemical industry led dialog. 
The campaign was composed of single advertisements made up of the same summarizing text 
and interviews with eminent persons in the economy (including the then president of the IG 
Chemie), science (a Nobel prize winner in chemistry), and academia (an ethicist and 
theologist). Moreover, it included a manifesto-advertisement which displayed eighteen 
signatures of representatives of these social sectors (the economy was, amongst others, 
represented by the presidents of the three peak trade associations DIHT, BDA, and BDI and 
the president of the IG Chemie) plus a church representative, the bishop of Mainz. With the 
manifesto-motif the campaign was brought to an end (see appendix HI. p.283).
The creation of a combined sponsorship on a political issue with groups and
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project in the field of rDNA technology did not reach an agreement: at the beginning of the 
final session (in June 1993), the participating eight environmental organizations jointly left 
the project53. The occasion for this step was the final evaluation of the past two years o f 
discussion that the project organizers presented the participants. According to the 
environmental organizations, the project organizers had totally pushed aside fundamental 
concerns about the use of herbicides and chemicalized agriculture as such which the 
environmentalists had put forward in the preceding two years of discussion. The reproach w as 
that on the grounds of a basic acceptance of the present structure and methods of modem 
industrialized agriculture, the evaluation had solely taken into consideration the advantages 
and disadvantages of the technological application at issue. That meant, the environmental 
organizations argued, that the WZB project had chosen the same misleading approach as the 
Commission of Inquiry on the Opportunities and Risks of Genetic Engineering, namely a 
technology-induced approach instead of a problem-induced approach (Lohr 1993: 12). 
According to the environmental organizations, the latter approach is the more appropriate one 
as it assesses a technology on the basis of a more complex scenario of societal development.
Industry, by contrast, saw its positions in these negotiations widely confirmed. Thus, 
not surprisingly, one of the Hoechst participants whom I asked for an evaluation in an 
interview appreciated the project. The discussions had been constructive and fruitful (Waitz 
1996 in interview).
These examples of »post-corporatist negotiation« indicate that there is a high probability that 
new social movement organizations participating in such negotiations become disappointed. 
The organizations tend to attempt to lead the discussions at a more fundamental and society- 
related level. This attempt is doomed to failure, when the majority of the negotiation partners 
is interested in restricting the discussion to a debate on technical safety or in adopting a 
technology-induced approach. The company which instigates or voluntarily enters into 
interorganizational negotiations obviously is not interested in discussing about wider societal 
consequences of genetic engineering applications. For the chemical industry the repeated 
frustration of its major political challenger in the context of such negotiations implies a 
problem in so far as it may transform into the challenger’s increased resort to the strategy of
53 The Gen-ethisches Netzwerk left the negotiations after the very first meeting.
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confrontation and may have a negative effect on the industry’s public image which engaging 
in interorganizational negotiations is actually meant to cultivate. However, at the moment at 
least, the willingness to engage in such negotiations on (parts of) both sides seems 
undiminished.
2.43 Taking the Initiative: The "Meinungs-Offensive Gentechnik"
The use of interactive methods and directly responding to public concerns constitutes one 
major political effort of the chemical industry in the given phase. Another major effort is the 
nation-wide four-month advertising campaign which the chemical industry ran between 
November 1992 and February 1993 and which called for the technology’s support with self- 
evident and aggressive argumentation.
The campaign was designed as advertising for a beneficial technology, not as 
institutional advertising. The advertisements were displayed as an "Informationsangebot" by 
the German chemical industry denoted "Initiative Pro Gentechnik". The campaign’s 
designation as information provision and the use of wording typical of a new social 
movement to denote the campaign can be understood as the attempt to convey the message 
that the campaigning industry did not simply stand up for its own benefit but also, or even 
in the first place, for the public good.
This impression was to be fostered by the use of "Testimonial-Anzeigen" (IGL 1994: 
4). It was not in the first place industry itself which spoke out in the advertisements, but 
eminent persons being »interviewed« by the industrial actor; the chemical industry led dialog. 
The campaign was composed of single advertisements made up of the same summarizing text 
and interviews with eminent persons in the economy (including the then president of the 1G 
Chemie), science (a Nobel prize winner in chemistry), and academia (an ethicist and 
theologist). Moreover, it included a manifesto-advertisement which displayed eighteen 
signatures of representatives of these social sectors (the economy was, amongst others, 
represented by the presidents of the three peak trade associations DIHT, BDA, and BDI and 
the president of the IG Chemie) plus a church representative, the bishop of Mainz. With the 
manifesto-motif the campaign was brought to an end (see appendix HI. p.283).
The creation of a combined sponsorship on a political issue with groups and
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professions which otherwise do not necessarily share industry’s goals was an attempt to add 
to the legitimacy of industry’s position by showing it to be in the general interest54. At the 
same time, it was meant to isolate and moralize opponents by declaring their position outside 
the societal consent.
2.43.1 Appealing to Morality
In terms of content, the advertisements constituted a moral appeal. It was a moral appeal to 
all groups and individuals of society to give their support to the use of a technology that was 
of unassessable value to society’s well-being. These groups and individuals were called upon 
to accept the same responsibility that they expected to be taken by industry: Responsibility 
for the public welfare as well as for public health and a clean environment. The following 
quotes shall illustrate the way in which industry appealed to the sense of responsibility o f 
political decision-makers, the media, environmentalists, and citizens. In the manifesto- 
advertisement it said:
Wir appellieren an die politische Führung unseres Landes, an die Entscheidungsträger 
in Bund und Ländern, an alle verantwortungsbewußten Bürger: Bauen Sie die Hürden 
für die Gentechnik in Deutschland ab! Wir brauchen diese Basistechnologie, um 
unsere Verpflichtung für die Zukunft unserer Kinder zu erfüllen. Wir appellieren an 
Ihre Verantwortung - für unser Land.
And two of the »interviewees« claimed:
Gerade die Umweltbewußten müssen sich vehement für die Gentechnik einsetzen. 
(quoted from the Nobel prize winner)
Es muß noch viel deutlicher werden, daß die Publizistik genauso eine hohe moralische 
Verantwortung hat wie die Wissenschaft. So wie gentechnische Projekte ethisch 
vertretbar sein müssen, so müssen sich auch die Autoren der öffentlichen Aufklärung 
über Wissenschaft und Forschung ihrer moralischen Verantwortung in jedem Einzelfall 
stellen, (quoted from the ethicist)
The campaign did not merely rely on moral appeals. It also banked on moral stigmatization. 
Statements like the following were meant to engage the reader’s sense of morality and
54 In this sense, the VCI, in its annual report 1992/93, stated that the manifesto-advertisement demonstrated 
"daß es ein breites Votum dafür gibt, die Chancen der Gentechnik in Deutschland zu nutzen" (VCI 1993: 60).
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indignation against the technology's opponents and critics:
Wer heute noch die Chancen der Gentechnik verhindem will, handelt 
unverantwortlich. (quoted from the ethicist)
The main target of industry’s moral appeal and stigmatization was the executive and its 
bureaucracy. The campaign’s key message can be summarized as follows: While industry and 
its allies were willing and determined to take the required responsibility (even speaking out 
in a joint initiative) the politico-administrative system had bowed to an emotionalized public 
opinion and some radical technology opponents and that way had deprived German citizens 
of their quality of life, their jobs, their health55, and a sound environment.
The fact that the stronghold against which the campaign sounded the attack was already taken 
suggests that deregulation had complementary objectives. Support of politics in improving 
public acceptance is likely to have been one of these objectives56. As the subsequent section 
will argue, it was a declared objective of the chemical industry in the early 1990s to induce 
government to expressly declare itself supportive of the disputed technology.
2.43.2 Communicating Genetic Engineering as a Force for Economic 
Development
As regards rhetorics, one is inclined to describe the campaign as pure drama. The next quote
from the manifesto-advertisement provides a good illustration of the use of dramatization:
Durch Gesetze und Verordnungen wird die Gentechnik bei uns zu Tode verw altet.... 
Es ist höchste Zeit, daß dieser Exodus gestoppt wird.
55 The health discourse centers on one of todays most feared diseases: "Wann wir AIDS besiegen werden, 
weiß ich nicht. Aber ich bin sicher Ohne Gentechnik hätten wir den Kampf bereits heute verloren!" (quoted 
from an AIDS-researcher).
56 Another objective has been to mobilize support for a general improvement of the Standort Germany. The 
campaign must be seen against the background of the at that time economically critical situation of the industrial 
sector. The campaign was part of the general location-Germany-debate (Standort-Dcutschland-Debalte) which 
criticized a highly unfavorable investment climate in connection with high personnel and social expenditures, 
taxes, and increasing environmental charges.
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According to the Initiative Pro Gentechnik, everything is at stake in a country that refuses to
make full use of a new core technology: Germany’s chemical industry and science,
Germany’s jobs, prosperity, and standard of living as well as a  high quality of life defined
in terms of health and a clean environment.
The rhetorically forceful re-direction of public fears from the risks of the technology’s
use to concerns about the consequences of its non-use mainly relies on linking the rDNA
issue to a policy and public issue of increasing national concern that is complementary to the
pro-technology propaganda: German industry’s "deepest crisis of the post war period" (Der
Spiegel 19, 1993: 140). With catchphrases such as "loss of competitiveness", "relocation of
production abroad", "loss of jobs", "threat to the research and industry location Germany" the
campaign’s doom-laden visions were embedded into the larger frame of Germany’s prominent
and, in view of growing recession, more and more pressing issue: The nation’s loss of
leadership in European research and industry. In the manifesto-advertisement it says:
Doch wie andere Staaten die Gentechnik zu fördern, setzt Deutschland ein Stück 
Zukunft aufs Spiel. Wie schon einmal bei der Mikroelektronik. Dürfen wir es zulassen, 
zweitklassig zu werden?
By framing the rDNA issue in economic terms the chemical industry has sought to meet the 
tone of the time and thereby reinforce argumentative cogency and resonance in the public at 
large. The transformation of a technology issue into an economic issue of national interest is 
particularly able to exert pressure on a political system that has put jobs and economic 
upswing on the top of its agenda.
At the same time this new issue frame was an attempt to neutralize the favorable 
resonances of the technology opponents and critics. In times of recession the technology risk 
discourse offers an appropriate target of indignation. Its sponsors come to be viewed as 
»coercive Utopians« and »neopastoralists« who retard economic growth and thereby make 
society renege on its obligations to the poor and to future generations. In this sense, the 
difficult economic situation that Germany has faced in the 1990s clearly has played into the 
chemical industry’s hands.
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2.4.4 Coalition-Building for Deregulation
As has been mentioned above, two and a half years after the Genetic Engineering Law had 
come into force, parliament proposed a resolution on changes of the Act designed to ease 
some of its restrictions (in November 1992). The resolution was based on a broad political 
consent. This parliamentary decision was preceded by extensive lobbying by both industry and 
the research community. For the first months after the law’s enactment the two interest groups 
had engaged in lobbying for deregulation. Actually, their initiative did not meet with much 
opposition from the legislative and executive57. Early in the implementation phase politicians 
had come to the conviction that the law required amendment
The focus of industry’s criticism was on overbureaucratic implementing regulations 
(Durchführungsverordnungen58) which entered into force shortly after the Act itself. The 
bureaucratization of decision-making, especially in lengthening and increasingly costly 
approval procedures for genetic engineering facilities and projects, was claimed to be out of 
all proportion to the risks, anti-science, and opposed to innovation. This criticism was 
thoroughly put forward in the context of a public hearing on the implementation of the 
Genetic Engineering Act that the Committee for Research, Technology and Technology 
Impact Assessment and the Committee for Health of the Bundestag conducted in February 
1992. The sharpest critics were VCI and BPI together with the Deutscher Industrie- und 
Handelstag (DIHT)59 which expressed their opinion in a joint statement60. The associations 
flanked the criticism of bureaucratization by the express threat that industry would choose to
57 It is important to note here that in the 1990 federal elections the Green Party did not manage to get into 
Parliament.
58 In the Law itself only the essential subject matters arc defined. Their concrctization occurred by legal 
regulations (Rechtsverordnungen). The enforcement of these provisions is not carried out federally but by the 
different regional authorities (Regierungsbezirke).
59 The DIHT is one of Germany's three structurally superordinated trade associations. The DIHT represents 
the regional interests o f trade and industry. The other two peak associations are the Bundesvercinigung der 
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA), and the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI).
60 The Dr. Karl Thomae GmbH which was running its T-PA facility without any problems (see point II1.1, 
ft.I) and some other chemical companies did not see the need for the law’s amendment Their demand was 
restricted to an "sub-statutory practicable procedure" (untergesetzliche, praktikable Vorgehensweise) (Handelsblatt 
13.2.1992) for the international specimen exchange and for ensuring a concerted performance by the Länder.
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expand elsewhere. The unfavorable regulatory and political conditions for the German 
Standort in the technology field and synergic effects with other disadvantageous conditions 
(shortest working hours, longest holidays, high wage additional expenses, high energy costs, 
and Europe’s highest environmental costs) and the globalization of the markets would force 
industry to sacrifice research and production in a core technology in their home country and 
to switch investment plans in favor of other countries; this would be the only possible way 
to compete on the same terms with other leading chemical and pharmaceutical firms 
(Handelsblatt, 13.2.1992). Thus, the controversy about genetic engineering was embedded into 
the highly prominent "Standort Deutschland" (location Germany) debate. It was framed as 
"yet another case against Germany as a Standort" (quote by a chemical company executive 
in International Herald Tribune 21.4.1993; emphasis in original).
Industry’s lobbying efforts reached their peak when in October 1992 the VCI together with 
the BPI and other specialist associations, the trade union of the chemical industry, IG Chemie, 
and scientific associations jointly published the "Memorandum zur Gentechnik in 
Deutschland". This successful effort o f  coalition-building has to be seen against the 
background of a generally harmonious relationship between VCI and IG Chemie and the fact 
that the chemical industry has always had good relations with scientists in governmental 
agencies and educational and research institutes (Grant, Paterson & Whitston 1988: 26361). 
The co-operation between industry and science is still interesting to note, as in the preceding 
phase the relationship between these groups had been competitive rather than co-operative. 
As the research community at that time was not affected by the special difficulties that 
industry faced (public participation procedure), it neither supported special legislation on 
genetic engineering nor did it see a real need to speak out in public. This markedly changed 
with legislation which soon was considered as severely impeding basic research (VDI 
Nachrichten, 29.5.1992). Thus, deregulation in the early 1990s became a shared interest of 
industry and the scientific community.
As is typical of position papers targeted at the political decision-maker, economic 
argumentation plays a key role. More unusual is the moralistic tenor similar to that of the
61 As the authors expose, scientists have often been called to defend the industry and also have played a key 
role in pointing out practical difficulties associated with implementing environmental policies (Ibid.).
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advertising campaign. In the position paper the co-operating associations emphatically claim
the irresponsibility o f  not seizing the technology’s opportunities. The following argumentation
on the legitimacy of applying genetic engineering to higher organisms quoted from the
memorandum's appendix shall illustrate the moralistic tenon
Das Verbot von Methoden, um Mißbrauch zu verhindern, ist aber kein erst zu 
nehmendes Argument, da es der Frage nach der Verantwortung ausweicht und 
vortäuscht, daß der einzig sichere Weg zur Verhinderung von Gefahren der 
Nichterwerb von Wissen sei. Dies wäre der Versuch, sich der Verantwortung zu 
entziehen und wäre die totale Negierung des Nutzens einer wissenschaftlich- 
technischen Methode. Die Alternative der gewollten Ignoranz anstelle von 
Verantwortung wäre eine unethische, unmoralische und verwerfliche Handlungsweise. 
(BPI et. al 1992: 32; emphasis added)
As is indicated by the concluding passage of the memorandum, the moralistic argumentative 
design was not only meant to induce government to ease legislative restrictions but also to 
actively promote public acceptance of the technology at issue; in view of a still uncertain and 
unstable public climate the state was expected to take a clear positive position on genetic 
engineering:
Darüber hinaus ist es erforderlich, daß sich die Grundeinstellung der Politiker und der 
Behörden zur Gentechnik im positiven Sinn verändert Die Bedingungen dafür sind 
durch das Zusammenwirken von Politik, Gesetzgebung, Behörden, Hochschulen und 
Industrie zu schaffen, wobei klare Signale der Förderung der Gentechnik von seiten 
der Bundes- und Länderregierungen und der Politiker in Europa notwendig sind und 
erwartet werden. (BPI e t  al 1992: 362)
In short, industry also worked towards establishing an »agency relationship« with government 
The resource that this relationship is to furnish business with is public acceptance.
As I have emphasized under point n.l.4, it seems that the chemical industry, supported by 
the scientific community, has been rather successful in its lobbying effort. For the benefit of 
both industry and science, the revised law which came into effect on 1 January 1994 provided 
for a streamlining of the regulatory process and once more reduced the participation hurdle. 
As far as the regulatory conditions in Germany are concerned, industry today generally
62 Along the same lines, Hoechst’s then public relations official, Brauer, has demanded that European 
politicians promote public understanding of the environment-related advantages of biotechnology through 
education and advanced training (Brauer 1991: 28).
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expresses contentment. However, as the VCI itself stresses, this contentment largely results 
from the fact that established European regulation does not allow further changes in national 
legislation (VCI 1994b: 10). And such changes, actually, are considered as necessary to 
improve the working conditions for genetic engineering research and production (Ibid.). 
Therefore, in 1994 the chemical industry started an initiative for the change o f European 
genetic engineering regulation relying on press work, lobbying, and mass media 
communication (IGL 1994: 19). Analogous to the advertising campaign at the national level, 
this initiative is referred to as the "EG-Offensive Gentechnik" (Ibid.).
258
* Die tnditkmclka Natur, Arbeit
ood Kapital find heute kerne hinreichende Basis mehr 
(Dr wirtschaftliche Unternehmungen- Em vierter Faktor 
wird immer wichtiger die Kommunikation. Sie war 
schon immer das Nervensystem aller Gescblftsprozene, 
gewinnt mm aber zunehmend eine eigenstlndige Rolle. 
Auf einen Nenner gebracht Was rieht öffentlich 
lom nurisiert werden kann, läßt lieh rieht verwirklichen,
* Kommunikation macht Grenzen zwischen 
gearltscfaaftlicheu Teilsystemen durcfaUssig. ln diesem 
Diffustoosprozeß müssen auch Unternehmen eine neue 
IdentiUI entwickeln: von der Wagenburg ium "corporate 
duzen“.
* Umer nehme nt kommuni kau on prägt Unternehmens- 
kölner. Der Dialog mit der Öffentlichkeit muß von der 
Kommunikation innerhalb des Unternehmen» getragen 
werden. (Donnann 1995, quoted m Wolter 1996: 42, 
emphaais added)
PART C: BUSINESS POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE »RENAISSANCE« OF
THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The general objective of the present study is a reassessment of what constitutes business 
political activity. With this objective the study reacts to a changed political context in which 
economic organizations have found themselves embedded since the 1970s in advanced modem 
society. This new political environment, the study claims, requires a new understanding of 
business political activity1. The case study was meant to provide the key to this new 
understanding with empirical »flesh«. This key is what Jürgen Dormann, the chief executive 
of the Hoechst company, forcefully articulates in the above quote1 2: The significance that 
public communication, or to be more precise, engaging in »public responsibility« discourse 
has gained for economic organizations in a society in which technological and economic 
rationalization is no longer an unquestioned process but, instead, an issue of public discourse: 
the key is the growing effort of economic organizations to »cultivate« the public.
As the case study has illustrated, the new social movements have acted as a prime
1 For another study that reassesses political activity in advanced modem society see Kropp (1995). Kropp 
employs the same broad concept of political action as does the present study in order to account for the political 
activity of young persons in a society that is characterized by »detraditionalization« and »individualization«.
2 Donnann has been the head of Hoechst since 1994 and represents the policy of a »new openness«. The 
overall objective of this policy is to get over the company's traditional »Wagenburgmentalit&t«, a declared 
exponent of which was Dormann’s predecessor, Wolfgang Hilger. Donnann presented the three theses upon 
which the new policy is based in a speech addressed to the Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Industrie- und 
Handelskammer, IHK) in Frankfurt/Main on 24 October 1995.
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mover in the transformation of technology development into a public issue. In general terms 
we can state that the analysis of the political activity of the chemical industry in the German 
rDNA debate has given empirical proof of what Hder (1996a) has identified as the primary 
effect of the institutionalization of the new social movements: The rise o f  public discourse3. 
In this public discourse the challenger and the challenged struggle, among other things, for 
the collective recognition of what they advance as meaningful and compelling rationales to 
their view and policy on modem technology. The case study has pointed out that in this 
struggle the chemical industry has resorted to two major political ideals: the ideal of the 
responsible citizen (see above quote) and the ideal of a public dialogue.
Resorting to the Ideal of the Responsible Citizen
Hence, what the case study was meant to show is that the political involvement of a major 
industrial sector in a current technical controversy has gone widely beyond »traditional« 
industrial political activity. This is to say, it exceeded negotiation in a corporatist framework 
of policy formulation to which industrial political activity in the first two postwar decades 
was largely restricted.
Throughout the rDNA debate, negotiations in camera with political and administrative 
decision-makers, organized labor and the academic research community have been of vital 
importance to the chemical industry. The sector, via its trade associations VCI and BPI, has 
engaged in negotiations about promotional strategies and, especially, about control strategies. 
Dependent upon the general political circumstances, the objective that the chemical industry 
pursued in negotiations about the technology’s political control has been self-regulation, 
legislation, or de-regulation. When the rDNA debate was restricted to executive settings, the 
sector argued against legislation and for adherence to the sector’s traditional policy of »self­
regulation«. When the rDNA debate turned into a multilevel societal conflict and public 
participation and the lack of a legislative basis of genetic engineering research, development,
3 Giddens makes a similar argument in explaining why it made sense to assume an interrelation between 
democracy and social movements. This interrelation mainly would be due to the fact that social movements 
created "Freiräume ... für einen öffentlich geführten Dialog" (Giddens 1997: 169). For instance, a social 
movement could bring aspects of societal behavior into the discursive sphere which previously were not 
discussed or were handled by the use of traditional procedures.
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and application brought about a quasi-blockade of the technology's industrial use» the 
chemical industry came round to accepting the need for legislative authority to replace self­
regulation. Its strategy changed from one of defending self-regulation to one of working to 
ensure that new regulation was industry-friendly (above all by reducing the public 
participation hurdle), a bulwark against calls by protest groups for tighter restrictions, and 
flexible to implement. When the quasi-production blockade with the new law was overcome, 
the chemical industry soon entered into negotiations about the law 's deregulation. In these 
negotiations it argued for control conditions which would have had little chance of meeting 
with approval in the strained political climate in which the process of law giving took place 
but which met with little opposition in a political climate that had grown less tense after the 
law had come into force; as it is typical of the life-cycle of public issues, legislation had 
brought about a downswing phase in the rDNA debate.
Negotiations in the official political arena and behind closed doors have played an important 
role in the chemical industry’s political involvement in the genetic engineering controversy. 
However, industrial political activity has not been restricted to corporatist negotiations. These 
were the principal industrial political activities, when genetic engineering had not yet become 
a public issue. When the rDNA debate developed into a public controversy, political activity 
in the institutional political arena, protected from the public eye, was complemented by 
negotiations in the half public/half private arena of the parliamentary Enquete-Kommission. 
When public debate got more intensive and extensive, it was increasingly complemented by 
activities in the noninstitutional political arena in some way or another geared towards 
»publicity«.
On the one hand, the chemical industry engaged more and more in self-presentation 
activities in the form of publications, institutional and issue advertising, and face-to-face 
communication in the context of public events. »Publicity« is constitutive of these activities. 
On the other hand, the sector engaged in post-corporatist negotiations carried on with a more 
or less pronounced Offentlichkeitsbezug. The deliberations on genetic engineering in the 
context of the "Gesprachskreis Hoechster Nachbam" had a particularly high 
Offentlichkeitsbezug. They were held »in public«; the interested public was invited to act as 
an audience of the company-community dialogue. The participatory technology assessment 
project of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin is an example of post-corporatist negotiations with
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a relatively strong Offentlichkeitsbezug. While the interested public was excluded from the 
actual negotiation process, the process and the results of the project have been 
comprehensively documented and presented to the public. The Unilever dialogue, on the other 
hand, had a relatively weak Ôffentlichkeitsbezug. Also this project excluded the interested 
public from the actual negotiation process. It differs from the WZB project by a higher degree 
of exclusivity and confidentiality; it has been held »in private«. Still, in this case like in the 
other two cases the engaging of the chemical industry in negotiations outside the official 
political arena was connected with an interest in publicity. Instigation of and participation in 
such negotiation has been communicated as an expression of the industry’s willingness to co ­
operate and build a consensus with regard to technology issues. It has not merely served to 
demobilize technology protest by argumentative exchange; like public self-presentation it has 
served to build trust and credibility in the public at large.
The development of the rDNA debate into a public debate meant for the chemical industry 
to be faced with growing public exposure. The case study has shown that it was this public 
exposure which stimulated the use of public communication and publicity as political 
instruments at both the associational and firm level. »Green« and protest discourse have 
defined the chemical industry normatively as a social actor who trades public safety, a clean 
environment, and morals in return for private profits. The established political and legal 
institutions have reacted sensitively to this discourse. They have acted on the basis of more 
than a decade of new social movement politics warning against the blind dynamics and 
incalculable risks of economic and technological rationalization. Local and national protest 
actors and the diffusion of the concerns of these actors into the political and judicial 
institutions created a heightened need fo r  justification, legitimation, and consensus-building 
for the chemical industry. What made the VCI and the big companies part of a publicly 
played game, a game they did not want to enter, is the dissolution of the society-wide 
agreement on the desirability of economic and technological rationalization.
In the 1950s and 1960s this consent was still given. In this period of time, the central 
societal concerns were overall economic growth, advances in collective and individual 
distributional positions, and legal protection of social status. The dominant collective actors 
were political parties and specialized, comprehensive, and highly institutionalized interest 
organizations (Offe 1985; 824). For the chemical industry this meant that its political
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environment was restricted to the institutional political arena and that political challenges were 
minor and could be easily met by relying on the sector’s strong strategic position in the 
system of intermediation. The genetic engineering controversy illustrates a period of time in 
which the political environment of industry »expands« by the addition of a new collective 
actor to the political stage, the new social movements, seeking to politicize the decisive 
institutions of the scientific-technical world by relying on a policy of public mobilization, and 
by a new central societal concern, technology induced risk, developing with the new collective 
actor’s »institutionalization«. It is the politics of public mobilization of the new political actor 
and the resonance of the actor’s technology-critical view in society at large which have 
necessitated the active creation of public support for the industrial use of genetic engineering.
The way in which the chemical sector in the course of the genetic engineering controversy 
has attempted to win the public over has been described in terms of a learning process. This 
learning process consists of the experience that the problem of public acceptance is less one 
of knowledge and understanding to be remedied by education, but rather one of changed 
societal expectations as regards industry as a technology utilizer. The indicator of this 
experience is the fact that informatory education, meaning the recourse to »objective« facts, 
especially scientific explanations and evidence, and appeals to authority and expertise has lost 
its original dominance as a public communication strategy, while confidence-building, 
meaning the recourse to normative commitments in the framework of the new social 
movement-generated and promoted idea of a socially and environmentally compatible use of 
modem technology, has gained this dominance. Since the mid 1990s, the chemical industry 
has made an increased effort to convey the message that it voluntarily restricts possible 
applications of genetic engineering to those that safeguard the values of public health, safety, 
and a clean environment.
The change in the content of industrial public communication, the case study has shown, has 
gone along with a change in the form  of public communication. In the course of controversy 
the emphasis has shifted from communication organized as a one-way (expert-layman) process 
(directed at and presented as bringing public perception into conformity with scientific 
rationality) to communication organized as a two-way communication process and presented 
as a dialogue between equal partners. The chemical industry has increasingly made the public
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an active participant in industry and corporate dialogue instead of reducing it to a non-acting 
recipient of information. The openness to active discussion has served as an instrument for 
demonstrating industry’s responsiveness to ecological and safety concerns and its willingness 
to contribute to finding a societal agreement on ecological and safety issues. In »post- 
corporatist negotiations«, this demonstration has served above all to mobilize tolerance on the 
side of the main antagonist, local and national protest actors, towards the technology’s 
industrial use.
What the chemical industry in the course of the rDNA debate has experienced can be 
summarized as follows: Technology acceptance is not simply determined by »objective facts« 
but has a strong cultural and social dimension. It is strongly influenced by the idea of what 
constitutes a good life and the idea of purity as compared with the idea of justice (Eder 1988, 
1996b: 208) in this definition plays a more important role than in the past. Industry 
representatives refer to this experience, for instance, in comments on the fact that the 
widespread use of genetic engineering in detergent production is hardly noticed, while the 
introduction of genetic engineering in agriculture and food processing is hotly disputed. 
While, on the one hand, this fact is taken as evidence of the inconsistency of public concern 
and technology protest, the major reason for this inconsistency is assumed to lie in the fact 
that in the first case the genetic engineering product remains external to the human body, 
while in the second case it is a matter of a "orale Einnahme" (Hilger 1996 in interview4). The 
assumption is that drinking and eating is a field of life in which the sensitivity regarding 
technology risk is especially pronounced as in this field the idea of a »positive naturalness« 
connected to the value of »health« generally plays a central role and has gained in importance 
with the increasing industrialization and technicalization o f food production.
Public commitment to the idea of a socially and environmentally compatible use of modem
4 Stefan Hilger is head of the VCI public relations department which forms part of the association’s 
information and communications department In the opinion of Hilger the food companies Unilever and Nestlé 
Deutschland were right to publicly withdraw from the use of genetically engineered soya which the United States 
since recently seeks to sell on the European market. The genetic modification serves to make the soybeans 
resistant to the herbicide "Roundup" of die American chemical enterprise Monsanto. According to Hilger, the 
use of genetic engineering in food production at present meets with such strong resistance that the companies 
would have run the risk of a general decrease in the sale of their products if they had decided to use genetically 
engineered soya (Katzek 1997: 8; Der Spiegel 9/1997, p.18: Wiesbadener Kurier, 267.27.10.1996).
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mtechnology - one of the ideas in which the desire for purity in a polluted world finds 
expression - is the way in which the chemical industry has translated the experience of the 
cultural and social dimension of genetic engineering into political action. It has resorted to 
this idea as a new carrier of legitimacy not only by communicating the technology's industrial 
use as being normatively bounded by the values underlying the idea. It has also resorted to 
it by communicating the technology's use as a purposeful contribution to the protection of 
public health, safety, and the environment The societal diffusion and stabilization of the idea 
of a socially and environmentally compatible technology development has plunged the 
chemical industry into a »legitimation crisis« and the problems it has faced in establishing 
genetic engineering as a new core technology are part of this crisis; at the same time the 
idea’s »institutionalization« has provided the possibility of a way out of the crisis, namely by 
means of commitment to the idea.
In communicating this commitment the chemical industry has demonstrated a high sensitivity 
as regards developments of the general public and political climate. As the case study has 
shown, it took the occasion of a situation in which a range of factors coalesced to provide 
support for genetic engineering while eroding the position of the technology opponents to 
engage in mass media based identity-building communication. That means, instead of 
employing commitment to the »post-materialist« perspective as an instrument of moral 
justification, the sector used it to mobilize support for the technology at issue in the form of 
a moral appeal to the nation and moral stigmatization of those seeking to impede the 
technology’s use. With the offensive thrust and drama-like design of the nation-wide four- 
month issue advertising campaign, the industrial sector reacted to a favorably changed 
political environment and at the same time adapted to the logic of mass media 
communication. The receptivity of the dispersed audience which mass media communication 
seeks to reach cannot simply be taken for granted. Rather, interest in the information to be 
circulated has to be produced - especially under conditions of competition. Dramatic 
representations are highly likely to act as an incentive to interest.
The chemical industry’s appeal to the sense of responsibility of the German citizens 
was conceived as an appeal to protect and promote public safety, health, and a clean 
environment and individual and collective welfare. By engaging in a moral crusade for the 
national economy the chemical industry again reacted sensitively to the general societal
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context in communicating genetic engineering to the public. In the situation of economic 
recession, that is, in a situation of increased public concerns about material security and a 
general upgrading of technological innovation and preparedness to take risk, the economic 
actor used both the value complex "environment and health" (Dyllick 1989: XV) - the basis 
on which it has found its legitimacy as a technology utilizer attacked - and the value complex 
"material wealth" (Ibid.) - the basis on which this legitimacy has traditionally rested - as 
instruments of mobilizing public support The chemical industry took the difficult national 
economic situation as an opportunity to, so to speak, re-mobilize the traditional basis of 
legitimation.
Resorting to the Ideal of Public Dialogue
In the genetic engineering controversy, I have explained, »public dialogue« constitutes an 
integral part of the chemical industry's political action repertoire and public responsibility 
discourse.
Dialogue has been practiced - in the form of noncommittal communication, for 
example in the context of public events, and in the form of more structured and result- 
oriented negotiation-based communication. In both cases, I have argued, dialogue presents a 
confidence-building strategy as regards opinion makers and the interested/concemed public, 
in the second case it presents moreover the attempt to promote the »antagonist's« tolerance 
towards the chemical industry as a technology utilizer.
It is important to see that the use of dialogue for building trust and credibility has not 
been restricted to its practice. Instead, public commitment to the mere idea of dialogue has 
served as a confidence-building instrument »Dialogue« as theory and practice, as the VCI’s 
public relations officer Hilger, puts it, is "politically correct" (Hilger 1996 in interview) and 
thus in both respects a valuable legitimacy resource.
Indeed, in Germany as well as in other Western European countries »dialogue« today presents 
a prominent concept in politics and the public. This prominence is closely related to the 
emergence of the new social movements in the course of the last two and a half decades. 
These movements sustain a cultural orientation which is opposed to the idea of foimal
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rationality; they are oriented towards "discursivity" (Eder 1996b: 200). The
»institutionalization« of the new social movements has not only forced economic 
organizations to adapt by opening up for consensus oriented argumentative exchange. It has 
also induced the traditional political institutions to resort more intensely to consensus-building 
procedures in the context of organized social communication. Especially in the fields of 
technology and environmental policy in which factual as well as normative premises are 
highly controversial» deliberative-participatory procedures have gained in importance (Majone 
1993). In contrast to corporatist negotiations these processes of organized deliberation and 
systematic reflection on technology and environmental issues - referred to as dialogue or 
discourse - for the most part are external to the actual decision-making process» oriented 
towards transparency and the inclusion of interested and affected social groups. They are not 
aimed at conveying legitimacy by a high degree of efficiency in problem-solving or 
ascertainment of the »right answer« to the problem but by providing a forum in which the 
problem can be tackled in a process of open discussion in which all points of view are heard.
As Eder (1985) has argued» the central political institutions of the modem 
constitutional state - the party system, separation of powers (legislative, executive, judicial) 
and negotiation-based systems - have a genuinely discursive character; it is their "letzter 
Legitimationsgrund" (Eder 1995c: 3). The stabilization of the "new political paradigm" (Offe 
1985: 825ff.) has brought about a situation in which the political institutions have a 
heightened need to demonstrate the orientation by this central regulative idea of 
»discursivity«5.
Not only the new social movements and the institutional political actors but also the 
social sciences have significantly contributed to the »positive career« of the concepts of 
dialogue and discourse. Some of the numerous studies on the mushrooming of dialogical- 
participative processes in the institutional and noninstitutional political arena present forceful 
arguments for a discursive politics6.
The chemical industry’s resort to dialogue-rhetorics in the rDNA debate is to be seen against
5 For this argument, see Keller & Hajer (1996) and Barthe & Dreyer (1995).
6 See, among many others, Habermas (1994) and Giddens (1997) for an argument for a 
delibcrative/dialogical democracy and Renn (1994) for an argument for the use of discursive procedures in the 
field of environmental and technology policy.
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this background of the societal career of the dialogue concept and its positive connotations 
as, so to speak, the translation of the philosophical discourse concept into everyday speech. 
These positive connotations are mutual recognition, social inclusiveness and consensus- 
orientation. The dialogue concept owes its special »aura« to these connotations. It is them and 
the present popularity of the dialogue concept upon which the chemical industry banks when 
it proclaims openness to and willingness to engage in public dialogue.
»Dialogue on the basis of a transparent industrial policy« has developed into the chemical
industry’s dominant public communication approach not only as regards the genetic
engineering issue but as regards technology and environmental issues in general. Actually, the
industrial sector commits itself to this approach at a worldwide level by the ’’Responsible
Care" program. Responsible Care, which commenced in Canada in 1984, is an "initiative
supported by the chemical industry worldwide to improve its performance in the areas o f
health, safety and environmental protection" (VCI 1992: 4). The major guiding principle o f
this program is that the industrial sector practices health, safety, and environmental protection
on its own initiative and responsibility and takes all necessary steps without being prompted
by legal and governmental requirements (Ibid.: 6). The continual dialogue with the staff
members, the customers, and the public presents an especially important element of the
industry’s flagship in its attempt to build public trust and prevent restrictive state regulation7.
In a VCI presentation of the German contribution to the Responsible Care program, it states:
"Verantwortliches Handeln" im Bereich Dialog heißt, zwischen den Unternehmen der 
chemischen Industrie und ihren Kunden, ihren Abnehmern sowie den Verbrauchern 
und dem gesellschaftlichen Umfeld ein Klima des Vertrauens und der Akzeptanz zu 
schaffen. Dazu gehört es, aufmerksam zuzuhören und aus Gesprächen zu lernen. 
Offenzusein für die Argumente anderer, auch die von Kritikern, und glaubwürdig 
eigene Argumente in die Diskussion einzubringen - das ist Dialog im Sinne der 
Initiative "Verantwortliches Handeln". (VCI, Leitfaden "Verantwortliches Handeln”: 
12)
The dialogue approach is also pursued to a certain extent by other industrial sectors. As
7 The Responsible Care program includes corporate commitment to a  set of guiding principles for industry 
and codes of practice and to various other initiatives in the field of environmental, risk, and stakeholder 
management. At present the individual countries’ programs are at different stages of development and have 
different emphases. The responsibility for the detailed implementation of Responsible Care in the individual 
countries is taken by the national chemical industry associations (CEFIC 1996).
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Dyllick has argued, public exposure of business presents a general challenge to the modem 
corporation and in order to meet this challenge the corporation has to develop a 
"gesellschaftliche Selbstbehauptungsfahigkeit" (Dyllick 1989: 477) including the capability 
for societal communication or dialogue; the capability for societal action or co-operation; and 
societal trustworthiness (Ibid.).
The need for a ’’capability for societal self-assertion" in other industrial sectors, 
however, is not nearly as great as in the chemical industry. This is due to the fact that the 
chemical industry is the priority target of the »quality of life« discourse. Since the 1970s, 
public awareness and concern about environmental and health risks associated with the 
sector’s operations have increased significantly, reinforced by a succession of high-profile 
incidents worldwide and by continual citizen protest and campaigning by the new social 
movements. Actually, environmental, safety and health issues seem to be the primary image 
on which at least the big chemical enterprises are judged. As a consequence, these economic 
organizations are faced with a special pressure of justification and legitimation.
It is certainly an especially interesting question whether industry’s present experimentation 
with »post-corporatist« negotiations will continue in the future and whether it will have 
positive effects on its relationship to its challengers and its public image. Due to the economic 
constraints that corporations face, corporate dialogue (NiedergesaB & Rettberg 1995), as such 
negotiations are typically referred to, is a difficult enterprise. The economic constraints make 
the corporations pursue the objective of the challengers’ tolerance of policies already decided 
on rather than compromise-oriented consensus-building on these policies (as the dialogue- 
rhetorics suggest). That means, however, that corporate dialogue always runs the risk of being 
unmasked as sham-dialogue and sham-co-operation (Thielemann 1994b) and turn out to be 
counterproductive.
Corporate dialogue takes place in a Spannungsfeld safeguarding corporate autonomy 
and safeguarding corporate legitimacy: A fundamental Ergebnisoffenheit would involve too 
high a loss of autonomy, an entirely lacking ErgebnisoffenheiU however, would entail too high 
a loss of legitimacy. The legitimacy imperative means that self-restriction in the pursuit of 
the actual organizational interests at least to a certain extent is necessary. In corporate 
dialogue, therefore, there is a relatively high probability that corporations compromise at least 
in minor affairs, as the Hoechst company has done in the context of negotiations in the
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"Gesprächskreis Hoechster Nachbarn" with respectto general corporate information and safety 
policy. These concessions surely have had a positive effect on its relationship with the local 
citizen groups and its public image.
The »corporation in dialogue« not only has to make sure not to jeopardize its social 
credibility. As the recently started co-operative project of the Hoechst company and the Öko- 
Institut Darmstadt has indicated, it also has to be careful about possible negative effects on 
the solidarity it enjoys in the industrial sector to which it belongs; as the example o f business 
collective political activity has demonstrated, despite all economic competition this solidarity 
is of vital importance to the individual company. The "heißeste Eisen des neuen Dialogs" 
(Lingenthal 1996: 8) between the multinational and the ecologically oriented research institute 
is not a process of negotiation but a contracted co-operation in the development of an 
ecological strategy for the company. Faithful to the maxim "Wertschöpfung durch 
Wertschätzung" (quoted in Ibid.) of its rhetorically inspired chief executive, the chemical 
company has asked the industry-critical research institute to examine two of the company’s 
product lines for their environmental compatibility: food additives and geo-textiles (Öko- 
Mitteilungen 3/96, p.17). This project has not only met with great astonishment in the 
chemical industry but also with sharp criticism (Lingenthal 1996: 8; Kraft 1996 in 
interview8). Similarly, the company that engages in post-corporatist negotiations can expect 
to be treated as a  traitor in one’s own ranks if it compromises on major matters or matters 
that are of importance to the industrial sector as a whole.
And, last but not least, the continuance and success o f corporate dialogue is dependent 
on its targets’ willingness to participate. In the case of protest groups and organizations, this 
willingness is by no means a matter of fact. They are »identity-organizations« the political 
power of which is largely based on a strategy of disassociation from industry and other 
exponents of an instrumental rationality; their image is based on attributions of 
»independence« (not to co-opt, not shrinking from confrontation...). Each attempt to put their 
credibility in negotiation-based processes in jeopardy affects the material basis of their 
existence. Therefore, in each individual case they need to carefully consider the benefits and 
risks of participation, and the result o f these considerations will reflect positive and negative 
experiences from prior negotiations. *
* Michael Kraft is official responsible for public & governmental affairs in the communications department 
of the Hoechst company.
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I shall leave a careful consideration of these aspects to future research and conclude 
this study with a forward glance as regards the specific case of business political activity that 
the study has analyzed. What will the political activity of the chemical industry in the rDNA 
debate in the foreseeable future look like?
The political and public climate in the course of the 1990s has clearly changed to the 
advantage of the economic actor. Not only the government coalition but also the Social 
Democrats today consider genetic engineering a core technology; parts of the Green Party 
have changed from a fundamentalist stance to a more pragmatic policy; technology protest 
concentrates on the technology’s use in agriculture and the food industry which thus far at 
least affects the sector only marginally. Generally, the prominence of economic issues has 
contributed to the public acceptance of genetic engineering. Today it is a widespread view 
that the full use of the economic potential of genetic engineering is indispensable to meet the 
challenge that processes of economic globalization present to the competitiveness of German 
industry. As the official responsible for pharmaceuticals in the communications department 
of the Bayer company, Sehnert, has put it, the rise of economy related concerns has rendered 
genetic engineering "gesellschaftsfähig” (Sehnert 1997 in interview).
Still, corporatist negotiation in the institutional political arena and self-presentation 
activities in the noninstitutional political arena will remain important in the future; this is at 
least the assessment of the industry representatives who I have interviewed in the winter of 
1996/1997 (no really clear statements were made on the future importance of post-corporatist 
negotiations). First, deregulation still is a political objective. As I have already explained, 
established European regulation does not allow further changes in national legislation; 
therefore, a great deal of industrial political activity in the official arena of politics will take 
place at the European level.
Moreover, the chemical industry to some extent is also affected by public concerns 
about and protest against non-industrial technology applications or technology activities that 
are canied out in other industrial sectors. It was important to see, the VCI public relations 
officer, Hilger, has stated in the interview, that for the population it made no difference 
whether »novel food« was an issue related to the chemical industry or the food industry, or 
whether a genetic engineering project was carried out in Germany or in the United States; the 
sector, anyway, would be "condemned to make a statement" (Hilger 1996 in interview). And 
last but not least, especially the big enterprises - which have attributed genetic engineering
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a key role in the growth field of the life-sciences - have come round to accepting that 
adherence to the policy of transparency and openness constitutes a public expectation and is 
thus a necessity in stabilizing the relaxed political environment
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a n n e x
Appendix I: On the Methodology
The data basis of the case study - the analysis of the political activity of the chemical industry 
in the German genetic engineering controversy - comprises, first, personal interviews, and 
second, actor documents and mass media texts.
The personal interviews, which amount to 27, have been conducted with representatives of 
the chemical industry, the genetic engineering research community, the politico-administrative 
system, and the new social movement sector.
The interviews with scientific experts first of all have served to provide information 
about the relationship between the scientific community and the chemical industry in the 
rDNA debate and general information about the nature and use of modem biotechnologies. 
The interviews with political/administrative and protest actors have served to provide 
information relevant to the analysis of the political environment in which the chemical 
industry in its efforts to commercialize genetic engineering in the time period of the mid 
1970s to the mid 1990s has found itself embedded. The interviews with the industrial actors 
have served to provide information on whether, and, if yes, how the political activity of the 
chemical industry has been organized in response to this context
The interviews have been conducted in two waves. The bulk of interviews was conducted in 
the first wave (November 1991 - February 1992). 21 representatives of the »key participants« 
of the technical controversy were questioned on the subject In the second wave (November 
1996 - February 1997) six further interviews were conducted exclusively with company and 
associational representatives in order to obtain information about the most recent 
developments concerning the political involvement of the industrial sector in the rDNA 
debate.
With the exception of three interviews, the interviews have been recorded. About half 
of them have been transcribed to facilitate and optimize their interpretation.
The biggest part of the interviews go to the political actor a t issue, organizations of the
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chemical industry (11 interviews), and new social movement groups and organizations 
engaged in protest activities (9 interviews). The focus on protest actors as another participant 
in the technical controversy is a result of the assumption that this collective actor presents the 
chemical industry’s main antagonist in this societal conflict and that thus the logic and 
dynamics of industrial political activity have significantly been shaped by this actor’s 
activities.
Most of the protest groups and organizations interviewed have identified specific 
issues of rDNA technology as important for their overall field of interest, and therefore, have 
taken up these issues in their programs. The persons interviewed here are those who have 
been entrusted with genetic engineering politics. In the case of the (small) organizations which 
have been expressly founded on the rDNA issue, there are no obvious responsibility criteria 
according to which the organizations might have based the choice of the interviewees. In the 
case of the industrial actors, the persons interviewed either work in public relations 
departments or public and governmental affairs departments in which they have been 
entrusted with genetic engineering politics or are active in research and have been 
»volunteered« to communicate genetic engineering to selected targets.
The interviews were conducted as open interviews on the basis of a questionnaire (Leitfaden). 
The questionnaire which was used to interview the industrial actors has broadly the same 
structure as the questionnaire for the protest actors. Some questions obviously had to be 
adapted to the specific organizational design of the groups/organizations. The questionnaire 
refers to the following aspects: *
* general information on the group/organization
* organizational resources provided for genetic engineering politics
* concrete activities (activities in the official political arena - at the national and 
European level - and in the public arena)
* goal determination of these activities (»ideologies«, pragmatic purposes, political 
situation definitions)
* targets of the activities
* evaluation of the efficiency of the activities (differences in efficiency, problems and 
prerequisites)
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* assessment of the future relevance of the activities
The industrial actors in addition were asked to report on the use of genetic engineering in the 
sector or respective company and the way in which corporate and associational politics are 
connected with each other.
In the context of the interviews actor documents were gathered (text and pictorial 
material) including publications, position papers and memoranda, advertisements, brochures,
leaflets, and posters.
Further data material that has been analyzed are mass media texts dealing with the topic of 
modem biotechnologies. Among the opinion making newspapers I have drawn upon the three 
big German newspapers {Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt) and 
the Frankfurter Rundschau, die tageszeitung, and the Handelsblatt. Moreover, I have 
employed the weekly magazines Die Zeit and Der Spiegel. Reporting on genetic engineering 
in these newspapers and magazines has not been analyzed in all its entirety. Instead, the data 
material is restricted to samples of articles that appeared in the course of the controversy. The 
bulk of the articles is from the time period of the late 1980s - when the rDNA debate reached 
its peak - and the first half of the 1990s.
The articles were analyzed in two respects. First, they were analyzed with respect to 
the representation of the chemical industry and its issue positions in the mass media which 
has been taken as one indicator of the sector’s efforts to employ the mass media for its 
political objectives. Second, the analysis served the purpose of obtaining information on the 
relevance of mass media reporting as a political challenge to the chemical industry as a 
technology utilizer; this information concerns the issue’s »career« as a mass media topic and 
changes in the specific (positive or negative) framing of the issue.
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H Appendix II: Confidence-Building Industry  Advertising
1
1
I
1
I
I
Verantwortung heißt für uns j 
in der Chemie:
Verantwortung heißt für uns 
in der Chemie:
Verantwortung auch ££=££££: 
für die umweitgerechte 
Nutzung des Rohstoffs Chlor. £ £ £ £ “£: 
Beispiel PVC.
Verantwortung heißt für uns 
in der Chemie:
Verantwortung auch für die 
Nutzung der Gentechnik. 
Beispiel neue Medikamente.
I iltmiv litt I tu lir ï
Source: IGL (1994: Appendix) 277
Wir wollen die großen 
Chancen der Gentechnik 
verantwortungsbewußt nutzen.
Die Chemie handelt.
Der Gentechnik 
kommt für die Wei­
terentwicklung der 
modernen Industrie- 
gesellschaft eine 
SchlüRselmlle zu.
Besonders in der 
Medizin -  aber auch
im Kampf gegen die globalen E m ährungs- 
probleme oder in der Umwelttcchnik -  eröffnet 
die Gentechnik völlig neue Möglichkeiten. Die 
Behandlung bisher unheilbarer Krankheiten  
rückt in greifbare Nähe. Kulturpflanzen können  
zur Verbesserung der W eitem äh rungslage er­
tragreicher und widerstandsfähiger gem acht 
werden. Gentechnisch veränderte Mikroorganis­
men lassen sich für die Bodensanierung ein- 
setzen.
Auch die deutsche chemische Industrie will 
deshalb die Gentechnik nutzen. Jedoch nicht um  
jeden Preis. Selbstverständlich muß dabei der 
Schutz von Mensch und Umwelt gewährleistet sein.
,  . - * ’ ' r ^  I
Die Gentechnik ist für neue Be-
handlungsfonmen von Aids, Krebs
und anderen bisher nicht heil-
#■
baren Krankheiten unverzichtbar. 
Auch bei d ieser neuen Technik 
legt die chem ische Industrie hohe 
Stcherfieitsm aßstäbe an.
Die Information 
der Öffentlichkeit 
ist für uns wichtig. 
Wir wollen zeigen, 
dnß wir alles tun, 
um bei geplanten  
gentechnischen Ver­
fahren Risiken aus- 
zuschließen. Und der Respekt vor Leben und 
Würde des M enschen setzt unserer Arbeit mit 
der Gentechnik Grenzen: Eingriffe in die 
menschliche Keimbahn lehnt die chemische 
Industrie ab!
Chemie im Dialog. Ihre Meinung ist uns wichtig:
Morttt** Sw arK n *  TWim  .Dm n .. ItantH. ZuJinnS* taltn?  Dann whmbm 
Sw an*. aérr rafr* Sw una an. Zm  NdHarif 101 W  M 00.
PIZ Ort
Vrftwwl Orr Owmiwtwn InduMnr a V. Kartarad* 21, (WO Frankfurt/Mam 1.
Die Deutsche Chemische Industrie.
278 Source: IGL (1991a: 7)
Chemie im Dialog:
Chancen der Gentechnik
Die Deutsche Chemische Industrie.
Source: IGL (1993: 6)
NV»
Í *
-
1
*
ialog? 
a, bitte
Initiative Energievemunft
Die Energiewirtschaft muß, trotz kontroverser 
Argumente, immer wieder einen Konsens fin­
den. der dem Industnestandort Deutschland, 
der Lebensqualität seiner Bürger und dem 
Schutz unserer Umwelt dient. Dieser 
Herausforderung steilen wir uns ebenso wie 
dum offenen Gespräch darüber.
Fordern Sie mit dem Coupon weitere Inr'or* 
manonen an. und werden Sie mit uns aktiv tur 
die Ziele der Initiative Energievemunrt,
Dire Stromversorger
I U. icn will ruf h iw fw cm unn werden. S c m c ^
Sir rrur M w tenin* J «  »’‘-o t i t i*  
Enwcr«.ir .A«vr. Hirkunc-cfJÜ ruf 
E rto lo  vmunrt" und meinen Mil*
nucitncker
Ein rach erntenden an:
\ZZ  - ln 11 •- Service Ern-rciet em  u r  ft. 
Vrt. W e iru r  O je r
m.ii S tu n  wort „ E n e m o  em um !"
an .»** üVvwivi »r-i nrte 
. e m v u n  Sie Ihrun At**era*r fuchi.
S
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Source: Der Spiegel (26/1996)
I G l - M i t s l i e d e r v e r s a m m l u n s  1 9 9 4
Dialog-Anzeigen zum bundesweiten Tag der offenen Tür
W i r  l a d e n  S i e  e i n :
T a g  d e r  o f f e n e n  T ü r  ^
S a m s t a g ,  2 5 .  S e p t e m b e r  | - ^ -
i n  m e h r  a ls  1 5 0  W e r k e n
und  U n ive rs itä ten  ~
25. September. 
Tag der offenen Tür. 
Die Chemie lädt ein.
U*m« U* lb»« MèHt M ém — *m 
(ImM Ihnt b««w. »tn«M (<« J« »Me*« tm '** Vu 11* « t  mm f iu f c  4m  tl. tof i *■ iw d im
I «W rHin»« / » •  I«f >4I««4 («v 
Im  mitrv* s« v  t-MH« «mm im«« m  i» i v  s*«irft t 
t h w «  w  Hl* w c*« Iftar» ,4«  «»’
he*.h:Urn «•* «•*! W» bin» «V *rf Mm« »«—tfc.
3 0 0 0 0 0 m a l
D anke.
Source: IGL (1994: Appendix)
Die Deutsche Chemische Industrie
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IGl-Mitgliederversammlung 1994
Dialog-Anzeigen Meinungs-Offensive Gentechnik
Appendix III: Identity-Building Industry Advertising
Source: IGL (1994: Appendix)
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M orgen ohne Krebs.
Ja  ohne Aids.
G EN  S UISSE.
*■ ——^
Mais ohne M itesser.
GEN SU ISSE .
Source: Müller (1992: 16-18)
284
l
Appendix IV: Symbolic Protest by New Social Movement Actors
W i
I
Source: Der Spiegel (15/1997, p.211)
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S_ource: Der Spiegel (46/1996, p.96)
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